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A HISTORY
OF
THE PAPACY
FROM
THE GREAT SCHISM TO THE SACK OF ROME

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THE ITALIAN PRINCES.

1464—1518.

CHAPTER X.

ALEXANDER VI. AND CESARE BORGIA.

1500—1502.

THE plan which Alexander VI. had most deeply at heart was the centralisation of the States of the Church. It was no new scheme, but had forced itself on the attention of his predecessors. The States of the Church during the Middle Ages had shared the same fate as the lands of the rest of Europe; they had been granted out to vassals, who had tended to become independent rulers, and during the Avignonese Captivity, Cardinal Albornoz had seen no better way of maintaining the papal authority than by recognising the position won by these vassal lords. The abasement of the Papacy, the Great Schism, and the Reforming Councils had still further strengthened the Pope's vassals; and the restored Papacy enjoyed only a nominal sovereignty over the greater part of its dominions, as the power of the Malatesta hampered Pius II. and Paul II. When Sixtus IV. found no other object for the Papacy to pursue, he turned to the extension of the temporal power. But the entire result of his passionate endeavours was to form Imola and Forlì into a principality for his nephew Girolamo. The feeble pontificate of Innocent VIII. let slip all that the Papacy had gained; and Alexander VI., in a time when the air was full of political changes, had to consider what object he had best pursue.

The French invasion had startled Italy, but had not kindled any spirit of national patriotism. The Italian

League had fallen to pieces, and each state pursued its separate interests as keenly as before. The Papacy had to choose whether it would strive to centralise its power or would submit to see its vassals fall before their more powerful neighbours. The fertile district of the Romagna was a network of small principalities, on which Venice, Milan, and Florence all cast a hungry eye. So long as the balance of Italian politics was maintained, they were secure; but if, by any chance, Venice, Milan, and Florence were agreed upon a partition, the Papacy would be helpless to prevent it. Alexander VI. was resolved to obviate this danger, to rid the Papacy of its troublesome vassals, and reduce the Romagna to one principality directly under the Church.

It was hopeless for a Pope to undertake this task himself, if, indeed, Alexander VI. had wished to do so. We need not analyse his motives, or determine how much was due to policy, how much to a desire to aggrandise his family. Nepotism has a deservedly hateful name; but by no other means could a Pope accomplish his object. The Romagna must be won by one who had his heart in the work, and by one whom the Pope could entirely trust. Pius II. had not done much with Antonio Piccolomini; Sixtus IV. had only raised Girolamo Riario to a small position; the Cibò family had been altogether without resources. Alexander VI. felt that he and Cesare were made of other stuff, and that the times were in his favour. There was nothing exceptional in his undertaking; he only pursued his end more entirely, more resolutely, and more successfully than his predecessors. The end and the means alike had become a recognised part of the papal policy; only when, in the hands of Alexander VI. and Cesare Borgia, they seemed likely to be accomplished, did they awaken universal terror. Italy quailed at the prospect of a powerful state in the centre, which was backed by the far-reaching influence of the Papacy, and could thereby command foreign allies at any emergency. Churchmen were terrified at the danger of the Papacy being made dependent on a powerful

Plans of
Alexander
VI. for
their con-
solidation.

Duke of the Romagna. The fruitful and sturdy stock of the Borgia swarmed in Rome, and the Papacy might become hereditary in the Borgian family. Few were far-sighted enough to see at first the full meaning of Alexander VI.'s policy; but all were made uneasy, and every step in the development of that policy revealed its bearing more clearly and produced deeper-seated alarm and hatred.

So soon as the French success in Milan was rendered probable, Alexander VI. proceeded to pave the way for his plans. He sent Cardinal Borgia as his legate to Florence and Venice, to see if they would consent to an attack on the duchy of Ferrara. Both gave guarded answers in the negative.¹ The Pope saw that he had nothing to expect from the Italian powers, and proceeded to act more cautiously with the aid of France. After the fall of Ludovico Sforza, neither Florence nor Venice could object to the expulsion of his relatives from their possessions in the Romagna, where Cesena was the sole town which remained in the hands of the Church. Taking that as a centre, Cesare might extend his dominion over Imola, Forlì, and Pesaro. The better to disarm opposition he accepted the title of Vicegerent of the French king, and was supplied with French troops for his enterprise.

Little was as yet known of the character or capacity of Cesare Borgia. As a Cardinal he had led a tolerably profligate life; but that was no rare occurrence amongst the members of the Sacred College.² His journey to France showed a pretentiousness which was somewhat

¹ Sanuto, ii., 1344-45, gives an account of the proposals of Cardinal Borgia to the Venetians on September 15, and the deliberations in the Council.

² A doctor, Gaspare Torella, dedicated to Cesare Borgia in 1497 a medical work, 'Tractatus contra Pudendagra'; in the dedication he claims Cesare as a benefactor of the human race, because the study of his case had brought to light a new cure for the 'morbus gallicus'. The dedication of this rare book is given by Alvisi, *Cesare Borgia*, Appendix No. 7. In this malady Cesare was not singular. Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, Giuliano della Rovere, and the Cardinals of Monreale and Segovia are all mentioned by contemporaries as sufferers. See Thuasne's note in *Burchardi Diarium*, ii., 521.

wanting in taste ; but Cardinal Rovere wrote to the Pope in January that his 'modesty, prudence, dexterity, and excellence both of mind and body, had won the affections of all'.¹ In Milan, so good an observer as Bernardo Castiglione, the author of 'Il Cortegiano,' described him as a gallant youth. It was yet to be seen what capacities he had for the political task which lay before him.

The first cities singled out for attack were Imola and Forlì, which were held by Caterina Sforza, widow of Girolamo Riario, as regent for her young son. So entirely was Cardinal Rovere on the side of the Pope, that he became bond for Cesare to the city of Milan for a loan of 45,000 ducats ; and this was to help Cesare to overthrow the son of his own cousin, for whom his uncle Sixtus IV. had made such sacrifices. In addition to his Italian troops, Cesare had 300 French lances and 4000 Gascons and Swiss. Imola at once opened its gates, and the town of Forlì surrendered ; but Caterina Sforza bravely held out in the fortress till it was no longer tenable, and was stormed on January 12, 1500. Caterina Sforza was made prisoner, but was treated with leniency. She was sent to Rome, where she was lodged at first in the Belvedere of the Vatican. She refused to resign her claims to the lands of which she had been dispossessed, and attempted to escape. This led to her more rigorous confinement ; but after eighteen months' imprisonment she was set at liberty, and ended her days in a monastery in Florence. She had married as her second husband Giovanni de' Medici, of the younger branch of that family, but became in 1498 a second time a widow. By her second husband she left a son, Giovanni de' Medici, known as Giovanni delle Bande Nere, who was famous in later Florentine history.²

Cesare
Borgia
captures
Imola and
Forlì.
January,
1500.

¹ Letter of January 18, 1499, quoted by Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom*, vii., 425.

² There is a life of Caterina Sforza by Burriel, Bologna, 1395. She is a famous instance of the *virago* who was a product of the emancipation of ideas produced by the New Learning.

Cesare's joy at the capture of Forlì was dashed by the news of the death of his cousin, Cardinal Borgia, on January 16. He was on his way to Rome and had reached Urbino, when he was attacked by a fever. His fever seemed to be mending, but when he heard the news of the fall of Forlì he mounted his horse to go and congratulate Cesare in person. He reached Fossombrone, where he had a serious relapse of his fever and died. Suspicions were so rife that there were rumours of foul play, and in later times it was said that Cesare had him poisoned because he feared his influence with the Pope. This also is one of the groundless rumours which were spread against the Borgia.¹

After his success at Forlì Cesare prepared to set out against Pesaro; but his plans were overthrown by a sudden change in the affairs of Milan. As usual the French could conquer but could not govern, and their arrogance disgusted their new subjects, who found that they had exchanged one tyranny for another that was less tolerable. Ludovico Sforza hired a body of Swiss mercenaries and advanced into his old dominions, where his arrival was greeted with joy by the fickle people. His duchy had been quickly lost and was as quickly won; in February he and Ascanio again entered Milan in triumph.

Return of
Ludovico
Sforza to
Milan.
February,
1500.

At the news of the advance of Ludovico the French troops were withdrawn from Cesare's army, and he was left with only a small force. He vainly asked for help from the Venetians, who were not sorry to see the Pope's ambitious schemes so rapidly checked. Cesare was driven to abandon all hopes of further conquest

Return of
Cesare
Borgia to
Rome.
February
26, 1500.

¹ Burchard's account is quite circumstantial about the progress of the disease, which at the beginning was 'medicis suspecta,' iii., 11. Sanuto, iii., 86, says: 'Chi diceva da Stracho, e chi esser stà intosegato: tamen mori da ferza'. A letter of his cousin, Giovanni Borgia, Cardinal of Capua and Bishop of Corea, to Ferdinand, is in the British Museum; it is dated Rome, January 18, 1500: 'Una cosa si es attranessada que vimiendo de prissa el legado Garal de Borja de Forli para aça a Roma a fu ste ya malo de romadizo y calentura por causa dellas grandes nieuvos y frios que enol cammino houo allogando en urbino se lo agravio el malo con muchos açcidentes por forma que murio a xiii. del presente, de cuya morte a muchos vienedanno'.

for the present, and on February 26 he returned to Rome, where the Pope ordered all the Cardinals to greet him with a triumphal entry. Clad in black velvet with a gold chain round his neck, and attended by 200 squires leading horses caparisoned in black velvet, amidst the blare of trumpets he rode to the Vatican, where the Pope received him with joy. Cesare addressed his father in Spanish and was answered in the same tongue, which perplexed the bystanders and made them feel that aliens were in the midst of Italy. The Pope was so overcome with joy that he laughed and cried at once.¹ He loaded Cesare with honours, solemnly instituted him Gonfaloniere of the Church, and conferred on him the golden rose. The festivities of the Carnival were made splendid by a representation of the triumph of Julius Cæsar in the Piazza Navona. Cesare was set side by side with the mighty founder of the Roman Empire.

The year 1500 was a year of jubilee. Alexander VI. in
Jubilee of
1500. due state had struck with a silver mallet the Golden Gate of S. Peter's, which was only opened at those times. Its exact position could not be found with certainty, and a new gate was made by Alexander VI.'s orders, with sculptured lintels, so that its place might be visible even when walled up. Alexander VI., with stately appearance and dignified bearing, delighted in ceremonies. Few Popes were more ready for public appearances, or more scrupulously performed the external duties of their office. Pilgrims from every land flocked to Rome, that they might earn the indulgences granted to those who visited the tombs of the Apostles. The disturbed state of Northern Italy and the insecurity of the roads deterred many; but the crowds who came testified to the deep hold which religion still had on Christendom, and to the veneration which still existed for the Holy See. On Holy Thursday it was computed that 100,000 were assembled for the public benediction.² 'I

¹ Sanuto, iii., 145: 'Lacrymavit et risit a un trato'. The other details are given by Burchard, iii., 21.

² Burchard, iii., 36.

rejoice,' wrote Peter Delphinus, General of the Camaldolensians, 'that the Christian religion does not lack the testimony of pious minds, especially in these times of failing faith and depravity of morals. "I have left," saith the Lord, "7000 men who have not bowed the knee to Baal."¹ Yet the pious minds that went to Rome can hardly have been much edified, apart from their religious observances, by the stories they heard or the sights they saw. The Romans, no doubt, told them many scandalous tales about the Pope and his family. Those who saw the triumphal entry of Cesare Borgia would be reminded of the temporal ambition rather than of the spiritual zeal of the Papacy. Rome itself would not strike them as a well-ordered or as a moral city. Brawls were common in the streets, and crimes of blood were frequent. One day in May eighteen corpses swung upon a gallows on the Bridge of S. Angelo. Thirteen of them were members of a robber band which had stripped the French envoy at Viterbo on his way to Rome. But a notable criminal was a doctor of the hospital of S. Giovanni in Laterano, who used in the early morning to shoot with arrows those who passed along the empty streets, and then rob their dead bodies. He further had an understanding with the confessor of the hospital, who told him which of the sick were wealthy; he poisoned them and shared their spoils with his confederate.² Sights too of secular splendour were displayed to the pilgrims' eyes. One day there was a duel on Monte Testaccio between a Burgundian and a Frenchman; the Princess of Squillace backed one of the combatants and Cesare Borgia backed the other. Another day the Piazza of S. Peter's was enclosed with barriers; six bulls were let loose into the ring, and Cesare Borgia gave the Romans an exhibition of Spanish fashions. Mounted on horseback he slew five with his lance, and cleft off the head of the sixth with one stroke of his sword.³

¹ Petri Delphini, *Epistolæ*, vi., No. 26.

² Burchard, vii., 45.

³ Burchard, iii., 64, and Capello's *Relazione*, in Sanuto, iii., 812.

The figure of Cesare Borgia now dominated Rome. He was tall, handsome, well-made, full of energy and vigour. The Borgia nature pulsed with the joy of living. Cesare delighted in enjoying himself and was ready to contribute to the enjoyment of others. Himself magnificent, he was liberal in his gifts, and the Pope vainly strove to check his extravagance. Fortune again smiled upon his plans. No sooner was Ludovico Sforza in possession of Milan than he again lost it, and this time for ever. The French troops advanced against Milan, and on April 10 Ludovico's Swiss mercenaries betrayed him into the hands of his enemies. His brother Ascanio was taken prisoner by the Venetians. Alexander VI. demanded that he should be given up to him; but the Venetians preferred to hand him over to the French king. Ludovico was imprisoned in the Castle of Loches in Berry; Ascanio at Bourges. The Pope made some show of interceding on behalf of a Cardinal; but he allowed the man who made him Pope to linger in a French prison. The fate of the Sforza brothers awakens little sympathy. Crafty, unscrupulous, unprincipled, they plunged light-heartedly into intrigues which they mistook for statesmanship. Their combinations were short-sighted; their self-confidence was overweening; their selfishness was utter. They led Italy to destruction, and were the first victims of the storm which themselves had raised.

Alexander VI. rejoiced over the entire downfall of the Sforza house, which opened out the career of Cesare; but Cesare was reminded that he must make haste to secure himself, as his prospects hung upon a thread. Alexander VI.'s life was uncertain. His physical constitution, though robust, was exceptional, and his life was often in peril, as he was liable to fainting fits which might at any time lead to a serious accident. In April he had a severe attack of fever which threatened his life.¹

The French recover Milan. April, 1500.

Escape of Alexander VI. from an accident. June 27.

¹ We know this from a most savage satire preserved by Sanuto, iii., 277: 'Dialogus Mortis et Pontificis febre laborantis'. The Pope beseeches Death to let him die in the arms of one of his concubines.

On June 27 he had a miraculous escape from destruction. A violent thunderstorm burst over Rome, and the wind blew down a chimney in the Vatican, which fell through the roof, wrecked the room below, and burst through the floor, sweeping amid the ruins three attendants who were killed. The mass of masonry fell into the chamber where the Pope was sitting and overwhelmed his chair. The Cardinal of Capua and a secretary who were present saved themselves by springing into the aperture of the window. When they saw the Pope's chair covered by the ruins they cried out, 'The Pope is dead'. The news spread through Rome and men took up arms expecting a riot. But when the ruin was examined the Pope was found alive. The beam immediately above his head had been clamped with iron outside the wall of the room, so that, though broken in two, it had not fallen, but had bent over the head of the Pope so as to make a screen. He escaped with a few trifling wounds on his head and arms.¹

The cloud of marvel and mystery was never long lifted from the Borgia family. Scarcely had Rome done talking about the Pope's escape before another and more terrible occurrence was noised abroad. On the evening of July 15, the Duke of Biseglia, the husband of Lucrezia Borgia, was attacked by assassins on the steps of S. Peter's as he was on his way from the Vatican. The assassins fled to a troop of horsemen, who were awaiting them, and rode off through the Porta Portese. The wounded man was carried into the house of the nearest Cardinal. At first he refused medical aid and seems to have shown great suspicion of those around him. He sent word to the King of Naples that his life was not safe in Rome, and the king despatched his own physician to attend him.²

Attempted
assassination of the
Duke of
Biseglia.
July 15,
1500.

¹ Burchard, iii., 65. The Pope's own account is given in a letter to his ambassador at Venice, in Sanuto, iii., 477.

² Letter from Naples, July 19, Sanuto, iii., 553: 'Il re Federico à inteso il caso dil ducha Don Alfonso: li à mandà un medico a Roma; et già li mandò il suo majordomo esso ducha, a dir a soa majestà stava a Roma con gran pericolo'.

Men said in Rome that this deed was wrought by the same hand as had slain the Duke of Gandia; no doubt they meant that it was the doing of Cesare Borgia. The position of the Duke of Biseglia in the Vatican had long been unpleasant. The Pope was allied with the enemy of Naples; Milan had fallen, and the turn of Naples was to come next. Alfonso dwelt amidst the active foes of his country and his father's house; he wandered disconsolate and helpless amidst aliens. The vigour, the brilliancy, the resolute daring of Cesare must have been hateful to him, and Cesare doubtless showed him scanty consideration. Moreover, there was another cause of ill-feeling between the two men. Alexander VI. had dispossessed the Gaetani of their lands, and sold Sermoneta by a fictitious sale to his daughter Lucrezia.¹ Sermoneta was a fief of Naples, and this was the easiest way of getting it into the hands of the Borgia; but Cesare is said to have grudged Lucrezia this possession on the ground that a woman was not strong enough to hold it.² As the irritation increased, Cesare suspected that Alfonso was intriguing with the Colonna, who were allied with Naples, while Alfonso found another cause for anger in the divorce which Alexander VI. pronounced, on April 5, between the King of Hungary and his wife Beatrice, daughter of Ferrante II. of Naples. Every one said that the divorce was due to French influence, and Alfonso bitterly complained to the Neapolitan envoy. The suspicion of an understanding between Alfonso and the Colonna was enough to arouse the wrath of the Orsini; and possibly the attempted assassination was the work of the Orsini, but probably Cesare was privy to it. At all events he was afraid of some outbreak of violence, as he issued an order prohibiting any one to wear arms between S. Peter's and the Bridge of S. Angelo.

Alfonso's wounds slowly healed, but he did not conceal his suspicions of Cesare, nor did Cesare show him any

¹ Burchard, iii., 15, February 12, 1500.

² Letter of the Florentine envoy, in Thuasne's Burchard, iii., 32.

friendliness.¹ The state of things is sufficiently explained by the Florentine envoy, who wrote, 'There are in the Vatican so many causes of grudges, both old and new, so much envy and jealousy, both on public and private grounds, that scandals will necessarily arise'.² Alfonso vowed revenge, and Cesare sullenly dared him. Their undisguised hostility awakened the alarm of Lucrezia and the Princess of Squillace, who vainly tried to mediate; but Alfonso accused Cesare of attempting his murder, and Cesare accused Alfonso of secretly plotting against him. Alexander IV. set a guard of sixteen trusty attendants round Alfonso's chamber to try and keep the peace. Pacific counsels were, however, unavailing. One day Alfonso, seeing from his window Cesare walking in the garden, seized a bow and shot at him. Cesare's wrath blazed up in a moment: he ordered his men to cut the duke in pieces. His orders were promptly obeyed, and the luckless Alfonso was murdered in his room.³

Assassination of the Duke of Biseglia, August 18, 1500.

Alexander VI. was helpless before his imperious son. He listened to his excuses and tried to make the best of them. Some of Alfonso's servants were imprisoned and tortured to extract confessions of their master's guilt, but it does not seem that much was discovered which would bear stating. Alexander VI. told the Venetian ambassador at his court that the Duke of Biseglia had tried to murder Cesare, and had paid the penalty for his rashness. He promised to send a detailed account of the results of the process which he was instituting; but no report was ever sent, and the Pope considered it best to hush the matter up. Alfonso was privately buried in S. Peter's, and nothing more was said about his death.

Alexander VI. hushes up the matter.

This terrible deed was a testimony to Cesare's resolute and unscrupulous character. Rome felt that it had a master

¹ Capello, *Relazione*, Sanuto, iii., 846.

² Letter of Capello on July 16, in Thuasne's Burchard, iii., 437.

³ See Appendix I for my reasons for adopting this account.

who would spare no one who crossed his path. Men's imagination was stirred and their fears were awakened. The numerous assassinations, which were of common occurrence in the streets of Rome, were put down to Cesare's mysterious designs. The Pope himself entertained for his son a mixture of affection, respect and fear. The Venetian ambassador, who looked calmly on, judged that Cesare had the requisite qualities for success in Italian political life; 'This duke,' he said, 'if he lives, will be one of the first captains of Italy'.¹

Alexander VI. did not long distress himself about the Duke of Biseglia's death, which he regarded as an unfortunate but trivial accident. 'This Pope,' says the Venetian envoy, 'is seventy years old, and grows younger every day. Cares never weigh on him more than a night; he loves life; he has a joyous nature, and does what may turn out useful to himself.'² Alexander VI. had the buoyant temperament of one fitted for practical life; he rose above troubles; he faced things as they were; he knew his own mind and used the means that offered themselves for the accomplishment of his purposes; he was free from scruples and rapidly forgot the past. The tearful face of Lucrezia, who was genuinely attached to her late husband, annoyed him. On August 31 he sent her to Nepi that she might overcome her grief and recover her spirits. He did not like to have around him any one who was not as joyous as himself.

During all these occurrences in his own family Alexander VI. had been pursuing his plans for the conquest of the Romagna. It required much negotiation to overcome the opposition of Venice to his proposal of the conquest of Rimini and Faenza; and Venice only gave way before long pressure, because it needed the Pope's help for a crusade against the Turks, who had alarmed the Republic by the capture of Modon. Not till September 16

Plans for
the con-
quest of the
Romagna.

¹ Capello, *Relazione*, in Sanuto, iii., 846.

² *Ibid.*

did Venice at last send the Pope an answer that, although it considered the time inopportune for an attack on Faenza and Rimini, it would offer no opposition. Alexander VI. was overjoyed at this news, and declared that he reckoned the friendship of Venice above that of France or Spain.¹

Alexander VI. had already declared the vicars in the Romagna deposed from their offices, on the ground that they had not paid to the Holy See the dues which they owed; in the beginning of August he further declared the vicars of Pesaro, Rimini, and Faenza to be excommunicated. Preparations for an armament were made at Rome; and amongst them was a creation of twelve Cardinals, which was made on September 28. The creation was avowedly made in the interest of Cesare Borgia, who openly visited the old Cardinals and asked them to agree to the new nominations that he might be supplied with money for his enterprise against the Romagna.² Of the new Cardinals, two were of the fruitful stock of the Borgia, and four others were Spaniards. Besides them were Cesare's brother-in-law, d'Albret, a Venetian, Marco Correr, and the Pope's secretary and chief minister, Gian Battista Ferrari. Immediately after their creation the new Cardinals were entertained by Cesare at a banquet, where they assured him of their fidelity and proceeded to settle their accounts; Cesare obtained from their gratitude the respectable sum of 120,000 ducats.³ To fulfil his undertaking with Venice, Alexander VI. issued Bulls for a crusade, and appointed legates to kindle the zeal of the princes of Christendom. He even said that he would go on the crusade in person if the King of France would go also,⁴ an offer which might be made without much

Creation of Cardinals. September 28, 1500.

¹ Sanuto, iii., 759-820.

² *Ibid.*, 855: 'Il ducha di Valentines à cavalchè da li reverendissimi cardinali, pregando siano contenti di far novi cardinali, acciò lui habbi danari per l'impresa di Romagna'.

³ *Ibid.*, 878: 'Li Cardinali novi, da poi fati, andono dal ducha, offerendossi, e disnò li, e saldono li conti, e li jurono fedeltà'. Burchard, iii., 77, specifies the sums paid by each.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 909.

prospect of the fulfilment of its condition. As a further sign of the good will of Venice Cesare Borgia was on October 18 enrolled as a member of the Venetian nobility. The proud Venetians can scarcely have believed Cesare to be steeped in every crime, or they would not have conferred on him this special distinction. The Florentines were amazed at their condescension. 'The time will come,' said they, 'when the Venetians will confess the truth of the proverb, *Whatever the monk gets he gets for the monastery.*'¹

Emboldened by this mark of favour from Venice, the Duke of Valentinois left Rome in October with an army of 10,000 men, French, Spaniards, and Italians. With him were Paolo Orsini, Gian Paolo Baglioni of Perugia, and Vitellozzo Vitelli, all famous captains. Pandolfo Malatesta at Rimini, and Giovanni Sforza at Pesaro, judged resistance to be hopeless; they abandoned their possessions, and their subjects hailed Cesare's entrance with joy. Faenza offered a more determined resistance, in which it was supported by Florence and Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna, both of whom trembled for their own safety. It did not capitulate till April 20, 1501. Its young lord, Astorre Manfredi, was by the terms of the capitulation free to go where he chose; but he stayed or was detained in Cesare's camp, whence he was taken to Rome. There he was confined in the Castle of S. Angelo, and was found drowned in the Tiber with a stone round his neck, on June 9, 1502.²

¹Thuasne's Burchard, iii., 440: 'con demonstratione di stimarlo assai,' he says. Sanuto, iii., 929, gives the votes: '15 non sincere, 35 di no, 821 di sì'. This was a very substantial majority in favour of Cesare, and was given three weeks after men had listened to the *Relazione* of Paolo Capello. Moreover this distinction was not given at the Pope's request, for he asked the Venetian envoy: 'Quello è esser zentilomo di Venecia? Li rispose: Gran dignità, re Federico, ducha di Ferrara e altri: e vi piacque assai.' *Ibid.*, 1008.

²Burchard, iii., 208; Giustinian, *Dispacci*, i., 18. Two other youths bound together, a woman, 'et alii multi,' were found at the same time. This murder is mysterious. Of course it is put down to Cesare Borgia; but why should he dispose of the body by throwing it into the Tiber, and so expose the crime to all men's eyes?

When Cesare was master of Faenza he suddenly demanded the surrender of Castel Bolognese, which was in the territory of Bologna, and lay between Imola and Faenza; its possession was necessary to round off the dominions which Cesare had acquired. Giovanni Bentivoglio was unprepared for war, and ceded Castel Bolognese on condition that the Pope should confirm the ancient privileges of Bologna.¹

Cesare was now lord of a large territory, and Alexander VI. conferred upon him indefinite rights by giving him the title of Duke of the Romagna.² He prepared the way for future exploits by excommunicating Giulio Cesare Varano, lord of Camerino, as another rebellious vicar of the Holy See. But the Orsini, who were with Cesare, urged him to a more important enterprise, an attack upon Florence and the restoration of Piero de' Medici. Cesare asked leave to march to Rome through the Florentine territory. Florence was in a condition of great exhaustion through its long war with Pisa; its magistrates were timorous and were afraid to refuse. Cesare raised his demands, and the Florentines at last consented to buy him off by taking him into their service for three years with a salary of 36,000 florins.³ Cesare was glad to make such terms, because the French king showed that he would not allow an enterprise against Florence, and Alexander VI., alarmed at Cesare's audacity, recalled him to Rome. He marched his disorderly army through the Florentine territory to Piombino, which he failed to carry by assault. Leaving some troops to carry on the siege, he hastened along the Maremma to Rome, where he was welcomed by the Pope on

Cesare returns to Rome. June 17, 1501.

¹ The capitulation is given by Alvisi, *Cesare Borgia*, Appendix No. xxxii.

² He is so styled first in a diploma of May 1, 1501, in Alvisi, *Cesare Borgia*, Appendix No. xxxiii. The Florentine envoy, Pipi, mentions it in a letter of May 17: 'La Santità del Papa ha mandato al Duca Valentinense il titolo di Duca di Romagna con la berretta et spada' (Thuasne, iii., 131).

³ The agreement is given by Canestrini in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 1^{ma} serie, vol. xv., 269.

June 17, 'as though he had conquered the lands of the infidels and not of devoted subjects of the Holy See'.¹

Cesare found Rome the scene of new intrigues which were of the most momentous importance for the future of Italy. Louis XII., after the success of his plans in Milan, resolved to pursue the conquest of Naples. But the French advance in Italy naturally provoked the jealousy of Spain. Louis XII. was not strong enough to carry out his plan if Spain offered resolute opposition; Spain was not inclined to wage a war in behalf of a king on whose dominions Ferdinand of Aragon already cast a longing eye. Matters were arranged between the two powers, and a secret treaty was entered into at Granada on November 11, 1500, in which they agreed to divide the Neapolitan dominions. Their ostensible motive for this act of robbery was the alliance which the terrified Federigo of Naples had unluckily made with the Turks. The Kings of France and Aragon, to preserve the peace of Christendom against the aggressions of the Turks, generously resolved to merge their conflicting claims on Naples and divide it between them; France was to have the northern provinces; Spain would be content with Apulia and Calabria.² This infamous treaty was the first open assertion in European politics of the principles of dynastic aggrandisement. It was the first of a series of partition treaties by which peoples were handed over from one government to another as appendages to family estates.

The preparations for the French expedition against Naples were openly made; but Federigo hoped, with the help of the Colonna, to offer determined resistance on the Neapolitan frontier. He trusted that Spain would interpose on his behalf; and Gonsalvo de Cordova, who had been assisting the Venetians in a campaign against the Turks, brought the Spanish fleet to anchor

Partition
of Naples.
Novem-
ber, 1500.

Ratified
by Alex-
ander VI.
June 25,
1501.

¹ Nardi, *Storia di Firenze*, book iv., ch. xxi.

² The treaty is given in Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, iii., 445.

off Sicily. In June the French army under D'Aubigny reached the neighbourhood of Rome. Then Alexander VI. was called upon to ratify the treaty which had hitherto been kept a profound secret. On June 25 he issued a Bull deposing Federigo as a traitor to Christendom by alliance with the Turks, approving of the partition of Naples between the Kings of France and Aragon, and investing them with the lands which they proposed to take.¹ The act of spoliation received the sanction of the head of the Church because, with a friendly power in Naples, he saw his way to reduce the Roman barons to subjection. There was, of course, a fair-sounding pretext; France and Spain, after reducing the treacherous King of Naples, were to combine against the Turks. Meanwhile the money raised for a crusade was to be spent in the conquest of Naples; there was always some trifling preliminary business to be done before Christendom could unite to expel the Infidel.

Federigo found himself abandoned and betrayed on all sides. Cesare Borgia joined the French troops; Gonsalvo de Cordova advanced into Calabria. Capture of Naples, August, 1501. Capua, which offered resistance, was stormed by the French and sacked with horrible barbarity, and Federigo, wishing to spare his people from further massacres, withdrew to Ischia on August 2, and surrendered to the French. Louis XII. conferred on him the duchy of Anjou and a yearly pension. He died in 1504, and unlike most fallen kings, was cheered to the last by friends who were faithful to him in his adversity, amongst them the poet Sannazaro. Federigo was a kindly man of gentle disposition, who in favourable times might have pacified and reorganised the Neapolitan kingdom; but the turbulent days in which his lot was cast left no place for gentleness or good intentions. The Nemesis which pursued his house struck down as its

¹ The Bull is in Raynaldus. *Annales Ecclesiastici*, 1501, § 53, etc. Burchard, iii., 146, gives an account of the preparations made by the papal commissioners for the French troops: 'Et ordinatæ vc meretrices quæ necessitati illorum providerent'.

victim the most guileless of the race. The house of Aragon had come as strangers to Naples, but rapidly became more Italian than the Italians themselves. Alfonso I. rivalled Cosimo de' Medici as a patron of art and letters; Ferrante developed the crafty statesmanship which was Italy's ruin; Alfonso II. displayed the refined savagery which was the sign of Italy's moral decadence; now the gentle Federigo saw Naples sink into bondage to alien domination.

The downfall of Naples brought with it the reduction of the Colonna faction, which could not venture to stand against a Pope supported by France, and helped by their hereditary foes, the Orsini. The Colonna thought it wise to prepare for what was inevitable, and tried to make terms by committing their castles to the custody of the College of Cardinals. This Alexander VI. would not allow; and the Colonna and their friends the Savelli were driven to open their castles to the papal forces. Many of their vassals came to Rome and did homage to the Pope, who on July 27 left Rome to visit his new possessions. During his absence Lucrezia Borgia was left with power to act as his deputy. It was an unheard-of thing, and shocked official decorum, that a woman should be seated in the Vatican as the Pope's representative. Lucrezia was commissioned to open the Pope's letters, and in case of need, to consult Cardinal Costa. One day she sought the Cardinal's advice. He answered that the custom was for the Vice-Chancellor to gather and record the votes of the Cardinals when the College was consulted. Lucrezia, impatient at this official reserve, exclaimed impetuously, 'I can write well enough myself'. 'Where is your pen?' said the Cardinal with a smile. They parted in laughter.¹

The Pope had a reason for giving Lucrezia an air of political importance, as he was diligently pursuing a plan for her marriage with Alfonso, son of Ercole, Duke of Ferrara. In the early part of Lucrezia's widowhood her hand had

¹ Burchard, iii., 154.

been used as a lure to the Orsini and the Colonna in turn.¹ Now that they were no longer formidable, an alliance with Ferrara commended itself to the Pope, both as honourable to Lucrezia and as politically useful, since it secured Cesare in the Romagna, and opened up the road to Tuscany. It was true that Duke Ercole did not show himself very desirous of this connexion with the Borgia, and Alfonso was strongly opposed to it. But Alexander VI. made use of Louis XII. to overcome their reluctance. By a combination of threats and allurements he pursued his design, and nothing is a stronger proof of his resoluteness than the way in which he drove the proud house of Este to ally themselves with his family.² He sacrificed the rights of the Church to his own projects, and remitted for three generations the tribute due from Ferrara to the Apostolic See. On September 4 the news was brought to Rome that the marriage contract was concluded, and Lucrezia rode in magnificent attire to offer thanks at the Church of S. Maria del Popolo, whither she was escorted by four bishops and 300 horsemen. She gave her robe, which had never been worn before, and was worth 300 ducats, to her court-buffoon, who afterwards put it on and rode in mock procession through the streets of Rome, crying 'Hurrah for the most illustrious Duchess of Ferrara! Hurrah for Pope Alexander VI.!'³ The delight of the Pope at his daughter's good fortune was boundless. He always showed a frank satisfaction in his own success, and made no secret of his pleasure in his family. He was naturally expansive, and called upon others to share his joy. He gave splendid entertainments at the Vatican, and looked, as a delighted spectator, on the dances in which Lucrezia's fine figure showed to advantage. He could not refrain from

Betrothal
of Luc-
rezia to
Alfonso of
Este. Sep-
tember,
1501.

¹ Letters of Capello, October and November, 1500, in Thuasne's Burchard, iii., 440-1.

² Details of the negotiations are given by Gregorovius, *Lucrezia Borgia*, 153, etc.

³ Burchard, iii., 162.

calling the Ferrarese envoy to admire her: 'The new duchess, you see, is not lame'.

Before Lucrezia left Rome, Alexander VI. made provision for her son by the Duke of Biseglia, Rodrigo, a child of two years old, and also for another Borgia infant of dubious parentage, by name Giovanni. This Giovanni was legitimatised by the Pope in two briefs dated September 1, 1501. In the first, he is said to be the offspring of Cesare unmarried, and an unmarried woman; in the second, he is called the son of Cesare married and an unmarried woman. Then the brief proceeds to say that the defect in legitimacy does not come 'from the aforesaid duke, but from us and the aforesaid unmarried woman, which for good reasons in the previous letter we did not wish specifically to express'.¹ It is difficult to explain these two contradictory statements; but it is clear that the Pope wished to provide, as far as he could, against all contingencies. We may either suppose that, in his desire to secure Cesare's bastard son against the possible claims of legitimate children, he executed a second instrument in his favour, and took upon himself a guilt which was not his; or we must hold that this child of three years old was the son of the Pope at the age of sixty-eight, and that Cesare consented to recognise him as his own. In either case the Pope's conduct was scandalous enough, and showed a shamelessness of inventive skill in moulding legal forms to suit his purposes. Giovanni and Rodrigo were both endowed with the possessions of the Roman barons. Rodrigo was made Duke of Sermoneta; Giovanni, Duke of Nepi and Camerino. Later times accepted Giovanni's parentage as dubious, and called him indifferently son of Cesare or of the Pope.²

¹ The two briefs are in Gregorovius, *Lucrezia Borgia*, Appendix Nos. xxvii. and xxviii.

² The evidence on this point is fairly collected by the Comte d'Espinous in an article on 'Le Pape Alexandre VI.' in *Revue des Questions Historiques* for April, 1881, p. 400, etc. Burchard, iii., 170, no doubt expresses the popular belief when he says: 'Johannem Borgiam, filium suum, quem

When these family affairs had been arranged, Lucrezia was ready to go to her third husband. But Ercole of Ferrara was a cautious man, and demanded that the Pope should obtain from the Cardinals a ratification of his promise to remit the tribute due from the Duke of Ferrara to the Holy See. This occupied a little time; but the Cardinals at last consented. A splendid escort for Lucrezia was sent from Ferrara, and was magnificently entertained at Rome. There were banquets and balls and bull-fights; there were pageants and theatrical performances—amongst other plays the *Menæchmi* of Plautus was represented before the Pope and Cardinals. The labours of Hercules, the deeds of Julius Cæsar, and the glory of Lucrezia gave endless scope for the adaptive ingenuity of the masters of the revels. Vast sums of money were spent on these entertainments and on the outfit of Lucrezia, who left Rome in royal splendour on January 5, 1502, carrying a dowry of 100,000 ducats from the papal treasury. Her journey to Ferrara was a triumphal progress, and Ferrara strove to vie with Rome in the magnificence of her reception. Lucrezia, who was still only twenty-two years old, was personally popular through her beauty and her affability. Her long golden hair, her sweet childish face, her pleasant expression and her graceful ways, seem to have struck all who saw her. Much as her husband disliked the notion of his marriage, he was soon won over by his wife, and Lucrezia lived a blameless life at Ferrara. However unhappy she may have been in her early days as the puppet of her father's political schemes, she found in Ferrara a peaceful home. She seems to have inherited her father's frank and joyous nature, but she was in no way remarkable. If Alexander VI. hoped that she would become a political personage, he was disappointed. She showed no aptitude in that

Departure
of Lucrezia
for
Ferrara.
January,
1502.

in pontificatu habuit cum quadam Romana'. Sigismondo de' Conti, who certainly cannot be said to be scandalous, says: 'Alexander, qui etiam in extrema ætate liberis operam dabat, Joannem Borgiam unum ex filiis bimulum ducem Camertum constituere cupiebat' (ii., 253). I think that his testimony is very weighty.

direction ; but she seems to have been a good wife to Alfonso. When the power of Alexander VI. and Cesare came to an end, Alfonso of Ferrara did not try to rid himself of the wife who had been forced upon him. She died in 1519, regretted by her husband, and on her deathbed wrote to Pope Leo X., begging for his benediction before she died.¹ The evil repute of her father and brother fell upon her in later days, and in her own time the tongue of scandal associated her name with shameless charges. But from the time that she left Rome no voice was raised against her ; and there are no facts proved which tend to her discredit. Romance has busied itself with her life and has converted Lucrezia Borgia into a heroine of unmentionable wickedness.

It was at this period, when the power of the Borgia was seen to be rising, and filled men's minds with terror for the future, that some of the most savage libels against the Pope were written. At the end of 1501 there appeared in Rome a pamphlet, in the form of a letter to Silvio Savelli, one of the dispossessed barons who had been driven to flee before the papal arms. It professed to be written from the camp of Gonsalvo before Tarento, on November 15, 1501, to Silvio in Germany, and besought him to stir up the Emperor against a Pope who was a disgrace to Christendom. It is clear that it was dictated through political terror, and is a set piece of declamation gathering together every possible charge against the Pope. He is a 'new Mahomet' and Antichrist ; he gained his seat by simony, and uses his power solely for the good of his family. The Vatican is like the jaws of hell, guarded by a second Cerberus, the Cardinal of Modena, who sells everything to gain money which the Pope spends on his own pleasures and in buying jewels for Lucrezia. The Vatican is the scene of abominable orgies, in which all sense of shame is lost. In Rome there is a reign of terror ; poison

¹The facts about Lucrezia Borgia are given by Gregorovius. As I have rejected all uncorroborated rumours, I need not consider the special accusations against Lucrezia.

Libel
against
Alexander
VI. No-
vember,
1501.

and the dagger of the assassin are directed against every one who stands in the Pope's way. In short the document is a summary of all the charges brought against Alexander VI., and seems to have furnished the basis for the statements of contemporary historians.¹ If such a document were accepted as literally true, history would have to be re-written. It is, however, a valuable testimony to the hatred which Alexander VI. inspired, and to the dangerous weapons which his notorious irregularities furnished to his enemies.

Alexander VI. had this libel read to him;² but he knew Rome too well to feel much annoyance at it. He took no steps to discover its author or to prohibit its circulation; and Silvio Savelli, in whose interest it was written, returned to Rome in safety and was admitted to the Pope's presence.³ Alexander VI. was willing to face the chances of war and did not object to receive his share of knocks. Cesare Borgia, however, was not so patient, and this libel roused his wrath against evil-speakers. At the end of November a man wearing a mask, who in the Borgo had inveighed against the duke, was seized by his orders and was punished by having one hand and the tip of his tongue cut off. A Venetian who had translated some scandalous document from the Greek and sent it to Venice, was seized and put to death, in spite of the remonstrances of the Venetian ambassador.⁴ The Pope deplored the vindictiveness of his son. He said to the Ferrarese ambassador: 'The duke is good-hearted, but he cannot bear injuries. I have often told him that Rome is a free country, where a man may say or write what he will; that much is said against me, but that I do not interfere. He answered, "If

¹ It is given by Burchard, iii., 182, and by Sanuto. It contains the story 'De convivio qui n̄ quaginta meretricum,' which Burchard has incorporated in his Diary under date October 30.

² 'Fuit, ut intellexi, Papæ lecta,' Burchard, *ibid.*

³ Giustinian, *Dispacci*, i., 309, under date January 4, 1503: 'Tutto ozi Silvio Savello è stato in Palazzo, et ha avuto audienza del Papa'.

⁴ Burchard, iii., 172, 190.

Rome is accustomed to write and speak slanders, well and good; but I will teach them to repent". For my own part I have always been forgiving—witness the Cardinals who plotted against me when Charles VIII. invaded Italy. I might have rid myself many times of Ascanio Sforza and Giuliano della Rovere, but I have not done so.¹ Alexander VI. spoke truly; he was not revengeful nor did he bear ill-will. He was determined to go his own way, but he did not conceal from himself that his course was sure to awake violent opposition. He only struck at those who were dangerous; if they would withdraw their opposition he was ready to receive them back into his favour. He regarded it as only natural that envy should attend upon success.

The outspoken unscrupulousness of Alexander VI. and Cesare Borgia made them, even during their lifetime, the objects of exceptional reprobation. Other statesmen might be criminal, but their criminality was not so openly recognised or commented upon. Whether men be right or wrong, they thought that Alexander VI. would hesitate at nothing. Two private letters written to Machiavelli by a friend in Rome express with cynical frankness the moral depravity of Roman society under a Pope whom every one regarded with dread. 'His mind,' says the writer in 1501, 'longs to play the part of Sulla and enjoy proscriptions; he takes one man's goods, another man's life, a third he drives into exile, a fourth he condemns to the galleys, a fifth he deprives of his house and puts therein some Spanish heretic; and all this for no reason or a slight one.'² Men certainly thought that Alexander VI. poisoned his Cardinals when he was in want of money, and almost every death of any member of the College was attributed to this cause. Thus Machiavelli's correspondent speaks of the death of Cardinal Lopez, and continues: 'If

¹ The envoy Costabili to the Duke of Ferrara, Feb. 1, 1502, quoted by Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom*, vii., 466.

² Vespucci to Machiavelli, July 16, 1501, in Villari, *Machiavelli*, i., 559: 'Animus ejus sullaturit et proscripserit in dies magis'.

you wish to know by what kind of death he died, it is commonly reputed to be by poison, since the great Gonfaloniere (Cesare) was unfriendly to him, so that such deaths are frequently heard of in Rome'. Such assertions can neither be proved nor disproved: it is bad enough that the Pope's conduct did not make them incredible. Men saw the Pope greedily seizing on the goods of dying Cardinals, without any attempt to conceal his pressing need of money and his readiness to receive it from every source. They can hardly be blamed for not stopping to reflect that even Cardinals must die, and that the number who died during Alexander's pontificate was not beyond the average.¹

The insatiable avidity of the Pope and Cesare, the pains they took to gain information and devise new projects, and their astonishing good fortune, all combined to fill men with a sense of helplessness as well as dread. Cesare's troops disturbed the peace of Rome, and Cesare's mysterious habits of secrecy and silence threw an air of darkness over the city. 'The dead of night,' says Egidius of Viterbo, 'covered all things. To say nothing of domestic tragedies, never was sedition and bloodshed more rife in the States of the Church; never were bandits more numerous; never was their more wickedness in the city; never did informers and assassins more abound. Not in their houses, in their chambers, or in their towers were men safe. Law of man and God alike was set at naught. Gold, violence, and lust bore undisputed sway.'² It would seem that during the last two years of

¹ I give from Ciaconius the numbers of creations and deaths of Cardinals under four successive Popes:—

	Creations	Deaths	Years of his pontificate
Sixtus IV.	35	27	13
Innocent VIII.	13	11	8
Alexander VI.	34	27	11
Julius II.	27	36	9½

² See Appendix.

Alexander VI.'s pontificate Rome was filled with uneasy suspicion. Everything was possible when so much was unintelligible; all sense of security had gone, and men trembled at the thought of future horrors.

In the early part of 1502 Alexander VI. and Cesare were watching their opportunity. On February 17 the Pope set out by sea to inspect the fortifications which Leonardo da Vinci was erecting for Cesare at Piombino. Six galleys were manned by sailors pressed for the Pope's service. At Piombino Alexander VI. was entertained by dances of maidens in the market-place, and it was observed that he and the Cardinals ate meat though it was the season of Lent. On his return to Rome he had a stormy voyage. Though the wind was contrary the Pope refused to put back, till at length the sailors were compelled to try and make for Corneto, but found it impossible to gain the harbour. All were panic-stricken save the Pope, who sat in the stern, and when a heavy sea washed over the ship exclaimed 'Jesus,' and crossed himself. His peril did not destroy his appetite and he asked for dinner; but was told that the winds and the waves together made it impossible to kindle a fire. At last there was a slight lull, and it was possible to cook a few fishes.¹ As the wind fell the ship reached Porto d'Ercole in safety, and on March 11 Alexander VI. returned to Rome. There he set to work to strengthen the Castle of S. Angelo, which he supplied with artillery at the expense of the Colonna. He heard that several guns had been buried at Frascati, whither he went to explore. He compelled by torture some peasants to discover the hiding-places, and brought the guns to Rome. He also bought for 13,000 ducats the artillery of the dispossessed King of Naples. By this means he was well supplied with means of defence, which he acquired at a cheap rate.

Meanwhile the position of affairs in Italy seemed to open

¹ Burchard, iii., 195.

out a fresh prospect for the ambitious plans of Cesare Borgia. France and Spain began to quarrel about the boundaries of their respective shares of the Neapolitan kingdom; war between the two powers was imminent, and each of them was anxious to have the Pope as an ally. Louis XII. was preparing for an expedition against Naples, and Alexander VI. knew that he might count upon his complaisance in the affairs of Central Italy. Venice was still engaged in war against the Turks, and adopted an attitude of watchful neutrality. It was important for Cesare to seize this moment of suspense and make the most of it. Rome was quiet; the barons of the Campagna were reduced; the greater part of the Romagna was in Cesare's hands; Ferrara was his ally; Piombino afforded him a means of attacking Florence and Pisa. With these advantages much might be done.

Plans of
Cesare
Borgia.

Alexander VI. could supply Cesare with money; but for troops he was largely dependent on condottieri generals. Chief amongst them were the Orsini, who hoped by Cesare's help to restore the Medici to Florence; and Vitellozzo Vitelli, who burned to revenge on the Florentines the death of his brother Paolo, who had been executed on the charge of treachery in his conduct of the war against Pisa. Another was Oliverotto Eufreducci, who, after serving under Vitellozzo, determined to increase his importance. Accordingly he returned in January, 1502, to his native town of Fermo, which was ruled by his uncle Giovanni Fogliani. One day he invited Giovanni and the chief citizens to dinner, and afterwards, saying that he wished to speak with them privately about the Pope and Cesare, withdrew with them to another room, where he had posted soldiers who sprang out and killed them all. Oliverotto mounted his horse and slaughtered all his uncle's friends in Fermo; then he sent word to the Pope that he held Fermo as Vicar of the Church.

His con-
dottieri
generals.

Such instruments were necessary, but they were undoubtedly dangerous. They had, however, one useful

quality, that they could be disavowed in case of need. Accordingly Vitellozzo Vitelli was allowed to encourage
 Cesare Borgia seizes Urbino. June, 1502. Arezzo to rebel against Florence, while Cesare in Rome was gathering troops, ostensibly for his long threatened expedition against Camerino. Arezzo rebelled on June 4, and Vitellozzo hastened thither with his forces. Alexander VI. expressed his regret at this invasion of the Florentine territory, which was under the protection of the French king, and asserted that neither he nor Cesare was privy to it; but no one believed him.¹

Soon news was brought to Rome that Pisa had raised the banner of the Duke of the Romagna, and elected him her lord. Though Alexander VI. declared that Cesare could not accept such an offer, still Florence felt herself attacked on two sides at once, and was thrown into great alarm. On June 12 Cesare left Rome with 700 horsemen and 6000 infantry, to go against Camerino. He advanced to Spoleto, then to Cagli in the dominions of Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino. Suddenly the town was seized in Cesare's name, and the unsuspecting Guidubaldo received the news just in time to flee before Cesare advanced to Urbino, which opened its gates to him on June 21. Cesare wrote to the Pope, saying that he was driven to this sudden action by the discovery that Guidubaldo was conspiring with the lord of Camerino, had sent him supplies, and was prepared to seize his artillery on its passage by Gubbio. It is not improbable that Guidubaldo was only half-hearted in his promises to help Cesare against Camerino, and that he did not relish the fall of so many of his neighbours before Cesare's arms; but it is tolerably certain that Cesare intended this surprise of Urbino before he left Rome, and that Alexander VI. expected the news.²

¹ Giustinian, *Dispacci*, i., 21, 30.

² The letter of Cesare is summarised by Giustinian, i., 33. But two days before the Pope had told him that the lord of Camerino 'aveva chi li dava soccorso. Et interrogando io chi erano quelli, mi rispose, Li signori suoi vicini,' which seems to show foreknowledge of Cesare's plea.

Cesare treated his new conquest gently, and made few alterations in its government. While he stayed at Urbino he was revolving in his mind a scheme for rendering his position more independent. This was only possible by securing an Italian alliance which would enable him to dispense with the support of the French king; and if this alliance could be gained by the sacrifice of his condottieri generals he would be free from another source of embarrassment. He had used the condottieri to terrify Florence, and Florence was the ally of France; if he could draw Florence into a close alliance with himself by sacrificing his condottieri, he might be in a position to hold the balance between France and Spain.

Cesare
endeav-
ours to
win over
Florence.

Accordingly Cesare demanded that Florence should send an envoy to Urbino; and Florence, which was sunk in deep despondency, sent the Bishop of Volterra, with Niccolò Machiavelli as his secretary. To him Cesare offered the alternative of close friendship or decided hostility; he was willing to serve Florence, to renew his old connexion with her as her general, and to rid her of her assailants. 'I am not here to play the tyrant,' he said, 'but to extinguish tyrants.' He thus made an offer, the meaning of which was afterwards understood, that he would rid Florence of the Orsini and Vitellozzo. In return he demanded that Florence should establish a stable government, favourable to himself, that he might know with whom he had to do. The Bishop of Volterra was impressed by the sincerity with which he spoke, and Machiavelli admired a man who knew his own mind and successfully pursued his course. 'This lord,' he wrote, 'is splendid and magnificent, and is so bold that there is no enterprise so great that it does not seem to him small. To gain glory and win dominions he robs himself of repose and knows neither fatigue nor danger. He comes to a place before his intentions are understood. He makes himself well liked amongst his soldiers, and has chosen the best men in Italy. These things make him

victorious and formidable, with the aid of perpetual good fortune.'¹

The Florentines may be pardoned for hesitating to enter into an alliance with so dubious a person as Cesare. The people were strongly opposed to it. 'We did not fear the King of France,' they said, 'with 30,000 soldiers; shall we fear a few ragamuffins led by the unfrocked bastard of a priest?'² The envoys were bidden to temporise, for news was brought that Louis XII. was advancing into Northern Italy. Cesare saw at once what was the object of the Florentines. 'I am no merchant,' he said to Soderini, 'and I came prepared for frank dealing. You answer me with words, and I can see that you wish to beguile me. You trust in the French king; you forget that he cannot be always in Italy. You will find that he will help me. One day you will be sorry that you tried to abuse my goodness and simplicity.'

The sudden arrival of Louis XII. at Asti caused a cessation of further scheming till the king's intentions were known. Cesare made sure of Camerino, which fell before his troops on July 20. Louis XII. sent some troops to aid the Florentines, and Cesare ordered the reluctant Vitellozzo to quit Arezzo and Città di Castello, which were again occupied in the name of Florence. Louis XII. had come into Italy at an unfortunate time for Cesare, whose enemies flocked with complaints to the French king. The Florentines told their grievances; the dispossessed lords of Urbino and Camerino carried their tale of woe to Milan; Cardinal Orsini went to remind the king of the services rendered by his house to France, and of the losses it had consequently endured. There was a general hope that Louis XII. would direct his arms against Cesare, and so restore Italian peace. But the Pope was busy in his

¹ Portions of the *Legazione di Soderini al Valentino* are given in Villari's *Dispacci di Giustiniani*, i., Appendix i. It is clear that these letters were written by Machiavelli.

² Parenti, MS. quoted by Tommasini, *Vita di Machiavelli*, i., 220.

negotiations with the French king, and Cesare offered to accompany him with 2500 men in an expedition against the Spaniards in Naples. They excused themselves of any privity to Vitellozzo's attempt on the Florentine territory, and though Alexander VI. expressed his wish to punish Gian Giordano Orsini and Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna, he submitted himself to the pleasure of the French king. The Pope's diplomatic activity was incessant. Cesare judged it better to take the matter into his own hands; leaving Urbino he journeyed with a few attendants to Milan, and was honourably received by Louis XII. on August 5.

Thus Cesare went to arrange matters with France, while Alexander VI. made fair promises to the Spanish ambassadors. Their diplomacy was successful. In return for Cesare's promises of help against Naples Louis XII. allowed him to proceed against Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna, and work his will on the Orsini, the Baglioni, and the Vitelli. Cesare stayed with Louis XII. till September 2, when he returned to Asti; then he set off for Imola to prepare his attack on Bologna. But suddenly the terror which his schemes inspired found an expression, and Giovanni Bentivoglio succeeded in convincing his neighbours of their own danger. Cardinal Orsini had learned in Milan something of the plan for the destruction of his house. Vitellozzo and the Baglioni were indignant with Cesare for disavowing them in their attempt on Arezzo; he had cleared himself before Louis XII. at their expense. Cesare's government in the Romagna, which was creditable to his desire for order and justice, alarmed those who profited by lawlessness. A formidable league was formed against Cesare, and the confederates met at the Castle of Mugione on Lake Trasimene. Thither went Cardinal Orsini, Paolo and Franciotto Orsini, Francesco Orsini Duke of Gravina, Oliverotto of Fermo, Vitellozzo, Gian Paolo Baglioni, with representatives of Guidubaldo of Urbino, Petrucci and Bentivoglio. They swore to be true

Confederacy
against
Cesare.

to one another; they discussed schemes for warring against Cesare; they arranged for common deliberation about their common affairs.¹ This confederacy against Cesare soon brought him into difficulties. There was a rising in Urbino in favour of the old duke, and a body of Cesare's forces was defeated by the rebels; Urbino was lost, and the lords who had been driven from the Romagna were all preparing to return. The schemes of Alexander VI. and the labours of Cesare seemed likely to be destroyed in a moment.

In this emergency the Pope and Cesare exerted all their powers. Cesare's first need was soldiers; his forces had been sorely diminished by the defection of his condottieri, and he made haste to reinforce them. For this purpose Alexander VI. supplied him with money. He had had a stroke of good luck by the death of the wealthy Cardinal of Modena on July 20, to the great rejoicing of the Curia. Gian Battista Ferrari had been the Pope's chief agent in matters of business, and had been created Cardinal in 1500 in recognition of his services in many matters of confidence. His death was attributed to poison, administered by his secretary, Sebastian Pinzone, who was believed to have acted as the Pope's executioner.² Burchard, however, gives a circumstantial account of Cardinal Ferrari's illness, which does not bear out that supposition. He was taken ill on July 3, of a fever, and refused to use the remedies which his physicians ordered; after five days' illness he prescribed for himself a diet of bread sopped in wine. His fever abated for a time and then returned with renewed violence; many physicians visited him, but he refused their medicine. In his delirium his mind was full of his business, and he complained of some one who had cheated him of ten ducats.³ The

Death of
Cardinal
Ferrari.
July 20,
1502.

¹ Sigismondo de' Conti gives a rhetorical account of their conference, ii., 257.

² Giustinian, *Dispacci*, i., 60: 'Per molti evidenti segni se tien ch'el Cardinale sia morto ex veneno, e che questo Sebastian era stato e' manigoldo'.

³ Burchard, iii., 212.

rumour of the Pope's complicity in his death probably arose from the unseemly way in which, after a last visit to the dying man, he ordered an inventory to be taken of all his goods.¹ The moment he was dead the Pope seized his possessions, which amounted to 50,000 ducats,² and at once distributed his benefices. The bishopric of Modena was given to the Cardinal's brother, and several of his smaller benefices to his secretary Pinzone. Perhaps the Pope wished to recompense them for the loss of legacies which they might have expected had Ferrari made a will. However, the guilt of Pinzone and the Pope's complicity were generally believed, so much so that Pinzone was called to account under Julius II. in 1504. Perhaps Julius II. was not sorry to use Pinzone's unpopularity as a means of striking a blow at one of the creatures of Alexander VI. and emphasising his dissent from the actions of his predecessor. It can hardly be taken as an avowal of guilt that Pinzone did not submit himself to trial, but preferred to be deprived of his offices for contumacy.³

It was not through any love for Cardinal Ferrari that so much attention was given to his death, for seldom was a man so universally hated. He was a hard man of business and added personal rudeness to his extortionate practices. A shower of epigrams followed him to his grave, the mildest of which gives a brief account of him: 'Earth has his body, the Pope his goods, the Styx his soul'. His unquiet spirit is represented as calling on the passer-by: 'Say not, Light lie the earth, nor scatter flowers: if you would give me rest, chink money on my tomb'.⁴

¹ Giustinian, i., 59.

² Giustinian, i., 61, says 14,000 ducats besides the furniture; Burchard, iii., 219, estimates it at 30,000 ducats, with furniture worth 10,000 and plate worth 10,000.

³ Giustinian, iii., 309: 'E stato privato dei sui benefizi per non essere comparso personalmente a purgar l'accusa contra di lui data ch'il sia stato consenziente alla morte del quondam reverendissimo Cardinale di Modena'. Burchard, iii., 370, gives the same account: 'Pro eo quod dominum Cardinalem Mutinensem patronum suum veneno interemisisset, qui eum de stercore exemerat'.

⁴ Burchard, iii., 215, collects twenty-five of these epigrams.

The money of Cardinal Ferrari enabled Cesare to raise forces, and he was soon at the head of an army of 6000 men. But he did not seek to meet the confederates in the field; he looked for allies, and strove to separate his enemies. Alexander VI. proposed to the Venetian envoy a close alliance with Venice. 'Though we are Spanish by birth,' he said, 'and though we sometimes show ourselves French in policy, we still are Italians. Our seat is in Italy; here we have to live, as also our duke.'¹ On the other hand Venice was invited by Spain to unite in freeing Italy from the Borgias, 'a disease which infects it all'. 'God,' said the Spanish envoy, 'has given you an opportunity which should not be lost.'² Venice, however, true to its cautious policy, preserved a neutral attitude, and gave general answers to the Pope and Spain alike. Louis XII. held to his alliance with the Pope, sent troops to Cesare, and expressed his anger against the rebel lords. Cesare pursued his request for an alliance with Florence, which in September had assumed a more stable government by electing Piero Soderini as Gonfaloniere for life; but the Florentine people distrusted Cesare, and Soderini thought it best to temporise. For this purpose he sent as envoy the secretary Niccolò Machiavelli, a man of no great distinction, but one whose acuteness might be trusted; and in the conduct of this negotiation with Cesare Machiavelli first showed his marvellous powers of political observation.

Cesare got no help save from France; but that was enough to prevent all Italy from turning against him and gave him time to manage the confederate lords. He and Alexander VI. used all their adroitness to face the emergency; they well understood one another and acted in admirable concert. Both were cool and resolute, and they soon showed themselves more than a match for their foes. The confederate lords

Cesare seeks allies. September, 1502.

The confederates reconciled with Cesare. October 28, 1502.

¹ Giustinian, i., 150.

² *Ibid.*, 186.

were bold enough when they were together; but they had no leader, and each was seeking only his own interest. They were afraid of the power of France, and had no confidence in themselves. Cesare showed no signs of alarm; Alexander VI. assured the Orsini of his good will towards them. Negotiations were carried on both by Cesare and the Pope with various members of the confederacy. The aged Paolo Orsini was soon won over by Cesare's promises, and undertook the office of negotiator; Cardinal Orsini confided in the Pope's fair speeches, though even children warned him of his folly. He smiled in the consciousness of superior wisdom, and said that all his differences with the Pope had only ended to his own advantage.¹ On October 28 an accord was drawn up by which peace was restored between Cesare and the confederates. Urbino and Camerino were to be restored to Cesare, who undertook to protect the confederates against all enemies, save the Pope and the King of France; the differences between the Pope and Giovanni Bentivoglio were referred to the arbitration of Cesare, Cardinal Orsini, and Pandolfo Petrucci.² Paolo Orsini had some difficulty in persuading his allies to accept these terms; Vitellozzo especially demurred. It was indeed disgraceful to them that they abandoned Guidubaldo of Urbino, and left Giovanni Bentivoglio to the uncertainty of a commission. But Paolo Orsini was deaf to remonstrances; he carried his point and persuaded the rebels to accept the peace. Cardinal Orsini was so infatuated as to return to Rome and boast before the Pope of his services in saving Cesare from ruin.

Bystanders saw that the agreement was hollow, and that there was no real confidence on either side. The Pope called the confederates a 'sorry company' to the Florentine envoy; 'See,' he said, 'how they accuse themselves of treason.'³ Machiavelli in the court of Cesare heard the

¹ Burchard, iii., 222.

² The accord is given by Alvisi, *Cesare Borgia*, Appendix No. lxxi.

³ Giustinian, i., 195; the note quotes the letter of Bracci, the Florentine envoy.

duke's secretary mutter about Vitellozzo: 'This traitor has given us a blow with a dagger and hopes to heal it with words'.¹ Alexander VI. and Cesare quietly strengthened themselves and took advantage of the perfidy of the confederates. Giovanni Bentivoglio, who had been abandoned by his allies, entered into negotiations with the Pope, who agreed to confirm the privileges of Bologna, and leave Giovanni in possession of the city in return for troops for the service of Cesare. This agreement so irritated Cardinal Orsini that he reproached the Bolognese envoy in the Pope's presence, and angry words passed between them.² Alexander VI. saw with amusement that he had succeeded in sowing discord between his opponents.

Cesare, meanwhile, showed no great haste to recover his lost possessions. Guidubaldo again fled from Urbino, but many of the castles of the duchy were still held by the troops of the Orsini. On December 10 Cesare marched from Imola to Cesena, prepared for some important expedition, and it was soon rumoured that he intended to attack Sinigaglia, which since the days of Sixtus IV. had been held by Giovanni della Rovere, Prefect of Rome. Giovanni married the sister of Guidubaldo of Urbino; and on his death, in 1501, his son was heir to the possessions of the Montefeltri. The boy and his mother were now in the castle of Sinigaglia, and despite the entreaties of Cardinal Rovere, Alexander VI. resolved that Sinigaglia also should go to Cesare. The last of the family of Sixtus IV. was to be sacrificed to the political emergencies of his successor.

Yet Cesare seemed slow in his movements, and tarried at Cesena to the growing impatience of the Pope. Alexander VI. was eager for news; he could not contain his wrath at Cesare's inactivity,³ and vented his anger in no measured

¹ *Legazione al Valentino*, ed. Passerini, Lett. 56.

² Giustinian, i., 232.

³ On December 23 Giustinian writes, i., 284, that the Pope, on receiving news from Cesare, 'cum gran collera et indignazion ben tre fiate disse forte, che tutti li astanti l'alditeno: Al fio di putta, bastardo—et altre parole in spagnolo, tutto stizzoso'.

terms. Cesare at Cesena weakened his forces by dismissing his French auxiliaries, to the amazement of all, so that there were rumours of a breach between him and the French king. At the same time he showed signs of a change of policy in his rule of the Romagna. His governor, a Spaniard, Don Ramiro de Lorqua, who had made himself feared by his severity, was suddenly committed to prison, and two days afterwards was beheaded in the Piazza of Cesena. No one knew the exact reason; some said that Cesare owed him a private grudge, others that he was suspected of intriguing with the rebels against the duke. Machiavelli contents himself with remarking, 'So it pleased the prince, who shows that he can make and unmake men at his will according to their deserts'.¹ Whatever Cesare's motive may have been, the deed itself was acceptable to the condottieri generals, who saw themselves rid of a man whose severity they dreaded, and about whom they complained to Cesare. The execution of Don Ramiro was most probably ordered because it would be popular both with the people of the Romagna and with the condottieri.²

While Cesare tarried at Cesena, his repentant generals showed their good will by attacking Sinigaglia. The town surrendered at once; but the castle held out, and its governor refused to give it up to any one save the duke in person. Cesare sent word that he was coming and would confer with the condottieri generals about future enterprises. There were at Sinigaglia, Oliverotto of Fermo, Paolo Orsini, the Duke of Gravina, and Vitellozzo Vitelli, each of whom had schemes of his own which he hoped to further. Preparations were made for Cesare's coming. Oliverotto's troops were quartered in Sinigaglia; those of the other generals were sent to some little distance to make room for Cesare's men. On December 31 Cesare

Cesare's
revenge.
December
31, 1502.

¹ *Legazione al Valentino*, Lett. 82.

² See the extract from a MS. chronicle given by Tommasini, *Vita di Machiavelli*, i., 255. Cesare told Paolo Orsini, 'quanto gli havea detto di Don Ramirori, spuose che presto di lui et loro et li popoli resteriano sodisfatti'.

advanced from Fano and was met outside Sinigaglia by Paolo Orsini, the Duke of Gravina and Vitellozzo. He showed great pleasure at meeting them, shook hands warmly and embraced them on the cheek. Not seeing Oliverotto with them, he gave a significant glance to his captain, Don Michele, who rode off into the town. There he found Oliverotto amongst his troops, and carelessly said that it was a pity to keep the men under arms, as their lodgings might be occupied by Cesare's troops through mistake; it would be better to go and meet the duke. Oliverotto accordingly went forward, and was greeted with every sign of affection. When they reached the palace where Cesare was to stay, the four generals prepared to take leave of him; but Cesare invited them to enter, as he had something to say. As soon as they were inside they were seized and made prisoners by the gentlemen of the guard. Then Cesare's troops were sent to disarm and disband the forces of Oliverotto in Sinigaglia, and those of the other generals in the neighbouring castles. As they were entirely unsuspecting, this was easily accomplished; the victors on their return to Sinigaglia proceeded to sack the town, and were with difficulty checked by Cesare.

Cesare sent for Machiavelli and received him with the 'best cheer in the world'. He reminded him that he had given him previous hints of his intentions, but added, 'I did not tell you all'. He used the moment of his triumph to urge again on Machiavelli his desire for a firm alliance with Florence: he had undone the most powerful enemies of himself, the French king, and Florence, and expected the gratitude of Florence for having uprooted these tares in the garden of Italy.¹ Cesare showed scant mercy to his captives.

¹ Machiavelli, *Legazione al Valentino*, Lett. 86. With this may be compared the *Modo tenuto dal Duca Valentino nel ammazzare Vitellozzo*, which was written soon after Machiavelli's return to Florence. We notice how Machiavelli's mind constructed an account different from his impressions as recorded day by day. But it must be remembered that the account was probably written without any copies of the despatches to correct details, and it is probable that the despatches were written with some caution, as they might fall into the hands of Cesare.

That same night Oliverotto and Vitellozzo were strangled, and both died abjectly. Oliverotto with tears accused Vitellozzo of being the instigator of his rebellion against the duke; Vitellozzo besought Cesare to beg the Pope to grant him a plenary indulgence for his sins.

The two Orsini captives were spared till Cesare learned how the Pope had sped in his part of the business.

Alexander VI.'s eagerness for news from Cesare was natural since he knew how large was the interest at stake. On January 1, 1503, he heard

Arrest of
Cardinal
Orsini.
January 3,
1503.

the news of the fall of Sinigaglia, and said significantly: 'The duke's nature is not to pardon injuries or leave vengeance to others. He has sworn to slay Oliverotto with his own hands if he can lay hold of him.' On the night of January 2 a messenger arrived from Cesare, and the Pope summoned armed men to the Vatican. He was resolved to strike a blow at the Orsini; and so terrified was the secretary, who had read Cesare's letter, that he did not leave the Pope's presence all night, lest, if the scheme failed, he should be suspected of giving information. Next morning Cardinal Orsini was summoned to the Vatican. He came without suspicion of evil, as he was on the best terms with the Pope, and two days before had celebrated Mass in his presence. When he alighted from his mule, it was taken to the Pope's stable. When he entered the Pope's chamber he found it full of armed men; he and several of his followers were at once arrested and imprisoned.¹ Rome was filled with confusion at this news; but there was no leader and nothing was done. Next day, the Pope summoned the ambassadors in Rome to give them an account of what had happened. He said that Don Ramiro de Lorqua, before his execution, had confessed to Cesare a conspiracy of Vitellozzo and Oliverotto against his life; they intended to have him shot on the march to Sinigaglia; to provide for his own safety Cesare imprisoned them; they confessed their guilt and had

¹ Burchard, iii., 230.

been put to death; their accomplices were still in prison, and as the Cardinal Orsini was suspected he had been imprisoned likewise. It was a plausible tale, but the Venetian envoy remarks: 'As he told me this he seemed to be conscious himself that it was a fiction, but he went on colouring it as best he could'.¹

The Pope proceeded rapidly with his measures against the Orsini. The Cardinal's palace was dismantled, and all his goods were seized by the Pope; his luckless mother, at the age of eighty, was turned into the streets, and begged in vain for shelter, as every one was afraid to receive so dangerous a guest. The Prince of Squillace was sent with troops to seize the Orsini castles in the neighbourhood, and they were all surrendered in terror. The Cardinals went to the Pope to plead the cause of their imprisoned colleague; the Pope only multiplied his accusations against Cardinal Orsini, and declared that he should have full justice. Other prelates of the Orsini faction were imprisoned likewise. There was a general panic in Rome, and many of the wealthiest men thought it wise to flee at once. The Pope was triumphant, and boastfully said: 'What has been done is nothing to what will be done soon'. The Cardinals were terrified, especially those who had ever opposed the Pope. When the Pope spoke with unwonted kindness to Cardinal Medici every one regarded him as a doomed man. So great was the terror that Cardinal Piccolomini besought the Venetian envoy to advise his Republic to interpose and stay the general ruin.²

It is amazing that this treacherous deed should have awakened no remonstrances, and should have been so completely successful; but in the artificial politics of Italy everything depended on the skill of the players in the game. The condottieri represented only themselves, and when they were removed by any means, however treacherous, nothing remained. There was

Italian
judgment
of this
treachery.

¹ Giustinian, *Dispacci*, i., 306.

² *Ibid.*, i., 323.

no party, no interest which was outraged by the fall of the Orsini and Vitellozzo. The armies of the condottieri were formidable so long as they followed their generals; when the generals were removed, the soldiers dispersed and entered into other engagements. Every one breathed more freely when Vitellozzo and the rest were out of the way. Florence and Venice, as well as Cesare and the Pope, were rid of troublesome neighbours and were glad of their destruction. The question of the means employed in their overthrow was quite of secondary importance. Most men admired Cesare's consummate coolness in the matter; many had foreseen that he could never really forgive the rebels. Their fate awakened no sympathy; they deserved no mercy, for they were stained with every crime. Cesare crushed them as he would have crushed a noxious insect and did not think that any excuse was needed for the way in which he got them into his power. No outrage was done to current morality. Italy was in a state of transition in which it had lost old principles of conduct and was groping after new ones. Old political landmarks had disappeared; old states had vanished; everything was at hazard, and no one could even dimly foresee the future. Most men in Italy accepted as sufficient Cesare's remark to Machiavelli: 'It is well to beguile those who have shown themselves masters of treachery'. Cesare's conduct was judged by its success, and that was sufficiently brilliant; but more than his ability Machiavelli admired his good fortune. The downfall of the Orsini was an immense step towards securing the permanence of Cesare's power in the future. Now that the Colonna and the Orsini were both crushed, a new Pope would not be under the influence of either of the old Roman factions, and Cesare might look forward to commanding the support of the Papacy even after his father's death.¹

¹ Machiavelli, *Legazione al Valentino*, Lett. 88.

CHAPTER XI.

DEATH OF ALEXANDER VI.

1503.

THE immediate result of the massacre of Sinigaglia was to bring new territories to obedience to the Church. Città di Castello and Perugia at once submitted to Cesare, who next turned his arms against Siena. On January 18 Paolo Orsini and the Duke of Gravina were put to death, and Alexander VI., eager to complete the destruction of the Orsini family, summoned Cesare to reduce the castles which were too strong for the arms of the Prince of Squillace. But Cesare did not entirely show his father's eagerness; he needed friends near Rome to help him in the event of the Pope's death, and was willing to trust to the gratitude of those whom he spared. The chiefs of the Orsini were Giovanni Giordano, lord of Bracciano, who was serving in Naples under the French king, and the Count of Pitigliano, who was in the pay of Venice. They and their friends prepared for resistance, and Cesare thought it best to leave them alone; he contented himself with besieging Ceri. Alexander VI. was impatient at the slow progress of the siege; 'I wish to root out this house,' he exclaimed; and for his own part he pursued his object steadfastly. On February 22 the Cardinal Orsini died in his prison, and the story of his last days is ghastly. His luckless mother did all she could to keep him alive; she paid the Pope 2000 ducats for the privilege of sending him a daily supply

Reduction
of the
Orsini
castles.
February,
1503.

of food. She even sent a mistress of the Cardinal to present the Pope with a costly pearl which he had envied. The Pope received it graciously, and renewed his permission to send food to the Cardinal; but men believed that he had already drunk a draught of deadly wine mixed by the Pope's orders.¹ After his death Alexander VI. was anxious to show that he died from natural causes; but his fate had been so long foreseen that no one was curious to know how it was brought about.²

At the end of February Cesare came to Rome, but went about masked and gave no public sign of his presence. He was always given to mystery, and envoys found it hard to approach him unless he wished to see them. He sat up late at night, slept during the day, and was careless of conventional formalities. It was clear that he did not agree with the Pope's desire to root out the Orsini, and was in favour of sparing Gian Giordano at the request of the French king.³ The Pope threatened to excommunicate him if he did not reduce Bracciano, and on March 14 Cesare unwillingly set out to the siege of Ceri, which surrendered on April 5. Giulio Orsini returned to Rome with Cesare and was well received by the Pope. He was sent to negotiate with Gian Giordano for the surrender of his possession; this was provisionally accomplished, and the Pope was now master of the Patrimony.

On April 11 Rome was startled by the news of the death of Cardinal Michiel, the nephew of Pope Paul II. There were strong suspicions of poisoning, which was very probable from the symptoms of the case.⁴ His death brought the Pope 150,000 ducats, and men did not hesitate to say that he had fallen a victim to the Pope's desire for money. However unwilling we may

Death of
Cardinal
Michiel,
April 11,
1503.

¹ Burchard, iii., 236.

² Giustinian, i., 411.

³ Giustinian, i., 423; Burchard, iii., 237.

⁴ Giustinian, i., 474, on the authority of the Cardinal's nephew, says: 'Da due zorni in qua li era zonto un destemperamento de stomego con gran vomito et anche un poco di flusso: el sospetto è grande ch'el sia sta' avvelenato, e non mancano evidenti conietture'.

be to accuse a Pope of poisoning, there can be no doubt of the prevalence of the belief amongst Alexander VI.'s contemporaries; and the deaths of Cardinals Orsini and Michiel were accompanied by such suspicious circumstances that we cannot dismiss the belief as entirely groundless in their cases.

On the fall of the Orsini, Alexander VI. could look round with triumph on the work which he had accomplished. He had inherited a troubled and precarious seat; by his prudence and energy, Rome had been reduced to submission; the Papal States had been rescued from petty tyrants; the rival factions who disturbed the Papacy in Rome had been annihilated. But all this only offered to Alexander VI. the opportunity for a new departure. Cesare had done much; but more might still be done. It was true that he had well-nigh accomplished all that was possible in the existing condition of Italian affairs; if his dominions were to be extended it must be in Tuscany, and there the French king forbade his advance. The advantages to be gained by the French alliance were nearly exhausted; but new combinations were possible, which might open up new fields for adventure. Cesare had expressed his wish for an alliance with Florence; Alexander VI. urged repeatedly on Venice a proposal for a close alliance which might enable them to interfere in the affairs of Naples. The Venetian envoy Giustinian tells us of a characteristic interview with Alexander VI. on April 11. The Pope pleaded the need of uniting 'this poor Italy'; Giustinian answered that it would be well to unite not only Italy but all Christendom against the Turk. This was far beyond the sphere of Alexander VI.'s political calculations; he laughed, and answered: 'You are talking nonsense'.¹ Considerations of the good of Christendom as a whole, had since the days of Sixtus IV. vanished from the papal policy.

New schemes of Alexander VI. and Cesare. April, 1503.

¹ Giustinian, i., 477.

The war between France and Spain for the possession of Naples meanwhile went on. All Italy rejoiced at the renewal of its military glory by the tournament at Barletta, in which thirteen Italians overcame their French opponents. Men boasted that Italians could now meet the French in the field; but they forgot that the Italian champions were not fighting for a national cause, but only to set one foreign conqueror in the place of another. Nothing shows more clearly the utter want of patriotism in Italy than its readiness to accept the tournament of Barletta as a great national exploit, to be celebrated in prose and verse. It was the military skill of Gonsalvo de Cordova, not the prowess of the Italians, which drove the French from Apulia. In May Gonsalvo entered Naples, and the French took refuge in Gaeta. Louis XII. was no more successful in the Neapolitan kingdom than the former claimants of the Angevin house.

The
French
driven
from
Naples.
May, 1503.

Alexander VI. was prepared to readjust his position and ally himself with Spain if anything was to be gained. He made proposals to Venice, who betrayed them to France. On May 18 the Pope's confidential secretary, Trocchio, fled from Rome, most probably that he might carry to the French king proofs of the Pope's machinations against France;¹ he was, however, captured in Corsica, brought back to Rome and strangled by Cesare's orders.² To prepare himself for further activity Alexander VI. raised a large sum of money by creating nine new Cardinals. Giustinian computes that the Pope received from 120,000 to 130,000 ducats from his new creations, and also raised 64,000 ducats by the sale of new offices of abbreviators, which he erected in the Curia, already overburdened

Political
possibilities.

¹ Soderini, writing from Rome on May 22, says: 'La commune opinione è che lui tenesse con Franzesi conto de parte, et che fusse molto partigiano del Re' (quoted by Villari in note to Giustinian, *Dispacci*, ii., 20).

² See a letter of the Ferrarese envoy, Cost bili, in Villari, *Niccolò Machiavelli*, i., 599.

with extortionate officials.¹ He offered to help Louis XII. in an expedition against Naples on condition that Sicily were given to Cesare; and he offered to help Spain if Cesare could thereby gain Siena, Bologna, and Pisa. Cardinal Piccolomini besought Venice to form an Italian League to free Italy from the foreigners; Spain offered Venice its alliance that they might join in settling Italian affairs without the interference of France or the Pope. Every diplomatic possibility was freely discussed, and no one could foresee what would happen. Cesare gathered troops, and at the end of July was said to be preparing for a journey to Perugia; men thought that he meant to make an attack on Siena, perhaps on Tuscany. He showed his troops that he was not a man to be trifled with. Some Albanians quitted his service because they were offended at the captain whom he set over them; Cesare allowed them to leave Rome, but they were pursued and their two ringleaders were put to death, as a warning to the rest of Cesare's mercenaries.²

Still Cesare stayed at Rome, and the Pope's attitude towards France and Spain was still ambiguous. A French army was on its way to relieve Gaeta, and no one knew whether Cesare would join it or no. Meanwhile the weather became extremely hot, and the inhabitants of Rome sickened in great numbers. On August 1 died the Pope's nephew, Giovanni Borgia, Cardinal of Monreale. Men said that he had 'gone the way of the rest,' and that Cesare had poisoned him for his money. On August 13 both Alexander VI. and Cesare were attacked by the fever. The Pope was bled, and his attendants remarked with wonder how vigorous was the flow of blood for a man of his age. The fever declared itself to be a tertian, and the exact condition of the Pope was kept as secret as possible; but on August 18 he received the Eucharist and soon after fell into a stupor. His physician was of opinion

Death of
Alexander
VI.
August 18,
1503.

¹ *Dispacci*, ii., 30.

² *Ibid.*, 87: 'Che ha messo li altri remasi qui in gran spavento'.

that the fever was complicated by apoplexy; ¹ he rapidly sank, and died on the evening of August 18. Cesare was too ill to visit him; but in the Pope's last moments sent his confidential officer, Michelotto, who with his dagger drawn extorted from the fears of the chamberlain the keys of the papal treasury, and carried off all the plate and some 100,000 ducats in gold.²

There is no more striking illustration of the hatred which Alexander VI. inspired than the rapid spread of the belief that he died of poison. So many strange things had happened during his pontificate that men could not suppose that it ended in a natural way. There was something wonderful in the fact that the Pope and Cesare were both taken ill at the same time. Their illness declared itself after a supper in the garden of Cardinal Hadrian of Corneto, who was also himself attacked by sickness. It is scarcely surprising that this coincidence should have suggested the idea of poison; and when once the idea was entertained, a story rapidly grew. It was said that a scheme was devised by the Pope and Cesare to poison a wealthy Cardinal, but owing to a mistake of the server the poisoned wine was given to themselves. This story was readily believed, and in some form or other is repeated by all the historians of that time;³ but it rests on no authentic basis. There is nothing to confirm it in the description of the Pope's illness as given by eye-witnesses. Rome was in a pestilential condition,⁴ and a supper in the open air

Story that
Alexander
VI. was
poisoned.

¹ Giustinian, *Dispacci*, ii., 119: 'E, per quanto mi ha narrato, per el discorso de tutto el mal et accidenti accaduti e remedii fatti, è da giudicar ch' el principio del suo mal sie stato apoplessia, e di questo parere è questo medico, omo eccellente nell' arte soa'.

² Burchard, iii., 239.

³ By Guicciardini, Bembo, Paulus Jovius, Petrus Martyr, Raphael Volterranus, Matarazzo, and many others.

⁴ Alexander VI. said to Giustinian on August 7: 'Questi tanti ammalati che sono a Roma adesso, e che ogni zorno morino, ne fanno paura in modo, che semo disposti aver qualche più custodia che non solevamo alla persona nostra' (ii., 99). Costabili, the Ferrarese envoy, writes: 'Non è però meraviglia che sua Santità et sua Excelentia siano inferme, chè tutti quasi li homini de questa Corte sono infirmati, et de quelli del Palatio spetialmente, per la mala conditione de l' aere se li ritrova' (Letter of August 14, in Giustinian, *Dispacci*, ii., Appendix No. iii.).

was not unlikely to lead to an attack of fever. It is not surprising that two men, living under the same conditions and in the same place, should suffer from fever at the same time. Contemporaries saw a proof of the effects of poison in the rapid decomposition of the Pope's body, which grew black and swollen.¹ This has been repeated by more modern writers, who ought to have known that it was evidence only of the condition of the atmosphere. There is no real reason for attributing the death of Alexander VI. to other than natural causes.

The Borgia have become legendary as types of unrestrained wickedness, and it is difficult to judge them fairly without seeming to palliate iniquity. Yet justice demands a consideration how far they represented the tendencies of their age, and how far they went beyond them. The secularised Papacy and the immoral politics of Europe can excite nothing but disgust; but the secularisation of the Papacy was begun by Sixtus IV., was as profound under Innocent VIII. as under Alexander VI., and was not much mended under Julius II. and Leo X. Political perfidy was universal in Italy; and Louis XII. and Ferdinand of Aragon were as perfidious as the Pope. The end of the fifteenth century shows the political and social corruption that followed on the decay of religious belief, just as the history of the sixteenth century shows how long a time was needed before a religious revival could re-establish morality or influence politics. The exceptional infamy that attaches to Alexander VI. is largely due to the fact that he did not add hypocrisy to his other vices. But however much his own times may have forgotten that there was any meaning in the position of Head of the Christian Church, it is impossible for after times to adopt the same forgetfulness.

Character
of Alex-
ander VI.

¹ Burchard, iii., 243: 'Factus erat sicut pannus vel morus nigerrimus facies livoris tota plena'. Giustinian, ii., 124: 'El più brutto, monstroso et orrendo corpo di morto che si videsse mai, senza alcuna forma nè figura di omo.'

Though the career of Alexander VI. was that of an active and unscrupulous statesman, yet he was not forgetful of the formal duties of his office. In the year of jubilee, Burchard asked for a remission of some of the obligations for an indulgence on the ground of his duties. Alexander VI. did not treat the matter with levity; he considered the application and refused it.¹ Few Popes appeared more frequently in public, or were more attentive to matters of ecclesiastical ceremonial. Alexander VI. was a good man of business and was endowed with great activity; he never allowed pleasure to stand in the way of his occupations, and would work till late at night. The despatches of the various envoys at Rome show us a man who was unsparing of himself, and whose mind was always active. He was not so entirely immersed in politics as to neglect little matters. He regulated the Curia, and saw that salaries were punctually paid, a point of which many Popes were neglectful. In times of scarcity at Rome he organised a corn supply from Sicily, so that the city suffered little from want. He discharged the ecclesiastical duties of his office with the same diligence that he showed in other matters.

Yet Alexander VI. was profoundly secular, and was so recognised by his contemporaries. The irregularities of his private life, his open disregard of public opinion, his avowed delight in his children, and his political unscrupulousness, all these combined to emphasise the secular character of his pontificate in a marked manner. It is true that the times in which Alexander VI. lived required in a Pope the genius of a statesman. The Papacy as a temporal power was threatened; the political equilibrium of Italy had been shattered by the French invasion, and Alexander VI. had been seriously menaced. He awaited his opportunity, and found means to realise the dream of many of his predecessors, by laying the foundation of a strong state in Central Italy. But he did this in a way that filled men

¹ Burchard, iii., 23.

with apprehension. In the eyes of churchmen, the lands of the Church were being recovered for Cesare Borgia, and the Borgia family was being set up as supreme disposers of the Papacy. The statesmen of Italy, who were alarmed about themselves, saw for the first time the nature of the papal power in politics, and were terrified at the prospect. Their own states were powerless before the armies of the stranger, and they found themselves suddenly in the presence of interests which their political craft was entirely unable to control. Their perplexity turned to terror when they saw that the Pope was the one Italian power which had a strong position outside Italy. The weakness of other Italian powers was his strength, and by watching his opportunity, he could dispose of them according to his will. Machiavelli's words explain the hatred felt against Alexander VI.; 'he was the first who showed how much a Pope, with money and forces, could make his power prevail'.¹

Moreover, Alexander VI. was the only man in Italy who clearly knew what he wanted to do, and who steadily pursued his purpose. Venice was watching affairs with an uneasy jealousy, which it tried to pass off as calculating caution. Florence was helplessly clinging to the French alliance, which it had already found to be worthless. The smaller states were desperately endeavouring to patch up a political system which had been hopelessly shattered, and to form new political combinations which were doomed to fall before the first shock. There was a dim consciousness that all these attempts were futile, and no one ventured to predict the future. A childish belief in good luck took the place of political wisdom, and all the luck seemed to fall to the lot of the Borgia, who came into no misfortune like other folk, and whatever they did prospered. They entered as strangers into the hazardous game of Italian politics, and soon showed that they could play it better than those who

¹ *Il Principe*, ch. xi.: 'Di tutti li Pontefici che sono stati mai, mostrò quanto un Papa e con il danaro e con le forze si poteva prevalere'.

thought that it was entirely in their own hands. Alexander VI. frankly accepted the principles of the game, but broke through its flimsy conventions; whereon other players felt that their tricks were turned against them by a player of superior skill, and loudly cried out that they were cheated. Alexander VI. dealt unscrupulously with unscrupulous men, and played for higher stakes than they had dreamed of. Amongst the uncertain, hesitating, bewildered statesmen of Italy, Alexander VI. and Cesare boldly pursued a successful course.

The personal qualities of the Borgia family increased the terror which their success inspired. Alexander VI. was full of life and vigour; he was physically and mentally a strong man. His children, Cesare and Lucrezia, showed the same marvellous capacity of adapting themselves to circumstances, and winning from life all that it had to give. Alexander VI. combined great natural gifts with great power of self-restraint. He had a large and strong nature, which he worked and directed to his purposes. His active brain was always devising fresh schemes. His keen intelligence was trained by diligent observation; but he was not naturally qualified to be a statesman, to intrigue, and to calculate. Handsome, joyous, and genial, he was best fitted to attract ladies by his winning ways, and cajole them by his honeyed speeches.¹ He was amiable and pleasant, a man who wished to enjoy life himself, and make others enjoy it. When he entered upon a political career, he carried into it the same zest, the same eagerness, the same clear purpose of getting all that was to be got. He had a boyish frankness in the pursuit of his object which was taken for profound dissimulation. He was fertile in forming schemes, which he discussed with an energy and sincerity which were almost convincing at the time; if any practical difficulty occurred, he was equally

¹ This was his character in early days. Gaspar Veronensis, in Muratori, iii., pt. ii., 1036: 'Formosus est, lætissimo vultu, aspectuque jocundo, lingua ornata atque melliflua, qui mulieres egregias visas ad se amandum gratior allicit, et mirum in modum concitat, plusquam magnes ferrum; quas tamen intactas dimittere sane putatur'.

ready the next day with an entirely different plan, about which he was equally in earnest. He was childishly delighted when his schemes succeeded; his extreme fertility of invention made him almost unconscious when they failed. He was constantly talking, and found it almost impossible to keep a secret. The ambassadors at his court were entirely baffled by him, and took for duplicity this restlessness of a mind which retained in old age the vigour of youth.¹ Cesare Borgia did not inherit this openness of his father, which indeed seems to have annoyed him. When he was at Rome he kept much to himself, and did his best to avoid interviews with ambassadors, nor did he appear with the Pope in public business. Giustinian tells of a scene which shows the characteristics of the two men. In May, 1503, Alexander VI. urged, as he had done before, a close alliance between himself and Venice. 'He spoke with feeling, and showed on his face deep concern.' He sent for Cesare to take a walk in the vineyard, and when Cesare entered he casually mentioned the subject of conversation, and repeated what he had said; whereon Giustinian repeated his answer. Cesare stood immovable, and only muttered a few words in Spanish to the Pope, who thereupon taxed Venice with betraying his counsels to the French king—a charge which Giustinian denied, but which was nevertheless true.² We see the two men; Alexander VI. impetuous, eager, full of great designs; Cesare cold, cautious, keen-eyed, and sus-

¹ Thus the *Relazione* of Hieronimo Donado, in Sanuto, ii., 826, says: 'È pontefice artificioso e composito, à natura duplice, si muta secondo il tempo, sa ben simular, è homo variabile'. Giustinian's *Dispacci* give constant illustrations of this restless activity of the Pope's mind: 'Il Papa variamente rasona da un zorno all' altro' (i., 145). The Spanish ambassador said, in March, 1503: 'Questo Pontefice sta ambiguo e tutto suspeso e non sa lui medesimo quel ch' el faza' (i., 439). That the Pope could not keep a secret is shown, i., 75: 'Narrando questa cosa, el Pontefice non puotè fare ch' el non confessasse quel che tutti questi zorni avanti aveva negato,' i.e., that he knew anything of Vitellozzo's raid on Tuscany in 1502. That he was not a skilled dissembler appears from the account of his story about the death of Vitellozzo (i., 306): 'La quel narrandome questa mattina, pareva che lui medemo dicesse de narrar un figmento, e pur l'andava colorando come meglio poteva'.

² Giustinian, *Dispacci*, ii., 26.

icious. There was complete confidence and sympathy between the two ; but at times, Cesare was contemptuous of his father's garrulity, and at times Alexander VI. thought Cesare needlessly prudent and too much given to use the high hand. Men said in Rome that the Pope was afraid of his son.¹

The frankness and amiability of Alexander VI. were not qualities which did him any service ; they rather added to the terror which he inspired. Alexander VI. genuinely wished people to agree with him, and tried his utmost to lead them as he would have them to go ; unfortunately his way lay in a direction contrary to their interests, and it only added bitterness to their sense of helplessness that the Pope tried by his geniality to gain their assent to their own ruin. It is hard to combine entire resoluteness with kindness ; and sympathy which is not accompanied by concession is looked upon as hypocrisy. Alexander VI.'s policy required that he should act tyrannically ; it was no comfort to the sufferers to be assured that tyranny went against the Pope's grain, and that he wished them to take a sensible view of the situation.

The desire of Alexander VI. to do unpleasant things in a pleasant manner may be illustrated by Giustinian's account of what happened in Rome after the imprisonment of Cardinal Orsini. The suddenness of the stroke threw the city into terror ; there were rumours of impending punishments, and many sought safety by flight. The Pope sent for the city magistrates that he might restore confidence ; he assured them that he had made all the arrests which he intended ; they might live in peace and quietness under an equal rule, before which Colonna and Orsini would be both as one ; if no new cause for complaint were given him he would forget all old grievances. Then he added with a laugh, ' See that you make fine shows this Carnival time. Let men enjoy themselves, and they will forget all their sus-

¹ *Relazione* of Paolo Capello : ' Il papa ama et ha gran paura di fiol ducha '.

picions.¹ It is no wonder that this light-heartedness awakened terror and made the Pope seem almost inhuman. Yet it was quite natural to him to turn lightly from one thing to another. He was keen in politics and keen in enjoyment. He seems always to have lived at the highest pressure, and never to have felt the strain of life. He worked hard, but he was always buoyant; he never showed fear, and he was ready to enter into any form of amusement.² He sat at his windows and laughed heartily at the buffooneries of the Carnival; ³ he delighted to see handsome women engaging in the dance, and often had comedies acted in his presence. In all his enjoyments he was frank, and paid no heed to conventional decorum. In February, 1503, he gave a public festival in the Vatican, at which a comedy was performed. Many Cardinals were present, some in their robes, others in masquerade costumes. Fair ladies thronged round the Pope's seat, and some were seated on footstools at his feet.⁴ There was nothing wicked in this; but it was certainly indecorous, and such scenes were easily exaggerated into scandals.

In truth Alexander VI. lived in the moment, and was thorough both in his pleasures and in his business. He was so interested in what he was doing that he lost all sense of its moral aspect, and he went beyond all his contemporaries in his disregard of social decorum and of diplomatic conventions. His reputation has suffered for his frankness. The larger elements of vigorous life, which made him greater than those around him, were looked upon as signs of more deliberate wickedness. His undisguised affection for his children, his natural impulsiveness, his

¹ *Dispacci*, i., 320.

² Raphael Volterranus, *Commentarii*, bk. xxii.: 'Idem in ocio solutissimus, in metu constantissimus, nunquam negotia voluptati prævertit, brevissimi somni cibique. Si quando rerum fasce non premeretur omni se remissionis generi sine discrimine dedit.'

³ The indecencies and buffooneries were very great, as may be seen from a description given in Burchard, iii., 227.

⁴ Giustinian, i., 404.

geniality and good humour, were all put down to unnatural feelings or to sinister motives.

In his private life it is sufficiently clear that he was at little pains to repress a strongly sensual nature. Yet he was by no means universally self-indulgent, but was sparing in food and drink, was satisfied with little sleep, and was above the temptations of luxury and indolence. We may hesitate to believe the worst charges brought against him; but the evidence is too strong to enable us to admit that even after his accession to the papal office he discontinued the irregularities of his previous life. The Vatican was frequently the scene of indecent orgies, at which the Pope did not scruple to be present. Men shrugged their shoulders at these things, and few in Rome were seriously shocked. The age was corrupt, and the Pope's example sanctioned its corruption.¹

Alexander VI. had no friends because his policy was manifestly a personal policy and was carried on for the good of his own family. He was profuse in the creation of Cardinals, but none of them were men of mark, or felt much gratitude towards their patron. Alexander VI. was genial and friendly; but after the fall of Ascanio Sforza no one felt that they could trust to his

Alexander
VI. and
his Car-
dinals.

¹ Burchard's story of Cesare's supper to fifty prostitutes was long thought to be an interpolation or a burst of spite, but the publication of Burchard's Diary in full makes it impossible to dismiss it on either of those grounds. For some time I thought that it might be explained as an insertion which Burchard had taken from the letter of Silvio Savelli. But this supposition does not prove that it is untrue; and we have the corroborative evidence of the Florentine envoy, Francesco Pepi, who, in a despatch to the signory, dated from Rome, November 4, 1501, writes in cipe. that an illness of the Pope 'non lo impedi domenica nocte per la vilia d' ognisancti vegliare infino a xii hore con il duca, quale pareo facto venire in Palazzo la nocte ancora cantoniere, cortigiane, et tutta nocte stierono in veggia et balli et riso' (Thuasne, iii., 167). This refers to the same date as the entry in Burchard and the story in Savelli's letter. We may still charitably hope that the details of what took place are exaggerated. But a letter of Agostino Vespucci to Machiavelli gives a still darker picture; he says: 'Ogni sera xxv femmine et più, da l' Avemaria ad una hora, sono portate in Palazzo, in groppa di qualcheuno, adeo che manifestamente di tutto il Palazzo è factosi postribolo di ogni spurcizia' (Villari, *Machiavelli*, i., 558).

favour. He wanted instruments not advisers, and made use of men like Ferrari; but Cesare Borgia was the only man whom he trusted. The Cardinals felt that they were helpless and had to give way; if they resisted, the Pope in a business-like manner reduced them to obedience. Cardinal Rovere was an instance of the uselessness of opposition: he resisted as long as he had any hope of French help: then he became reconciled with the Pope, but was a doubtful friend and watched an opportunity to oppose him. Alexander VI. was afraid of his influence with the French king, and in June, 1502, despatched his secretary Trocchio and the Cardinal d'Albret to inveigle Giuliano at Savona; the plan was to invite him on board their galley and then set sail for Rome, but Giuliano escaped by refusing the invitation.¹ Alexander VI. was not revengeful and had no objection to opposition provided it was harmless for practical purposes. Capello says that the Cardinal of Lisbon spoke openly against the Pope; but the Pope only laughed and did not answer. He was satisfied to know that the Cardinals could do nothing against his will.²

There was not much moral sense in Europe to be shocked by the conduct of Alexander VI. Men did not say much about it, for it was useless to talk when there was no obvious method of mending matters. Now and then the old call for a Council was renewed, and longings for reform were hidden in many hearts. But there was no opening for any definite effort, and right-thinking men said little of the shame they felt. We catch a glimpse, however, of the common talk of

¹ This account is given by Burchard, iii., 209. Trocchio and Cardinal d'Albret took with them 'duo pulchræ curtisanæ italice Thomasina et Magdalena'; Burchard does not say whether they were for their own entertainment, or as a bait to Giuliano. He adds (p. 212), under date July 12: 'Redierunt ad Urbem secreto prout etiam inde recesserunt Carlis de Alibreto et Franciscus Trochia cum meretricibus suis, qui commissionem eis datam non fuerant executi, Revydam Cardinalem S. Petri ad Vincula de manibus impiorum Domino preservante'.

² Capello, in Sanuto, iii., 844: 'Il reverendissimo Ulisbonense di anni 84, molto stimato in corte, parla aperto contra il Papa, e il Papa si la ride e non li risponde; tamen, esso cardinale li da in le cegne, e si potesse, faria; ma li cardinali senza il papa non pol o'.

Europe in an ironical letter addressed by some German knights to the Pope. They had been summoned to Rome, to answer for wrongs done by them to the Abbey of Wesenberg near Speyer, and wrote to excuse themselves for not appearing. They were not scholars, they pleaded, and could do nothing in Rome; but they were good Christians, and served a good master, the Pfalzgraf, 'who worships God, adorns His temples, loves justice, hates vice, was never accused of adultery, nor even of an indecent act or word, who is truthful and upright'. They go on to make a profession of their faith: 'We believe in one Church and one Roman See, to which each Catholic head ascends, not by bribery, but by just election; nor does he defile that highest dignity by evil manners or bad example; nor does he cast stumbling-blocks in the way of the sheep redeemed by Christ's blood, but is the universal father and judge, whom all men are bound to obey. We believe, too, in a just God, who will punish with eternal fire all sins, such as robbery, sacrilege, pride, violence, vanity, abuse of Christ's patrimony, concubinage, simony, and other horrible crimes, through which the Christian religion totters and Christians of every age are scandalised.' The reference to the Pope's manner of life was so clear, that Burchard has preserved this letter as one of the many good stories current in the year of jubilee. The times were indeed evil when a rehearsal of the rudiments of Christian morality became a witticism by their manifest contrast to the life of the Head of the Church.¹

It is not his contemporaries, but the writers of the next generation who have branded Alexander VI. as a monster of iniquity. This fact is a sign of an awakening conscience in Italy, when it began to see the havoc which its corruption had wrought. Of this corruption the pontificate of Alexander VI. marked the highest point. Before that time the degradation of the Papacy had been gradual; in Alexander VI. the Papacy stood forth in all the strength of its

¹ Burchard, iii., 110.

emancipation from morality. Italy recognised how completely it was secularised when they saw it pursuing objects of its own outside the limits of Italian interests. The traditions of priestly life were gone, and the Papacy no longer represented Christian morality in the international relations of Europe. Its self-seeking was open and avowed: it joined with glee in the scramble for Italy which foreign invaders had begun. We cannot wonder that, in an after age, men detached Alexander VI. and Cesare Borgia from their place in history and clothed them with abnormal wickedness; that they pictured as monsters the men of alien race who, in a time of general helplessness, schemed to exalt themselves by erecting an Italian monarchy on the basis of a secularised Church.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FALL OF CESARE BORGIA.

PIUS III.—JULIUS II.

1503—1504.

THE unexpected death of Alexander VI., at a time when Cesare was confined to bed by sickness, was a contingency for which Cesare was not prepared; still his position was a strong one, as Rome was filled with his troops. On the other hand, the Spanish army was close to Rome, while the French forces were still at some distance. Under any circumstances the Orsini were sure to rise and attempt the recovery of their possessions; as it was, Cesare could not take the field against them or secure himself from their machinations in Rome. He felt that he could not stand alone, and promptly made overtures to the Colonna party, whom he had only deprived of their castles, whereas he had shed the blood of the Orsini. His overtures were not rejected; the Colonna were willing to oppose the Orsini, but were not likely to lend Cesare effective help for his own purposes.

Position
of Cesare
Borgia.
August,
1503.

Cesare's position was attacked on every side at once. Round Rome the Orsini gathered troops; in the Romagna the dispossessed lords prepared to return, and Venice was ready to help them, in hopes of sharing the spoil. Cesare could only resist them if he were supported by the Papacy, and his first object was to secure the election of a Pope who would be in his interest, or who at least would feel himself

obliged to lean on his protection. Everything depended on Cesare's power of managing the Conclave. He must exercise his influence decidedly, without giving any plausible ground for complaint of undue pressure. For this purpose, the attitude of a sick and helpless man had some advantages. If Cesare could not act openly with all the insolence of overbearing power, the next best thing was to make his enforced inactivity serve as a cloak for his schemes.

Amongst the Cardinals were seventeen Spaniards, on whose fidelity Cesare relied. The question was, if they were strong enough to carry their own candidate; and this depended on the number of Cardinals present at the election, and on the pressure which Cesare could indirectly bring to bear. Cesare could scarcely flatter himself that the College of Cardinals as a whole was devoted to his interests; but he might so manage matters that they would not venture to elect a Pope openly hostile to himself. The situation was very delicate and depended on small matters for its issue.

The first to move was Cardinal Caraffa, who immediately after Alexander VI.'s death summoned his brother Cardinals to meet in the Church of S. Maria sopra Minerva. They took precautions for guarding the city, and ordered an inventory to be made of the late Pope's goods; luckily one room had escaped the scrutiny of Michelotto, and in it were found precious stones to the value of 25,000 ducats. Next day they met again and sent a message to Cesare, that they could not enter the Conclave in the Vatican till the Castle of S. Angelo was in their hands. On this Don Michele made an armed demonstration by riding with 200 horse into the Piazza of Minerva. The citizens were alarmed, and offered to protect the Cardinals, who answered they had no fear. That night barricades were erected in the streets, which made them impassable for horsemen. Cesare saw that it was useless to attempt any form of intimidation, and from his sick bed he disavowed his agent. He ordered the governor

Proceedings of the Cardinals. August 19-30, 1503.

of the Castle of S. Angelo to take an oath of allegiance to the Cardinals; he explained that he only kept his troops in Rome for his personal safety, till he was well enough to travel; he professed the most dutiful obedience towards the College. Really he was seeking the political support of Spain; he gathered round him the Spanish Cardinals, pursued his negotiations with the Colonna, and professed himself entirely in the Spanish interest. Eleven Cardinals declared that they would elect a Spanish Pope, or would cause a schism. Cesare sent galleys and troops to prevent his chief enemy, Cardinal Rovere, from entering Rome.¹

The Cardinals who wished to make an independent election found it no easy matter. On the one side they were exposed to the pressure of Spain, on the other side to the pressure of France. They besought Venice to send troops for their protection; when Venice cautiously refused they found that they could not dispense with Cesare, and offered to confirm him in his office of Gonfaloniere of the Church provided that all his captains took an oath of allegiance to the College. Cesare was not prepared to give way so far. Probably at his instigation Prospero Colonna entered Rome with 100 horse on August 23: he was followed next day by Fabio Orsini, and Rome was disturbed by brawls between the rival factions. Cesare hoped that the Cardinals would turn to him for help: they turned instead to the ambassadors present in Rome, and besought them to guarantee the withdrawal of all troops to a distance of ten miles from the city; the Colonna, the Orsini, and Cesare were alike to withdraw. This was agreed; but as soon as the Orsini were gone Cesare found that the state of his health prevented him from leaving Rome, and that he would not be safe outside the walls of the Vatican. He was offered an abode in the Castle of S. Angelo, and long negotiations went on about the number of his attendants.

¹ Giustinian, ii., 138.

At last it became clear to Cesare that it was dangerous to delay the election longer, that he could not hope to stay in Rome and overawe the College, but must trust to the activity of his adherents in the Conclave. On September 1 he agreed to retire and withdraw his troops, on condition that the College took his person under their protection, gave him full liberty of passing through the territory of the Church, and used their influence to prevent Venice from helping his enemies in the Romagna. On September 2, borne in a litter, he departed from Rome with his troops, his cannon, and his goods; he went first to Tivoli, and thence to Nepi, and Civita Castellana.¹

Cesare's departure was followed by the arrival in Rome of Cardinal Rovere, who at once began to take a leading part in the intrigues about the papal election. Louis XII. thought that he had a claim on one whom he had so long protected, and commended to him his favourite, Georges d'Amboise, whose election he was anxious to secure. But Rovere at once cast aside all his obligations to the French king. 'I am here,' he said, 'to do my own business, not that of others. I will not vote for the Cardinal of Rouen unless I see that he has so many votes that he will be elected without mine.'² He put himself at the head of the Italian party and wished to secure his own election. Besides him there flocked to Rome the other Cardinals who had fled before Alexander VI., Colonna and Raffaele Riario. Finally on September 10 came the Cardinal Amboise, bringing with him the Cardinal of Aragon, brother of the dispossessed Federigo of Naples, and Ascanio Sforza, who was released from his long captivity in Bourges that he might give his vote in the French interest. Ascanio, however, was no sooner in Rome than he began to scheme in his own behalf.

When on September 16 the thirty-seven Cardinals

¹ The account of all this is given by Burchard, and Giustinian, ii., 138, etc.

² Giustinian, ii., 181.

entered the Conclave every one was doubtful about the issue of the election. At first each party put forward its own candidate. The Spaniards chose Cardinal Castro, a native of Valencia; the French worked for the Cardinal of Rouen; the Italians were divided between Giuliano della Rovere and Ascanio Sforza. The first scrutiny on September 21 showed that the voting was very scattered, but Amboise, Rovere, and Castro were almost equal. It was not a time which admitted of delay, and all parties had already contemplated the probability of a compromise. The night was spent in private colloquies, till at last Amboise and Ascanio Sforza agreed on Cardinal Piccolomini, who proved to be generally acceptable. His election was at once accepted, and was formally made and announced on the morning of September 22.

Election of Francesco Piccolomini. September 22, 1503.

Francesco Todeschini de' Piccolomini was sister's son of Pope Pius II., by whom he had been raised to the Cardinalate. He was a man of considerable learning and great personal amiability, who had lived a quiet and simple life. He had been employed in several legations and had discharged his public duties with tact. His character stood high in all men's estimation, though he was the father of a large family of children. He had held aloof from the political intrigues which had so largely occupied the activity of the Cardinals under the last three Popes, was not committed to any party and had offended no one. He had always been on good terms with Alexander VI., and Cesare Borgia expected to find in him a friend. His election awakened no animosity, but every one foresaw that his pontificate would be brief, as he was sixty-four years old, and suffered from an abscess in his leg which threatened to be fatal before long.

Previous life of Cardinal Piccolomini.

The new Pope took the name of Pius III. in memory of his uncle. He had at once to face the question of his relations with Cesare Borgia, whose dominions began at once to fall in pieces. Venice supplied troops to Guidubaldo, who advanced into his former duchy

Pius III. and Cesare Borgia.

of Urbino; Jacopo d'Appiano returned to Piombino; Pandolfo Malatesta occupied Rimini; Giovanni Sforza entered Pesaro; even the nephews of Vitellozzo were welcomed in Città di Castello. There was a general restoration of those whom Cesare had ousted from their states. In the Romagna an attempt was made, with the aid of Venetian troops, against Cesena, but the governor was loyal to Cesare and Cesena still held out. The day after his election Pius III. expressed to the Venetian envoy his surprise that Venice should have helped in disturbing the peace of Italy. Giustinian answered that it was natural for the dispossessed lords to seek their own. 'God,' said the Pope, 'has willed to chastise them for their sins, though it might be with a sorry instrument.'¹ He added with a smile that perhaps God might restore them after they had done sufficient penance. The envoy gathered that the Pope was under obligations to the Spanish Cardinals, and could not take up a hostile attitude towards Cesare. When Cardinal Rovere petitioned for the restoration of his nephew Francesco to Sinigaglia, the Pope gently but firmly refused. On September 25 he issued a brief reproving the chiefs of the league against Cesare, and bidding them cease from their attacks upon the Church.²

Pius III. had no affection for Cesare, who had carried away from the Vatican everything that he could and had left the treasury laden with debts. But Pius III. desired peace above all things. 'We will not,' he said, 'allow any one to bring war on Italy under pretence of helping us.'³ He spoke of reforming the Church, and thought that Cesare might be left to the judgment of heaven. Cesare for his part was anxious to secure himself in Rome before taking up arms, and his illness gave him a plausible pretext. On October 3 he returned to

Return of
Cesare to
Rome.
October 3,
1503.

¹ Giustinian, ii., 203: 'Dio li aveva voluti castigar per i peccati soi ancor con un tristo instrumento'.

² In *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 1ma serie, xvi., pt. ii., 595.

³ Giustinian, ii., 209.

Rome, bringing with him only 150 men-at-arms, 500 infantry, and a few cavalry; still he spoke confidently, and said that he would soon enjoy his own again.¹ His enemies pointed out the danger of a rising of the Orsini, and urged the Pope to order him to disarm. Pius III. listened but did nothing, and Cesare had great hopes of winning his good will. But fortune was adverse to Cesare's plans; on October 14 the Pope, who had been suffering much from his leg, was seized with fever, and the Orsini on this news set a watch to prevent Cesare from leaving Rome. He attempted to make his escape, but was so hotly pursued that he judged it wise to return, and took refuge in the Castle of S. Angelo, where he was regarded as a prisoner, and was only allowed two attendants.

The expectations which led to the election of Pius III. were soon fulfilled. He died on October 18, to the regret of all those who wished for peace.² No sooner was he dead than the Orsini demanded of the Cardinals that they should keep Cesare in ward till the election of a new Pope; but the death of Pius III. made Cesare again a person of some importance. He commanded the votes of the Spanish Cardinals, which would be weighty in deciding the new election. The possible candidates were regarded as Caraffa, Rovere, and Riario; the chances of Georges d'Amboise had gone, those of Rovere had risen. It was not in Cesare's power to procure the election of one of his own party, or of the Cardinal of Rouen; but it was still possible for him to prevent that of Rovere. It was still possible, if he was driven to desperation, that a disputed

¹ Giustinian, ii., 223.

² Burchard gives an epigram on his death:—

'Vixit Alexander multos crudelis ad annos,
At Pius ad nullos; quid juvat esse pius?'

Still more savage was the epigram of Colucci:—

'Tertius hic Pius est qui summum ad culmen ab ipsa
Virtute erectus protinus interiit;
Nec mirum, quia peste atra qui sederat olim
Sextus Alexander polluerat solium'.

Death of
Pius III.
October
18, 1503.

election might lead to another schism. The Cardinals would not provoke him; they declared him free to stay in the Castle of S. Angelo or go at his pleasure.

Cardinal Rovere meanwhile pursued his candidature openly by promises and bribes. Giustinian, ordered by Venice to favour his election, wrote home that contracts were made in public, no expense was spared, the pontificate was put up to auction for the highest bidder.¹ Cesare Borgia saw that he could do nothing better than make a good bargain with Cardinal Rovere. On October 29 there was a secret meeting between the two, and Rovere undertook to confirm Cesare as Gonfaloniere of the Church, to restore him in the Romagna, and give his nephew, with his claims on Sinigaglia, in marriage to Cesare's daughter. He said, with a smile to the Venetian ambassador, that men in a strait were often driven to do what they did not wish; when they were freed they did otherwise.² He was prepared to do anything to secure the Papacy, and his plans were so well laid that when the Cardinals entered the Conclave on October 31 no one had any doubt of the result. Even the name to be assumed by the new Pope was known, and had been engraved on the papal ring to be ready at once. The Conclave was almost held in public, as the window of the door was not closed. The proceedings were purely formal, and scarcely occupied an hour. On November 1 it was announced that Cardinal Rovere was elected Pope, and had assumed the name of Julius II.

The new Pope wished at first to be on good terms with every one. He heaped dignities on the Cardinal of Rouen; he took Cesare Borgia under his protection and gave him rooms in the Vatican; at the same time he assured Venice

¹ Rome, October 19: 'Li contratti si fanno publicamente. . . e non si parla a centenara, ma a migliara e desine di migliara, con grandissimo obrobrio de la religion nostra, et offesa del Signor Dio, perchè oramai non è differenza dal pontificato al soldanato, perchè plus offerenti datur' (ii., 255).

² Giustinian, ii., 273.

of his good will and of his gratitude. But he let it be known that he had a policy of his own about the Romagna. 'Our promise to Cesare,' he said, 'extends to the safety of his life and goods; but his states must return to the Church, and we wish for the honour of recovering what our predecessors have wrongly alienated.'¹ The Venetians by no means took this view of the situation. They had promoted the election of Julius II. because they reckoned on his hostility to Cesare Borgia to help their plan of restoring the dispossessed lords of the Romagna in dependence upon themselves.

Julius II.
sends
Cesare
against
Venice.
November 19,
1503.

It is a noticeable feature of the times that the Pope's coronation was deferred till November 26 because the astrologers promised on that day a lucky conjunction of the stars.² The adventurous politics of Italy, being founded on no definite principles, were supposed to be influenced by luck. Cesare Borgia's good fortune excited the admiration of Machiavelli, and Julius II. was anxious to begin his pontificate under a lucky star. He had already formed his own plans, but he was in no haste to declare them. He did not intend to allow Venice to extend its dominion over the Romagna. He had no forces at his command to prevent them, and determined meanwhile to make use of the influence of Cesare Borgia for that end. Some castles in the Romagna were still held in Cesare's name; he might be useful in resisting the Venetians. Accordingly, on November 19 Cesare with 150 horsemen was permitted to leave Rome for Ostia, whence he was to proceed by sea to some Florentine port. The Florentines, through fear of Venice, were willing to give him passage through their territory and help him to reach Imola.

Immediately after Cesare's departure came the news that Faenza was on the point of falling before the Venetians. Julius II. spent a sleepless night; he was afraid lest the appearance of Cesare should create such dread of his vengeance that the other

Imprisonment of
Cesare.
November 29,
1503.

¹ Giustinian, ii., 289.

² *Ibid.*, 295.

cities of the Romagna would throw themselves into the hands of Venice. Next day he sent the Cardinal of Volterra to Ostia to make a new agreement with Cesare. He asked that Cesare should order his captains to surrender into the hands of the Pope the fortresses which they still held in the Romagna, on condition that they should be restored to Cesare when the danger from Venice was past.¹ This plan had been previously discussed, but Julius II. put it aside, saying that he would break faith with no man. He now resumed it; but Cesare, rejoicing in his newly acquired liberty, refused to consent. It was the last act in Cesare's political career. Julius II. instantly sent orders that his galley should not be allowed to set sail from Ostia, and commanded the troops to be disbanded which were being sent by land to aid him. On November 29 Cesare returned to Rome and was committed to the care of one of the Cardinals. His course was run; but he was still useful as a means of enabling Julius II. to get into his hands the fortresses of the Romagna. Guidubaldo of Urbino came to Rome and Cesare Borgia had an interview with the man whom he had so greatly wronged.² The result of this meeting was that Cesare gave up to Guidubaldo the watchword of his castles in the Romagna, and restored the books and tapestries which he had carried off from the palace of Urbino.

Julius II. at once sent to take possession of the castles; but the captain of Cesena refused to receive orders from a master who was kept a prisoner, and even hanged the Pope's messenger. Julius II. was angry at this failure of his schemes, and ordered Cesare to be confined in the Castle of S. Angelo. The Spanish Cardinals strove to procure his liberation. There was a plan that he should go to Civita Castellana under the

Failure of
Julius II.
to recover
Cesena.
Decem-
ber, 1503.

¹ Machiavelli, *Commissioni*, Lett. 44-49.

² The letter in Ugolini, *Storia dei Conti e Duchi d'Urbino*, ii., 523, scarcely agrees with Giustinian's account of what Guidubaldo said to him afterwards (ii., 326), and must be dismissed as rhetorical.

guardianship of one of the Cardinals, and as soon as the castles were surrendered to the Pope, should be set at liberty; but the Cardinal chosen for the office of guardian found that his health did not permit him to undertake this perilous duty. Cesare still remained in Rome, and Julius II. showed growing anger against Venice.

France and Spain were still engaged in war about Naples, but the defeat of the French on the Garigliano and the consequent surrender of Gaeta saw the Spaniards in entire possession of Naples in the beginning of 1504. Julius II. was disappointed at this result, for he had more to hope from France than from Spain. He was, however, careful to preserve an appearance of neutrality, though he showed his humanity to the French fugitives, who in the depth of winter made their way almost naked to Rome. The Romans remembered too well what they had suffered from French arrogance, and left the unhappy men to die in crowds upon the dungheaps where they sought shelter.¹ The Pope clothed and fed as many as he could, and provided for their passage to France. In February a truce for three years was concluded between France and Spain, though every one knew that it was hollow.

Julius II. had no better object to pursue than the possession of the castles which were still held for Cesare—Cesena, Forlì and Bertinoro. The captains were faithful, and refused to give them up to the Pope till their master was at liberty. Long negotiations were carried on between Julius II., Cesare, and the castellans; negotiations which the Venetian envoy found 'more intricate than the labyrinth'.² Julius II. could not obtain the castles without Cesare's consent, and Cesare wished to secure his freedom before he consented. At last it was agreed that Cesare should go to Ostia under the charge of the Cardinal of S. Croce, who should set him at liberty as soon as he was satisfied with the arrangements for the surrender of the

The
French
lose
Naples.
January,
1504.

Liberation
of Cesare
Borgia.
April 19,
1504.

¹ Giustinian, ii., 379; Landucci, *Diario*.

² Giustinian, iii., 29.

castles. When this was done the captains of Cesena and Bertinoro were ready to admit the Pope's forces, but the captain of Forlì demanded 15,000 ducats for payment of his troops. On this new difficulties arose, and Julius II. was so ungenerous as to require Cesare to give security for this sum. Cesare at last agreed, and on April 19 the Cardinal of S. Croce declared that Cesare had done all that was in his power and allowed him to set out for Naples. Julius II. was by so means pleased with the Cardinal of S. Croce, who acted on his own responsibility, because he was afraid that the Pope would raise fresh difficulties as a means for keeping Cesare in his power.

Cesare was welcomed in Naples by Gonsalvo de Cordova, who gave him an ample safe-conduct. His friends gathered round him, and he looked for some opportunity to restore himself to a position of importance in political affairs. He proposed to go to the help of Pisa against Florence; but a rising in Piombino gave him a more favourable opening. He was preparing to lead troops thither, and was on the point of setting out, when on May 26 he was made prisoner by Gonsalvo's orders. This was done by the command of Ferdinand of Spain, moved thereto by the representations of Julius II. that Cesare was bent on disturbing the peace of Italy. Anyhow it was a treacherous deed, and Gonsalvo felt it to be such. His first care after Cesare's imprisonment was to recover the safe-conduct which he had given him and destroy it.¹ Even prejudiced bystanders like the Venetian ambassadors judged the conduct of the Spanish king to be dishonourable. In his second captivity Cesare Borgia despaired of any further power in Italy. He wrote to the captain of Forlì that 'fortune had grown too angry with him,' and ordered the surrender of the castle to the Pope. This was done on August 10, and ten

¹ Giustinian, iii., 125, etc.; also letters of Francesco Pandolfini, given by Villari, *ibid.*, Appendix ii. A letter of Julius II. to the Spanish monarch, dated May 11, is given by Alvisi, *Cesare Borgia*, Appendix cii.

Death of
Cesare
Borgia.
March 12,
1507.

days afterwards Cesare was released from prison in Naples and was sent to Spain. There he remained in close confinement for two years, though his brother-in-law, Jean d'Albret, King of Navarre, pleaded for his release. At length a plan of escape was contrived, and in November, 1506, Cesare fled from his prison and took refuge in Navarre. There he took arms in the service of the king against his rebellious vassal the Count of Lerin, and besieged the castle of Viana. The Count of Lerin made a sortie which was repulsed, and Cesare followed hotly in pursuit. The Count met with reinforcements and faced upon his pursuers, who fled in turn. Cesare, with only one companion, stood his ground till he was overwhelmed and slain on March 12, 1507.¹

Cesare Borgia's fate was the same as that of his predecessors who had trusted to the favour of an individual Pope as a means of procuring a political position in Italy. He differed from them only because he was more resolutely supported by a Pope who was his father, and who was free from any restraints imposed by his office or by his sympathy with the political feeling of Italy. Alexander VI. had frankly set forward as the great object of his policy the advancement of his son. Cesare had brought to his task considerable capacity, and the state of Italian affairs had given scope to his cleverness. Resolute and unscrupulous, this stranger had acted boldly on the principles which Italian statesmen adopted without daring to admit. They had only to apply their principles upon a small scale, to maintain or readjust what they already possessed; Cesare had to begin his career from the beginning, and did so with a thoroughness and precision which awakened the mingled terror and admiration of bystanders. He was resolute to acquire and strong to maintain. He attacked his enemies with their own weapons. He remorse-

Career of
Cesare
Borgia.

¹ The account of his death is given by the Ferrarese secretary, Mag-nani, in a letter dated April 12, 1507, in Alvisi, *Cesare Borgia*, Appendix ciii.; also *Atti e Memorie per le Provincie Modenesi*, viii., 183.

lessly swept all obstacles from his course, and used at every moment the means which the vicissitudes of affairs placed at his disposal. But he aimed at justifying his violent measures by his good government of his conquests. He brought law and order into the Romagna, as it had never been before, and his subjects regretted his downfall. He knew that his design was hazardous, and that he had but a short time in which to work it out; in the supreme moment of his fortunes fate was against him and his prosperity crumbled away.

The exceptional odium which Cesare Borgia inspired is due partly to the terror caused by his rapid success, and partly to his personal character. It was not so much his violent and treacherous deeds which horrified his contemporaries as his strange and mysterious life. A man might smile and be a villain, and his villainy was easily overlooked; but Cesare rarely smiled, and practised duplicity from mere love of the art. He made no friends; he gathered no body of followers; he eschewed the intercourse of his fellows except when his own designs required it. He affected darkness and seclusion; he enshrouded even his licentiousness in mystery; he spoke to his father in Spanish in the presence of others; he avoided all visitors, and refused to talk even with his own followers.¹ Perhaps he deliberately chose to act as a foil to his father's restless garrulity; perhaps he thought that an affectation of secrecy was best calculated to help his plans. At all events he succeeded in creating universal dread. In his misfortunes he was pitied by few, and after his fall the sense of relief from the presence of one who would not let himself be understood swept away all the admiration which his success inspired.

Yet the career of Cesare Borgia was a great epoch in Italian politics. It made all men dimly conscious of the

¹ Such is the testimony of Giustinian, and equally of Branca di Talini, quoted in Appendix. The diary of Marino Sanuto, vol. iii., makes frequent mention of the efforts of Venice to discover the truth about a lady whom Cesare was suspected of having carried off; but not all the ingenuity of the Venetian could find out anything certain.

direction in which they were tending. It showed them that Italy had become the prey of adventurers, and they shuddered at the thought. The ordinary man, who looked to the past, laid upon Cesare the blame of originating the state of things which he used. A political thinker like Machiavelli strove to construct the only possible ideal of the future, that a prince, endowed like Cesare, but with more than Cesare's good fortune, should follow in Cesare's steps. The only hope that he saw for Italy, divided and helpless, was the resolute brain and the strong hand of one who would heal her breaches by the only means of which the times admitted.

CHAPTER XIII.

FIRST PLANS OF JULIUS II.

1504—1506.

THE removal of Cesare Borgia from Italy was of little service to Julius II., save that it cleared the way for his open hostility to Venice. Venice had been eager in promoting the election of Julius II. to the Papacy, in the hope that his animosity against Cesare Borgia would lead him to acquiesce in a Venetian protectorate over the Romagna, and was disappointed when Julius II. showed a resolute determination to recover the Romagna for the Church. But the Pope was powerless, and bitterly resented his impotence. So long as Cesare was still an object of dread he was driven to temporise; but when Cesare was imprisoned in Naples, he said with a smile to the Venetian envoy that now Venice had no excuse for keeping the lands of the Church. 'Venice,' he added, 'makes both herself and me the slaves of every one—herself that she may keep, me that I may win back. But for this we might have been united to find some way to free Italy from foreigners.'¹ It was a remarkable confession that Julius II. saw clearly whither the course of his policy would lead. Rather than endure the action of Venice he would be the 'slave of every

¹ Giustinian, iii., 134-5: 'Assai meglio seria stato che la Signoria non fusse entrata in quel pensiero di far quel che ha fatto, perchè è causa de tegnirne nui e lei in travaglio, e che lei e nui convegiamo essere schiavi d'ognuno: nui per acquistare, e lei per conservare; chè senza questo, averessimo, uniti insieme, possuto trovare qualche bona via de liberar l'Italia dalla tirannide de barbari'.

one,' and would try every possible combination to win back from Venice its ill-gotten gains. Yet at the bottom of his heart he was an Italian patriot, and longed for the freedom of his country from the yoke of foreigners. He regretted that Venice had thought fit to behave so as to compel him in self-defence to rivet more firmly his country's chains. Italian patriotism was a distant ideal, which he was compelled to sacrifice to the needs of the present. It was always so in Italian history. Large considerations of general utility were in the background awaiting a convenient season. The liberator was always preparing himself for the task. There was just one enemy to overcome by any means that could be found, and then a nobler policy would be possible. Italy was ruined beyond redemption by the selfishness of her rulers before the favourable opportunity arrived. The struggles of the Italian states against one another were justified by constant expectation of some general benefit which never was attained. Local patriotism dictated treachery to the common interest. Treason to Italy was committed with a sigh in vague hope of some splendid act of reparation. Patriotism was on all men's lips, but no one dared to set an example of patriotic self-sacrifice. Men sinned with the knowledge that they were sinning, but were helpless to see how they could avoid sinning without running the risk of destruction.

Of all this Julius II. was fully conscious. His experience of France enabled him to see whither Italy was tending. He had seen how cruel were the tender mercies of the foreigner; he had heard the jests of the invader, and had witnessed the havoc which he wrought. His position as Pope enabled him, had he wished, to act upon his knowledge and set an example of patriotic forbearance. The Papacy could afford to wait for the Romagna, and Julius II. might well have hesitated to seize all that had been won by the crooked ways of Alexander VI. But Julius II. was too entirely an Italian to escape from the unblushing self-seeking of his time; he was too obstinate, too self-willed, to sacrifice

anything to which he considered that he had a claim. He had invoked French help to do him right when he was Cardinal; as Pope he was ready 'to be the slave of every one,' rather than sit down patiently under a sense of wrong. He desired to free Italy from the stranger, but first he would use the stranger to humble the pride of Venice. There was in this a cynical consciousness of political wrong-doing that is as revolting as the frank unscrupulousness of Alexander VI.

'We will do our duty, and will use all possible means for the preservation of our honour and the maintenance of the Church. The Venetians wish to treat us as their chaplain, but that they shall never do.'¹ So spoke Julius II., and Venice would have been wise to give way. But the Venetians trusted that they would wear out the Pope's firmness, and would not abandon their policy of cautiously grasping at every opportunity of aggrandisement. In this they had been so successful that they had awakened universal jealousy, and the Italian powers looked with dread on the advance of Venice towards universal rule in Italy. Maximilian complained of its aggressions on the imperial territory; Ferdinand of Spain grudged the towns which Venice held in the Neapolitan domains; Alexander VI. had seen in Venice the great obstacle to his plans for Cesare, and had striven to raise up a coalition against her.² The diplomatic intrigues of the rulers of Europe made it easy for Julius II. to revive the idea of a dismemberment of Venice. He exhorted Maximilian to enter Italy, protect the Church, and come to Rome to receive the imperial crown. He sent envoys to France and Spain, begging them to unite and recover from Venice all that she had unjustly acquired; her spoil would pay the expenses of the war, and would be a rich recompense for the undertaking.³ His proposals were embodied in the treaty which was signed at Blois, on Sep-

Treaty of
Blois.
Septem-
ber 22,
1504.

¹ Giustinian, iii., 179.

² De Leyva, *Storia Documentata di Carlo V.*, i., 73.

³ Brosch, *Papst Julius II.*, 326, gives several extracts from the Pope's instructions to his nuncios.

tember 22, 1504, between Louis XII., Maximilian, and his son the Archduke Philip. This treaty expresses the desire of Louis XII. to secure the alliance of Maximilian against Spain at any cost. He had no intention to carry out a plan for securing to the house of Austria an almost universal monarchy; yet the treaty provided that Philip's son Charles, who was heir to Maximilian on one side, and to Ferdinand and Isabella on the other, should marry Claude of France, and receive in dowry the French claims on Milan, Genoa, Burgundy, and the heritage of Brittany. To separate the Pope from Spain, and to prevent him from making any accord with Venice, another treaty provided for an alliance with him against Venice to win back the territories of which she had deprived the confederates.

If Julius II. rejoiced when this treaty was concluded, he was doomed to speedy disappointment. Its immediate object in the eyes of Louis XII., a separation between the house of Austria and Spain, was achieved by other means. The death of Isabella of Castile on November 26 caused a more serious breach between Ferdinand and the Austrian house. The Archduke Philip claimed the regency of Castile by virtue of his wife Joanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella; but Ferdinand had been too long accustomed to rule in his wife's name to give up his power without a struggle. He strove to win over Louis XII. to his side, and a little reflection convinced Louis that the treaty of Blois was dangerous to the interests of France. The plan for the partition of the Venetian territories was suspended while Ferdinand negotiated with Louis XII. But Venice was well informed of what had been devised against her, and was somewhat alarmed. Both the Pope and Venice were keenly watchful of political possibilities. Venice thought it wise to abstain from awaking further animosity by attempting to extend her hold on the Romagna. The Pope, as he saw the chances of an attack on Venice grow more remote, was disposed to secure what he could obtain at present. Negotiations were

Accord of
Julius II.
with
Venice.
April,
1505.

cautiously carried on by the mediation of the Duke of Urbino, and Venice undertook to restore all her conquests in the Romagna except Rimini and Faenza. Julius II. conducted his negotiations with consummate skill. He received all that Venice would give, but avoided any guarantee for her right to retain Rimini and Faenza. When pressed for a brief to confirm the accord with Venice, Julius II. replied, 'It is not in our power to alienate the lands of the Church. I have done enough in pledging my word.'¹ It was clear that the papal accord was worth nothing; it was only a recognition that nothing better could be done at the present. Venice could only hope that the confederates who sought her ruin might find employment in other matters, or that the Pope might be involved in some difficulty.

The fixed idea of Julius II. was to carry on the schemes of territorial aggrandisement which Sixtus IV. had begun and which Alexander VI. had so successfully continued; but Julius II. had a horror of the doings of the Borgia, and wished to emphasise his desire to abolish all their traditions. What Alexander VI. had done ignobly as a means of enriching his son, Julius II. would do with persistent resoluteness for the glory of the Church. He had no other aim than his predecessors; he was not much more scrupulous in his choice of means than they had been; but his aim was clear and was not mixed with personal considerations, so that it gained in grandeur as it was made intelligible. Men feared and hated Julius II., but they respected him, and his fiery impetuosity lent him a dignity which was wanting to the supple Alexander VI. He did nothing to raise the Church from its purely secular course of policy, but he succeeded in making that policy respectable.

Relation
of Julius
II. to the
Borgia
policy.

¹ Giustinian, iii., 408, under date April 22, 1505. The course of these long negotiations is traced by Brosch, *Papst Julius II.*, 120, etc. Sigismondo de' Conti, ii., 340, says: 'Oppida restituerant suasu Guidi Urbini ducis affirmantis fore ut, illis redditis, nihil aliud repetiturus ab eis Pontifex esset. Optabat id quidem ille, sed animum Julii parum exploratum habebat, cui cura recuperandi Ariminum et Faventiam penitus erat infixata.' This is a fair account of the facts.

For this purpose he emphasised the difference between himself and Alexander VI.; and in 1504 deprived Rodrigo Borgia of the Duchy of Sermoneta, which he restored to the Gaetani. In his Bull of restitution he openly gave as his reasons, 'Our predecessor desiring to enrich his own kin, through no zeal for justice but by fraud and deceit, sought for causes of depriving the Gaetani of their possessions'.¹ Rarely had a Pope been so outspoken in condemning the man whom he succeeded in the Chair of S. Peter.

Though Julius II. abandoned nepotism as a political weapon, he did not forget the claims of his relations. In his first creation of Cardinals there were two of the Rovere family; in his second creation there was another. His nephew Francesco Maria, son of the Prefect, was adopted by his childless uncle, Guidubaldo of Urbino, as heir to his duchy, so that he needed no special favour from the Pope. The marriage of another nephew, Niccolò della Rovere, was curious, and seemed to show a desire on the part of Julius II. to quit old scores and live in charity with all men. In November, 1505, Niccolò was married in the Vatican to Laura, the reputed daughter of Orsino de' Orsini, but whose parentage was generally attributed to Alexander VI. It was clear that the antipathy which Julius II. felt to Alexander VI. rested on personal and political grounds, not on moral reprobation. Julius II., like his predecessor, was a father, and his daughter Felice was welcomed in Rome;² but his parental fondness gave rise to no scandals, and Felice was not raised to any great dignity. Her father proposed to marry her to Roberto Sanseverino, a nephew of Guidubaldo of Urbino, Prince of Salerno, but dispossessed of his principality by the Spaniards. Felice, however, showed some spirit and refused to marry a husband without territory and without revenues;³ so another husband was provided, Gian-

¹ Quoted by Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom*, viii., 4.

² Giustinian, *Dispacci*, iii., 143.

³ Letter of Giovanni Acciaiuoli from Rome, quoted by Villari in Giustinian, *Dispacci*, iii., 439: 'Allegando non volere maritarsi al signore senza stato et senza alcuna entrata di presente; il che non è seguito senza qualche indignazione da prima della Santità del Papa'.

giordano Orsini, whom she married in 1506; and the unrestrained display of affection made by the bridegroom at the wedding sorely shocked many of the bystanders.¹ Thus Julius II. showed no undue partiality for his own relatives, and so did much to abate one of the most grievous scandals of the Papacy. Moreover, the marriages with the Orsini were a surer way of turning the old Roman barons into nobles of the papal court than was the aggressive policy of Alexander VI.

The subject of the reformation of the Church was one to which every Pope felt bound to give a passing recognition. As Julius II., when Cardinal, had pressed for a Council, and had denounced the conduct of Alexander VI., it was natural that for the sake of consistency he should make a show of doing something. In November, 1504, he appointed a commission of six Cardinals to report; but commissions had so often been appointed that no one took the matter seriously, and we have no evidence that a report was ever presented.² But Julius II. felt that some step was necessary for a vindication of the papal dignity, and though he was not prepared to reform the Church, he tried to abate the scandals attaching to papal elections. He issued a protest—for it could be nothing more than a protest—against the simony which he had witnessed and even practised. A constitution published on January 19, 1505, declared that any gift, or promise, of money or benefices invalidated the election of him who had made it: even enthronisation could not do away with the defect of title; all Cardinals, even those who had been guilty of receiving bribes, were bound to avoid the simoniacally elected Pope as a heathen and a heretic; it was their duty to depose him and call in the secular arm, if need were, to

¹ Paris de Grassis: 'Labia sponse intra os suum medium impressit non sine rubore sponse et admiratione multorum'. Paris himself soon went away 'metuens ne graviora vidisse me oporteat'.

² It is mentioned by Giustinian, iii., 299, who remarks: 'Per l'esperienza del passato crederò che la cosa non avrà alcun effetto'.

their aid.¹ The publication of such a constitution was a bold measure, and showed a strong sense of the need of amendment. Perhaps Julius II. was in some degree animated by a desire to separate himself from the misdoings of Alexander VI., to fasten upon him the obloquy of the past, and shake himself free from his own former self.

In several ways Julius II. showed a desire for a better state of things in Rome, and endeavoured to bring the Cardinals to a more decorous way of life. Thus on Whit Sunday, 1505, he sent Paris de Grassis, his Master of Ceremonies, with a message to the Cardinals forbidding them to be present at a comedy which was to be acted next day. 'It was not fitting,' he said, 'for Cardinals to be seen in public, looking at the amusements of boys.'² Paris found some difficulty in delivering this unwonted message in an intelligible form.

The reform of the Curia was not, however, the object that was foremost in the thoughts of Julius II. He burned with desire to distinguish himself as a politician and to shed lustre over the Church. He grieved over his enforced inaction, and prepared for the time when activity would be possible. He knew that pretensions were useless unless backed by force, and he knew that troops needed money; so he lived with careful frugality, and spent no more as Pope than he had done as Cardinal. He was even miserly, and tried to escape paying his debts. It is no wonder that the work of reform was not vigorously prosecuted; for reform meant the abandonment of the sale of ecclesiastical offices, and however much Julius II. might condemn simony from which the Papacy obtained no advantage, he regarded it in another light when it supplied the means of carrying on a

¹ Raynaldus, 1506, § 1.

² Brequigny, *Notices des Manuscrits du Roi*, ii., 604: 'Quoniam non decet cardinales ad locum publicum ire visuros spectacula puerorum'. I am not sure if 'spectacula puerorum' means plays acted by boys, or spectacles fit only for boys, or if the prohibition was directed against plays in general or this particular play.

spirited policy in behalf of the Church.¹ But though the desire for money checked any attempts at reform, it did not lead the Pope into any acts of violence or extortion. Men said that at least the Pope did not seek money to enrich his family.

It was not, however, solely for warlike purposes that Julius II. hoarded his money, nor was it only by the sword that he wished to increase the dignity of the Church. He inherited the traditions of Sixtus IV., and carried them out with greater nobility of aim. Sixtus IV. had done much for the architectural restoration of Rome; Julius II. was resolved to do still more. Even Alexander VI. had felt the artistic impulse which swept over Italy, though he confined his work chiefly to the neighbourhood of the Vatican. He summoned Antonio di Sangallo to superintend the restoration of the Castle of S. Angelo, in which he fitted up rooms for his own use, and employed Pinturicchio to paint them. In the Vatican he built the rooms which he delighted to inhabit, and which still bear his name. The Torre di Borgia, or Appartimenti Borgia, form part of the present library, and were built along the court of the Belvedere which Innocent VIII. had laid out. Nowhere is the beauty of Pinturicchio's decorative work more delicately displayed than in the allegorical figures of the planets, the intellectual virtues, the saints, and sacred histories with which he has adorned the lunettes and wall spaces of these rooms. The story ran that Giulia Farnese served as model for the Madonna in a fresco over one of the doors, and that Alexander VI. had his own portrait painted in an attitude of devout adoration of her beauty.² This

¹ Giustinian, iii., 346. Brosch, *Julius II.*, p. 329, quotes from a letter of Pisani, the Venetian envoy who succeeded Giustinian, January 16, 1506: 'El papa se atrova assai denari, et in dies ne fa, et usa tanta simonia che non lo potesti pensar, et io so le cose sue vi prometto chel ha duc. 400 M. tra denari et arzenti et indies va accumulando; debitamente però non cum extorsion et non per darli a nepoti'. Pisani is quoting the words of Alidosi, the papal treasurer.

² Vasari, *Vita di Bernardino Pinturicchio*; the story has been endlessly repeated without verification.

Architec-
ture at
Rome
under
Alexander
VI.

story is characteristic of the way in which the legends that grew round Alexander VI. were repeated without verification even of the most obvious details. Giulia Farnese may, or may not, have been the model for Pinturicchio's Madonna; but the Madonna in his picture is adored only by cherubim, and the portrait of Alexander VI. is in another room, as one of the shepherds who kneel before the infant Christ.

Perhaps the story may have owed its birth to the refusal of Julius II. to inhabit the rooms occupied by the man whom he so profoundly hated. In 1507 he removed to another part of the Vatican, saying that he could not endure to look at the portrait of his enemy, whom he called a Jew, an apostate, and a circumcised wretch. When his attendants laughed at this last epithet, Julius II. reduced them to silence by a scowl. When Paris de Grassis suggested that the walls might be cleared of the obnoxious pictures, the Pope answered, 'That would not be decorous; moreover, I will not live in rooms that recall memories of crime'.¹ In estimating the character of Alexander VI. it should be remembered that no Pope had a successor who was so outspoken in his hostility.

Alexander VI. was too much engaged in politics to be a great patron of art. It was in his early days as Cardinal that he left a more important memorial than any of his works as Pope, by building one of the most renowned palaces in Italy. It is now known as the Palazzo Sforza-Cesarini, and has undergone many alterations which have destroyed its former character, save in the inner court. This palace of Cardinal Borgia marked a new epoch in the

¹ Paris de Grassis (MS. Brit. Mus., Add. 8046), November 26, 1507: 'Hodie Papa cepit in Superioribus mansionibus Palatii habitare, quia non volebat videre omni hora, ut mihi dixit, figuram Alexandri predecessoris sui inimici, quem maranum et Judæum appellabat et circumcisum. Quod verbum cum ego cum nonnullis domesticis riderem, ipse quasi egre tulit a me quod non crederem que diceret de Papa Alexandro quia esset circumcisus. Et cum ego replicarem quod, si placeret sibi ipsam imaginem delere de pariete, et omnes alias simul cum assis illi adpictis, non voluit, dicens quod hoc non deceret, sed ipse non volebat ibi habitare ne recordaretur memorie illius pessime et scelerate.' It is noticeable that Paris tells us of similar language used by Leo X. about Julius II.

architectural history of Rome, in which church building was laid aside, and Cardinals vied with one another in the splendour of their houses. The only ecclesiastical buildings during Alexander VI.'s pontificate were due to the liberality of foreigners. Charles VIII. left a memorial of his abode in Rome in the Church of S. Trinità dei Monti, which was built at the cost of the Cardinal of S. Malo; and the Germans in 1500 began the Church of S. Maria dell' Anima in connexion with their national hospital.

Still in the days of Alexander VI. a new era in the architectural history of Rome was opened by the coming of Bramante. Born in Urbino, he had worked in various places till he settled in Milan, where he left many traces of his industry. On the fall of Ludovico Sforza in 1499 he went to Rome, where his first work was the emblazonment of the Borgia arms over the Porta Santa at the Lateran, in honour of the Jubilee. The sight of the ancient monuments of Rome filled him with enthusiasm; he rambled as far as Naples in quest of Roman remains, and Hadrian's Villa at Tivoli especially attracted his careful study. Cardinal Caraffa was the first to see his merits, and for him Bramante planned the cloisters attached to the Church of S. Maria della Pace; but two mighty palaces, which he designed for two Cardinals, first revealed his genius.

Bramante
in Rome.
1499-1504.

There are still no buildings of the Renaissance time in Rome which can compare in beauty with the palaces which Bramante built for the Cardinals Raffaele Riario and Hadrian of Corneto. Cardinal Riario wished to have his palace attached, as was the custom, to the Church of S. Lorenzo in Damaso. Bramante altered the old basilica and connected it with the palace already in course of erection, for which he designed the noble façade and the arcades of the courtyard, which are the finest examples of the graceful and refined simplicity of his style.¹ It is sad to say, that

¹ In 1517 Cardinal Riario was involved in a conspiracy against Leo X., and his goods were confiscated by the Pope. His palace was made the seat of the papal Chancery, and is now known as the Cancelleria.

the granite pillars which support the arcade were taken from the basilica of S. Lorenzo; but the builder of the church had in his day carried them off from the portico of the neighbouring theatre of Pompeius. In every age architects have borrowed and destroyed, while they praised and studied, the work of those who went before.

More massive and severe in style was the palace which Bramante built for Cardinal Hadrian of Corneto in the Borgo Nuovo, which Alexander VI. had laid out. Cardinal Hadrian stood high in the Pope's favour, and wished to please him by decorating his new street. It was in Hadrian's garden that Alexander VI. supped in the evening before his fatal illness. He had gone perhaps to see the progress of Bramante's work, which was there uninfluenced by any need of adaptation, and consequently conceived a simple but stately dwelling for a great noble. A plain basement of rustica work with square windows was surmounted by a floor more richly decorated for the habitation of the master. Round-headed windows are set within massive square cornices, and the wall space between them is adorned by two graceful pilasters. The upper story, designed for the use of dependents, has the same decoration of pilasters with smaller and simpler windows.¹

In the days of Alexander VI. Cardinal Rovere had not seen much of Rome. He needed architects for practical purposes, and summoned from Florence Giuliano di San Gallo to fortify his castle at Ostia. He afterwards employed Giuliano to build a palace at his native place, Savona, and when he felt it wise to withdraw to France, Giuliano went with him. There Giuliano made a model of a palace which was presented to Charles VIII. at Lyons, and was the astonishment and delight of the King

Cardinal
Rovere
and
Giuliano.

¹ Cardinal Hadrian was Bishop of Bath and Wells, and gave his palace to Henry VIII., when his tortuous ways led him to leave Rome. It was the residence of Cardinal Campeggio as protector of England, and after the breach with Rome went to him. It was bought in 1760 by Count Giraud, and now belongs to the Duke of Torlonia. It is generally called the Palazzo Giraud or Palazzo Torlonia.

and his Court. On the election of his patron to the Papacy, Giuliano di San Gallo hastened to Rome; but Julius II. knew enough of architecture to discover the superiority of Bramante, and he was determined that whatever he did should be done by the foremost men of his day. His views were magnificent, and were prompted not so much by a love for art as by a desire to perpetuate his own fame. He had none of that delight in beauty which led him to surround himself with lovely things. He was not a patron of jewellers or workers in embroidery—indeed he was the first man who drew a clear line of distinction between the lesser and the greater arts. He saw the permanent value of architecture, painting, and sculpture, and treated with respect the great men who pursued them. In this deliberate determination to patronise only what was great and lasting, Julius II. has been amply justified by the result. He may be forgotten as a warrior or as a statesman, but he will live as the patron of Bramante, Raffael, and Michel Angelo.

Giuliano di San Gallo was disappointed to find that Julius II. had made Bramante his architect in chief, and employed him busily at the Vatican. The Pope devised a great plan of connecting with the Vatican Palace, by means of covered porticoes, the garden house of the Belvedere which Antonio Pollaiuolo had designed for Innocent VIII. The distance was about four hundred yards, but the inequality of the ground caused exceptional difficulties. A little valley lay between the two buildings, and the first floor of the Vatican was on a level with the ground floor of the Belvedere. Bramante designed a double loggia with a flight of steps leading from the lower ground. The lower loggia was adapted from the Doric pillars of the Theatre of Marcellus; over it was a gallery adorned with Ionic pillars, but enclosed and furnished with windows. The upper part of the space contained within this courtyard was to be a terraced garden: the lower part, nearest the Vatican, an open-air theatre for games and tournaments, while the spectators could sit in the loggia, which commanded

Bra-
mante's
loggia
at the
Vatican.

a view of Rome on the one side and of the wooded hills on the other. The Pope was delighted with this magnificent plan, and ordered Bramante to push on the work with feverish haste. The earth dug out during the day was carried away by night, so that there should be no hindrance to the progress of the work. Julius II. wished his walls to grow rather than be built,¹ and the result of this overhaste was that the foundations in aftertimes gave way, and the portico has needed continual repairs. Still, with all the haste that Bramante made, his work was not finished. At the death of Julius II. the greater part of the corridor on the side towards Rome had been built, but on the opposite side only the foundations were laid. Nor did posterity respect Bramante's magnificent design. It is true that Pius IV. carried on the corridor; but Sixtus V. made impossible the execution of the original plan by building his library across the court. He walled up Bramante's arcades, and severed what might have been the most stately court in the world into two disconnected portions. The building of the Braccio Nuovo in 1817 still further filled up the space. There are now two courts and a garden on the ground where Bramante strove to present a striking picture of a mighty palace with all its dependencies for comfort and amusement blended into harmony by his architectural skill. Had his plan been carried out, Julius II. would have left his successors a palace unrivalled for beauty and convenience.

If we are to believe Vasari, care for his future fame was amongst the first thoughts that occupied Julius II. when he ascended the Papal throne. The design for his own tomb after death was a strange object of solicitude for one who was only at the beginning of his career; but the passionate desire for posthumous glory was a leading motive with the men of the Renaissance who were drunk with a new sense of power over their own lives and over the world around them. The assertion of their individu-

Taste for
sepulchral
monu-
ments.

¹Vasari, *Vita di Bramante*: 'Il papa aveva voglia che tali fabbriche non si murassero ma nascessero'.

ality was their chief delight ; the sense of common life and common interests was weak. Society was necessary as the sphere of the individual's activity ; but society had no rights against him. He strove to act so that his actions should stand out clearly and decidedly his own, distinct from those of his fellow-men. He wished his name to be frequent in the mouths of those who came after, and his memory to live associated with some great undertaking. Vanity suggested sepulchral monuments as a ready means of satisfying this desire for fame. Men vied with one another in elaborating great designs. Sculpture was encouraged in a way which at no other time has been possible, and the churches of Italy were filled with stately tombs which are still their chief ornaments.

In Rome this taste for monumental sculpture had grown especially strong. Perhaps the honour paid by Cosimo de' Medici to the deposed Baldassare Cossa, whose tomb adorns the Baptistery of Florence, awakened the emulation of the rightful Popes. At all events the tomb of Martin V. in the Lateran Church is the first of a splendid series. It was the work of Antonio Filarete and was simple in its design ; before the papal altar lies the recumbent figure of Martin V. in papal robes, wrought in bronze.¹ The tomb of Eugenius IV. in the Church of S. Salvatore in Lauro was more in accordance with the ordinary design ; on a white marble sarcophagus, enclosed by an architrave supported by pillars, lies the figure of the Pope ; in the space above the sarcophagus is carved in relief the Madonna and an adoring angel.² The tombs of Nicolas V., Calixtus III., and Paul II. were destroyed by the work of Julius II. in S. Peter's, and only portions of the delicate

¹ I am afraid that the restoration of the tribune of S. Giovanni in Laterano may lead to a removal of this tomb, which I have on three visits to Rome failed to see.

² Ill luck has pursued Eugenius IV. even after his death. The Church of S. Salvatore in Lauro is now disused and turned into a depôt of military stores. The tomb of the Pope is carefully boarded up, and will some day probably be removed to a museum.

Tombs of
the Popes.
1436-1496.

figures which Mino da Fiesole made for Paul II. now remain. Pius II. was more fortunate; his monument was removed to the Church of S. Andrea della Valle, where it still remains, a vast architectural erection in four divisions, overladen with pillars, cornices, and reliefs. Happier were Sixtus IV. and Innocent VIII., whose tombs by Antonio Pollaiuolo still adorn S. Peter's. On the bronze lid of a sarcophagus Sixtus IV. is represented as reposing with folded hands; the face is strong and vigorous even in the quietness of death. The figure of the Pope is surrounded by an ornamental border in which are allegorical figures of Virtues in relief, while the bevelled edge of the lid is adorned with figures representing the various branches of intellectual study. It is noticeable as a sign of the times that the figure of Theology has been studied from Diana;¹ over her shoulders she carries a quiver and in her hand a bow; an angel holds an open book before the reclining figure, but her face is turned away as though she were on the watch for some more practical object of pursuit. Sixtus IV. fared better at the hands of Pollaiuolo than did Innocent VIII., whose tomb is more pretentious, but fails in energy and in architectural arrangement. The Pope lies on a bronze sarcophagus, and above is again represented as in life; one hand is raised in benediction, the other holds the point of the Holy Lance which the Sultan Bajazet had sent as a precious relic. Over Alexander VI. no tomb was erected. Julius II. caused the coffin of his enemy to be taken from S. Peter's to the Church of S. Giacomo degli Spagnuoli, whence it was again transferred to the Spanish Church of S. Maria di Monferrato. No man ventured to raise a memorial to one whose name was hateful to his successor and whose pontificate every one wished to forget.

Nor was it only the Popes whose fame was thus perpetuated. All the chief churches of Rome are full of tombs of the Cardinals of this time. It would almost seem that

¹This is remarked by Gregorovius, *Die Grabmäler der Päpste*, 112. Gregorovius gives a good popular account of the tombs of the Popes,

the great ones among them were content to let their deeds speak for them, while the more obscure sought the assistance of the artist to perpetuate their name.

Tombs of
the Car-
dinals.

No great monuments remain of Torquemada, Bessarion, Carvajal, Ammannati, or Prospero Colonna; but the Church of S. Maria del Popolo abounds in tombs of the Rovere and other relatives of Sixtus IV., and there are others in the Church of SS. Apostoli. Everywhere throughout Rome are traces of the chisel of Mino da Fiesole, Paolo Romano, Andrea Sansovino, and other sculptors whose names have perished.

Julius II. was a complete representative of the Italian temper of his time, and resolved to be commemorated by a tomb which should tower above all others in its grandeur and magnificence. He was fortunate in his opportunity. As a new epoch in architecture had been opened by the genius of Bramante, so Julius II. witnessed the beginning of a new epoch in sculpture. A young Florentine, Michel Angelo Buonarotti, came to Rome in 1496 in the service of Cardinal Raffaele Riario. The study of the ancient sculptures in Rome rapidly developed his conceptions of the possibilities of his art, and the Pietà which he executed for the French Cardinal la Grolaye was at once recognised as a masterpiece. The mighty Mother bends her head in agony over the body of the Son, which lies in death upon her lap, as peaceful as when He slumbered as a babe. When some critics remarked that the Virgin was represented as too young, Michel Angelo answered that purity enjoyed eternal youth. We cannot fail to read on this statue the profound impression produced in his mind by the world around him. He expressed the helpless agony of the strong upright nature which had to endure in patience the outrages of those who were powerful only for evil; he portrayed the despair of hopeless disappointment, not the patience of resignation. But whether or no his contemporaries caught the grandeur of his conception, they admired his technical skill and truth in modelling; and his fame,

Michel
Angelo in
Rome.

which this work raised high, was still further enhanced by the statue of David which he made on his return to Florence. When Julius II. bethought him of his tomb, he had no doubt about entrusting the work to Michel Angelo as the foremost sculptor in Italy.

The plan which Michel Angelo submitted was sufficiently magnificent to satisfy even the aspirations of Julius II. Over the spot where the Pope lay buried was to rise a mighty sculptured chapel. Its pillars were to be supported by figures in bonds, representing the arts and sciences, which were so closely connected with the Pope that at his death they also died. The pillars were so massive that each had two niches holding statues of Victories with the cities and provinces captured by the Pope chained to their feet. This huge pedestal was to contain altogether forty statues. At the four corners of the cornice were to be placed figures of Moses and S. Paul representing the religious life, and Rachel and Leah, whom Dante had taught men to regard as allegories of the contemplative and the practical life. Above them were to tower two colossal figures supporting the bier on which lay the sarcophagus of the Pope. One of these figures was Heaven rejoicing to receive the soul of Julius II., the other was Earth bewailing her irreparable loss.¹

Michel
Angelo's
design
for the
tomb of
Julius II.

Julius II. was anxious to have this design carried out at once, and Michel Angelo set to work with characteristic ardour. He superintended the quarrying of the marble, and brought it to Rome by sea, till half the Piazza of S. Peter's was filled with unhewn blocks. So eager was the Pope to see the progress of the work, that he had a drawbridge made by which he might pass, when he would, to Michel Angelo's studio from the corridor which ran between the Vatican and the Castle of S. Angelo. At first all went well; but misunderstandings soon arose between the Pope and the sculptor.

¹ The design is amongst the drawings at the Uffizi Gallery. Grimm, *Michel Angelo*, points out that the drawing indicates eight figures on the cornice, though Vasari and Condivi only mention four.

Michel Angelo thought only of his art; Julius II. thought only of himself; both were impetuous and exacting. As Julius II. became more deeply involved in politics he cared less about his tomb, and Michel Angelo could not get money to pay for his marble. His fruitless visits to the Vatican galled his independent spirit, and he grew unduly sensitive. One day, when he was waiting while the Pope at table was turning over the wares of a jeweller, he heard Julius II. say, 'I will not spend another farthing on stones, either small or great'.¹ He looked on the testy remark as significant of a change of purpose; and when an official told him, in answer to his application for money, that he need not come again for some time, he left Rome in indignant despair at the end of 1505, after writing a letter to the Pope: 'I was this morning driven from the palace by order of your Holiness; if you require me further you must seek me elsewhere than in Rome'.

The tomb of Julius II. was unlucky from the first; its work was often suspended, its design altered, its fragments scattered; and Michel Angelo's design fared worse than did Bramante's at the Vatican.

Julius II.'s plans tripped up one another by their rapid succession. If we are to trust Vasari, the discussion about the place where Michel Angelo's monument was to stand led to the rebuilding of S. Peter's.² The vast structure which Michel Angelo had designed required an open space around it that it might be seen to advantage. While considering this point the Pope went back to the scheme of Nicolas V. for rebuilding the old basilica; but the conservative restoration which Nicolas V. had begun in the tribune made way for a more splendid plan of Bramante. The old basilica was to be swept away, and a building in the new classic style was to take its place. Bramante's design was a building in the

Bra-
mante's
design for
S. Peter's.

¹ *Lettere di Michel Angelo*, ed. Milanese, 377.

² Vasari, *Vita di Michel Angelo*, and also *Giuliano di San Gallo*.

form of a Greek cross, with spacious tribunes at the ends of the three arms. The middle was to be surmounted by a mighty dome, on either side of which rose a bell tower; the façade was adorned by a spacious vestibule supported by six pillars.

In vain the Cardinals murmured and remonstrated at this destruction. The Pope's purpose was fixed. Even an age greedy of novelty and full of confidence in itself was startled at the demolition of the most venerable church in Christendom to make way for something new. The basilica of S. Peter's had been for ages the object of pilgrimages from every land. Outside, it gleamed with mosaics, of which the ship of Giotto is now the only survival; inside, its pavement was a marvel of mosaic art; its pillars dated from the days of Constantine; its monuments told the history of the Roman Church for centuries. Men may praise at the present day the magnificence of S. Peter's; they forget what was destroyed to make room for it. No more wanton or barbarous act of destruction was ever deliberately committed; no bishop was ever so untrue as was Julius II. to his duty as keeper of the fabric of his church. His boundless vanity and self-assertion was accompanied by insolence to the past; a new era was to date from himself, and all that had gone before might be forgotten. Half of the old basilica was pulled down with ruthless haste. Mosaics were taken up; monuments were torn down; pillars, which might have been used elsewhere, were shattered. Michel Angelo's wrath was stirred by the ruthless havoc which Bramante wrought, and he indignantly but vainly pleaded for more respect to the precious relics of the past. A few fragments only were preserved and placed in the Grotte Vaticane, where they still keep some memory of what was lost. The tombs and inscriptions there remaining range from the sarcophagus which tells that Junius Bassus, Prefect of Rome, 'went to God' in A.D. 359 to the remnants of the lovely tomb which Mino da Fiesole carved for Paul II. The tombs of other Popes were removed by

their relations to smaller churches; Julius II. himself had no care for the memory of any save his uncle Sixtus IV.

The 'Grotte Vaticane,' as they are called, are the row of chapels which had been erected under the old basilica, where many burials had taken place. Julius II. was driven to respect the bones of the dead, and gave orders that the burying-place should be as little as possible disturbed, and that the foundations of the pillars which were to bear the roof of the new church should be laid below the old chapels. On April 18, 1506, the ceremony of laying the foundation stone was performed by the Pope. It was the pillar against which is now erected the altar of S. Veronica. Here a deep pit had been excavated, and the bottom was full of water, which was being baled out as fast as possible by workmen. The Pope courageously descended the ladder, accompanied by two Cardinals; but he was fearful lest the crowd above should cause the earth to slip, and shouted to them to stand further back. His courage in running the risk of an attack of giddiness was regarded as a sign of his trust in God and his boundless reverence for S. Peter.¹

On the same day Julius II. wrote with pride to Henry VII. of England to announce the fact; 'in sure hope,' he says, 'that our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by whose monition we have undertaken to renew the old basilica, which is perishing through age, will, through the prayers of the Apostle, give us strength—so that what was begun with so much zeal may be finished to the praise and glory of God'.² The hope of Julius II. was not to be fulfilled, for when he died only a small part of his design had been executed. The building of S. Peter's went through many changes, and was not finished for 150 years. Julius II.

¹ Paris de Grassis, quoted by Bonanni, *Templi Vaticani Historia*, 66: 'Non terruit in descendendo periculum ob vertigines, quæ in homine, præsertim sene, poterant evenire, sed Divino fretus auxilio immensoque erga Beatum Apostolum Principem ductus amore, cujus nomini vastissimum Templum, orbis miraculum futurum, magno animo aggrediebatur'.

² Raynaldus, 1506, § 45.

demanded that Christendom should join in his pride at the greatness of his undertaking; but Christendom was ceasing to feel that the centre of its interests lay in the city of Rome, or that its affairs were directed by the Pope. The contributions levied for the building of S. Peter's did much to make men feel the weight of the papal yoke and to criticise the grounds on which they were taxed by a foreign priest. The church which Julius II. strove so diligently to raise never met with the reverence which had been paid to the venerable building which he overthrew; it was never to be the great central church of the Germanic peoples.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE LEAGUE OF CAMBRAI.

1506—1510.

THE care of architecture and sculpture did not divert the attention of Julius II. from politics. His scheme against Venice had failed for the present. The league of Blois came formally to an end in October, 1505, when Louis XII. entered into an alliance with Ferdinand of Spain; and the struggle between Ferdinand and his son-in-law Philip was the point of interest in the politics of Europe. Italy was at peace save for the war which still dragged on between Florence and Pisa. It needed little to break this peace, and Julius II. determined to be the first to do so. He made preparations, but kept their object secret. He allowed the Venetian envoy to think that he intended an expedition against Naples, for which he refused to accept the homage of Spain. At last it became known that the Pope intended to reduce Perugia and Bologna under the obedience of the Roman See. It was an undertaking which Alexander VI. had found too large to be contemplated; but Julius II. calculated on the neutrality of all and the help of many. Venice remained still; Louis XII. of France reluctantly promised help; Florence was ready to do anything which would annoy Venice; the Dukes of Mantua, Ferrara, and Urbino promised troops.

Gianpaolo Baglione of Perugia and Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna were, in name, papal vicars of their states; in

Designs
of Julius
II. on
Perugia
and Bo-
logna.
1506.

reality they ruled as independent lords. The rule of the Baglioni had been tyrannical, and the city suffered from bloody feuds; so that Julius II. was in some measure justified in declaring that he went to free Perugia from a tyrant. But he had on his accession confirmed the privileges of Bologna;¹ and Giovanni Bentivoglio was an ally of Louis XII. and was under French protection. A more cautious man might have doubted of the success of his enterprise against such foes; but Julius II. trusted to his audacity. Machiavelli instances his success as a proof of the advantage of promptitude. Julius II., he says, ordered the Venetians to remain neutral, and ordered the French king to help him; had he given them time to deliberate they probably would not have obeyed him; but he took the field at once, and they saw nothing else to do but fall in with his wishes.²

Julius II. left Rome before sunrise on August 26, having committed the care of the city to Cardinal Cibò. He was mounted on horseback, and wore a rochet; before him was carried a cross, and a bishop bore the Host. But as the bishop's horse had to be led by an attendant on foot, the Pope on the second day sent him along the road, while he himself chose to ride through the woods; he seems to have wished to lay aside his ecclesiastical character as much as possible and adopt the manners of the camp.³ He set out with twenty-four Cardinals, but only with a force of 500 men. He advanced by way of Nepi and Viterbo to Orvieto, where he was joined by the Duke of Urbino, whose martial ardour was checked

Julius II.
marches
against
Perugia.
August 26,
1506.

¹ On November 30, 1503, Theiner, *Codex Diplomaticus*, iii., 515.

² *Discorsi*, iii., ch. xlv.

³ Paris de Grassis, MS.: 'Causa autem cur Papa premittat Corpus Xti est quoniam ipse est impatiens more que fit propter equum deferentem Corpus Xti, nam sepiissime aptari capsula contingit, ut equalis deferatur et non pendeat; etiam quia Parafrenarius qui equum per habenas ducit non potest continuo discurrere, sicut Papa equitare vellet. Ideo per hec loca minus famosa Papa premittit Sacramentum ut ipse liberius possit properare; properat enim ita ut pauci pedites sequi possunt.'

by an attack of the gout,¹ and who was on that account better fitted for the office of mediator. Gianpaolo Baglione saw no one to help him and was afraid of the Pope's threat that he would expel him from Perugia. He thought it better to come to terms, and offered to put in the hands of the Pope all the castles in the territory of Perugia, and the gates of the city itself, and also to aid him with his forces in the expedition against Bologna. As Bologna was the chief object of Julius II. he did not wish to waste time over Perugia; on September 8, Gianpaolo Baglione came to Orvieto and made submission to the Pope,² who, with the Cardinals, the Duke of Urbino, and Gianpaolo Baglione, entered Perugia in state on September 13. His troops had not yet taken possession of the city, and he was attended only by a small guard.

Machiavelli, who was in his train, wondered at the Pope's rashness. 'The Pope and the Cardinals,' he wrote the same day to Florence, 'are at the discretion of Gianpaolo, not he at theirs. If he does no mischief to the man who has come to upset his power it will be owing to his good nature and humanity.'³ He repeated the same remark after mature reflection. 'Prudent men who were there noted the rashness of the Pope and the cowardice of Gianpaolo; they could not understand how it was that he did not, to his lasting fame, rid himself at one blow of his enemy and enrich himself with booty, as he had in his power the Pope and Cardinals with all their luxuries. It was not goodness nor conscience that restrained him, for he was incestuous and a parricide; but he did not dare to do a deed which would have left an eternal memory. He might have been the first to show priests how little a man is esteemed who lives and rules as they do. He

Machiavelli's
comments
on the
capture of
Perugia.

¹ 'Illo non melior fuit alter

Nec pietate prior, sed nec præstantior armis;
Tot dotes juveni invidit lapidosa podagra.'

Hadrian de Castello, *Itinerarium*, in Ciaconius, iii., 225.

² Machiavelli, *Commissione Seconda alla Corte di Roma*, Letters 5-12.

³ *Ibid.*, Lett. 22.

would have done a deed whose greatness would have outweighed all its infamy and all the danger which might have followed.'¹

The passage is remarkable as showing the hatred against priests which the secular career of the Papacy had necessarily produced. The condition of Italian politics emboldened the Popes to pursue their own advantage as temporal princes, and by so doing they ran the risk of being treated as on the same footing as other Italian rulers. But Machiavelli's judgment also shows the confusion which lay beneath his political subtilty. He thought it possible that selfish villains should pursue some ideal end, and did not see that in a crisis all great conceptions necessarily vanished from their minds and self-interested motives alone remained. Why should Gianpaolo, being what he was, care to bring upon himself the retribution which would surely follow any violence offered to the Pope? He could not even have been sure of Perugia, had he done so, and he had no allies to support him. As it was, he had made good terms for himself owing to his insignificance; Bologna was the Pope's object, and he himself was honourably saved. It is the weakness of Machiavelli's political method that, while professing to deal with politics in a practical spirit, he is not practical enough.

Julius II. was received in Perugia with due respect, and ordered mass to be celebrated in the Church of S. Francesco, where he had been ordained when a simple scholar.² He restored the Perugian exiles and laboured to promote peace within the city. The Marquis of Mantua joined him with forces, and on September 21 he set out for Bologna by way of Gubbio and Urbino; thence, to avoid the Venetian territory

Excommunication of the Bentivogli. October, 1506.

¹ *Discorsi*, i., ch. xxvii.

² Paris de Grassis, MS.: 'Ex eo, ut dixit, quod in loco illo olim ipse initiatus fuit in litteris et professione ecclesiastica, ibidem vitam agens scholasticum et simplicem, propterea Deo et B. Francisco gratias acturus in loco illo quod ad summum et meliorem apicem pervenerit'.

of Rimini, he traversed the rugged road over the Apennines by San Marino to Cesena.¹ There he received a definite promise of the aid of France, for the powerful adviser of Louis XII., the Cardinal of Rouen, had been won over to the Pope's side by the promise of the Cardinalate to three of his nephews. His influence prevailed with the king, and the French troops, which had marched out of Milan to aid Bologna, received orders to join the Pope. Julius II. was triumphant, and on October 7 issued a bull of excommunication against Giovanni Bentivoglio and his adherents as rebels against the Church; their goods were given as prey to any one who seized them, and plenary indulgence was offered to those who slew them. The Pope with pride enumerated his forces to Machiavelli, and said, 'I have published a crusade against Messer Giovanni, that every one may understand that I will make no terms with him'.² It was part of his policy to give others no chance of drawing back.

Giovanni Bentivoglio would not have feared either the Pope's forces or the Pope's ban; but the advance of 8000 French troops under Charles d'Amboise, the Marshal of Chaumont, filled the people of Bologna with dread of pillage. Giovanni wavered for a time, and then threw himself on the protection of France, which had already betrayed him; on November 2 he left Bologna and retired to Chaumont's camp. The Bolognese sent envoys making submission to the Pope. It was time that they did so: for the French troops were longing for the pillage of Bologna, and Julius II. had to pacify Chaumont by giving him large sums of money. The Bolognese only kept the French army at a distance by opening the sluices of their canal and so flooding the neighbourhood of the French camp.

Retreat of
Giovanni
Bentivoglio.
November
2, 1506.

¹ At Cesena the Cardinals suffered the common incidents of travel:—
'Cesenam intramus; culices avertere somnos
Omnibus, et multos variis maculare figuris'.—Hadrian de Castello.

² *Commissioni*, ut supra, Letter 52.

Julius II. hastened to take possession of Bologna. The astrologers tried to dissuade him from entering at once on his arrival, saying that the stars were unpropitious. But Julius II. now cared not for astrologers,¹ and answered, 'Let us go on and enter in the name of the Lord'. The splendour of the Pope's entrance on November 11 might recompense the weary Cardinals for the hardships of their journey. The populous city, with 70,000 inhabitants, welcomed the Pope as the liberator of Italy, the expeller of tyrants. Julius II., borne in his litter upon men's shoulders, was hailed as a second Julius Cæsar. The weather was exceptionally warm, and the roses, which blossomed in abundance, were strewn in his path; men said that he was lord even of the planets and the skies.²

Julius II.
enters
Bologna.
November
11, 1506.

Julius II. was master of Bologna, but he had exhausted the papal treasury to gain his object, and had bound himself by many engagements. Bologna was hard to regulate, and Julius II. was obliged to guarantee the old privileges of the city and leave its government in the hands of a council of forty, over whom was set a papal legate. The Bentivogli had taken refuge with the French king, who refused to surrender them to the Pope. Julius II. could not be secure against attempts at revolt, and he made a bad choice of his first legate, Cardinal Ferrari. Ferrari's extortion was so notorious that he was recalled in a few months and was imprisoned in S. Angelo. His successor, Cardinal Alidosi, was still more oppressive to the Bolognese, and Julius II. soon felt that it was easier to conquer than to govern. It was an ominous sign that his first act was to lay the foundations of a fortress by the Porta Galera, a strange

¹ 'Quorum scientiam et levitatem sprevit et detestatus est,' says Paris de Grassis in Raynaldus, 1506, § 30.

² Sigismondo de' Conti, ii., 358, etc., gives a full account of the ceremony. Albertini, *De Mirabilibus Urbis* (ed. 1519), p. 72, says: 'Quo anno et flores rosarum et poma et tempora æstiva fuere e mense Decembris. Et omnes Bononienses dicebant, Vere Julius est pater cælorum et planetarum.'

measure for the liberator of the land and the expeller of tyrants.

Julius II. was resolved to perpetuate in Bologna the memory of his triumph. He had been vexed at the hasty departure of Michel Angelo from Rome, and wrote peremptory letters to Florence ordering his return. In vain Michel Angelo asked permission to execute his work at Florence and send it, as it was finished, to the Pope ; the haughty artist was at last ordered by the Gonfaloniere Soderini to go to Bologna and make his peace. Julius II. looked at him angrily. 'It seems,' he said, 'that you have waited for us to come to you, instead of coming to us.' Michel Angelo knelt and asked pardon ; he had acted in anger, but he could not endure the treatment which he had met with in Rome. A bishop, who was a friend of Soderini's, tried to calm the rising indignation of the Pope. Artists, he said, were men of no education ; they only knew their art and did not know how they ought to behave. In a moment the Pope's wrath found a new object. 'How do you dare,' he exclaimed, 'to say what I would not have said ? It is you who are ignorant, not he. Out of my sight with your impertinence.' The astonished bishop was hustled out of the room by the attendants. Then Julius II. looked with an amused look at Michel Angelo, gave him pardon and bade him not leave Bologna. Soon afterwards Michel Angelo was ordered to execute a bronze statue of the Pope to adorn his new possession. When he said that he could not be sure of the success of his first casting, the Pope answered, 'You must cast till you succeed, and you shall have as much money as you need'. Michel Angelo modelled a seated statue, three times the size of life. The right hand was raised ; the Pope was asked what should be done with the left. Michel Angelo suggested that it might hold a book. 'Nay,' said the Pope, 'give me a sword, for I am no scholar.' Then as he looked at the statue he caught the severe expression with which the sculptor had clothed his face. 'What is my right hand

Michel
Angelo
summoned
to Bolog-
na.

doing?' he asked; 'am I blessing or banning?' 'You are admonishing the Bolognese to be wise,' was Michel Angelo's answer. The statue was placed over the portal of S. Petronio, and was unveiled in February, 1508. In its final form the Pope held neither book nor sword in his left hand, but the keys of S. Peter.

When Julius II. had gained Bologna he felt that he had taken the first step towards the reduction of Venice and the conquest of the Romagna; his plan of a league against Venice revived and he was again hopeful. The death of the Archduke Philip at Burgos, in September, 1506, removed the great cause of European discord and left the French king more free to act. Julius II. strove to reconcile Louis XII. and Maximilian, and renew the undertaking which had been laid aside. In this he was doomed to disappointment, and events occurred which made him suspicious of France. The city of Genoa had long been under the suzerainty of France, as a free republic with a French governor. The party quarrels of the Genoese nobles favoured the growth of a strong popular party, till, weary of the avarice of the French governor and the bloody deeds of the nobles, the Genoese rose in revolt. They expelled the nobles, besieged the French garrison, elected a dyer as their Doge, and abolished the suzerainty of France. Louis XII. was indignant and vowed revenge; he entered Italy with a large army, and refused to hear the rebels, who could offer no resistance, punished them with great severity, imposed a heavy fine upon the city and abolished all its privileges.

Julius II. vainly tried to interpose. As a native of the Genoese territory he loved his country; as a man sprung from the people he was inclined to the popular side; as an Italian he looked with alarm at the presence of a powerful army with no definite object in view; as Pope he feared the designs of the Cardinal of Amboise, who was known to hanker after the Papacy and was capable of devising a scheme for his deposi-

Revolt of
Genoa
against
France.
1507.

Julius II.
returns to
Rome.
March 27,
1507.

tion.¹ His friendship with France gave place to alarm. He refused an interview with the French king, and quitted Bologna for the greater safety of Rome. There he arrived on March 27, and enjoyed a triumphal entry. On all sides was heard the clang of trumpets and the din of war as Julius, seated in his car, swept through the streets amidst the shouts of the people. It was Palm Sunday, and the Romans thought that they did honour to the day by welcoming Christ's Vicar with the cry, 'Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord'. When the Pope reached S. Angelo he was met by a chariot containing a globe on which danced ten boys attired like angels. Suddenly the globe opened and another angel stepped forth and offered the Pope a palm, saying in neat Latin verses that the Pope had brought on Palm Sunday the palms of victory to Rome.² No one thought it incongruous that this military parade should end with the Pope giving the benediction from S. Peter's.

When Julius II. looked around him he saw the political condition of Europe to be threatening on all sides. In-Germany Maximilian was freer to work his will than he had been hitherto. Maximilian seemed a careless adventurer, but he had a fixed policy of opposition to France, and a desire to maintain the rights of the Empire and secure supremacy for his own house. The rivalry between France and the house of Austria had already begun and was the determining element in the politics of Europe. Maximilian found himself strong enough to take up a de-

European
politics in
1507.

¹ These motives are assigned by Paris de Grassis in Raynaldus, 1507, § 1.

² See Albertini, *De Mirabilibus Urbis*, and Paris de Grassis in Raynaldus, 1507, § 5. Paris, MS., says that he remonstrated on ecclesiastical grounds: 'Respondi sanctitatem suam considerare an conveniat quod, Christo Jesu in Passione existente, Papa, qui est Vicarius ejus, sit in triumpho et pompa et gloria. Turbatus est contra me Papa, et dixit me super legatum scire velle, qui scripserat quod ea die posset solemniter venire, cum Paschalis dies sit, et totus clerus et populus Romanus paravisset festivitates, ut in illis occurrerent Pontifici clamantes, Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini.'

cided position of resistance to the French advance in Italy. In June, 1507, he summoned a diet at Constance, and laid before it his grievances. The French king, he said, was endeavouring to rob the German nation of the Empire; he had made his plans for securing the Papacy for France, and for this end was plotting against the Pope; to prevent this Maximilian asked the Diet to help with men and money, that he might make an expedition into Italy, receive the imperial crown, and assert the rights of the Empire in the Milanese.¹ The Diet decreed that it would help the Emperor, and Maximilian won the Swiss confederates by promising them territory in the Trentino.

Meanwhile Ferdinand of Spain had been visiting his Neapolitan kingdom, where he wished to make sure of the fidelity of Gonsalvo de Cordova, who was loyal to his own cost. Even after the death of Philip had freed Ferdinand from any immediate dread, the suspicious king removed Gonsalvo from Naples, which was afterwards governed by a viceroy. The attitude of Maximilian drew Ferdinand and Louis XII. more closely together, and Ferdinand sailed from Naples to have an interview with the French king at Savona. Julius II. wished to see him on his way, and went to Ostia for that purpose; but Ferdinand was ill-disposed to the Pope, who refused to grant him the investiture of Naples. He sailed past Ostia, and at the end of June confirmed the Franco-Spanish alliance by a conference with Louis XII.

The politics of Europe had now definitely settled down into a struggle for ascendancy between France, Spain, and the house of Hapsburg, and it was recognised that Italy was the battlefield of their arms and their diplomacy alike. The Papacy had elected to enter Italian politics as a secular power, and as a consequence of that decision must be prepared to defend its own interests. Julius II. had refused to cast himself unreservedly on any

Schemes
against
Julius II.

¹ Müller, *Reichstags-Staat*, 576, etc.

side, and was known to have plans of his own about Italian affairs. The three great Powers had therefore a common interest in getting rid of him, and in dealing with the States of the Church according to the requirements of their own policy. If a common agreement had been possible, the Papal States would have been secularised, and the Papacy, as an institution, would have been completely changed; but, as usual, the strength of the Papacy lay in the want of statesmanlike capacity in its opponents. The desirability of dealing with the Papacy was frankly recognised on all sides. In Spain the zeal of the clergy was fervent, and the party in favour of reform was strong. Ferdinand discussed with Louis XII. a plan for convoking a General Council, and this plan was warmly seconded by the Cardinal of Rouen, who hoped that Julius II. might be deposed in favour of himself. On the other hand Maximilian's adventurous mind had conceived a scheme of uniting the Papacy with the Empire. On June 10 he wrote a mysterious letter to the Bishop of Trent in which he said that the fox (Louis XII.) would find the cock or the hen (the Pope and the Empire) flown from the tree. His own plan was to go to Rome and become Pope and Emperor in one.¹

This astounding scheme shows the power of the ideas of the Renaissance even in Germany. Anything was considered possible. The ideas of Charles the Great had made way for the ideas of Augustus; the titles of Cæsar and Pontifex Maximus might be again combined in the same person as they were when Augustus began the restoration of order in the distracted world. But if the ideas of the Renaissance fostered visionary

Plan of
uniting
the
Empire
and the
Papacy.

¹ The letter is published in Jäger, *Kaiser Maximilians I. Verhältniss zum Papstthum*, 73: 'Als der Kunig von Frannkreich gesehen hat, das daz Reich und wir, mit In, hie versambelt und wir uns von den Niderlanden, dahin wir dann zu ziehen willens gewest sein, herauf gewendnt und unsern auslag gemacht haben gen Rom zu ziehen und Babst und Kaiser zu werden . . . so nymbt er sich an, er hab dem Reich Kain smach tun wollen, dazist also, der Fuchs, Idest Kunig zu Frannkreich, dem der Han oder die Henn, Idest der Babpst unnd daz Kaiserthumb auf der pamm entwichen ist'.

plans, the Church did nothing to dispel them. The Popes were surrounded by none of the awe inspired by the sight of the duties of the priest's office discharged in the spirit of a priest. It was long since holiness or a care for the well-being of the Church as a spiritual power had been the leading features of the Papacy. Maximilian might truly plead that he could carry on the work of Sixtus IV., Alexander VI., and Julius II. with as pious a mind and as much priestly decorum as they themselves had shown. Moreover the reformers at Basel, by their choice of Amadeus of Savoy, had suggested the view that a reformation of the Church was only possible by a union of temporal and ecclesiastical power.

The plan of Maximilian was kept a profound secret amongst a few of his confidential advisers, to whom was added a discontented Cardinal, Hadrian of Castello. Cardinal Hadrian had been influential under Alexander VI., was a man of considerable experience in politics, and was a friend of Henry VII. of England, by whose permission he held the bishopric of Bath and Wells. He bemoaned his exclusion from affairs under Julius II.; even his verses about the Pope's expedition against Bologna had not advanced him in the papal favour. He seems to have striven to win the good graces of Henry VII. of England by writing calumnious letters against the Pope, which Henry VII. forwarded to Julius II. Fearing the Pope's wrath, Hadrian on September 1 suddenly left Rome, to every one's astonishment. Then he wrote from Spoleto asking for pardon, and on September 10 returned to Rome.¹ Those who wondered at his departure wondered still more at his inconstancy; and his conduct became still more inexplicable when, on October 6, he again fled in disguise from Rome. The Pope knew nothing of his reason, and could only suspect some conspiracy against himself. Hadrian made his way into the Tyrol, where he lived in obscurity, and nothing more was heard about him

¹ See Appendix for the extracts from Paris de Grassis about Hadrian.

in Rome; but a letter of Maximilian's in 1511 shows that Hadrian was his secret adviser in this scheme for securing the Papacy,¹ and it was a plan which Maximilian never dismissed from his mind.

Julius II. knew nothing of Maximilian's designs, but rumours were rife concerning those of Louis XII. and Ferdinand. He was not, however, much disturbed about himself, but boldly entered into the game of diplomacy, in which he showed much dexterity. He was still bent on the overthrow of Venice, and for this purpose strove to reconcile France and the Emperor. When the dangers that might follow to Italy were pointed out to him he answered impatiently, 'Let the world perish provided I obtain my wish'.² He professed himself ready to ally with France and with the Emperor at the same time; he tried to reconcile the two foes, but he was trusted by neither.

¹ Letter to Paul von Lichtenstein, Brixen, September 16, 1511, in Jäger, *l. c.*, from *Lettres du roi Louis XII.*, iii., 324: 'Non dubitamus quin etiam nunc recorderis eorum sermonum quos antehac tecum habuimus de causis et rationibus propter quas deliberavimus ac constituimus Pontificatum Romanum, si quoquo modo ad illum pervenire possemus, ambire et appetere. Itaque Cardinali Hadriano qui aliquamdiu, ut non ignoras, apud nos in Germania legatum egit, eas quas diximus causas et rationes proposuimus, qui quidem eas non tantum probavit sed et auctor nobis suasorque fuit ut pergeremus, existimans nos nihil in agendo difficultatis apud Cardinales, nihilque laboris esse habituros.' Jäger, following Von Schreck (*Biografia del Cardinale Hadriano, da Ambrogio Simpliciano*, Trento, 1837), tries to show that Maximilian did not really mean to make himself Pope, but only to make a Pope who would be in the interests of Germany, and so oppose the plan of Louis XII. for the Cardinal of Amboise. Maximilian's candidate was Cardinal Hadrian, who withdrew from Rome to be ready to follow Maximilian on his entry. There is, however, no good reason against taking Maximilian's words literally. His plan is expressed in three letters of his own. In the third, to his daughter Marguerite (Le Glay, *Correspondance de l'Empereur Maximilien I. et de Marguerite d'Autriche*, ii., 37), September 18, 1511, he says that he has asked the help of the King of Aragon for his plan. A letter of the Doge of Venice to the envoy at Rome, November 20, 1513 (quoted in Brosch, *Julius II.*, 335), tells of intercepted letters of December, 1511, in which Ferdinand 'exhorta el Re de Ro. ad elargarse dal re di franza . . . et che etiam se potria mandar ad effetto el pensier et obiecto de l'Imperator, ch'è de farsi lui papa'. In the face of the evidence, there is no ground for refusing to understand Maximilian's language literally.

² 'Pereat totus mundus pur che io conseguisca lo intento mio.' So the Pope's envoy Areniti told the Venetian envoy. Brosch, *Julius II.*, p. 333.

Meanwhile the Venetians had to decide which party they would choose. As France already had possessions in Italy, while Germany lay outside, they thought that it was best to oppose the new invader, and answered Maximilian's request for passage through their territory by saying that, if he came peacefully with a small escort, like his father, they would admit him, but not if he came accompanied by an army. Maximilian could not shake this determination, and advanced against Venice as a foe. Early in 1508 he assembled his troops and passed on to Trent, where on February he took a step of which contemporaries did not appreciate the importance. Preceded by the imperial heralds and the naked sword, Maximilian went in solemn procession to the Cathedral, where the Bishop of Gurk announced to the people Maximilian's journey to Rome, and in so doing called him by the title of 'Emperor elect'.¹ No papal representative gave formality to this act, which was meant to be an assertion of the inherent authority of the Empire and its emancipation from the Church. It claimed that the German king became by his election Emperor, and needed no further confirmation. Heretofore the chosen of the electors had styled himself King of the Romans, and only took the title of Emperor after he had received his crown from the hands of the Pope in the imperial city of Rome. Maximilian swept away the claims of Rome to bestow the Empire when, without any direct authority from the Pope, he took the title of 'Emperor elect'. He asserted that the choice of Germany, not the choice of Rome, gave validity to the imperial dignity. In former days this assertion would have been stoutly withstood; as it was, it was either unobserved or misunderstood.

Maximilian assumes the title of 'Emperor elect'. February, 1508.

¹ 'Ervälter Kaiser,' as the title continued to run. The significance of this act was first pointed out by Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte*, i., 177. On the authorities, see his *Beilagen*, zweiter Abschnitt, i.; also Heidenheimer, *Petrus Martyr Anglerius*, 173. Peter Martyr, *Ep.*, 381, says: 'Maximilianum novo summus Pontifex titulo insignavit, loco namque aureæ secundæ coronæ Imperatorem electum Pontificio chirographo nuncupavit'. See also the remarks of Tommasini, *Machiavelli*, i., 412.

Maximilian wished, before starting on his Italian expedition, to secure some memorial of his attempt; Julius II. did not wish to see him in Rome, and was glad to satisfy him so far as titles went. He had already offered to send a legate for his coronation in Germany; and though he was not consulted by Maximilian before his assumption of the title, he at once recognised it and addressed Maximilian by the name which he had chosen. Maximilian's assumption of the imperial title was more enduring than any other of his exploits. None of his successors went to Rome for coronation. Charles V. was crowned at Bologna; but afterwards the title of 'Emperor elect' was taken after coronation at Aachen or Frankfurt, and the word 'elect' was soon dropped by courtesy except in formal documents. The imperial title was vindicated for Germany and for Germany alone by Maximilian, who with his romantic policy thought that he had taken a great step by this assertion of the rights of the German folk; really, he had but recognised the fact that Rome had become the city of the Pope. While maintaining the universal rights of the Empire, he had associated it with the German nation. To make the Empire more powerful he called in to his aid the principle of nationality whose growth proved the Empire to be a dream.

From Trent Maximilian pursued his way into the Venetian territory, where he threatened Vicenza, while his generals attacked Roveredo and Cadore. But his troops fell away, and the Swiss did not come to his help. He was beaten back on all sides by the Venetian troops, who won victory after victory. At the end of May Venice had captured Trieste and passed on into Friuli; and on June 6 Maximilian made a truce for three years with Venice, allowing her to keep all her conquests.

This triumph of Venice seemed to overthrow all the plans of Julius II., as Venice, which he wished to isolate, was negotiating for an alliance with France and Spain. Louis XII. had secretly given help to the

Unsuccessful war of Maximilian with Venice. February-June, 1508.

Anger of Julius II. against Venice.

Venetians, and Maximilian was enraged against him. The Pope himself had reasons to be suspicious of the French king. There had been a rebellion at Bologna, instigated by the dispossessed Giovanni Bentivoglio, who lived under French protection in Milan, and was ready to take advantage of any disturbance at Bologna. The rising was put down; and Louis XII. reluctantly withdrew his protection from the Bentivogli, who fled to Venice, where they took sanctuary. Julius II. demanded their surrender, and the Doge pleaded against him the rights of asylum. On this the Pope issued a brief, withdrawing the right of sanctuary from homicides, incendiaries, and rebels against the Church; he empowered the Doge to use his discretion in seizing any who at the time were guilty of these crimes.¹ Nothing was done, and the Pope's anger against Venice grew more fierce. Soon another cause of quarrel arose, as Venice refused to allow him to nominate to the bishopric of Vicenza and exercised its own right of election. This was only according to custom; but Julius II. was indignant and said, 'Even if it cost me my mitre I will be Pope and maintain the jurisdiction of the Papacy'.²

Julius II. did not speak without some grounds of assurance. Already the scheme was drawn up which afterwards resulted in the formation of the League of Cambrai. The papal legate, Cardinal Carvajal, together with the Spanish envoy, the French Governor of Lombardy, Marshal Chaumont, some representative of the Emperor, and the Marquis of Mantua, had drafted proposals for the settlement of disputes in Italy. They set forward a league between Maximilian and Louis XII., by which all their differences were to be arranged. A common expedition was to be undertaken against Venice, that Maximilian might recover all that Venice had usurped from the Empire and the house of Austria; while Louis

Project of
a league
against
Venice.
February,
1508.

¹ The brief, dated August 22, 1508, is given in Sanuto, *Diario*, vii., 624.

² *Ibid.*, 641.

XII. was to recover all that Venice held to the detriment of his claims in the Milanese. The Pope and the Kings of Hungary and Aragon were to have the opportunity of entering the league also, to recover their rights from Venice.¹

If Maximilian had this plan seriously before him, it mattered little to him how the Venetian war was ended; indeed, it was all the better that Venice should gain important advantages, and thereby inspire greater animosity. Louis XII. was offended by the haste with which Venice concluded its advantageous truce with Maximilian, without considering his interests or including in it the Duke of Gueldres, whom Louis XII., in the interest of Venice, had encouraged to attack Brabant. The triumph of Venice was on all sides regarded with sullen suspicion. Venice knew of the danger which threatened her, but took no steps to gain allies. Already the foreigner had set his foot in Italy, but this had not taught the Italian powers to draw more closely together. Separate interests were still as powerful as ever, and the growth of one Italian state was still regarded as a menace to the rest. They preferred the yoke of the stranger to the consolidation of Italy under any state save their own. Individual Italians might sympathise with Venice; the Italian states hailed her approaching ruin with glee.

The league for the partition of the possessions of Venice on the mainland was signed at Cambrai on December 10, 1508, by Margaret of Austria, Regent of the Netherlands, on behalf of her father, Maximilian, and by Cardinal Amboise as representative of the French king. It provided that Padua, Verona, Brescia, Friuli, Aquileia, and the other territories claimed by Maximilian should be restored to him; France was to

¹ This document was brought to light by Brosch, *Julius II.*, 155, 338. An imperial envoy brought it to Bruges in February, 1508. The Venetian envoy, Condulmier, managed to have it stolen while he slept. It was copied by him, and sent to Venice on February 29.

have all that was wanting to the duchy of Milan; the lands belonging to the Church were to be restored to the Pope; the King of Aragon was to have the cities occupied by Venice on the Neapolitan coast; Hungary was to have Dalmatia; the Duke of Savoy the island of Cyprus; while the Duke of Ferrara and the Marquis of Mantua were to recover all their losses.¹

The League of Cambrai was a great political crime. In a time of peace, without any provocation, the powers of Europe deliberately determined to combine for the purpose of international robbery. Old claims were revived: an arbitrary principle of legitimacy was assumed. Venice was singled out as the aggressor who had defrauded others of their rights, and Europe nobly determined to redress the wrong; it was of no consequence to the allies that every one of them was liable to similar claims against themselves. Separate interests converged for the overthrow of Venice, and the partition of the Venetian territory was recognised as an undertaking of European importance. No feeling of honour stood in the way; no treaty was recognised as binding. Maximilian had made a three years' truce with Venice at the time when he was meditating an alliance against her; Louis XII. professed himself her friend; Julius II. had pledged his word not to disturb her in her possessions. All this went for nothing. Self-seeking, without any other end alleged, was recognised as the principle by which the newly formed nations of Europe were to guide their course. The man who above all others devised this plan, and the man who urged it persistently upon the rest, was the nominal head of European Christianity, Pope Julius II.

It was not merely the possession of a couple of cities in the Romagna that impelled Julius II. He wished to see Venice thoroughly humbled, so that she could no longer be a hindrance in his path. He was clear-

Objects of
Julius II.

¹ Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, iv., i., 115; also Lunig, *Codex Diplomaticus*, i., 134.

sighted enough to perceive that a strong power in Northern Italy was a hindrance to the growth of the States of the Church. With Spain in Naples, and France in Milan, it was possible for the Church to grow into a strong power in Central Italy. The Pope might hold the balance between two foreign powers jealous of one another; but a strong Italian power was an obstacle to his success in this design. Julius II. wished to be rid for ever of any such danger. His object was to reduce the threatening power of Venice into limits within which he was strong enough to cope with it. He had no love for France, for Germany, or for Spain; he was ready to attack them all, and to unite Italy under the Church, if that might be. His policy was intelligible, and in a measure it succeeded; Venice was reduced, and the States of the Church were created by Julius II. But this policy cannot claim to be regarded as patriotic. Julius II. did his best to destroy the one state in Italy which might have made head against the foreigner; and he did so in the interest of the States of the Church. The Church as a temporal power was in consequence of his policy established in Central Italy; but this result was won by the sacrifice of any chance of Italian independence.

The subsequent action of Julius II. led contemporaries to think that he sought only the restoration of the cities in the Romagna, and that the obstinacy of Venice turned him reluctantly against her. This opinion at once heightens and lowers our estimate of the Pope's policy. He pursued a plan which was more extensive than immediate gain; but the plan was more selfish, and was more disastrous to the interests of Italy as a whole. He did not at once give in his adhesion to the League of Cambrai, though it was the result of his own endeavour. He was not sure that it would succeed, or that the agreement made at Cambrai would lead to any better results than that previously made at Blois. He was not sure that the King of France was friendly to himself, and he would not commit himself till he saw that others were in

Julius II.
enters the
league.
March,
1509.

earnest. In January, 1509, the Venetian envoy reported that the Pope was ill pleased with the league; in February he said that he wished to be neutral; in March, after France had proclaimed war against Venice, he said that he would not enter the league if it was directed specially against Venice. At last when he saw that France was in earnest, he entered the league on March 25, and agreed to furnish 500 men-at-arms, and 4000 infantry. When Venice wished to reduce the number of her foes, and offered on April 7 to restore Faenza and Rimini to the Pope; her offer was contemptuously refused, and the Pope said, 'Do what you will with your lands'.¹

Moreover, the Pope was resolved to inflict on the Venetians all the harm that he could. Venice tried to engage the Orsini to fight on her side, and the Orsini received money from the Venetian envoys. Julius II. excommunicates Venice. April 27, 1509. Julius II. forbade this engagement, and succeeded by threats and negotiations in prevailing on the Orsini to remain quiet. But he went further than this; he threatened to imprison the Venetian envoys, and he ordered the Orsini not to return the money which they had received. On April 27, when he saw that France had begun the war, he published a Bull of excommunication against Venice, couched in the strongest terms. He interpreted his Bull by telling the Orsini that he absolved them for keeping the money of Venice, because it was the money of excommunicated persons. 'Holy Father,' said one of the Orsini, 'we do not wish to blacken our good faith.' 'Do not by any means restore the money,' was the Pope's angry answer.² It is some comfort to know

¹ Sanuto's *Diario* tells us the changing news from Rome. January 17: 'Par il papa non li piace l'acordo fato, maxime dovendo venir il re di Romani con arme in Italia; et il re di Franza si dice vien a Milan per dubito del papato' (vii., 719); so January 22 (vii., 724). On February 2: 'Il papa non vol far liga ma star universal' (vii., 138); so February 17, 19, and 28 (vii., 760, 780; viii., 10). March 19: 'Al Pixani parlando disse che 'l voleva riveder li capitoli et hessendo cossa contra Venetiani non sottoscriveria'. On March 22 was held a congregation, to which the Venetian Cardinals were not summoned; on March 25 the Pope entered the league. On April 7 he replied to the offer of Rimini and Faenza: 'Sete ignoranti; et di le terre la Signoria faza come la vuole'.

² Sanuto, viii., 183.

that the Orsini had higher views of honour than the Pope, and managed to give back 3000 ducats to the Venetian envoy.

When war was inevitable, Venice prepared to offer a firm resistance. The French army crossed her frontier, and the papal troops under the Pope's nephew, Francesco della Rovere, now Duke of Urbino, attacked the Romagna. But Maximilian and Ferdinand of Aragon were both quiet, and waited on events; if Venice could prolong the war it was possible that the confederacy against her would quickly dissolve. The French advanced, capturing cities on their way, and the Venetian troops were ordered to defend the passage of the river Adda; but there were divided counsels in the Venetian camp, and a mistake in tactics enabled the French to bring on a battle. At Ghiara d' Adda or Vaila, the Venetians were defeated on May 14, and the mercenary troops fell into hopeless disorder. The loss inflicted in the battle was not considerable, and Venice had still 25,000 men in the field, but the mercenaries could not be reorganised; they fled to Mestre, and lost all discipline. Venice was rendered practically helpless by a slight reverse. Her haughty nobles fell into abject terror, and the subject cities on the mainland rejoiced that they had escaped from Egyptian bondage. The Venetian oligarchy had never trusted the people whom it governed, and had never taught them to defend themselves. The insignificant defeat at Vaila upset all the statecraft of Venice, its government fell into unreasoning despondency. Machiavelli utters a severe, yet truthful judgment. 'If the Government of Venice had possessed any heroism, it could easily have repaired its loss, and showed a new face to fortune. It might in time either have conquered, or lost more gloriously, or made more honourable terms. But the cowardice caused by the want of good organisation for war made them lose at once their courage and their dominions.'¹

Defeat of
the Venetians at
Vaila.
May 14,
1509.

¹ Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, iii., 31. See the quotations in confirmation of this opinion given by Tommasini, *Vita di Machiavelli*, i., 465-6.

Venice could devise no policy save submission. Louis XII. was allowed to conquer all that he claimed as belonging to the Milanese, and then he retired. Verona, Vicenza, and Padua admitted the representatives of the Emperor, who did not find it necessary even to appear in arms. The towns on the Neapolitan coast were restored to Ferdinand. Rimini, Faenza, Cervia, and even Ravenna were surrendered to the Pope's legate, Cardinal Alidosi, on May 28. The Venetians wished first of all to make their peace with the Pope, as a step towards breaking up the formidable league against them; it was hopeless to turn to Louis XII. or Maximilian. But they found that the tender mercies of the Pope were indeed cruel. The Venetian officials in the surrendered towns were imprisoned, contrary to the terms of the agreement. They were not allowed to remove their artillery from Rimini, on the ground that it belonged to the city, not to the Venetians.¹ On June 5 the Doge wrote to the Pope in terms of the most abject submission: 'Your Holiness knows the state to which Venice has been reduced. Let the bowels of your compassion be moved; remember that you are the earthly representative of Him who was gentle, and who never casts away suppliants who flee to His mercy.'²

Severity
of Julius
II.
towards
Venice.
May-June,
1509.

Julius II., however, was implacable. In his ordinary talk he called the Venetians heretics and schismatics; he would send his Bull of excommunication throughout the world, and make it impossible for them to live. The Cardinals murmured at this extreme ferocity. 'He has his lands,' they said; 'why should he wish to consummate the ruin of Venice, which would be his own ruin also, and that of all Italy?'³ So they thought, and with good reason. The overthrow of Venice had been accomplished too quickly and

¹ Sanuto, viii., 320.

² *Ibid.*, 371: 'Novit sanctitas vestra, certo scimus, quo in statu res Veneta sit constituta, commoveantur jam tandem viscera misericordiæ vestræ, meminerit se vices ejus in terra gerere, qui mitis est, neque unquam a se rejicit supplices ad ipsius clementiam aufugientes'.

³ *Ibid.*, 389.

too entirely. The glory had all gone to Louis XII., and the French power seemed firmly established in Northern Italy. Maximilian had been reconciled to the French king, and had reaped the fruits of the French success. Julius II. thought that the only policy for himself was to pursue his victory to the uttermost so as to secure firmly what he had won; meanwhile he could watch events and use them for his purposes.

Negotiations of Venice with the Pope. July, 1509. Venice accordingly was allowed to negotiate with the Pope, but every hindrance was put in the way of an agreement. Julius II. would not break up the League of Cambrai till he was sure that there was nothing more to be gained by it. Venice was led to think that the Pope was ready to remove the excommunication, and appointed six envoys extraordinary to arrange matters. When the envoys arrived at Rome, on July 2, they were chilled by their reception; as excommunicated persons they were not permitted to enter the city till night-fall, and the Cardinals were forbidden to meet them in the way in which envoys were customarily received. They were bidden to occupy the same house; they were not allowed to hear mass, nor to go out together on diplomatic business; only one of them might go at once. On July 8 the Pope sent for one of the envoys, whom he had known previously, Hieronimo Donado. He gave him absolution first, that he might be able to speak to him; then he broke into an angry speech. The provisions of the League of Cambrai must first be fully carried out, then the Venetians might come with a halter round their necks and ask for pardon. He would have nothing to say to the proposals which the envoys were empowered to lay before him, but demanded that Udine and Treviso should be given to the Emperor, that Venice should resign all its possessions on the mainland, should no longer claim the Adriatic Gulf as Venetian waters, should make a money payment to Louis XII. and Maximilian, and give up to the Pope the nomination to benefices and the right to tax the clergy. He ended by giving Donado a

paper containing the terms on which he was prepared to give Venice absolution, a paper which Donado calls 'devilish and shameful'.¹

When this letter of Donado was read before the Pregadi, there was a general exclamation that the Pope sought their utter ruin and wished to root out Venice from the earth. Lorenzo Loredan, son of the Doge, said loudly: 'We will send fifty envoys to the Turk before we do what the Pope asks'. There was no possibility of negotiating on these terms, as Julius II., who only wished to temporise, was well aware. On July 26 Antonio Grimani came from Rome to Venice, and reported that the Pope had said that the French and Germans wished to destroy Venice, but he had prevented them. Grimani gave it as his opinion that the Pope would never absolve Venice so long as Louis XII. was in Italy; he wished to maintain his own position, and to be on the strongest side; the more he was entreated, the worse would be his demands.²

Grimani's judgment was in a great measure true, as events had already proved. On July 17 Venice showed unexpected signs of vitality by recovering Padua from Maximilian's captain, and at the same time news was brought to Rome that Cardinal Amboise had died at Milan. Donado said to the Pope, 'The dragon is dead who wished to devour this seat'; and the Pope laughed a sardonic laugh. The news of the death of Amboise was, however, premature. It is true that he was seized with an illness which proved mortal next year, but the Pope soon discovered that he was not entirely freed from his foe. Julius II. wore an appearance of firmness when he really was perplexed; and the Venetian Cardinals wrote at the end of July that 'the Pope was in a maze'. He could not throw in his lot with France, for Louis XII. was

Venice shows signs of recovery. July-August, 1509.

¹ Sanuto, viii., 511: 'Il papa mandò certa scriptura diabolosa e vergognosa'.

² *Ibid.*, 556: 'Et che chi far gajardmente il papa ara di gratia star bene e come papa, ma più che 'l si pregerà, pezo el farà'.

ill content with him; it was useless to hold by Maximilian, for Maximilian's constant demand was for money; he did not wish to join Venice, for he was afraid lest Venice might recover its strength, reconquer the Romagna, and even threaten Urbino.¹ Hence he was greatly grieved at the recovery of Padua, which was soon followed by other conquests. Verona threatened to follow the example of Padua, and the Marquis of Mantua was marching to the aid of the imperial governor when he was made prisoner by the Venetian troops. Julius II. was so wrathful when this news reached him, that he dashed his cap on the ground and blasphemed S. Peter.² He was now driven to watch anxiously the result of Maximilian's attempt to recapture Padua, which would be a sign how things were likely to turn. To avoid the importunities of the Cardinals and ambassadors in Rome he wandered in the end of August to Ostia, Civita Castellana, and Viterbo. There he led an easy joyous life which gave rise to ill-natured sayings.³

Maximilian's attempt against Padua failed. He wearied the Pope with requests for money and was angry because they were not granted. Early in October he departed ingloriously from Italy; and about the same time Julius II. was involved in a quarrel with Louis XII. The Bishop of Avignon died at Rome; and Julius II., according to the custom in the case of vacancies occurring in the Curia, appointed his successor. Louis XII. objected to this on the strength of an agreement which he had made in July with Cardinal Alidosi, an agreement that the Pope should give up to the king the nomination to bishoprics within his dominions, while the king undertook that he would not extend the protection of France over any vassal or subject of the Church. It would seem that Julius

Quarrel of
Julius II.
and Louis
XII. Sep-
tember,
1509.

¹ Sanuto, ix., 25.

² *Ibid.*, 81: 'Intesa questa nova il papa furiva, butando la berreta per terra biastemando san piero'.

³ See Priuli, quoted by Brosch, *Julius II.*, 343: 'Solazzandosi con alcuni Ganimedi . . . quasi ogni giorno si gustava del vino'.

II. did not consider this agreement to override the old customary rights of the Pope, while Louis XII. applied it without exception. Each was obstinate, but Louis XII. used a practical argument; he stopped the payment of ecclesiastical revenues in the Milanese to all those who were in Rome attending on the Pope.¹ Julius II. threatened to withhold admission to the cardinalate from the Frenchmen whom he had lately nominated; but reflection brought prudence, and Julius II. reluctantly gave way. The Venetians rejoiced that he should learn what French influence in Italy brought upon the Holy See.

The Pope had expressed himself dissatisfied with the terms in which the submission of Venice to his censures had been couched, in the powers which had been given to the Venetian envoys; and this was the ostensible ground of his refusal to negotiate further. In September a fuller form of submission was sent from Venice and was laid by Dunado before the Pope, who still regarded it as insufficient; so that Dunado could report no advance towards a settlement. Still the Venetian Signory were encouraged by their success in defending Padua, and by the Pope's quarrel with the French king. They resolved to use their advantage, and on October 26 wrote to their envoys that it was long since they had received any communication from them; they saw no use in all staying at Rome; five might return and Dunado alone remain. On the same day that this letter was written, Julius II. had taken a step towards Venice. He was alarmed by the news of an interview between Maximilian and Chaumont, the Grand Master of Milan, and feared the revival of some plan against himself. He accordingly sent for the Venetian Cardinal Grimani and told him the terms which he was ready to accept from Venice—a thing which he had hitherto refused to do; and the envoys were allowed to discuss these terms with Cardinals Caraffa and Raffaele

Proposals
of Julius
II. to
Venice.
October,
1509.

¹ Guicciardini, bk. viii. Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1509, §§ 20, 21. Sanuto, ix., 80, 83, 197.

Riario. The Pope's demands were severe, and aimed at the complete subjection of Venice to the authority of the Church; they covered all the points, temporal and spiritual alike, which had ever been subjects of dispute between Venice and the Holy See. Venice was to give up its claim to nominate to bishoprics and benefices, was to allow appeals in ecclesiastical cases to go direct to the Roman Rota, and was not to try the clergy in its courts or impose taxes on them without the Pope's consent. In like manner it was not to meddle with the subjects of the Church in any way, was to recompense the Pope for his expenses in recovering his possessions and restore the revenues which had been unjustly received, was to open the navigation of the Adriatic Gulf, withdraw its official *Visdomino* from Ferrara, and be ready to supply galleys to the Pope on his request.¹

Just as these negotiations had begun came the revocation of the five Venetian envoys. Julius II. was too wary a diplomatist to pay any heed to the hint which this step was meant to convey. 'Not only five shall go,' he exclaimed to Cardinal Grimani, 'but all the six; I will have twelve before I remove the excommunication.' To this determination he remained firm; either all of them should go or none. He showed no signs of modifying his conditions; really he felt no desire that the matter should be ended. In the middle of November the Venetian envoys flattered themselves that they had gained a new friend. Christopher Bainbridge, who had been elected Archbishop of York, in 1508, came as English ambassador to Rome. The new King of England, Henry VIII., was already an object of curiosity. Henry VII. had been content to hold aloof from the great questions of European diplomacy; Henry VIII. was young and warlike, and had a well-filled coffer. Venice and Julius II. alike hoped to make use of him as an enemy to France. Bainbridge assured the Venetians that his master was

Hopes of
Venice
from the
influence
of Eng-
land.
November,
1509.

¹ Letter of November 3, in Sanuto, ix., 298.

warmly on their side. Julius II. gave him permission to sit with Cardinals Caraffa and Riario to hear the Venetian answer to his proposals. When Bainbridge expressed himself satisfied, Julius II. said, 'We will write to the King of England, and ask his opinion'. The Venetians thought that this consultation would make the decision a very protracted matter.¹

The Venetians, whose hopes had risen after their success at Padua, suffered a severe disaster at the end of the year. Their fleet, which blockaded the mouth of the Po to punish the Duke of Ferrara, was severely injured by an unexpected fire from batteries skilfully constructed on the land. Venice was again humbled; and on December 29 the Signory, not being able to do otherwise, agreed to the Pope's conditions. They proposed two modifications—that the Gulf of Venice should be open only to the subjects of the Church, and that they should be allowed to substitute a Consul for a Visdomino at Ferrara, who should protect their interests. As this agreement involved a cession of the laws and jurisdiction of Venice, a majority of three-fourths was needed in the Senate. On the first ballot this was not obtained; the question was again put to the vote, and was only carried by the bare majority required.² The pride of Venice was tried to the uttermost; but it had to be tried still more severely before its business with the Pope was finished. Julius II. paid no heed to the modifications which Venice proposed, but rather increased his demands. On January 9, 1510, he declared that the Gulf of Venice must be free to all, and added a requirement that in case of war against the Turks Venice should be obliged to furnish fifteen galleys. The abolition of all custom dues was a severe blow to Venetian finance; war with the Turks meant the suspension of Venetian commerce. At last the Pope consented to restrict his claim for free

Venice
agrees to
the Pope's
terms.
December
29, 1509.

¹ Sanuto, ix., 372, 409.

² *Ibid.*, 424. Sanuto adds: 'Nota: no fo vardà la legge come adesso; che fo cossa mal fata'.

navigation of the Gulf of Venice to the subjects of the States of the Church; while Venice accepted the obligation of furnishing galleys for a crusade, stipulating only that it should not be expressly mentioned in the written conditions, lest their relations with the Turks should be needlessly embroiled.¹

At length, on February 4, Julius II. laid the absolution of Venice before the Consistory of Cardinals. Fifteen gave their opinions in favour, eleven were against it. Only the French Cardinals were entirely opposed; the rest considered that it should be deferred for the present. Julius II. had fortified himself by an opinion of the doctors of the University of Bologna to the effect that he could not with justice do otherwise than absolve Venice. Cardinal Carvajal thought that it would be well for the Pope to consult his allies. 'What have we to do,' exclaimed the Pope, 'with the opinions of others about the duties of our office?' Before the Consistory separated all the Cardinals had, in some form or other, given way to the Pope's will.² Still the Venetian envoys were beset with technical questions of procedure. Exception was taken to their powers as insufficient for the purpose of seeking absolution. Cardinal Caraffa was commissioned to draw up a proper document, *in forma camerae*, as it was put. The Venetians wondered what was meant; if this *forma camerae* were used by princes, it were well; if not, they were obliged to conclude, 'we must do sometimes as we can, not as we would'.³ It was soon made clear to them that the form required was one which contained a confession of the justice of their excommunication. It was almost too much that they should be called upon to endorse the language of Julius II., language such as might be used of street robbers and assassins. The Venetian Senate tried to modify the wording of the docu-

¹ Sanuto, ix., 481. 'Item di lo armar le 15 galee che semo contenti; ma che non poni in scriptura per caxon del Turcho non ne vegni adosso.'

² Brosch, *Julius II.*, 188, 345, from the letters of the Venetian envoys.

³ Letter of Count Hieronimo Porzil to Badoer, in Sanuto, ix., 552.

ment which was sent for their acceptance ; but the Pope would have his way to the uttermost. The final mandate to the envoys empowered them to 'confess and allow that the papal monitory had come to their knowledge, and had been lawfully issued on true and lawful grounds; and further to beg his Holiness humbly and devoutly for pardon and absolution from the censures therein contained'.¹ The submission of Venice was made complete; all that the luckless envoys could do was to entreat the Pope to deal with them as gently as he could, and to have regard to their honour.

Julius II. was too wise a statesman to wish to inflict any personal humiliation, and showed himself willing to make the ceremony of absolution as little burdensome as possible. Paris de Grassis, the Master of Ceremonies, had been diligently seeking precedents for months, and laid his report before the Pope.² The customary form of absolution was to strike the penitent on the shoulder with a rod; and in some cases the shoulders were bared. Julius II. omitted the use of the rod altogether, and only required that the ceremonial should be such as to set forth his own power and greatness. On February 24 the portico of S. Peter's was hung with tapestries and strewn with carpets; in the middle was erected a throne for the Pope, who was borne thither in his litter. The Cardinals stood round him, but they met with little respect from the crowd of other prelates who mingled with them. The five Venetian envoys,³ dressed in scarlet, advanced and kissed the Pope's foot; then they retired and knelt upon the steps. Donado in a few words begged for absolution; he was asked for his mandate, and produced it. When it had been accepted as sufficient, a papal secretary read the agreement made with the Pope. He read it in so low a voice that no one but the Pope could hear its contents; but this tedious

Absolu-
tion of
Venice.
February
24, 1510.

¹ Sanuto, ix., 579.

² His report is given in Raynaldus, 1510, § 7.

³ One of the six, Pixani, had died in Rome a few days before.

process lasted for an hour, and the envoys had great difficulty in maintaining their kneeling posture. When the reading was over, the envoys rose, and placing their hands on a missal held by some Cardinals, swore to observe the terms. Then the Pope chanted the *Miserere*, and after a few prayers gave them absolution, imposing on them, as a penance, a visit to the seven basilicas of Rome, where they were to pray and give alms. Then the doors of S. Peter's were opened, and the penitentiary led the Venetians into the Church from which they had been outcasts. Mass was said in the Chapel of Sixtus IV.; but the Pope retired to the Vatican, for he never was present at long services.¹ He ordered his household to escort the envoys home, and they returned from S. Peter's in state, each riding between two prelates. So far as concerned the mode in which absolution was given the Venetians were well satisfied.

In spite of the splendid example which Julius II. had given of the power of the Papacy, he was not in heart very proud of his triumph. He could scarcely hide from himself that his action was scarcely defensible on ecclesiastical grounds; and his utterances to the Venetian envoys show that he was somewhat ill at ease. When he absolved them he said a few words. He had wished before excommunicating them that they had come into the right way; as they would not give up their occupation of the patrimony of S. Peter he had acted promptly so as to recover it; following the example of Christ he now accepted their repentance. When the envoys took leave of him on February 25, he said, 'Do not think it strange that we have been so long in removing the interdict. The Signory was the cause; it ought to have satisfied our demands. We grieve over the censures we were driven to use. Be mind-

¹ Letter of Capello in Sanuto, x., 9: 'Perchè sua Santità non resta mai a questi officii longi'. Sanuto gives three letters, of Paolo Capello, Cardinal Corner, and Alvise Malipiero, describing the scene. A joint despatch of all the envoys to the Doge is given by Brosch, *Julius II.*, 288. Further mentions are made in the *Relazioni* of Capello and Trivixan, Sanuto, x., 71, 77; also in Alberi.

ful to stand well with Popes ; then it will be well with you, and you will not lack favours.' ¹ These were mere common-places, as every one knew that the Pope had wrung all he could out of Venice, and was only anxious to prevent the gain of France and Germany from turning to his own loss. He absolved Venice as a step towards checking the progress of France : and he dared not absolve her till she had shown herself strong enough to beat back Maximilian from Padua. He had brought about the ruin of Venice to serve his own interests ; he wished, in the defence of these interests, to prevent that ruin from being complete.

Julius II. might indeed flatter himself that his policy was successful. He had set up the States of the Church in Central Italy ; he had reduced the haughty power which seemed supreme in North Italy to a condition of vassalage to the Church. Venice had been forced to surrender her privileges, had been rendered harmless for the present, and was bound in the immediate future to look to the Papacy as her sole protection. But Venice had not given way so thoroughly as the Pope supposed ; she bowed before the storm, but she did not mean to surrender any of her rights. The Council of Ten resolved to leave a record of their opinions to those who came after. They gave way before the necessity of an overwhelming crisis, but they did not consider that it was in their power to alienate to the Pope the rights of their civil government. On the same day that they sent the final powers to their envoys at Rome, they executed a legal protest against the validity of their deed. Their protest set forth that they had, contrary to justice, suffered intolerable wrongs ; that the Pope, ill informed, refused them absolution save on unjust conditions and the renunciation of their rights. On these grounds the Doge protested that he acted, not voluntarily but through violence and fear ; that his acts were null ; that he reserved the right of revoking them, and presenting his

Protest of
the Venetian
Doge.

¹ *Relazione di Domenico Trivixan*, in Sanuto, x., 78. Alberi, series 2, iii., 30.

rights before a better informed Pope.¹ It was a clumsy way of asserting that self-preservation is the first law of states; that treaties are the recognition of existing necessity; that no generation of statesmen can alienate for ever the fundamental rights of a community.

Such a protest may be regarded as a mean subterfuge; the history of the Papacy, however, had supplied a precedent. Eugenius IV. protested on his deathbed that his concessions to Germany were not to be understood by his successors to derogate from the privileges of the Holy See.² If the Church claimed rights which could not be alienated, civil communities had also an inalienable right to existence. Julius II. had used spiritual censures as a means of temporal warfare, and had compelled Venice to plead guilty to sins which it did not admit. Venice registered the fact that its admission was outward only, and did not express its real mind. It waited its opportunity to take back what it had been forced to abandon; and the papal grasp over the Venetian Church was not long permitted. Venice never recognised the agreement with Julius II. as legal. In no long time it reasserted its independence, and devised means for its protection against papal encroachments. The next attempt to excommunicate Venice ended in signal failure.

Another protest against the Pope which proceeded from Venice at this time deserves attention. It was a fly-sheet circulated amongst the people, criticising, in moderate and dignified language, the conduct of Julius II., judged by the standard of his high office. It took the form of a letter, according to the custom of the times—a letter addressed by Christ to His unworthy Vicar. Christ died, so ran the contents, to redeem mankind; He chose His disciples to hand on the testimony of His gracious will; He committed to them the administration of all things which concerned men's salvation. This pastoral office was

¹ This protest is printed by Brosch, *Julius II.*, 280. Brosch first called attention to its importance; see p. 194.

² See vol. iii., 88.

well discharged by S. Peter; let Julius compare himself with that example. Has he shown Peter's humility, gentleness, and love for souls? Has he not been the cause of deeds of blood and shame? 'Numbers of souls,' so Christ is made to say, 'have gone to perdition for whom We, who created heaven and earth, suffered such bitter passion; ay, and We would suffer it anew, to save one of the least of all those who through your fault have gone into eternal fire, and who call to Us for vengeance on your wicked deeds. All this evil comes from your desire for temporal rule; and the ill that has befallen is but a small part of what will follow if you do not amend. Think for a moment; if one of your servants withstood your designs about temporal things, how great would be your anger, how severe his punishment. What then shall We do, whose wishes for men's salvation are being withstood by you? We use the rod of correction before We draw the sword of judgment.'¹

There is no mention of national loss in this document, and no appeal to national patriotism. The New Learning set before men's minds the inherent dignity of man. On one side the overmastering sense of individual power led to moral recklessness: on another side it led to a deeper religious earnestness. The Middle Ages had been concerned chiefly with the outward organisation of the Church and its doctrines; the Renaissance passionately emphasised the value of the individual soul. It is this yearning after a regenerate society, which shall encourage a noble life in the individual man, that makes Savonarola so attractive, so different from those who went before him. The same feeling is expressed in this Venetian broadside. Many things might have been said against Julius II.; what the writer

¹ Sanuto, ix., 567. It is headed 'Jesus Christus Mariæ Virginis filius Julio II. vicario nostro indigno'. It ends 'Data ex cælo Nostro empireo die 26 Decembris, anno Nostræ Nativitatis in sæculo, 1509'. It has an attestation, 'Joannes Evangelista de mandato subscripsi'. From the use of these forms it would seem that the document was the production of some State official. This is borne out by its phraseology; thus the Gospels are called 'li acti de alcuno de li evangelisti Nostri fidelissimi canzelieri'.

chose to emphasise was the pitiful sight of the loss of souls for whom Christ died—a sight sad enough under all circumstances, but made terrible by the thought that these horrors were the work of him who was Christ's Vicar upon earth. The Papacy seemed to be in its most glorious days. It was carrying the strong organisation which the Middle Ages had forged into the battlefield which the Renaissance had opened out. But the Renaissance was by no means wholly immoral or wholly irreligious ; and the words of the Venetian clerk were but an echo of the sense of misery and sadness which filled many humble souls who looked out on the distracted world.

CHAPTER XV.

THE WARS OF JULIUS II.

1510—1511.

WHEN Julius II. absolved Venice and thereby withdrew from the League of Cambrai, he boasted that he had stuck a dagger into the heart of the French king. It was a treacherous blow. The Pope had been foremost in urging the spoliation of Venice; and when he had despoiled her to his heart's content, he grudged France the share that she had won. As soon as Venice had been reduced to become the handmaid of the Pope, he was desirous to raise her up again sufficiently to be a check to the preponderance of France in North Italy. He had succeeded in isolating Venice; he was now anxious to isolate France. Having broken up one league as soon as he gained his own ends by it, he wished to form another directed against the instrument of his first success.

Julius II.
plots a
league
against
France.
1510.

It was, however, useless to irritate France until he was sure of allies. He counted on reviving the old hostility of Maximilian against Louis XII.; he expected that Henry VIII. of England would be ready to seize a good opportunity for prosecuting the old claims of England against France: if a movement was once begun he knew that Ferdinand of Spain would join. Accordingly he began a series of negotiations which did not at first succeed. Maximilian refused the Pope's overtures with anger, and summoned the Diet, which promised him aid in carrying on the war against Venice. However,

Failure of
his first
attempts.

Julius II. had not a great opinion of Maximilian ; he looked on him as a 'naked child,'¹ and comforted himself with the assurance that before the year was over, Germany would be at war with France. But both Julius II. and the Venetians received a severe blow when the news was brought in April that Henry VIII. had renewed his father's league of amity with France.² When Bainbridge, the English envoy, protested to the Pope that he knew nothing about the matter, Julius II. answered in anger, 'You are all villains'.

But though Julius II. found that the powers of Europe hung back from his proposed league against France, he still showed his own feelings. One day in April the French Cardinal of Albi read a letter from his brother, who was engaged in defending Verona against the Venetians. He told the Pope that the Venetians had almost made an entry, in which case the French and Germans would have been cut to pieces ; but God willed otherwise. 'The devil willed otherwise,' was the Pope's angry exclamation. Julius II. did not cease to prosecute his plans ; he bribed Matthias Lang, Bishop of Gurk, the chief adviser of Maximilian. More important was an alliance which he made with the Swiss through the help of Matthias Schinner, Bishop of Sitten. The Swiss had been the mercenary allies of France, but their alliance for ten years was expired, and Louis XII. refused to grant the terms which they demanded. Schinner had already been employed by Julius II. to raise 200 Swiss as a bodyguard for the Pope. The Swiss guard of Julius II. was retained by his successors, and still exists, wearing the picturesque uniform which Michel Angelo is said to have designed. Julius II. recognised the cleverness of Schinner in discharging his first commission, and gave him legatine powers ; through his

Alliance of
Julius II.
with the
Swiss.
May, 1510.

¹ *Relazione di Trevisan*, in Sanuto, x., 77 : 'Stima l' imperatore infantem nudum'.

² Sanuto, x., 158 : 'Fe restar molto sospensa tutta la terra, e dove si sperava di bene per la via de Ingalterra hora è persa. E tutto Rialto fo di malla voja.'

persuasions the Swiss made an alliance for five years with the Pope and undertook to enter Lombardy with 15,000 men. When Julius II. heard this news he could not repress his delight, and said to the Venetian envoy, 'Now is the chance to drive the French out of Italy'. He could not rest for thinking over his designs. 'These Frenchmen,' he said, 'have taken away my appetite and I cannot sleep. Last night I spent in pacing my room, for I could not rest. My heart tells me all is well; I have hopes that all will be well after my troubles in the past. It is God's will to chastise the Duke of Ferrara and free Italy from the French.'¹

The schemes of Julius II. were directed to a new conquest for the Church. He had won Bologna and the Romagna; he now cast longing eyes on the duchy of Ferrara, which was a fief of the Roman See. Designs of Julius II. against Ferrara. The Duke of Ferrara was a member of the League of Cambrai and had extended his dominions at the expense of Venice. He had not followed the Pope in deserting the league, but remained a firm ally of Louis XII., under whose protection he was. An attack upon him was a declaration of war against France; and towards this Julius II. resolutely advanced. Hitherto he had refused to recognise either Louis XII. or Ferdinand as King of Naples, and had demanded that their claims should be submitted to his decision. On June 17 he invested Ferdinand with Naples, without, however, obtaining from him any definite promise of immediate help.

With the prospects of war the spirits of Julius II. rose, and he talked ceaselessly of his assured triumph. The Frenchmen found Rome unpleasant for them; Cardinal Tremouille in July tried to escape, but was brought back and imprisoned in the Castle of S. Angelo, where he was not even allowed to see his chaplain. When he pleaded that the constitutions made in the Conclave provided that no Cardinal should be imprisoned without a trial in Consis-

¹ Letter of Donado in Sanuto, x., 369, under date May 14.

tory, the Pope answered, 'By God's body, if he makes me angry I will have his head cut off in the Campo de' Fiori'. When some of the Cardinals tried to intercede, the Pope angrily asked if they wished to share his prison.¹ He stormed at the French so that the Venetian envoy remarked with complacency that they were treated one half worse than they themselves had been the year before.²

Julius II. began his war in the manner, which had now become customary, of publishing a Bull of excommunication against Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara. He took a childish joy in preparing it, and said to the Venetian envoy, 'It will be more terrible than the Bull against you; for you were not our subjects, but he is a rebel'. When the Bull was laid before a Consistory, all the Cardinals gave their assent save the Cardinal of S. Malo; it was of little use to remonstrate with a Pope who threatened imprisonment as a reward for counsel. The charges against Alfonso ranged from general complaints of ingratitude towards the Holy See to the specific crime of making salt at Comaccio to the prejudice of the papal mines at Cervia; and he was excommunicated as a son of iniquity and a root of perdition. The Pope ordered his Bull to be printed and sent everywhere, and men read with amazement the vigorous language of the Pope; it could not have been stronger if the existence of Christianity had been at stake.³

The plan of the Pope's campaign was skilfully devised. One detachment of the papal forces advanced by land to co-operate with the Venetian fleet in an attack upon Genoa; another marched into the territory of Ferrara, where it was joined by the Venetian troops; at the same time the Swiss entered

Excom-
muni-
cation of the
Duke of
Ferrara.
July, 1510.

The Swiss
fail the
Pope.
August,
1510.

¹ Sanuto, x., 761, 856.

² *Ibid.*, 761: 'Francesi sono tutti storniti la mità più di quello erano nostri l' anno passato'.

³ Peter Martyr, *Ep.*, xxiii., 443, says: 'Anathema promulgavit horrendum; cristæ mihi præ horrore quando edictum legi horruerunt'. See the letter of André de Burgo to Marguerite of Austria, from Blois, July 22, 1510, in *Lettres de Louis XII.*, i., 255, etc.

Lombardy. But though the plan was well laid it was ill executed. The Genoese did not rise as was expected, and the French fleet brought reinforcements, so that the expedition against Genoa was a failure. The Swiss crossed the Alps to Varese and thence marched to Como; but they showed no eagerness to fight, and the French commander Chaumont bribed their leaders to return. The mercenary soldiers recrossed the mountains and left the French troops free to march to the aid of Ferrara. Their leaders wrote to the Pope saying that they had entered into an agreement for the protection of the Pope's person, but found that they were expected to war against the King of France and the Emperor; this they were not willing to do, and they offered their services to mediate for the settlement of differences between the Pope and his adversaries. Julius II. wrathfully replied, 'Your letter is arrogant and insolent. We did not want your help for the defence of our person, but we hired you and called you into Italy to recover the rights of the Roman Church from the rebellious Duke of Ferrara. Amongst his helpers is certainly Louis, King of France, who in this and other things has greatly injured us. Against the Emperor far be it from us to think or do anything, because we know his filial reverence towards the Holy See. In writing to us to lay aside our plots and make peace, you are not only impudent but impious and insulting. They are the true plotters who by good words and deceitful promises seek to deceive us. In offering yourselves as mediators you show yourselves arrogant and forgetful of your condition. Princes of high dignity daily offer themselves, and we can make peace without you. You ought not to desert our service after receiving our pay. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that you purpose to make an agreement with the French king and fight against the Roman Church. If you do, we will reconcile ourselves with the French king, will league ourselves with him and the Emperor against you, and will use all our temporal and spiritual arms against breakers of their faith and deserters of the Church. We

will send your letters and your sealed agreements throughout the world, that all men may know that they can have no dealings with you or put trust in your words; so that you may be in all nations hateful and infamous.'¹

These were brave words, and they show a resolute policy.

Synod of
Tours.
Septem-
ber, 1510. In fact, resolute action was the one redeeming quality of the statesmanship of Julius II.; he knew what he wanted, and his prompt action filled his opponents with alarm. Louis XII. was astonished, and supposed that the Pope had secured powerful allies.² Instead of acting promptly he was desirous of establishing an accord with other powers, and wished to temporise till he was sure of Maximilian and Henry VIII. So instead of attacking the Pope by armed force, he weakly decided to carry the struggle into the field of ecclesiastical politics. He summoned a synod of French bishops, which met at Tours on September 14. Eight questions were submitted, and were answered according to the royal wishes. The prelates of France declared the wrongfulness of the Pope's actions and the right of the king to defend himself; they revived the decrees of the Council of Basel and approved of the summons of a General Council which should inquire into the conduct of the Pope.

Ecclesi-
astical
attack of
Louis XII. In the eyes of a shrewd politician like Machiavelli, all this was sheer waste of time, and proceeded from inability to grasp the facts of the case. 'To put a bridle on the Pope,' he wrote, 'there is no need of so many emperors, or so much talking. Others who made war upon the Pope either surprised him, as did Philip le Bel, or had him shut up in the Castle of S. Angelo by his

¹ This is an abstract of a curious letter printed by Tommasini, *Niccolò Machiavelli*, i., 704, from the *Annali del Tizi* in the Chigi Library. It is dated Bologna, September 30, 1510. Though this letter was unknown before, there is no reason to doubt its genuineness. It is thoroughly characteristic of Julius II.'s political attitude.

² André de Burgo (*Lettres de Louis XII.*, i., 270) wrote, July 26: 'Rex est totus indignatus contra Pontificem propter illa quæ fecit hactenus, et quia interceptit aliquas litteras per quas cognovit quod Papa machinabatur res diabolicas contra ipsum Regem'.

own barons, who are not so much extinguished that they cannot be revived.¹ Machiavelli knew the real weakness of the Pope's temporal power, which would fall at once before a determined onslaught; but the French king took matters seriously, and wished to give his opposition to the Pope an appearance of ecclesiastical regularity. It was a grave mistake; for a General Council could not well deal with questions which were purely political, nor was there any reasonable chance of obtaining the assent of Europe to such a Council. Henry VIII. of England was already forming plans of using the embarrassment of France for his own advantage; Maximilian still entertained the preposterous plan of making himself Pope as well as Emperor; Ferdinand of Spain was quite content that the Pope should harass France as much as he pleased. The hesitation of Louis XII. left the field open for Julius II.'s plans.

Still Julius II. found it more difficult than he had expected to conquer Ferrara. His troops, joined with the Venetians, took Modena, but were not strong enough to besiege Ferrara, which was well fortified. In the beginning of September the Pope set out from Rome to enjoy the triumph which he then thought secure; but as he drew near to Bologna he learned much that made him uneasy. The Bolognese were discontented with the government of Cardinal Alidosi, a worthless man for whom the Pope showed an unaccountable fondness. Already Alidosi had been charged with peculation, had been summoned to Rome to answer, and had been acquitted.² He was hated by the people whom he governed; he was lukewarm in his conduct of the war against Ferrara; he was strongly suspected of intriguing with the French. In spite of all this Julius II. persisted in trusting him, even when in Bologna he found nothing save disappointment. To

Julius II.
at Bolog-
na. Sep-
tember,
1510.

¹ *Legazione Terza alla Corte di Francia*: letter of August 9. See Tommasini's remarks, *Niccolò Machiavelli*, i., 504, etc.

² In October, 1509. Sanuto, ix., 253, etc. Paris de Grassis, in the Appendix.

the other causes of his grief was soon added the news that five Cardinals, amongst them Carvajal, had gone to Florence and thence made their way to the French camp. It was clear that they would lend their authority to Louis XII.'s plan of summoning a Council, which might end in another schism.

The news of the withdrawal of the Swiss reached the Pope at Bologna, and he soon found out its serious effect. Chaumont, the Grand Master of Milan, turned his troops southwards and made a feint of attacking Modena; when the papal troops had gathered for its defence, he suddenly turned and marched against Bologna. By this movement he divided the papal forces, and Bologna was ill fitted to offer any resistance. Only 600 footmen and 300 horse were left for its defence; it was ill supplied with victuals; the people were discontented: the expelled Bentivogli were hovering near, and a rising might be expected at a favourable moment. Julius II. was ill of a fever and was confined to his bed; he could not flee, as the country was beset by parties of French horsemen, and on October 19 Chaumont was within ten miles of Bologna.

Julius II. did what he could. He promised many boons to the people of Bologna, who mustered under arms and received his message with applause. He dragged himself from his bed and, seated on the balcony, gave them his benediction; but he did not put much trust in the Bolognese. His courage left him and he gave himself up for lost; he told the Venetian envoy that if the Venetian army did not cross the Po within twenty-four hours he would make terms with the French; 'Oh, what a fall is ours!' he exclaimed.¹ Negotiations were already opened with Chaumont, and it was believed that Cardinal Alidosi was in a secret understanding with him. Chaumont's proposals were that the Pope should again join the League of Cambrai and abandon

¹ Guicciardini praises the Pope's constancy; but the letters of Hieronimo Lippomano, who was at Bologna at the time (Sanuto, xi., 547, etc.), show that the Pope was terribly alarmed.

French
attack on
Bologna.
October,
1510.

Venice; that the question of Ferrara should be left for settlement by the Kings of France, Spain, England, and the Emperor; that the Pope should give the French king the power of appointing to all benefices within his dominions. These demands were crushing to Julius II., but he saw no way of escape. All night he lay in restless misery, uttering delirious cries of despair; 'I shall be taken by the French. Let me die. I will drink poison and end all.' Then he burst into passionate reproaches—every one had broken faith and deserted him. Then he uttered exclamations of revenge and swore that he would ruin them all. At last he made up his mind to sign the agreement with Chaumont; he ordered all to leave him and went to sleep. Every one thought that the agreement was actually signed; but suddenly Spanish and Venetian reinforcements made their appearance, and the Pope's spirits revived. Chaumont had wasted his time and lost his opportunity by his negotiations. He shrank from seizing the Pope when he was defenceless; he did not venture an attack now that Bologna was reinforced. The French forces sullenly withdrew, and the first use that the Pope made of his freedom was to publish an excommunication against Chaumont and all in the French camp.

It was some time before the Pope recovered from his fever. During his illness he allowed his beard to grow, and did not shave it on his recovery. He was the first Pope who wore a beard, and in this he adopted a fashion which, though not adopted by his successor, was followed by Clement VII. and afterwards found favour with the Popes. Men said he grew his beard through rage against France; indeed, it was in keeping with the character of Julius II. that he wished to wear the appearance of a warrior rather than a priest.¹ As soon

Disorder
in the
papal
army. No
vember,
1510.

¹ Paris de Grassis, February, 1511: 'Barbatus more Greco; nam ab eo quo Bononiam ex Urbe ingressus est, nunquam barbam totundit, causante morbo, qui tunc cepit illum molestare; et sic aut voto, aut alia causa, ut placuit in similibus, usque modo barbatus fuerat et est'.

as he was recovered of his illness he burned to wipe away the memory of his failure, which had indeed been signal. He had narrowly escaped a crushing disaster, and had escaped only by the incapacity of his foes. He had run into danger without due consideration; his action had been bold, but he had lacked the political foresight necessary for carrying out great plans. When he looked around him he found that his camp was in disorder, and he was disappointed in the number of his troops. He was no judge of men, and was ill served by those whom he most trusted. He still clung blindly to Cardinal Alidosi, and he prevailed on the Venetians to release from prison the Marquis of Mantua and appoint him commander of their forces. He seemed to think that previous imprisonment was a guarantee of fidelity; but both Alidosi and the Marquis of Mantua were untrustworthy. They did not believe in the Pope's schemes, and thought only of keeping on good terms with the French king. Julius II. was resolute in the choice of ends; he lacked the sagacity needed for the choice of means.

The Pope's forces were insufficient for the siege of Ferrara; but he was determined not to end his campaign ingloriously. He joined his troops with those of Venice and attacked an outpost of the dominions of Ferrara, the County of Mirandola, which was held by the widow of Count Ludovico, a daughter of Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, a Milanese general in the pay of France. The two castles of Concordia and Mirandola lay on the west of Ferrara, and by holding them the Pope could prevent the advance of the French troops to its aid. Concordia soon fell; but the widowed countess held Mirandola with stubbornness. The winter was severe and the ground lay deep in snow. It was contrary to the traditions of Italian warfare to carry on military operations in the winter, but Julius II. overbore all opposition to his plans. He resolved to shame the lukewarmness of his generals by going in person to the camp. On January 2, 1511, he set out for

Siege of
Miran-
dola. Janu-
ary, 1511.

Bologna, and reached Mirandola on January 6, borne in a litter through snow which was nearly three feet deep.

The Pope showed himself well fitted for military life. His generals trembled before him as he roundly abused them for their incapacity, and called them 'thieves and villains,' with a copious garniture of military oaths and coarse jests.¹ He spared no one, not even his nephew, the Duke of Urbino. He threw off entirely the decorum of his priestly office and behaved as a general. Though old and just recovered from a long illness he walked about in the snow, showed himself to all, and created amusement by the vigorous energy with which he kept on repeating 'Mirandola must be taken,' till the words flowed with rhythmic cadence from his mouth.² He presided at councils of war, arranged the position of the cannon, directed military operations, and inspected his troops. Still, in spite of all his efforts Mirandola held out; till the Pope, to encourage his soldiers and strike terror into his foes, gave out that if it did not surrender at once he would give it up to pillage. This seemed to the Cardinals to be a strong measure, and the Cardinal of Reggio suggested that it would be better to exact a heavy ransom. The Pope replied, 'I will not do that, for there will be no fair division; the poor soldiers will get nothing, and the ransom will all go to the Duke of Urbino; I know how these things are managed. If they choose to surrender at once I will deal gently with them; if not, I will give them up to pillage.'³

The Pope's threat did not reduce Mirandola, which bravely returned the fire of the cannon. One day the Pope's headquarters were struck by a ball, and one of his servants was

¹ The Venetian Lippomano, in Sanuto, xi., 721: 'Non vol scriver le parole il papa li disse a questi soi: ladri: ribaldi; farò et dirò; questo gioto dil ducha: con zuramenti grandissimi' . . . 'quando partì di Bologna disse, Vederò si averò si grossi li coglioni come ha il re di Franza'.

² *Ibid.* 'Il papa non ha altro in bocha che Mirandola, Mirandola, e va parlando, quasi cantando, Mirandola, Mirandola; qual fa rider tutti.'

³ *Ibid.*, 743.

killed. He removed to other quarters, and they likewise were struck; so in the evening the Pope came back to his first abode and ordered the damage to be repaired at once. His personal courage awakened the admiration of the soldiers; 'Holy Father,' said the Venetians, 'we look upon you as our officer'. Julius II. delighted in such tokens of recognition; his spirits rose, and he lived as a boon companion with the Venetian generals and officials. 'He sits and talks,' wrote Lippomano, 'of all sorts of things; how different people live, about different kinds of men, about the cold weather he had felt at Lyons, about his plans against Ferrara. There is no need for any one else to speak.'¹

At last, on January 19, Mirandola was driven to surrender.

Capture of
Miran-
dola.
January
19, 1511.

In the council held to decide on terms Julius II. went back from his original menace; he proposed to spare the inhabitants of Mirandola, but exact from them a sum of money which should be divided among his troops; all foreign soldiers were to be put to the sword. Fabrizio Colonna interposed, 'Holy Father, for a hundred foreign soldiers will you raise this disturbance? Let them ransom themselves like the rest.' The Pope angrily answered, 'Begone, I know better than you'.² Luckily there were no French troops found in the little garrison of Mirandola, and the Pope was saved from an act of butchery. He entered Mirandola through a breach in the wall, as there was no other mode of entrance, for the gate had been walled up and the drawbridge destroyed. When once Mirandola was taken the Pope's anger passed away; and he did his utmost to restrain his troops from pillage and to protect the people. The countess was brought before him and knelt at his feet; he looked at her with a clouded face and said, 'So you would not surrender? Get you gone, for I wish to give this land to Gian Francesco'—the brother of the late duke, who was in the Pope's camp. He ordered the countess to be honourably escorted to Reggio.

¹ The Venetian Lippomano, in Sanuto, xi., 745.

² *Ibid.*, 763.

The capture of Mirandola had tasked the resources and the personal energy of Julius II.; and he could not really exult in his triumph, for it only showed how difficult was the attainment of his ultimate end, the reduction of Ferrara. Julius II., in person, had taken Mirandola; he could not continue to exercise the office of general, and he had no capable general in his employ. He felt this and stormed at the Duke of Urbino and the rest; but he could devise no other way of mending matters than bursts of passionate language.¹ When he had to design a plan of future action he was irresolute, and changed his opinion from day to day. He negotiated with the Duke of Ferrara that he should abandon his alliance with France, but the duke refused. To detach Maximilian from France the Pope gave up Modena, which was a fief of the empire, to the imperial general and advised him to demand Reggio also on the same ground. By this means Reggio and Modena would serve as a further barrier between Ferrara and the French troops at Milan; and if the surrender of Reggio was refused, Julius II. hoped that the refusal might lead to a breach between France and Maximilian.

Failure of
Julius II.
against
Ferrara,
February,
1511.

None of the Pope's plans succeeded, as the Duke of Ferrara defeated the papal and Venetian forces on February 28. The Pope's treasury was well-nigh exhausted; so he listened to overtures for a general pacification, and meanwhile endeavoured to strengthen himself by a new creation of the unwonted number of eight Cardinals. Amongst them was Christopher Bainbridge, Archbishop of York, and Matthias Schinner, Bishop of Sitten, his legate amongst the Swiss. The Venetian envoy calculated that the Pope obtained an average of about 10,000 ducats for each of his creations, and with his treasury thus enriched Julius II. could keep his forces for some time longer in the field. To every one's surprise he chose Cardinal Bainbridge as legate in his army. 'It is a great matter,'

Creation
of eight
Cardinals.

¹ The Venetian Lippomano, in Sanuto, xi., January 10, 732: 'Il papa a subfato con il ducha di Urbin colericho e bestial'.

wrote the Venetian envoy, 'that an Englishman should hold such a post. He is capable enough and quite Italianate.'¹

Meanwhile, in March, representatives of France, Germany, and Spain met for a conference at Mantua, and drew up proposals for the restoration of peace. The imperial minister, Matthias Lang, Bishop of Gurk, was deputed by them to carry their resolutions to the Pope, who had returned to Bologna. There Lang appeared on April 10, and astonished the Curia by his magnificence, his pride, and his disdain of the offers by which the Pope sought to win him to his side. Venice was ready to bribe a man who could bring about peace between herself and Maximilian; Julius II. had reserved for him a Cardinal's hat, and promised him the rich patriarchate of Aquileia and other benefices to the annual value of 1,000,000 florins.² But Lang showed no desire for these good things. He behaved like a king rather than an ambassador; he sat in the Pope's presence, and did not remove his biretta when he spoke to him. He proposed to the Pope schemes of pacification; when the Pope refused, he warned him that the Emperor and the Kings of France and Aragon would 'resist his unreasonable doings'. On April 25 he left Bologna; and his escort as they rode out of the town raised the cries of 'The Empire!' 'France!' and even the rallying cry of the Bentivogli. Men marvelled at the magnanimity of the Bishop of Gurk, and said that the Pope would be deposed by a Council and another elected in his stead.³

Visit
of the
Bishop of
Gurk to
Bologna.
April,
1511.

¹ Sanuto, xii., 69: 'Son cosse grandi che uno de Ingalterra toglia questo cargo: è homo di assai e talianado'.

² Wingfield to Henry VIII. Brewer, *State Papers of Henry VIII.*, i., 168.

³ Sanuto, xii. Raynaldus (*sub anno*, § 57) gives extracts from Paris de Grassis, but has omitted many characteristic sayings. On April 10 Paris writes: 'Et licet ego Gurcensem admonuerim quod sit de proximo publicandus Cardinalis, tamen nullo modo voluit, sed esse in habitu in quo a Cesare discessit'. On April 25 he writes: 'Nihilominus quia, ut reliqua omittam, barbarus est, barbarice egit . . . voluit potius ut barbarus barbaro quam suo vero pastori adherere'. Of Lang's conduct at Bologna

Julius II. prepared for a renewal of war by an excommunication of the Duke of Ferrara and all who protected the enemies of the Church. He had, however, a new general to oppose him, one who understood the Pope's weakness, and was withheld by no scruples. Chaumont, the French commander in Lombardy, died in March, and on his deathbed sent to beg for the Pope's absolution; Louis XII. appointed as his successor Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, who as the father of the dispossessed Countess of Mirandola had a personal reason of hostility against Julius II. When negotiations were broken off, Trivulzio repeated the plan of Chaumont and made a sudden dash on Bologna. Julius II. had already had experience of what might befall him in that unlucky city, and hastily withdrew to Ravenna, leaving the care of Bologna to Cardinal Alidosi and the Duke of Urbino. The discord between the two prevented common action. Cardinal Alidosi was afraid of a rising of the Bolognese on behalf of the Bentivogli, and after a futile attempt to call out the city levies, fled by night from his post. The Duke of Urbino followed his example; his troops were pursued by Trivulzio, and suffered heavy losses. On May 23 Trivulzio entered Bologna, and the Bentivogli were restored. The people hailed with delight the return of their former lords; they pulled down the castle which Julius II. had built; they overthrew his statue which Michel Angelo had cast; it was sold as for old bronze to the Duke of Ferrara, who recast it into a cannon which he mockingly christened Giulio.

he writes: 'Quinimmo, ut sui subdebant, se neglectum a Curia nostra quodammodo arbitratur, ex eo quod, cum orator Cesaris ac primus ejus consiliarius esset, voluit tanquam Cesaris persona honorari et in capite Collegii Cardinalium super omnes haberi; quod fuit stolidum. Ex hac causa nunquam intra hebdomadam sanctam ad ædes sacras accedere voluit, fingens se ab aeris hic mali frigiditate lesum esse; quod minime verum fuit. Ego vidi; nam et ipse me noctu ad diversa loca secum diversari invitavit. Itaque, ut finem faciam suis levitatibus, abiit, vel potius minabundus aufugit.' It is impossible not to see, in this conduct of the Bishop of Gurk, an attempt to set up a special claim for the person of the Emperor in ecclesiastical matters; in fact, it was an experiment in the direction of the Emperor's elevation to the Papacy.

Bologna
captured
by the
French.
May 23,
1511.

The loss of Bologna was followed in a few days by the loss of Mirandola, which surrendered to Trivulzio. All the Pope's conquests had vanished in a moment; his political plans seemed at an end, and he was helpless. Still Julius II., when the news was brought him at Ravenna, showed no signs of discouragement. His first impulse was to defend himself where he knew that he was indefensible, for his confidence in the legate Alidosi. He summoned his Cardinals, and told them that Bologna had fallen, not through the fault of Alidosi, but through the treachery of the citizens; then he suddenly discharged his pent-up wrath against the Duke of Urbino, saying, 'If the duke, my nephew, should come into my hands, I would have him drawn and quartered as he deserves'. He next turned his attention to the condition of his army, and heard to his grief that it had been attacked by the rustics during its retreat, and was almost entirely dispersed. After another fit of passion he set to work to devise means for the reconstitution of his forces, and sent for the Duke of Urbino to confer with him.

Cardinal Alidosi had shut himself up in the castle of Rivo for security; but when his friends in the Curia told him that the Pope's anger was not directed against himself, but against the Duke of Urbino, he decided to come to Ravenna, and take measures for securing himself in his legation. Early next day he arrived in Ravenna, and after a short rest mounted his mule to visit the Pope. Julius II. knew of his coming, and cut short a stormy interview with the Duke of Urbino, that he might be ready to receive his favourite. When the duke, beside himself with rage, was returning through the street, he met Alidosi, who uncovered his head and greeted him with a mocking smile. The duke leapt from his horse, and furiously seized the bridle of Alidosi's mule. The Cardinal dismounted in alarm, and the duke, drawing his sword, struck him on the head, saying, 'Take that, traitor, as you have deserved'. The Cardinal's retinue, which had drawn

Behaviour
of Julius
II.

Murder of
Cardinal
Alidosi.
May 24,
1511.

up to salute the duke, uttered a cry, and some rushed forward; but the duke bade them be still, and as they paused, doubtful if he was executing the Pope's vengeance or his own, he redoubled his blows till Alidosi fell to the ground, and was despatched by two of the duke's attendants. While all stood irresolute, the duke mounted his horse and rode off to Urbino.¹

The murder was horrible enough; but no one save the Pope regretted Alidosi's death. With uplifted hands the Cardinals gave thanks that he was gone, while Julius II. gave way to an unrestrained display of grief. He wept passionate tears, beating his breast and refusing all food; he could not endure to stay in Ravenna, but left it next day for Rimini, whither he was carried in a litter, with drawn curtains through which were heard the lamentable cries of the Pope. He entered Rimini by night, that no one should see him in his broken state. Next day the Cardinals ventured to comfort him, and suggested that Alidosi's death was not an unmixed loss. Julius II. listened, and with the astounding capacity which he possessed for quick change of mood, soon began to rail at Alidosi as a villain. The vigour of Julius II. rested on an acceptance of what the day might bring forth, and he wasted none of his energy on useless regrets.²

It is hard to account for the infatuation of Julius II. towards Cardinal Alidosi, and we cannot wonder that contemporary scandal attributed it to the vilest motives.³ It is certainly a blot upon his reputation as a statesman that he persisted in giving his confidence to a man who was entirely worthless, and whom every one suspected of betraying his interests. Alidosi only sought his own profit;

¹ I have followed the account of Paris de Grassis, which I have printed in the Appendix.

² See Paris de Grassis in Appendix.

³ 'Il papa era molto vitioso e dedito alla libidine Gomorraea,' says a *relazione* of Trevisan, printed by Brosch, *Julius II.*, 296. The charge was often repeated with reference to Alidosi. It was a rude way of explaining what could not be explained.

his government of Bologna was as bad as possible; he was guilty of misappropriating the Pope's money, and when the charge was clear, he was nevertheless acquitted. Julius II. had the capacity for forming great designs, and had the courage to carry them out; but he had no power of choosing fitting agents, or of inspiring others with his own zeal. He undertook an expedition of the utmost moment, with no better counsellor than Alidosi and no better general than his own nephew the Duke of Urbino. Even then he did not care to enforce unity of action between the two, but listened to Alidosi's complaints against the duke, and so fomented jealousy which was sure to lead to political disaster, and which ended in a brutal murder.

When Julius II. arrived at Rimini there was fixed on the door of the Church of S. Francesco a document

Summons
of a Coun-
cil in Pisa. summoning a General Council to meet at Pisa on September 1. This citation rehearsed the decrees of the Council of Constance, set forth the Pope's neglect to summon a Council in accordance with their provisions, pointed out the difficulties of the Church, and assumed the adhesion of the Emperor and the French king to the proposed Council. It bore the signatures of nine Cardinals, all known to be discontented. Four of them, however, declared that they had given no authority for the use made of their names, and withdrew their signatures. The leader of this revolt of the Cardinals was the Spaniard, Carvajal; with him were Borgia and Sanseverino, and the French Cardinals Briçonnet and Brie. It is difficult to estimate fairly the motives which induced Carvajal to take this step. He was a man of high character, great learning, and much experience of affairs. In his early years he had distinguished himself by a book defending the authenticity of the donation of Constantine against the criticism of Lorenzo Valla. Sixtus IV. summoned him to Rome and made him chamberlain; Alexander VI. was delighted to find in the Curia a Spaniard on whom he could confer the dignity of Cardinal; and Carvajal was employed by him in many negotiations,

so that he thoroughly understood the politics of Europe, and was well known in all the European courts. On Alexander VI.'s death he seemed the most likely man for his successor, and was aggrieved at the intrigues of Cardinal Rovere which led to the election of Pius III. as a make-way for his own election. It would seem that Carvajal took Rovere's early life for his model. As Rovere had opposed Alexander VI. and tried to depose him by French help, so Carvajal used the same arts against Rovere when he became Pope. He waited till he saw him engaged in a perilous undertaking which raised against him many enemies; then he put himself at the head of a band of discontented Cardinals, and relying on the support of France, raised the old cry of a reforming Council. Perhaps Carvajal was sincere in his desire for reform; he was certainly sincere in a desire for his own advancement. He trusted to his large experience and to his personal knowledge of European sovereigns; and tried every means to form a strong party against Julius II. by a judicious mixture of personal, political, and ecclesiastical grounds.¹

Julius II. was well informed of Carvajal's intrigues; indeed Henry VIII. of England had forwarded to him Carvajal's letters to himself. The summons of a schismatic Council was no surprise to the Curia; but when the citation appeared no one ventured to speak to the Pope about it. Julius II. did not stay long at Rimini, but went southwards to Ancona, where he issued a terrible excommunication against the revolted Bologna. Then he made his way slowly to Rome, which he entered sadly on June 27.

Julius II.
returns to
Rome.
June 27,
1511.

Though he had suffered great reverses, Julius II. did not regard himself defeated. He knew the weakness of his opponent, and pitted his own resolute spirit against the feeble mind of Louis XII. Louis XII. did not wish to push the Pope to extremities and did not use his opportunities, but hoped to obtain

Julius II.
summons
a Council
to the
Lateran.
July 18,
1511.

¹ See his letters to Henry VIII. in Appendix.

peace by menaces. After the capture of Bologna, Trivulzio, who might easily have taken the Pope prisoner and entered Rome as a conqueror, was ordered to withdraw his troops to Milan. In like manner Louis XII. encouraged the rebellious Cardinals to summon their Council at Pisa, and then entered into negotiations for peace with Julius II. The Pope at once saw the weakness of his adversary, and made use of the delay. He answered the rebellious Cardinals on July 18 by convoking a Council to be held at the Lateran on April 19, 1512. Moreover, in his letter of summons, he boldly met his opponents in the point where his own case was weakest. They might fairly urge against him that they were only following the example which he had set. As Cardinal he had besought the French king to call a Council and depose a Pope who was disturbing the peace of Christendom; where he had failed they were successful. Julius II. accepted the position. The Cardinals, he said, accused him of neglecting to call a Council. Was it not his zeal for a Council that had drawn on him the hostility of Alexander VI.? Had he not been tossed about by land and sea, had he not faced the perils of the Alps, solely that he might revive this laudable custom which had fallen into disuse? He lamented that the troubles of the times had prevented him from summoning a Council before. The times were still perilous; nevertheless he was prepared to undertake the holy work of extinguishing schism, reforming the Church, and arranging a crusade against the Turk. For these purposes he summoned a Council to Rome as the safest and fittest place.¹ It was sagacious policy on the part of Julius II., and deprived the Council of Pisa of all claim to legitimacy. It was useless for a few Cardinals to hold a General Council against a contumacious Pope, when the Pope had declared his willingness to meet them, and had summoned a Council himself.

Meanwhile Julius II. was engaged in carrying on meaning-

¹ Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, 1511, § 9, etc.

less negotiations with Louis XII. He had no wish for peace so long as he had any prospect of gaining allies, and he knew that allies were at hand. King Ferdinand of Spain had at length decided to abandon the League of Cambrai; he had recovered from Venice all that he could claim, and he did not wish to see the French arms making further progress in Italy. Already, in June, Ferdinand had offered to help the Pope in the recovery of Bologna, and held out hopes that Henry VIII. of England might join the alliance. Even in his negotiations with England Julius II. showed his incapacity to find trustworthy agents. He had sent from Bologna an envoy, Hieronimo Bonvixi, apparently recommended by Cardinal Alidosi, who made known to the French envoy in London all that passed between himself and the English king. Henry VIII. suspected him and set spies to watch him. His treachery was discovered, and he confessed that he was acting in pursuance of Alidosi's instructions. Henry VIII. informed the Pope, who requested him to punish Bonvixi according to his deserts.¹ This incident serves to show the weakness of Louis XII., who was content to negotiate with an enemy whom he knew to be devising an alliance against him. He was well acquainted with the Pope's plan, which rapidly took shape. It was arranged that Ferdinand was to send troops to aid the Pope against Bologna and Ferrara: England was to attack France, while Venice by sea and land invaded the French possessions in Italy.

Julius II. negotiates a league against France. July, 1511.

Before this treaty could be definitely arranged, Rome was thrown into alarm by the illness of the Pope. On August 17 Julius II. was confined to his bed, and three days later his life was despaired of. There were fears that the Orsini would seize the city in the name

Illness of Julius II. August, 1511.

¹ This was known in Rome on July 31 (Sanuto, xii., 330): it is also reported by the Venetian envoy in London, Badoer (*ibid.*, 333). Brewer, *Henry VIII.*, i., 17, n. 4, quotes an unsigned letter in the MSS. of the Bibliothèque Nationale, which was clearly from Bonvixi, and shows him to have been a thorough villain.

of France, and the Colonna hastened to return. The Cardinals began to dispose of the succession of Julius II.; even the renegades at Pisa prepared to return to Rome for the approaching Conclave. On August 21 Julius II. was unconscious, and the city was full of excitement; an attempt was even made to revive the old republican spirit, and seize the opportunity of beginning a new epoch in the history of Rome. The leader was Pompeo Colonna, Bishop of Rieti, a man full of vigour and energy, whose youth had been spent in the camp. He had fought with bravery in the Neapolitan campaigns, but was driven by his uncles to take orders that he might inherit the ecclesiastical offices of Cardinal Giovanni Colonna. Against his will, Pompeo had entered the Cardinal's household, and on his death, in 1508, had been appointed to the rich bishopric of Rieti. Pompeo had watched with keen interest the stirring events in which he had no share; he longed for an active life, and scorned the atmosphere of clerical intrigue which surrounded Rome. As a Roman noble he looked down upon the strangers whom Julius II. raised to the Cardinalate, and was indignant that no Roman was called to that dignity. At an assembly of the Roman people in the Capitol, Pompeo Colonna appeared and spoke with passionate energy. He exhorted the Romans to rise and recover the liberty of which they had been robbed by the deceitful arts of priests. It was for them to rule the city: it was for priests and Popes to take care of the Church, and if they did so rightly they would not fail to receive due respect. As it was, Rome lay at the mercy of the avarice and lusts of a handful of priests, and had lost all memory of its true position. The old Roman stock was well-nigh destroyed; half-barbarous strangers lorded it over the city. The Romans were stirred by this unwonted outburst of patriotic feeling, and agreed to arm and compel the Cardinals, before the approaching Conclave, to take oath that they would abolish the taxes and restore the old government of the Roman Republic. They arranged to guard the Conclave and extort from the new Pope a similar oath

before they would allow him to proceed to his coronation.¹

The Cardinals who hankered after the succession of Julius II., and the Romans who girded themselves to recover their liberty, were alike doomed to disappointment. Julius II. recovered consciousness on August 22, and rapidly showed his old energy. He asked for a drink of wine, which the doctors refused. The Pope sent for the captain of his guard and said, 'If you do not give me wine, I will have you shut up in the Castle of S. Angelo'.² He had his own way, and his wilfulness did not prevent his recovery. He prepared for approaching death by pardoning his nephew the Duke of Urbino, who was in Rome awaiting his trial for Alidosi's murder. Julius II. was by this time convinced of Alidosi's treachery, on which alone the duke rested his defence; ^{Unex-pected re-cove-ry of the Pope.} he gave him absolution, and sent for 36,000 ducats from his treasury, which he distributed amongst his two nephews and his daughter Felice.

The Roman barons, who had been so brave at the Capitol, now found their position awkward. With a view of putting a good face on their action, they met on August 28 and signed an agreement of peace amongst themselves, undertaking to lay aside their private feuds and live in amity.⁴ At first no one ventured to tell the irascible Pope what had happened during his illness, and one of his first acts was to appoint Pompeo Colonna his legate in Lombardy. Pompeo was somewhat surprised at this mark of favour, but after a few days went to visit the Pope. By this time Julius II. had been informed of Pompeo's conduct; for once he was

¹ Paulus Jovius, *Vita Pompeii Colonnæ*, which deserves to rank as one of the best of his biographies.

² Sanuto, xii., 441. Paris de Grassis says that his relatives in despair sent him a doctor who allowed him to do what he liked, and eat fruits which had been forbidden him.

³ Dennistoun, *Dukes of Urbino*, ii., 328, gives an abstract of the document prepared by the duke's advocate for his defence. It laments that the murder was not committed earlier, and claims for the duke the title of liberator of the commonwealth.

⁴ Coppi, *Memorie Colonnese*, 258.

mindful of his dignity and sent him a message: 'Tell him that I will not bandy angry words with an insolent rebel'. Pompeo left the Vatican and withdrew from Rome. He took refuge in Subiaco, and most of the Roman barons judged it wise to flee from the Pope's wrath. Pompeo turned to martial ambition, and wished to raise forces and join the French army, but was restrained by the warm remonstrances of his uncle Prospero.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE HOLY LEAGUE.

1511—1513.

AFTER his recovery Julius II. hastened to arrange definitely his measures against France. On October 5 a league between the Papacy, Ferdinand, and Venice, for the recovery of Bologna and the defence of the Church, was published in Rome; Henry VIII. of England and Maximilian were allowed time to join it, and on November 17 Henry VIII. signified his adhesion.¹ Julius II. could now look proudly around him. He had succeeded in enlisting two of the kings of Europe and the powerful republic of Venice as supporters of his policy and defenders of the Holy See.

The first use which the Pope made of his secure position was to strike a blow against the schismatic Cardinals of Pisa. On October 24 he declared the Cardinals Carvajal, René de Brie, Borgia, and Briçonnet to be deprived of their dignities, and he annulled their Council summoned at Pisa. They on their side were ready to carry on the ecclesiastical warfare against the Pope; but they were only faintly supported. Louis XII., engaged in fruitless negotiations with Julius II., was only half-hearted about the Council's business. Maximilian at first took the matter seriously in hand, and requested a learned professor at Heidelberg, Jacob Wimpheling, to draw up a list of the grievances of the German Church and

Publication of the Holy League. October 5, 1511.

Antipapal policy of France and Germany.

¹ Brewer, *State Papers*, vol. i., No. 1980.

to report on the means for their redress. He devised a Pragmatic Sanction for Germany after the model of that which had proved to be a failure in France.¹ He wrote to the Florentines and commended the Council to their care, saying, 'We intend to prosecute it, nor will we by any means desist, for we see that it is necessary for the whole commonwealth of Christendom'.² But Maximilian's good intentions were thwarted by his fantastic aim of having himself elected Pope, and his interest in ecclesiastical matters was bounded by this object. The illness of Julius II. awakened his hopes, and he thought that the Cardinals would raise few difficulties. He wrote to his daughter that he was scheming to have himself appointed coadjutor to the Pope, 'so that after his death we may be assured of having the Papacy and becoming priest, and afterwards a saint; so that you will be under the necessity of adoring me after my death, of which I shall be very proud'.³ With such childish aims before him, Maximilian was not likely to support the Council with vigour. He and Louis XII. had different objects, though both wished to terrify the Pope. Julius II. was not terrified, and met this clumsy artifice of a Council with a resolute bearing which condemned it at once to failure. No one could hope that the Council of Pisa would benefit the Church; Henry VIII. of England only said what every one felt when he wrote to Maximilian that the Council was the result of private animosity and would do more harm than good.⁴

¹ Freher, *Rerum Germanicarum Scriptores*, ii., 677, etc.

² Letter of Maximilian, in Tommasini, *Niccolò Machiavelli*, i., 702.

³ Two letters were written at this date: one, of September 16, to Paul von Lichtenstein, in *Lettres du roi Louis XII.*, iii., 324; the other to his daughter Margaret, in Le Glay, *Correspondance de l'empereur Maximilien I.*, ii., 37. It is there dated 1512: but there can be no doubt that it should be referred to 1511, for it says: 'Le pape a ancor les fyeuvres doubles et ne peult longement fyvre'.

⁴ *Lettres de Louis XII.*, ii., 305. For the letters of the Cardinals to Henry VIII. see Appendix. The negotiations of Louis XII. with Scotland and Denmark are told from a MS. at Besançon by Ahnfelt in *Revue Internationale* for 1884, 189, etc.

Moreover the Council met with but a cold welcome in the place which had been chosen for its session. Florence had not been able to resist the request of the French king that the Council should sit at Pisa; but as the time of its meeting drew near, the government of Florence feared to incur the manifest enmity of the Pope. The Gonfaloniere Soderini was conscious that he had many enemies, and that the faction of the Medici had been steadily growing in power. The Florentine Republic depended for its maintenance upon the French power in North Italy, and so was regarded with disfavour by the Pope. Soderini shrank from increasing the Pope's ill-will, and wished to withdraw the permission for the Council to sit at Pisa. In September Machiavelli was sent to the Cardinals to try and prevail upon them to abandon their Council; his efforts were naturally useless, and he proceeded to France on the same errand. Louis XII. answered that he desired nothing better than peace with the Pope, but if he abandoned the Council the Pope would be less disposed to peace than ever; if he were to change the place of the Council he would offend the Cardinals; but he thought it possible that after one or two sessions had been held at Pisa, the Council might be transferred to Vercelli or some other place.¹ It was clear that as the time drew nigh when the threatened Council was on the point of becoming a reality, every one who had encouraged it was afraid. Julius II. showed an amount of caution which was scarcely to be expected from his rash and impetuous nature,² in his efforts to crush the Council. He was alive to its possible importance, and neglected no means to deprive it of adherents.

The Cardinals at Pisa found themselves in a poor position; but there was no way of drawing back, and they advanced with uneasy dignity. On September 1, the day fixed for the opening of the Council, three proctors appeared, and in an empty church went

Difficulties
of holding
the Council
at Pisa.

Assembly
of the
Council at
Pisa.
Septem-
ber, 1511.

¹ Machiavelli, *Legazione Quarta alla Corte di Francia*.

² Sanuto, on Sept. 6: 'Il spirito in moto per caxon di questi consilii'.

through the formalities necessary to call the assembly into existence. On September 11 the schismatic Cardinals wrote to their brethren at Rome saying that they would wait for a short time in hopes that the Pope would summon a Council to some neutral place: they could not accept his summons to the Lateran, as Rome was not free and safe for all men. They were answered that the Pope's intentions had been already declared. Accordingly they proceeded on November 1 to begin the work of the Council at Pisa. There were present the Cardinals Carvajal, Briçonnet, Brie, and d'Albret; commissioners claimed to represent three other Cardinals—Borgia, Sanseverino, and Philip of Luxemburg. Besides these there were only fifteen prelates and five abbots, representatives of Louis XII., the Universities of Paris, Thoulouse, and Poitou, with a few French doctors.

The Council was ill received in Pisa. The Florentine Government was thoroughly alarmed by the Pope's menaces, though they feared his political rather than his ecclesiastical action. He laid Florence under an interdict for favouring schism; but this produced little effect, for Soderini sent orders to the friars that they should perform divine services in the churches under pain of expulsion from Florence. The friars were not like the secular clergy, and had nothing to lose by the Pope's displeasure: they obeyed Soderini's commands, and the Florentines did not suffer any inconvenience from the interdict.¹ More significant, however, was the appointment of Cardinal Medici as legate in the Romagna. The party opposed to Soderini in Florence was thus provided with a leader who was backed by all the power of the Church. Soderini felt his weakness and was only desirous to escape the Pope's anger by ridding himself of the Council as soon as possible. He refused to allow any large body of French troops to enter Pisa for the defence of the Council, and only

Discontent of
Florence
with the
Council.

¹ Scipione Ammirato, bk. xxiii.

admitted an escort of 150 French lances, commanded by Odet de Foix, Sieur de Lautrec, who was sent by Louis XII. as protector of the Council.

The people and the clergy of Pisa showed no respect to the fathers of the Council. When on November 1 the procession advanced to the cathedral it found the doors closed, and had to return to the Church of S. Michele for its opening ceremonies. There was much point in the sermon, which dwelt on the small beginnings of the Christian Church, and the great results which followed from the energies of a scanty band of resolute men.

On November 5 the first session was held in the cathedral, which was now placed at the disposal of the Council, but the magistrates of Pisa refused to close the shops or give any sign of popular recognition. The Council proceeded with due regard to forms.

Sessions of
the Council
at Pisa.
November
5-12, 1511.

It declared its own legitimacy, annulled all measures directed against it, summoned all prelates to attend, and took under its protection the persons and goods of all who came to Pisa. Cardinal Carvajal was appointed president, and Lautrec protector of the Council. Finally notaries and other officials were elected. On November 7 the second session recognised the decrees of the Council of Toledo as regulating the order to be observed in its proceedings, and declared that all causes concerning members of the Council were to be judged in the Council only and nowhere else; for which purpose four French bishops were appointed judges.¹

The third session was fixed for November 14; but it was never held. Soderini was only anxious to be rid of the Council; and the unfriendly attitude of the citizens of Pisa did not encourage the Cardinals to stay in a place where they were so coldly welcomed.

Transfer-
ence of the
Council to
Milan.
November
12, 1511.

On November 6 Machiavelli came to remind Cardinal Carvajal of the promise of Louis XII. that the Council should be transferred as soon as was decorous. He pointed out

¹The proceedings of the Council are given most fully in Richer, *Historia Conciliorum Generalium*, iv., 176, etc.

that the Pope's hostility would be less if the Council were removed further from his neighbourhood; moreover in France or Germany the people would be more obedient, for the King or the Emperor could use compulsion which the Florentine magistrates had no means of employing towards their subjects.¹ Carvajal said that he would consider what was best. His consideration was quickened by the outbreak of riots between the servants of the Council and the Pisans. They quarrelled in the market about buying food; they quarrelled in the streets over their ignoble pleasures. At last a serious riot took place, and the rioters tried to storm the Church of S. Michele in which the Cardinals were deliberating. The officers who strove to quell the disturbance were wounded. There was much bloodshed and great excitement. It was clearly time for the Council to leave Pisa; so on November 12 a meeting of emergency was held in Carvajal's house, at which the Council first decreed that it could not be dissolved till the Church had been reformed, and then decreed its translation to Milan.

The departure from Pisa was dignified. Carvajal thanked the city magistrates for their courtesy, and informed them that the transference of the Council was due to sufficient reasons. The Cardinals were honourably escorted as far as Lucca. 'They all departed,' says Ammirato, 'to the great delight of the Florentines, the Pisans, and the Council itself, so that on November 15 there remained in Pisa no vestige of this Council.'

This ignominious beginning of the Council was a decided triumph for Julius II. The ecclesiastical opposition was driven to admit that it could find no shelter save directly under the wing of France. It was now apparent to Europe generally that a few French Cardinals and a few French bishops were used as the tools of the French king to annoy the Pope. Carvajal seems to have felt that it was necessary to make a new departure. Before leaving Pisa the Council

¹ Scipione Ammirato, bk. xxiii. : 'Per conto d' una meretrice' . . . 'pur per conto di femmine'.

sent envoys to Julius II., proposing to unite with his Council if it were summoned to some convenient place, either in Italy or outside, provided it were not in the dominions of the Pope or of Venice ; they were also to offer the intervention of the Cardinals in settling the affairs of Bologna and Ferrara. The Council's envoys sent from Florence to ask for a safe-conduct ; but their messenger was so threatened in Rome that he fled for his life and the envoys advanced no further.

On December 7 the Cardinals entered Milan in state, but were obliged to defer the session which had been fixed for December 13. Milan was reduced to great straits by a formidable invasion of the Swiss, whom Julius II. had again employed against his foes.

Swiss
attack on
Milan.
Decem-
ber, 1511.

The money of the Pope, the urgency of Cardinal Schinner, and growing ill-will towards France, combined to make the Swiss confederates ready for another expedition into Italy. In the middle of November a force of 20,000 footmen crossed the San Gothard. The French troops in vain tried to prevent them from emerging from the Alpine pass ; in the end of November they were at Varese, and the French slowly retreated before them towards Milan. On December 14 the Swiss were in the neighbourhood of Milan, where the French were preparing to stand a siege. But the Swiss had no artillery and no supplies ; the cold was intense and food was scarce ; no messengers came from the Pope or from the Venetians. The Swiss hesitated what to do ; then they conferred with the French, and finally retreated across the Alps, marking their way with fire and slaughter.¹

Again the Pope was angered by the remissness of the Swiss : again his affairs were ill managed. The Holy League moved too slowly for the impatient Pope ; the Papal forces were disorganised by the flight from Bologna, and only with Spanish troops could Julius II. hope to win back the rebellious city. But the Spanish general, Raimondo de

¹ Prato, *Storia di Milano*, in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, serie Ima, iii., 286.

Cardona, Viceroy of Naples, showed no haste in moving; the Venetians were delighted at the advance of the Swiss, but did not join them. The opportunity of striking a decisive blow at the French power was lost by want of combined action amongst the allies.

Freed from the fear of the Swiss invasion, the Council proceeded with its business at Milan; but even when under the immediate protection of France, it received no popular support. The papal interdiction was levelled against Milan, and many of the priests observed it, though the governor threatened them with deprivation of their benefices. The people mocked at the Cardinals when they appeared in public, and treated them with no respect.¹ There was no accession to the members of the Council, as Maximilian still refused to send proctors, and no prelates appeared from Germany. There were only five Cardinals and twenty-seven bishops and abbots at the session held on January 4, 1512. There the Cardinals related the ill success of their efforts to negotiate with the Pope, and a term of thirty days was allowed him to change the place of his Council summoned to the Lateran, and so render union possible.

The eyes of Julius II. were fixed on the expedition which he had sent into Lombardy. Scarcely had the Swiss retired from Milan before the army of the League marched into the territory of Ferrara with a combined force of Spanish and papal troops of about 20,000 men, led by Raimondo de Cardona. The territory south of the Po fell at once into their hands, and they passed on to the siege of Bologna, where the Bentivogli were aided by Odet de Foix and Ivo d'Allegre. The Pope already counted on the success of his arms, and wrote letter after letter to his legate, Cardinal Medici, urging

¹ Guicciardini, bk. x., is borne out by the Milanese chronicler, Prato, who says of the acts of the Council, 'Li quali io, per aver poco inchiostro, non mi curo di raccontare'; he calls them 'queste cose da scherzo contro il papa' (p. 287).

Gaston de Foix defeats the army of the League. February, 1512.

Session of the Council at Milan. January 4, 1512.

prompt action and commissioning him to inflict summary punishment on the Bentivogli. But the Pope's expectations were doomed to disappointment. France had a general in Italy who knew how to act with decision, Gaston de Foix, Duke of Nemours, a nephew of the French king. Though only twenty-two years old, Gaston de Foix was both a skilful general and a wise statesman. He saw the importance of preventing a junction between the Spanish and Venetian forces, and in the piercing cold of winter hurried across the snow-covered Apennines to the aid of Bologna, which he entered on February 5. His rapid march disconcerted the plans of Cardona, who was driven to withdraw from Bologna into the Romagna. Scarcely had he gone before news was brought that Brescia, always averse to the French rule, had opened its gates to the Venetians. Gaston de Foix at once made a hurried march to Brescia, which he reached in nine days, and took by storm. He was resolved to suppress rebellion by severity. Brescia was given up to pillage, and for two days was ravaged by the fury of a horde of brutal soldiers; more than 8000 were slain, and many of the French were so laden with spoil that they returned home to enjoy it.¹

Julius II. chafed at the ill success of his arms. He bitterly complained that he was entirely in the hands of the Spaniards, who robbed him of his money and did nothing in return.² In fact Ferdinand of Spain was more bent upon diplomacy than on military exploits. He was stirring up Henry VIII. of England to attack France, and was endeavouring to draw Maximilian into the League. He was not anxious to restore Bologna to the Pope, and ordered his general, Cardona, to avoid a battle; so that Julius II. was left to fume and fret over the inactivity of the

Difficulties of
Julius II.
March,
1512.

¹ Brewer, *State Papers*, vol. i., No. 3026.

² Sanuto, quoted by Brosch, *Papst Julius II.*, p. 356: 'Il papa si doleva molto di l'horò e vedeva i non voleano nulla et che era sasinato da l'horò e spendeva li soi danari et za ne havia enborsato a diti spagnuoli duc. 60,000'.

troops in the Romagna. His legate Cardinal Medici was overwhelmed with complaints, which he vainly tried to pass on to Cardona, who answered that priests knew nothing about war, and their ignorance led them to precipitate counsels. The Council of Pisa appointed Cardinal Sanseverino as its legate in Bologna; and Sanseverino, who was a man of war, was more readily listened to by Gaston de Foix. Moreover Sanseverino's influence was powerful among the Roman barons, and he strove to stir up the Orsini against the Pope. Rome was so insecure that Julius II. withdrew into the Castle of S. Angelo, and the city magistrates urged him to make peace with France; a French victory, they said, would lead to the loss of the Romagna and a tumult in Rome. Julius II. answered that he was not opposed to peace, but he must first recover Bologna. Unsafe in Rome, and ill served by the Spanish general, Julius II. felt that his position was one of serious danger.¹

His alarm was well founded, for Gaston de Foix was resolved to give his enemies no rest. Not contented with thwarting their plans and reducing them to inactivity, he wished to strike a decisive blow. Already Gaston's energy had dazzled the Italians, and the veteran general, Trivulzio, said with a smile, 'Fortune is like a woman, who favours the young and slights the old'.² Gaston prepared to tempt fortune once more. From Brescia he returned to Milan to gather his troops, who numbered 7000 cavalry and 17,000 infantry—Germans, French, and Italians. With these he advanced into the Romagna, determined to force a battle; a decisive victory might end the war, might prevent Maximilian from joining the league, check Henry VIII.'s projected invasion of Normandy and leave the Neapolitan kingdom an easy prey.

¹ Despatch of Foscari, the Venetian envoy, abstracted by Brosch, *l. c.*, 242. It bears date March 17.

² Prato, *Storia Milanese*, 290: 'A Messer Andrea Gritti (me presente) fra l' altre cose, i disse il Trivulzio: Sig. Proveditore, veramente la fortuna è proprio come una puttana, che a li giovani favorisce, ed a' veggi dà de' calzi'.

Cardona on his side did not wish to fight. His forces were somewhat smaller, 6000 cavalry and 16,000 infantry, of whom the majority were Spaniards; but the fame of the Spanish infantry was great, and their fighting qualities might be held to make up for the slight inferiority of numbers. But the same reasons which made Gaston de Foix desire a battle, made Cardona wish to avoid one; Spain had everything to win by delay, while only a victory could save France from a powerful combination against her. As the French army advanced to Ravenna, Cardona withdrew to Faenza. Gaston de Foix on April 9 attacked Ravenna unsuccessfully; but it was clear that he would soon take it if it were not relieved. Cardona dared not abandon its garrison, and was reluctantly compelled to return. On April 11—it was Easter Day—the two armies met on the marshy plain between Ravenna and the sea. There was nothing in the ground to allow of tactics on either side; the day was decided not by strategy but by hard fighting. On the side of the French was conspicuous the stalwart form of Cardinal Sanseverino, clad in full armour and eager for the fight; the papal legate, Cardinal Medici, was present in the rear of the army of the League, but wearing the garments of his office. The battle began with a heavy discharge of artillery on both sides; but the artillery of Ferrara was skilfully posted so as to play on the flank of the army of the League. The Spanish infantry lay flat upon the ground and escaped, while the Italian cavalry fell thick before the destructive fire. Fabrizio Colonna urged an immediate charge, but the Spanish general wished to act on the defensive. At last Fabrizio could endure no longer. ‘Shall we all be destroyed for nothing?’ he exclaimed, and dashed upon the foe. The Spaniards were bound to follow, and the fight raged along the banks of the Ronco. The cavalry of the League were the first to flee, and with them fled the Spanish general, Cardona. The Italian infantry were hard pressed by the Gascons, and were finally routed by an attack of the French cavalry under Ivo

Battle of
Ravenna.
April 11,
1512.

d'Allegre, who lost his life in the charge. The Spanish infantry still held their ground and hewed their way into the middle of the opposing square of German mercenaries who fought for France. Gaston de Foix, seeing the cavalry of the League in flight, ordered a body of horse to charge the Spaniards, who were driven backwards by the shock. Still they preserved their ranks unbroken, and protecting one flank by the river, prepared to retreat still fighting and in good order. Gaston de Foix burned to make his victory complete, and led his cavalry to drive the Spaniards into the river. His horse was killed and he fell to the ground; the Spaniards rushed upon him, and heedless of a cry, 'He is our general, the brother of your queen,' slew him where he lay. There was no longer any opposition to their flight, and they retired in safety.¹

Rarely was a more bloody battle fought. Of the 45,000 men engaged, between 10,000 and 12,000 lay dead upon the field. The loss of generals was especially great on the French side, while the generals of the League showed their discretion by a speedy flight. Cardona never drew rein till he reached Ancona; the routed soldiers made their way to Cesena and then dispersed. Cardinal Medici was swept away by the crowd of fugitives, was made prisoner and handed over to his old friend Cardinal Sanseverino, who treated him with great respect.

The victors were left paralysed by the death of Gaston de Foix, Lautrec, and Ivo d'Allegre. They sacked Ravenna, and under the leadership of La Palisse occupied the cities of the Romagna; then they paused, uncertain what to do. Had Gaston de Foix been left alive he would have pressed on to Rome and Naples, would have reduced the Pope to terms and annihilated the Spanish power in Italy; but Gaston was laid in his grave amidst the tears of his army.

¹ The battle of Ravenna is described by Guicciardini, *Storia d' Italia*, bk. x., and more fully in letters to him by his father and brother (*Opere Inedite*, vol. vi., 36, etc.); also Paulus Jovius, *Vita Alfonsi*, and Coccinius, *De Bello Maximiliani cum Venetis*, in Freher, *Rerum Germanicarum Scriptores*, ii., 562; *Lettere Storiche*, di Luigi da Porto, 308, etc.

The recumbent statue of the young warrior, a remnant of his broken tomb, still witnesses to the charm which he exercised as the type of all that was noblest and most beautiful in the chivalry of the Renaissance.¹

On April 14 a trembling fugitive brought to Rome the news of the battle of Ravenna. The Cardinals gave themselves up as lost, and with tears besought the Pope to make peace with France on such terms as he could. Pompeo Colonna and many of the Orsini gathered troops and prepared to join the French army in its expected march on Rome, and Julius II. thought of flight as the sole means to escape humiliation. But next day arrived Giulio de' Medici, cousin of the captive Cardinal, who had gained permission to send a messenger to the Pope. Cardinal Medici had seen enough to know that the French had suffered almost as severely as the League; their army was demoralised; their counsels were divided. Cardinal Sanseverino disputed with La Palisse the office of General-in-chief; the Duke of Ferrara withdrew into his own territory; there was no danger of an immediate blow, as La Palisse had sent to Louis XII. for further instructions, for he hesitated to march against Rome for fear of leaving Milan exposed to an attack of the Swiss. Julius II.'s spirits revived at this intelligence; he saw that if he could escape immediate danger he still had hopes. The increase of the power of France by the victory of Ravenna would bind the League more closely together. He only needed time to direct a stronger force against the French; and to gain time he again entered into negotiations with Louis XII., while he strained every nerve to gather money and reorganise his broken army. Again Louis XII. weakly listened to the Pope, and allowed the opportunity won by the valour of Gaston de Foix to be aimlessly wasted.

Weakness
of the
French
policy
after their
victory.

¹ This exquisite statue is the work of the Milanese Agostino Busti. Other remnants of the beautiful sculptures of the tomb are in the Ambrosiana at Milan, the Museo Civico at Turin, and the South Kensington Museum.

The victory of Ravenna was also the triumph of the Council of Milan. In proportion as the French arms were successful, the boldness of the Council increased. On March 24 the Pope was accused of contumacy for not sending legates to the Council or listening to its admonitions; the Council which he had summoned to the Lateran was declared null, and he was admonished to withdraw all proceedings against the Council of Milan. On April 19, after the news of the battle had reached Milan, an accusation for contumacy was formally presented against Julius II. On April 21 he was cited to appear, and when no one was present to answer on his behalf he was declared contumacious and was suspended from his office. These were brave words; but the Council could not flatter itself that its decrees were of much value. Cardinal Carvajal was the object of popular ridicule in the streets, while the captive Cardinal Medici was welcomed with every token of respect. The people thronged round him and begged his blessing: many went to him for absolution for having been compelled to hold intercourse with the excommunicated Cardinals.¹

Julius II. was busily engaged in preparing for war, and in bribing or flattering the Roman barons into quietness. Still he did not disregard the necessity of overthrowing the ecclesiastical opposition; he was anxious to set his Council of the Lateran against the schismatics at Milan. He was urgent in gathering members and in arranging for an imposing opening ceremony; and every care was taken that the Council of Milan should be entirely thrown into the shade. Eight Cardinals were appointed a commission to make necessary preparations, and regulate the Curia so that it should present an orderly appearance befitting the decorum of the papal office. The Master of the Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, was bidden to search the records of the Council of Florence, and submit

The Council at Milan decrees the suspension of Julius II. April 21, 1512.

Preparations for the Lateran Council. April, 1512.

¹ Paulus Jovius, *Vita Leonis X.*, bk. ii.

for due decision any obscure parts of ceremonial.¹ The disturbed state of Italy after the battle of Ravenna rendered impossible the meeting of the Council on April 19, as had been originally fixed; but on May 3 Rome was so far quiet as to permit its assembling.

In the evening of May 2 Julius II. was carried in his litter to the Lateran Palace. Before him rode armed troops of the Knights of Malta, who were guardians of the Pope and of the Council; behind him came fifteen Cardinals, and the members of the Council, twelve Patriarchs, ten Archbishops, fifty-seven Bishops, two Abbots, and three Generals of monastic orders, almost all Italians; a strong body of soldiers brought up the rear, and during the Council kept watch in the neighbourhood to prevent a rising in the interest of France. An immense crowd thronged to witness the splendid ceremony with which the Council was opened on May 3. The sermon of the learned General of the Augustinians, Egidius of Viterbo, produced a profound impression on his hearers, and was long regarded as a masterpiece of oratory. In turns men marvelled at his eloquence and were moved to tears by his passionate earnestness. He began by saying that he had long preached throughout Italy of the evils of the time and the need of reform; at length he saw the long-expected work begin; the winter was past, the summer was at hand; the light of the Council would again warm and make fertile the field of the Church. Distress might for a time wax great, but Jesus said, 'A little time and ye shall see Me'. All the troubles of the Church in past times had been healed by Councils; this Council had its work to do, to restore the authority and order of the Church. Nine years had Julius II. sat on the papal throne; he had done great things in Rome, he had warred for the recovery of the lands of the Church. Two things remained to do: to summon a Council, and lead Europe against the Turk. All

Opening
of the
Lateran
Council.
May 3,
1512.

¹ Raynaldus, *Annales*, 1512, § 32, etc.

good men longed to see the Church reformed by a Council and the Turks expelled from Europe. Not by violence, in days of old, but by deeds of piety had the Church won Europe, Asia, and Africa; she lost Asia and Africa because she exchanged the golden panoply of an ardent spirit for the iron arms of Ajax in his fury. Unless true holiness of life were restored by the Council, religion would be lost and the commonwealth of Christendom would be undone. When was life more effeminate? When was sin less bridled? When was religion less esteemed? When was schism more dangerous? When was bloodshed more rife? When had dawned a more disastrous Easter Day than that which saw the slaughter on the field of Ravenna? All these things were warnings from on high; for the facts of the world's history were the voices of God. He ended by an earnest prayer for the purification of Christendom, the expulsion of the Turks, the revival of Christian love, and the restoration of the Church to her ancient purity.¹

They were noble words and finely spoken, and they expressed the opinions of a large party within the Church; but they had little connexion with possibilities, and arraigned the conduct of Julius II. while they professed to support him. Julius II. deplored the battle of Ravenna because its issue had gone against himself; he was more concerned for the recovery of Bologna than of the Holy Land, and was more at his ease in the camp than in the Council. However, he curbed his natural restlessness and sat through the long ceremonial with a patience that astonished those who knew his ordinary ways.² But he had forgotten to prepare a speech in which to state the business of the Council, and further procedure was put off till the first session on May 10; even then

First session of the Lateran Council. May, 1512.

¹ The sermon is given in the *Acta Concilii Lateranensis*, Rome, 1521, reprinted in Harduin, ix., and Mansi.

² Paris de Grassis, Raynaldus, 1512, § 38: 'Pontifex patientissimus semper extitit: quod omnibus quasi mirum fuit, cum suo naturali more in rebus novis plerumque moveri soleat'.

Julius II. could only stammer through a few sentences, in which he said that it was needless to state the reasons for summoning the Council, as they were well known. At the second session, on May 17, the real business of the Council was done, by a decree which declared the proceedings of the Council of Pisa to be null and void and its adherents to be schismatics. The Council was then prorogued till November 3; it had served its immediate purpose of showing the strength of the Pope's ecclesiastical position, and of answering the schismatics at Milan.

In fact, Julius II. had no time for Councils. On the same day on which this session was held he published anew the Holy League, which had now received the adhesion of Maximilian; and Rome blazed with bonfires in honour of this new triumph of the Pope.

With-
drawal
of the
French
from
Milan.

But Leagues were useless without soldiers, and Julius II. knew that he again had forces in the field. He had brought about an agreement between Maximilian and the Venetians, and Venice had raised money to hire another army of the Swiss; Maximilian's consequent entrance into the League gave the Swiss an easy access into North Italy through the Tyrol. On May 25 the Swiss, who had mustered at Trent, descended to Verona; and the French general, La Palisse, who had wasted his time in the Romagna, was suddenly recalled to the defence of Milan. The Swiss were joined by the Venetians, and their force was formidable; but a battle was made impossible by the publication of an order from Maximilian bidding the German mercenaries in the French army return home under pain of death. The greater part of the veterans who had won the battle of Ravenna obeyed, and La Palisse was unable to resist; he withdrew to Pavia, where he was followed by Trivulzio, who had no hope of holding Milan.¹ The remnants of the French army retired across the Alps, and the French rule in North Italy disappeared with them. Even Genoa shook off the yoke of France and welcomed Giano Fregoso as its Doge.

¹ Prato, *Storia Milanese*, 298, etc.

The withdrawal of the French troops from Milan necessarily meant the suppression of the Council. The schismatic Cardinals retired to France with the intention of continuing their proceedings at Lyons; and in their train was the captive Cardinal Medici, who had the good fortune to escape on the way. When he reached Bassignana, on the bank of the Po, he counterfeited illness and asked to be allowed to rest for the night. Meanwhile his friends assembled secretly and roused the neighbourhood in his behalf; were the Italians, they asked, going to allow the French to carry away a Cardinal as their prisoner? Next day, when half the French escort had crossed the river, a sudden rush was made upon those who were left behind. In the tumult Cardinal Medici was rescued, and after hiding for a few days made his way to Mantua, where he was safe from pursuit.¹

The Pope was not slow to reap the fruits of the French withdrawal from the Romagna. He had managed to gather together some forces, and he did not scruple to use for his own ends the lucky results of the treacherous conduct of the Duke of Urbino. Still sulking under the Pope's displeasure at the murder of Cardinal Alidosi, the Pope's nephew had refused to march with his forces to join the army of the League, and after the battle of Ravenna he was prepared to make common cause with the French; but the inactivity of La Palisse gave him no opportunity, and when the fortunes of France were desperate, the Duke of Urbino was again ready to join the winning side. Julius II. readily forgave a want of zeal which events had proved to be true discretion. He made the Duke of Urbino general of his forces, with orders to march at once against Bologna. The Bentivogli fled, and the city opened its gates to receive again a papal legate as its governor, on June 13.

From Bologna the papal forces proceeded to Parma and

¹ Paulus Jovius, *Vita Leonis X.*; Luigi da Porto, *Lettere Storiche*, 316; Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1512, § 59.

Julius II.
recovers
Bologna.
June 13,
1512.

Piacenza ; but Ferrara was still the great object of the desire of Julius II. It was evident to Duke Alfonso that he could not hold out without allies against the force which was now directed against him. He resolved to throw himself on the Pope's magnanimity and seek a personal interview. Fabrizio Colonna, who had been captured in the battle of Ravenna, was in Duke Alfonso's hands. Alfonso earned his gratitude by refusing to give him up to Louis XII., who wished him to be sent as a prisoner to France. He released him without ransom, and by the mediation of the Duke of Mantua and the Spanish king, obtained from the Pope a safe-conduct to Rome, for the purpose of reconciling himself with the Pope and obtaining absolution from his excommunication. On July 4 he entered Rome with Fabrizio Colonna, attended by a troop of horse. Julius II. received him kindly ; he had no wish to humble his enemies, but only aimed at reducing them ; he did not demand from Alfonso a public humiliation, but gave him absolution privately in the Vatican without the ceremony of striking him with a rod.¹ But he said to the Venetian envoy, 'I wish to deprive him of Ferrara ; I have given him a safe-conduct for his person, not for his state'.² After Alfonso's personal reconciliation came the discussion of a lasting peace. The negotiations were entrusted to a commission of six Cardinals ; but it soon became obvious that the Pope would be satisfied with nothing but the immediate surrender of Ferrara. He offered to indemnify Alfonso with the principality of Asti, and while the matter was under discussion his troops under the Duke of Urbino pressed the siege of Reggio. He raked up old charges against Alfonso and declared that they rendered his safe-conduct invalid. He threatened imprisonment and death, hoping to terrify him into submission ; but Alfonso was not

The Duke
of Ferrara
in Rome.
July, 1512.

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1512, § 71. I have printed in the Appendix the account which Paris gives of the political dealings of Julius II. with Duke Alfonso.

² Brosch, *Julius II.*, p. 352.

cowed, and steadily argued against the Pope's charges and refused his terms. Julius II. persisted in his policy of intimidation, angrily refused him permission to leave Rome, and ordered the guards at the gates to be increased. When Fabrizio Colonna heard this he felt his own honour to be at stake. After vainly pleading with the Pope, he took the matter into his own hands. Taking a retinue sufficient to overawe the guard at the Lateran Gate he escorted Alfonso to Marino, where he remained in safety till he could reach the sea and make his way back to Ferrara, which his brother, Cardinal Ippolito, still held against the papal forces.

The conduct of Julius II. towards the Duke of Ferrara excited general alarm. Ferdinand of Spain expressed his disapproval, and praised the action of Fabrizio Colonna. 'If,' said he, 'the Pope meddles with Fabrizio or Prospero Colonna for what they have done, I will make him understand that they are my soldiers, and that I will not fail to protect them. As to Ferrara, let the Church recover its tribute and its jurisdiction; but I do not wish to see the Duke of Ferrara robbed of his lands. The Pope should be satisfied with the recovery of Bologna. No power in Italy should help him to take Ferrara and make of the Duke of Urbino a second Cesare Borgia. The Pope has warred against France in behalf of the liberty of Italy; Italy must not have another tyrant, nor must the Pope govern it at his will.'¹ Guicciardini, who was the Florentine ambassador at the Spanish court, saw that there were great dangers in the political condition of Italy. The downfall of the French power had been too rapid and too complete; the work of reorganisation was fraught with difficulty; there were too many conflicting interests, and the balance of power was hard to establish. 'Italy is already made into a new world,' wrote Guicciardini, 'and it might easily happen that through the question of Ferrara it was made into another. The Pope demands too

Alarm at
the plans
of Julius
II. July,
1512.

¹ Guicciardini, *Opere Inedite*, vi., 83.

much ; and when the League begins to fall in pieces, things may go in a strange fashion. But all will be to the loss of Italy, which is in a worse way than ever, if the Italians are not united, which will be difficult.'¹

Julius II. soon began to weary of his alliance with Spain, and said that he hated the Spaniards as much as he had hated the French. He again talked of driving the foreigner out of Italy, and dreamed of ridding himself of Spain by means of the arms of the Swiss. His audacity knew no bounds ; he believed in endless possibilities of skilful combinations, by means of which each power in turn was to have its own way for a little time as a reward for helping the Papacy. In the conflicts which he hoped to foment all in succession were to be ousted, while meanwhile the Papacy was steadily to gain, till in the end it would be strong enough to overcome its last ally, and then would bear undisputed sway in Italy. The policy of Julius II. did not differ from that of Cesare Borgia which won the admiration of Machiavelli. But Cesare Borgia, as he advanced, would have consolidated his dominions and trained an Italian army ; Julius II. could neither weld together his conquests nor rekindle into patriotism the local feeling which he destroyed. Cesare Borgia governed as well as conquered the Romagna ; Julius II. had no capacity for organising, and the papal government by Cardinal-legates could never awaken a national feeling, which alone could make Italy strong. Julius II. was no far-sighted statesman ; his aims were dictated by the opportunities of the moment, and his patriotism throughout his career was an afterthought. He sought the help of the stranger to crush his Italian foes, and indulged in the vain hope that at his will he could give new life to Italy, which he had destroyed.

However much Julius II. might wish to treat the Spaniards as he had treated the French, he still had work for them to do. The spoils of France must be divided, and the Pope

¹ Guicciardini, *Opere Inedite*, vi., 94.

and his allies assembled to decide the share of each. In August their representatives met at Mantua for discussion. Maximilian and Ferdinand wished to obtain the duchy of Milan for their grandson Charles, son of the Archduke Philip and Juana of Spain, who was to marry Renée of France, the second daughter of Louis XII., and so unite the conflicting claims; ¹ Julius II. was opposed to the establishment of a foreign power in North Italy, and favoured the restoration of the Sforza family. The son of Ludovico II Moro, Massimiliano Sforza, had been brought up at the court of Maximilian. He was now some thirty years old, and showed no marked capacity for affairs. His feeble character made him acceptable to the Swiss, who wished for a neighbour who would be dependent on them for help, and would be willing to pay for their good offices. The Venetians hoped that they might in time make conquests at the expense of an uncertain ruler. ² The settlement of the question lay with the Swiss, who were the real masters of Milan; and through their decision the restoration of Massimiliano Sforza as Duke of Milan was accepted by the allies. The Swiss took care that they were well paid for their past and future help; and Julius II. demanded the towns of Parma and Piacenza, which he claimed for the Church on the ground of the bequest of the Countess Matilda of Tuscany, who had died in 1115, leaving all her lands to S. Peter. ³

Another question engaged the attention of the confederates at Mantua—the political position of Florence. Florence had never renounced its alliance with France, and during the last war had maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality. The Gonfaloniere, Piero Soderini, was an upright man; but was not a strong

¹ Brosch, *Julius II.*, 259.

² Francesco Vettori, *Storia d' Italia del 1511 al 1527*, in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, Appendix vi., 288.

³ *Ibid.*, 296: 'Aveva tirato certi scartabelli antichi per li quali voleva mostrare avervi su ragioni lasciate alla Chiesa da Contessa Matilda'.

statesman. The growing influence of Cardinal Medici encouraged the Medicean faction, so that Florence was distracted; and Soderini was not the man to heal its breaches. After the retreat of the French army from Italy, Julius II. sent orders to the Archbishop of Florence to make processions and hold thanksgiving services for the deliverance of Italy. The government did not resent this needless insult, and the citizens looked on with indifference;¹ but a studied affectation of indifference was not the way to meet approaching danger, or to avert the hostility of a man like Julius II. Soon afterwards the Pope sent Cardinal Pucci with a demand that the Gonfaloniere should lay down his office, that the exiles should be restored, and that Florence should enter the Holy League. Soderini gave a dignified refusal; but the time was past when words without deeds could avail. The papal project of restoring the Medici to Florence, and so separating the Republic from the French alliance, was secretly agreed to by the Congress of Mantua. The Florentine ambassador at the Congress, Giovan Vittorio Soderini, was carefully kept in the dark, and the Florentines were on all sides deluded into the belief that the divergent interests of the allies gave them practical security. Ferdinand of Spain said to Guicciardini that the Pope wished to treat Spain as he had treated France, and that Florence in the hands of the Medici would only give the Pope more power in Italy: Julius II. told Cardinal Soderini that he would not see the influence of Spain increased, and that he did not wish to see Florence attacked by Spanish troops.² While Florence hugged herself in false security, her doom was being sealed at Mantua, and she made no preparations to avert the danger.

¹ Cambi, quoted by Tommasini, *Niccolò Machiavelli*, i., 574: 'Nessuno scholare non v'andò nè nessuna chonpagnia nè di fanciulli, nè duomini nè di magistrati, nè sonossi le campane di palazzo, nè mostrò la Città segno nessuno d'alegerezza, ma più tosto stava con dispiacere et sospetione di mutamento di stato'.

² Vettori, *Storia d'Italia*, 290; Guicciardini, *Opere Inedite*, vi., 88. The letters of the envoy Soderini from Mantua are printed by Tommasini, *Niccolò Machiavelli*, i., 715, etc.

On August 21 the Spanish viceroy, Raimondo de Cardona, entered Tuscany with 8000 infantry, 500 men-at-arms, and 600 light horse. It was not a formidable army for the reduction of a powerful state; and Florence, at the advice of Machiavelli, had reorganised its old force of citizen militia, and had 30,000 men whom she could set in the field. But by the side of the Spanish general rode Cardinal Medici and his brother Giuliano, who represented a powerful faction in Florence. The Florentines were divided in opinion; their successes since the expulsion of the Medici had not been striking; the downfall of the French power left them isolated in Italy, and many thought that their present government was clearly untenable and that its fall was only a question of time. When the demands of the viceroy for the abolition of the power of the Gonfaloniere and the restoration of the Medici were brought to Florence, Soderini called the Great Council together. He asked them to decide if they wished for the Medici; if so, he was ready at once to retire. The unanimous answer was given: 'We wish for you, and not the Medici'.¹ Many brave words were spoken, and troops were sent to hold Prato against the advance of the Spaniards.

The citizen forces of Machiavelli were not prepared for the terrible earnestness with which the Spaniards made war, and the peasants were terrified by the wholesale slaughter which followed any attempt at resistance. The Spaniards, however, found great difficulty in obtaining supplies, since the Florentine troops cut off their communications with Bologna. Raimondo de Cardona cared little for the restoration of the Medici, and was willing to withdraw from the Florentine territory if his troops were supplied with food. In an evil hour for Florence the proposal was rejected, and Cardona led his starving troops to Prato, and told them that within its walls were

¹ Letter of Jacopo Guicciardini to his brother Francesco, in Guicciardini, *Opere Inedite*, vi., 98.

food and plunder. The Spaniards felt that they were fighting for their lives, and continued the assault with terrible earnestness till a breach was made in the wall; it was useless for the garrison to try and keep out the famished horde; on August 29 Prato was stormed and sacked. No records in history are more horrible than those that tell of the fiendish cruelty, the brutal lust, the insatiable thirst for gold, of the Spanish soldiers. It is said that 5000 of the inhabitants of Prato were slain; those who survived were tortured, mutilated, and dishonoured. We may well believe the story that Pope Leo X. was haunted on his deathbed by the remembrance of the horrors wherewith the greatness of the Medicean family was again established.¹

Men trembled in Florence at this awful news. Cardona triumphant offered them the choice of war or the Medici; and Soderini shrank from exposing Flor- ^{Flight of} Soderini. ence to the fate of Prato. While he hesitated a band of four young men, who were of the party of the Medici, forced their way into the Palazzo, and bade him lay down his office. Soderini had not the soul of a hero, and had already begun to despair; he asked that his life should be spared, and that he might quit Florence. Without any formal deposition, without any popular rising against him, without waiting to strike a blow for his country, he quitted Florence, and made his way to Siena. It is no wonder that Machiavelli sentenced the silly soul of Piero Soderini to the limbo of infants;² it is no wonder that a Republic with so faint-hearted a leader had no hopes of life.

The downfall of Florence was due to the feeling of political helplessness which had been growing in Italy in view of the

¹ There are three narratives of the sack of Prato in the *Archivio Storico Italiano*, vol. i. These are supplemented by others collected by Guasti, *Il Sacco di Prato*, 1880.

² Machiavelli's epitaph on Soderini:—

'La notte che morì Piero Soderini,
L' anima andò dell' inferno alla bocca:
Gridò Pluton; Che inferno! anima sciocca,
Va su nel limbo fra gli altri bambini'.

rapid changes which baffled all attempts at calculation. The old idea of liberty had ceased to have any definite meaning, and political thinkers asked themselves vainly, 'Where is freedom to be found?' In the absence of any answer, they fell back upon incredulity; they abandoned any search for a principle on which to found political life, and accepted party struggles as rough scrambles for the sweets of power. The Florentine Francesco Vettori frankly expresses the sentiments on which he acted. 'The changes made by the Medici,' he says, 'may be called tyrannical. It is true that in Plato's "Republic" and in Thomas More's "Utopia" there are examples of governments which are not tyrannical; but all the republics and states of which I have read in history or which I have seen smack of tyranny. We may say that all governments are tyrannical. In the case of Florence the city is populous; many citizens wish to share in its advantages, and the good things to be distributed are few. One party is driven to govern and enjoy honours and advantages; the other must look on and criticise the game.'¹ Such were the cynical considerations whereby Florence was induced to submit to the imposition of its former yoke.

Next day, September 1, Giuliano de' Medici entered Florence, and the Paleschi, as the partisans of the Medici were called, gathered round him. A Gonfaloniere was elected for a year, and the old government by means of the consiglio grande was still retained. The Paleschi wished for a more thorough change; they found Giuliano too gentle for their leader, and submitted their views to Cardinal Giovanni. He entered Florence in state accompanied by the viceroy, and by his advice the Paleschi, on September 16, took possession of the Palazzo and remodelled the constitution of Florence. The consiglio grande was abolished; the Gonfaloniere's tenure of office was restricted to two months; the franchise was confined to men who could be trusted;

Restoration of the Medici. September, 1512.

¹ *Storia d' Italia*, in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, Appendix vi., 293.

in short the republican reforms of 1494 were swept away, and Florence was brought back to the condition in which it had been under Lorenzo.

The impetuosity of Julius II. carried away his judgment in permitting the restoration of the Medici to Florence by Spanish arms. He was pursuing an old design which altered circumstances had made dangerous rather than useful to his ends. So long as the French power was strong in Italy, the Pope had an interest in trying to separate Florence from its alliance with France, and the overthrow of the republican government by means of the Medici was the easiest course to pursue. When the French power had fallen the Republic of Florence was left isolated and feeble. It would have been wise policy for the Pope to have left Florence in this condition of weakness. The restoration of the Medici by Spanish help reproduced the state of things which Julius II. had been striving to overthrow. Florence allied to Spain was just as dangerous to the Papacy as Florence allied to France; and the Pope, who aimed at driving the foreigner out of Italy, was ill-advised in helping the dominant foreign power to win an ally such as Florence. Florence under Soderini would have been powerless; Florence under the Medici was sure to be an obstacle in the way of the Pope's plans. Julius II. did not foresee the extent of the disaster which he wrought for the Papacy. He could not foresee that the Medici would weave the fortunes of their house with the fortunes of the Papacy, and would inflict on both the direst disaster. But he did not use such foresight as he possessed, and was bent on satisfying an old grudge, heedless of all else; he could not forgive Soderini for harbouring the schismatics at Pisa. Even when Soderini had fallen, Julius II. strove to get him into his power, and Soderini only escaped from the Pope's anger by fleeing to Ragusa.

Julius II. looked round with satisfaction on the results achieved by the Holy League. The French were driven from Italy and were menaced by the forces

Gains of
Julius II.

of England and Spain; Ferdinand's army occupied Navarre; the English forces threatened Guienne and the English fleet ravaged the Breton coast. France was hard pressed on every side and had no ally save Scotland; the Pope had nothing to fear from a revival of French influence in Italy. Moreover Julius II. had won Parma and Piacenza for the Holy See. He had not, it is true, succeeded in winning Ferrara; but Modena and Reggio were in the hands of his troops.

There were other members of the League who were not so well satisfied. Maximilian and the Venetians could not agree about the division of the territories won from the French. Julius II. desired above all things to establish his authority beyond dispute by the splendour of his Council at the Lateran, whose sessions had been suspended during this interval of war. For this purpose he needed the accession of the Emperor: when that was gained, France with its schismatical Cardinals at Lyons would be as completely isolated in ecclesiastical as it was in temporal affairs. Again Julius II. tried to win over Maximilian's adviser, the powerful Bishop of Gurk, of whom it was currently said, 'Gurk is not the chief bishop in the Emperor's court; but the chief king who dances attendance on Gurk is the Emperor'.¹ Gurk came to Rome to confer with the Pope on November 5, and was received with all the honour shown to sovereigns.² The Venetians soon found that Julius II. was entirely on the Emperor's side. He was accustomed by this time to use his allies solely for his own purposes, and had no scruple in ordering them to submit to his dictation. Venice was bidden to make peace with Maximilian on the terms which he offered; they were to give up Verona and Vicenza, and hold Padua and Treviso as fiefs of the Empire subject to an annual payment.³ The Venetian envoys in Rome re-

Adhesion
of Maxi-
milian to
the Late-
ran Coun-
cil. De-
cember 3,
1512.

¹ Vettori, *Storia d' Italia*, 296.

² Jo. Pierii Valeriani, *Epistola de honoribus Matthæi Lang*, in Freher, ii., 573.

³ Brosch, *Julius II.*, 265.

fused to accept these terms, whereon the Pope in anger cried out, 'If you will not take them, we will all go against you'. He was ready to renew the League of Cambrai against Venice, and on November 19 signed an accord with the Emperor which was published on November 25. After this he hastened to enjoy his triumph. On December 3 was held the third session of the Lateran Council, in which the Bishop of Gurk declared the adhesion of the Emperor to the Council, pronounced in his name all the proceedings of the Council of Pisa null and void, and further asserted that the Emperor had given it no mandate. France was laid under an interdict for harbouring schismatics; and in the fourth session, held on December 10, proposals were made for the formal abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction of France, but the question was deferred for a time.

The Pope enjoyed his ecclesiastical triumph, but he paid a great price for it. It is the most remarkable feature in the policy of Julius II. that he spared no pains to extinguish the beginnings of a schism. It might have been expected that the Pope, immersed in political schemes, would have disregarded the intrigues of a few discontented Cardinals or would have satisfied himself with defeating them on political grounds. But Julius II. seems to have felt this ecclesiastical revolt more deeply than any interruption of his temporal plans, and never laid aside his efforts to establish his ecclesiastical authority in undisputed grandeur. For this purpose he curbed his fiery disposition; he grew cautious and patient; he made unexpected sacrifices. The adhesion of Maximilian to the Lateran Council was no great matter in itself: yet Julius II. was determined to have it, though Ferdinand of Spain pointed out the danger of alienating the Venetians, who would be driven to ally themselves with France and so bring back French influence into Italy.¹

Dissatis-
faction of
Venice.

Maximilian urged the excommunication of Venice, but

¹ Still to Henry VIII. in Brewer's *State Papers*, i., Nos. 3614, 3662.

Julius II. shrank from pressing Venice too hardly; he threatened, but did not excommunicate. Venice was anxious to avoid a rupture, and declared its adhesion to the Lateran Council. One motive of temporal policy led Julius II. to unite with the Emperor. He was above all things desirous of the conquest of Ferrara, and urged the Emperor to recall the German mercenaries who were in the service of Duke Alfonso. He hoped that Alfonso's army would thereby fade away like the army of La Palisse. But no one was willing to further the Pope's schemes: Maximilian refused to move; the Spanish forces abode at Milan and preferred to enjoy themselves in the festivities which followed on the restoration of Duke Massimiliano Sforza. Julius II. saw with displeasure that operations against Ferrara were suspended for the winter months, that he had little to hope from his allies, and that the negotiations between Venice and France threatened new dangers for the future. The only success which the Pope could reckon was the occupation of Pesaro by the Duke of Urbino in the end of October.

Failure of
 Julius II.
 to win
 Ferrara.

CHAPTER XVII.

ROME UNDER JULIUS II.

THE sense of increasing difficulties weighed heavily on Julius II., whose health began to give way. At the end of January, 1513, he took to his bed, and in a few days his other ailments were complicated by an attack of fever.¹ On February 4 he sent for Paris de Grassis, and told him that he had no hopes of recovery. He gave him orders about his funeral, saying that he knew how little attention was paid to a Pope after his death.² He did not wish his illness to postpone the next session of the Lateran Council, which was accordingly held on February 16 under the presidency of Cardinal Raffaele Riario. At the Pope's wish the Council promulgated the decree which he had previously issued against simony in papal elections. Julius II. was so far a reformer that he recognised the mischief which was wrought on the Papacy by the unblushing simony of which he had himself been a witness. The decree of Julius II.

Illness of
Julius II.
January,
1513.

¹ Paris de Grassis writes about the cause of his illness: 'Aliqui dixerunt ex plurimis fantasiis; aliqui ex radice mali Gallici, quo antea vexatus fuerat, aliquid restare unde magis nunc vexatur; aliqui ex suis immoderatis appetitibus stomachum dissolvere'.

² Some of Paris's account is given in Raynaldus, 1513, § 1; but some parts omitted are worth quoting: 'Dicebat enim se recordari vidisse multos pontifices in obitu eorum a propriis affinibus et suis necessariis derelictos sic fuisse ut indecenter nudi, etiam detectis pudibundis, jacerent; quod profecto in dedecus tante majestatis cessit. Quare volebat ut ego, quem ipse prudentem et fidelem reputabat, omnimodam sui corporis curam susciperem, ut honeste in omnibus honorateque efferretur et conderetur.'

against simony, and the care with which from his deathbed he urged it on the consciences of his Cardinals, are sufficient proofs of the scandals of the past.

Julius II. felt his strength slowly ebbing away, and quietly prepared for death. On February 20 he received the sacrament from the hands of Cardinal Riario, and afterwards bade farewell to the Cardinals. Addressing them in Latin as a Pope, he asked for their prayers; he confessed himself a great sinner, who had not governed the Church as wisely as he ought: he besought them to stand fast in the fear of God and the observance of the laws of the Church. Then he implored them to observe in the election of his successor the Bull which had just received the approbation of the Council. The absent Cardinals should be admitted to the Conclave, all save the schismatics; to them as a man and a priest he gave his pardon and his blessing, as Pope he could not sanction their polluted presence within the city. Then changing his speech to the Italian tongue, he told them his last wishes as a man. He wished that the Duke of Urbino should be confirmed in the vicariate of Pesaro as some return for the services which he had rendered to the Church.¹ Julius II. felt the calls of nature strong at the last. He had avoided the fault of Alexander VI.; he had even treated the Duke of Urbino with disdain; but he could not help expressing a wish that his nephew might secure an honourable but modest provision. The Cardinals assented, and the Pope dismissed them with his blessing. Afterwards he took leave of his household. His strength fast waned before this last effort, and on the following night he died.

The death of Julius II. filled Rome with sorrow. It was long since there had been such unfeigned grief at the death of a Pope; the quietness of the city and the absence of deeds of violence during the vacancy bore unmistakable testimony to the impression which his

Death of
Julius II.
February
20, 1513.

Sorrow at
the death
of Julius
II.

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, *Annales*, 1513, § 7.

character had produced.¹ Men felt that a great man had passed away. Their thoughts rested on the things which he had accomplished, on the successes which he had obtained. They recalled those qualities of the departed which always fascinate the popular mind: his resoluteness, his activity, his great designs. He had wrought changes in Italy with a rapidity which baffled understanding. He had made the Papacy the centre of the politics of Europe. He had used great kings as his instruments, and when they had secured his purposes he had driven them ignominiously away. The ordinary Italian may well be pardoned if he had no clear view of the future of Italy. He saw himself in a whirl of change and revolution, from which he could only hope for a favourable issue. He clung to the strong man who seemed to have a plan of his own, and who pursued it with untiring energy. Julius II. gave himself out as the Liberator of Italy, and the average Italian was willing to believe him. He saw that Julius II. was pursuing no merely personal ends, and was not trying to set up a dominion for his family; disinterested ambition seemed noble in his eyes, and the aspiration of Julius II. to free Italy from the stranger seemed to be the utterance of lofty patriotism. Men saw that Julius II. had done great things; they believed that his

¹ Letter from Rome of February 24, quoted by Brosch, *Julius II.*, 363: 'La terra è in pace e poi la morte del papa non è stata mortale per l'uomo lì a Roma, niuna insolentia si fa'. So too testifies Paris de Grassis: 'Non vidi unquam ab annis 40 quibus in Urbe fui, nec etiam visum quidem fuisse credo unquam tam ingentem populorum multitudinem ad ullum Pontificis cadaver effusam; ita ut per horas duas, ne dicam quatuor, integras steterimus a descensu scalarum ad aulam ipsam, et omnes cujuscumque ordinis, conditionis, sexus et etatis quicumque fuerat omnino, quantumcumque repellentibus militibus corporis custodibus, voluerunt pedem osculari, prout osculati sunt; acclamantes inter lacrymas salutem anime sue, qui vere Romanus Pontifex, Christi Vicarius fuit, justitiam tenendo, ecclesiam apostolicam ampliando, tyrannos et magnates, inimicos persequendo et debellando. Omitto multos, quibus credibile erat hanc mortem gratam esse etiam ubertinis lacrymis flevisse, quoniam, ut dicebant, Hic Pontifex nos omnes, omnem Italiam omnemque Christianitatem a Barbarorum et Gallorum manibus eripuit.'

schemes, if fully carried out, would bring back order out of chaos.¹

The statesmen of Italy took a more sober view of Julius II. They regarded the means which he used, and discussed their wisdom; they estimated the immediate results which he produced, and doubted about his ideal aims. 'He was a man,' says the Florentine Francesco Vettori, 'fortunate rather than prudent, courageous rather than strong; but ambitious and beyond measure desirous of every kind of greatness. Alexander and Julius were so great that they may be called Emperors rather than Popes.'² In the same strain wrote another Florentine, Francesco Guicciardini: 'He was a prince of courage and boundless resolution, but impetuous and full of unmeasured schemes which would have brought him to ruin had he not been helped by the reverence felt for the Church, the discord of the princes, and the condition of the times, rather than by his own moderation and prudence. He would deserve the highest glory had he been a secular prince, or if he had used the same care and efforts to exalt the Church in spiritual things by peaceful arts, that he used to exalt her by war in temporal greatness.' Guicciardini goes on to say that Julius II. was extolled above his predecessors 'by those who, having lost the right use of words and confused the distinctions of accurate speech, judge that it is the office of the Popes to bring empire to the Apostolic seat by arms and by the shedding Christian blood, more than to trouble themselves by setting an example of holy life and correcting the decay of morals

¹ Thus Bontempi of Perugia says in his *Ricordi*, quoted in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, serie 1ma, xvi., pt. ii., 263: 'Fo ricordo con le lacrime agl' occhi e con gran dolore nel cuore come papa Giulio passò da questa vita presente, la cui vita quanto sia stata laudabile et onorevole alla Sedia Apostolica e a tutta la Cristianità, e la sua morte quanto sia perniciososa, mai dire si potria, e quanto abbia esaltato la Chiesa di Dio, e le città, quale lui ha recuperato alla prefato Sede Apostolica che a tutto il mondo è noto. Dio sia quello che ci dia un altro pastore simile a lui, se è possibile.'

² *Storia d' Italia*, p. 306.

for the salvation of those souls for whose sake they boast that Christ set them as His Vicars on earth'.¹

The different judgments of which Guicciardini speaks are still possible. For good or for ill, Julius II. was undoubtedly the founder of the Papal States. The nepotism of Sixtus IV. was merely the extension of a tendency that already existed, and was not a system which could leave lasting results. Alexander VI. set himself with relentless craft to establish for his son an independent principality in Central Italy. Such a plan might have been for the good of Italy, but would have destroyed the temporal sovereignty of the Papacy, which would have been left with only spiritual functions, and would have run great risks of being reduced to an appendage to a new and vigorous dynasty. From this danger it was rescued by Julius II., who entered upon the labours of Cesare Borgia and carried out the plans of Alexander VI. But the conquests of Julius II. were for the Church; and when he died he left the Church supreme over dominions of which Alexander VI. had never dared to dream. Not only were the States of the Church recovered, but their enemies were crushed and their neighbours weakened. The Italian powers had been reduced; the political life of Italy, which before was tottering, had received from Julius II. a fatal blow; only the Papal States rested on a sure foundation. When the crash came they alone were safe, for the Papacy as a temporal power was bound up with the politics of Southern Europe. It is easy to point out the dangers which the Papacy ran in bringing about this end. The head of Christendom leading his armies to attack an insignificant fortress in Italy, and hurling his anathemas against those who crossed his path in politics, was not a figure to command the respect of Europe. It is easy to point to the great religious movement which followed, and find its origin in feelings of moral reprobation awakened by

Julius II.
founder
of the
Papal
States.

¹ *Storia d' Italia*, bk. xi.

such-like conduct. But the success of the Reformation was due to intellectual, social, and political causes as well as moral. Christendom became conscious of differences which were sure to find expression sooner or later in religious matters. The Reformation would have taken place in some way or another, even if the Popes had stood aloof from Italian politics. The system of the mediæval Church would have felt the attack of the modern spirit of criticism, whether the States of the Church had been ruled by the Pope or by his unruly vicars. A secularised Papacy may be a proof to after times that the days of the undisputed rule of the Pope over the Church were drawing to an end ; but it is hard to see how the Papacy, organised as it had been for centuries, could have escaped the conflict.

If this be so, the foundation of the States of the Church was by no means an unworthy or unnecessary work. If the crash had come when the Papacy was politically insignificant, it might have been entirely swept away. As it was, the Papacy was preserved on political grounds till it had time to put forth new strength and re-establish its hold on the ecclesiastical system. Had not the Papacy possessed a strong foothold in the States of the Church, it might, in the rapid movement of the Reformation, have been reduced to its primitive condition of an Italian bishopric. The story of the founding of the States of the Church may be regarded as an episode, an ignoble episode, in the history of the Papacy, but it is none the less an integral part of its development. The beginning of the sixteenth century saw the states of Europe engaged in extending their boundaries and consolidating their power. The Papacy frankly accepted the political spirit of the time, and entered on the scramble as keenly as the rest and as sagaciously as the wisest. It must in all fairness be admitted that it received its reward.

It cannot be said of Julius II. that he entirely disregarded for politics the higher duties of his office. He saw the dangers of the secularised Papacy, and did his utmost to

rescue papal elections from simony and bring back the Cardinals to a sense of their responsibilities. He was not so venturesome as to run the risk of a schism, nor so cowardly as to refuse to meet the opinion of Europe if Europe had anything to say. But the Churchmen who assembled at the Lateran Council were unconscious of any coming danger, and though they spoke of a coming time of peace, they agreed in praising the Pope's warlike bearing as needful in the present. Julius II. sorely needed money; but he introduced no new exactions and was not personally oppressive. He received large sums from new Cardinals; but he probably thought that those who were honoured by the Church should contribute to the Church's needs. His resources were due to personal frugality and careful management. Men thought that he was avaricious because he was slow in parting with his money and liked to keep a good sum in reserve. He was not generous or open-handed, and his service brought no rewards. Michel Angelo lived in poverty while he worked for the Pope, and found it hard to get money to enable him to pay for his marble or his colours.

Julius II. stands high above Alexander VI. because his policy was disinterested and was intelligible. Men could forgive much to a Pope who fought for the Church; they looked with dread on a Pope who used the authority of the Church to establish his own family in power. Julius II. was an unscrupulous politician; but he played his game openly and men saw the reasons for his moves. He spoke out clearly and did not conceal his objects; the allies whom he used for his purposes were never deceived into thinking that he had any real love for them, and he never struck a blow in the dark. His rough, resolute, impetuous, outspoken character gave him an appearance of dignity and high-mindedness. Alexander VI. filled Italy with horror because he suddenly strode forward as master of that statecraft which had many dilettante admirers. In contrast to him, Julius II. seemed to return to primitive virtues—to

revive an heroic age. He set up steadfastness in the place of subtilty; he triumphed by rashness rather than by guile; he professed to talk of greater plans than he could compass rather than cloak his schemes under an affected geniality and good humour. In this Julius II. corresponded to a movement of the Italian mind. The early Renaissance strove after delicacy and worked tentatively in points of detail; it gradually felt its way to a desire for largeness of design and boldness in execution. What Michel Angelo did for art, what Bramante did for architecture, Julius II. did for politics. He conceived vast designs and worked at them with the fury of one overmastered by the grandeur of his own ideas.

Amid the tumult of political endeavour, Julius II. little thought that his name would be borne through the ages chiefly by three workmen whom he employed: Bramante, Michel Angelo, and Raffaele; yet it is mostly owing to their labours that the fiery personality which dominated his own contemporaries has never ceased to enthral men's minds. Its great aspirations were expressed in stone by Bramante; its passionate force breathes through the frescoes of Michel Angelo; its triumphant energy is set forth by the pencil of Raffaele. Julius II. had the true mark of greatness, that he sympathised with all that was great. He was more than a mere patron of art; he provided great artists with great opportunities. He did not merely employ great artists; he impressed them with a sense of his own greatness, and called out all that was strongest and noblest in their own nature. They knew that they served a master who was in sympathy with themselves.

Julius II. was a stern master, fitful and capricious; even Michel Angelo found that it was useless to rebel against his will. When he had finished his unlucky statue of Julius II. at Bologna, he was ordered to return to Rome and continue his work at the Pope's tomb. When he arrived he found that Julius II. had changed his mind; he thought that it was unlucky to have his tomb

Julius II.
in his rela-
tion to art.

Michel
Angelo
and
Julius II.

erected in his lifetime. Michel Angelo was bidden to lay aside his sculptor's chisel and betake himself to the art of the painter. The Pope had resolved to carry out the adornment of the Sistine Chapel, whose walls were enriched by the panels of the great artists of the previous generation. Julius II. wished that the space above the windows, whence sprang the flat vaulted ceiling, should be adorned by the painter's skill. The task was not to Michel Angelo's taste, and he found it hard to produce a satisfactory design. He had difficulties in contriving a scaffold and in procuring colours. The work of his assistants did not please him, and he had sadly to dismiss them, destroy their painting, and carry on his labour single-handed. He made mistakes at first in his process of fresco painting, and his work was destroyed by damp. For months he was in despair; he lived in poverty, and dared not ask the Pope for money, for he had nothing to show. 'I cannot get on with the work and have had no claim for pay,' he wrote to his father. 'I am wasting my time in vain; God help me.' Never was a work of art so entirely the result of the travail and agony of the artist's soul.

Michel Angelo began his work on May 10, 1508. As he laboured on, sick at heart, the restless Pope often clambered up the ladder that led to the giddy platform where the painter lay. Had it not been for his persistency the painter's spirit would have flagged. 'When will you have done?' asked the Pope. 'When I can,' said Michel Angelo. 'You seem to wish,' said Julius in a rage, 'that I should have you thrown down from your scaffold.' At last, on November 1, 1509, half the work was done, and Julius II. ordered the scaffolding to be removed that men might see and criticise. They came and gazed with wonder and delight; none doubted that they stood before a masterpiece. The ceiling had been by the painter's art gifted with new architectural forms. Its plain flat vault had been laid out with cornice, arches and niches. The whole surface was a magnificent delusion, in which archi-

The decoration of the Sistine Chapel.

ecture, sculpture, and painting seemed to combine. Gigantic figures of prophets and sibyls rose between the windows from the wall; caryatids bore the cornice; huge slaves with garlands were seated by the arches at its edge. In the centre of the ceiling the painted panels told the story of the creation of the world and of man; told what man was when God was by his side, and what man became when he lost the light of the Divine presence. Never since the days of Pheidias had the human form been raised to such dignity; never did Italian art achieve a greater technical triumph; never has the painter's brush carried so profound a message to the minds and consciences of men.

Julius II. was satisfied with Michel Angelo's work and urged him to finish it. The scaffolding had been removed before the last touches had been given to the painting; Julius II. would have it again erected that the figures might be enriched with gilding. Michel Angelo pleaded that this was needless. 'But it looks so poor,' said the Pope. 'Holy Father,' answered the painter, 'they were but poor folk whom I have painted there: they wore no gold upon their garments.' Julius II. smiled and submitted. Michel Angelo was allowed to go on with the other half of the ceiling. In vain he asked for leave to go to Florence and visit his family; Julius II. was inexorable, and Michel was chained to his work till it was finished.

When Julius II. was on his deathbed, he left instructions to his executors that Michel Angelo should continue his work at the monument; and a contract was made for a design on a somewhat smaller scale. The tomb was no longer to stand four-square, but was to be placed against the wall, and have fewer figures.¹

For three years Michel Angelo laboured; then he was sent by Leo X. to other work at Florence, and the tomb of Julius II. was put aside during his absence. Its design was again

¹ The contract is in Milanese, *Lettere di Michel Angelo Buonarrotti*, 635. Michel Angelo was to receive 16,500 ducats, of which 3500 had been already paid by Julius II.

and again contracted from the mighty scale on which it had first been planned; finally, in 1550, it was erected as we see it still, not beneath the dome of S. Peter's, but in the little Church of S. Piero in Vincoli, from which Julius II. took his Cardinal title. The unquiet spirit of Julius II. haunted Michel Angelo, and the execution of the tomb was a cause of constant trouble to the sculptor. Through the weariness of all concerned, it assumed its present shape and was placed in its present position, for which its proportions are much too vast. Huge pilasters of marble stand against the wall, and on the upper story rests the sarcophagus of Julius II. with his recumbent figure. In a niche above the Pope stands the Madonna with the Holy Child; in the side niches are a prophet and a sibyl; these were the work of Michel Angelo's pupils, Maso del Bosco and Raffaele di Montelupo. In the lower story are three statues by Michel Angelo's own hand. He had made others which were rendered useless by the change in the position of the tomb; and two of his noblest works, two captive slaves originally designed for this work, are now in the Louvre. Still, with all its losses and all its evil fortune, the tomb of Julius II. is the mightiest of sculptured memorials to the dead. The three figures by Michel Angelo are masterpieces of Italian sculpture. A colossal figure of Moses is seated in the middle of the lower story of the monument; on either side of him stand Leah and Rachel, Dante's types of the practical and the contemplative life. Moses is not set before us as the law-giver, but as the great leader of his people. Holding the table of the law in one hand, with the other he clutches his beard and looks out with a resolute force upon a craven folk. So Michel Angelo idealised the fiery personality of Julius II.; the mighty frame of Moses, which seems to be with difficulty held in rest, sets forth the stormy spirit of the Pope who strove to mould states and kingdoms to his will, and owned no bounds to his furious impetuosity.

Besides Michel Angelo, Julius II. summoned to Rome the other great artist of his day, Raffaele Santi. The son of a

vigorous Umbrian painter, Raffaele after his father's death studied under Perugino, and had gained some fame when in 1508 he came to Rome at the age of twenty-five. Julius II. at once set him to work to decorate the chambers in the Vatican in which he chose to live. After abandoning the rooms which Alexander VI. had occupied, he selected for his own dwelling the rooms which Nicolas V. had built. Their walls were covered by frescoes from the hands of Piero della Francesca, Luca Signorelli, Perugino, and Sodoma. At first Julius II. intended that Raffaele should thoroughly finish the work that they had begun; and he first undertook the second of the four rooms, the Stanza della Segnatura, where the Pope used to receive the documents which required his signature. The first of Raffaele's paintings was a female figure representing Theology, which occupied an unfinished panel in the ceiling. Julius II. was so delighted with this work that he ordered the existing paintings to be destroyed, that Raffaele might have free scope for the harmonious decoration of the entire room. Raffaele allowed much of the merely decorative work, with its mythological medallions, to remain on the ceiling; but the wall paintings were swept away.

It seems most probable that Julius II. suggested—he certainly approved—the noble series of designs which Raffaele executed. The room represents the whole field of human knowledge, sacred and profane. In the four divisions of the ceiling are allegorical figures of Theology, Poetry, Philosophy and Law; round them are grouped appropriate medallions. The four walls unfold the muster roll of the heroes of literature and science. Theology shows us the heavens opened. The Father blesses His Church on earth; the Son, seated amidst His Apostles, with outstretched hands pleads gently with mankind; the Holy Spirit is descending from heaven to shed Divine grace on the Sacrament which stands upon the altar beneath. Round the altar are grouped the fathers and great teachers of the

Church, amongst them Dante and Savonarola; and in the foreground are figures which tell of the living power of Christian faith and Christian teaching in the painter's day. No less splendid in conception are the pictures which represent the triumphs of Poetry and Philosophy. Apollo crowned with laurels is seated on the hill of Parnassus, with the muses by his side, while the hill slope is filled with the great singers of all time, from Homer to Sannazaro. In the School of Athens, a stately hall modelled on Bramante's design for S. Peter's, are gathered the great teachers of antiquity, whose writings seemed to the men of the Renaissance a fount of inexhaustible wisdom. The space allotted for the fourth picture, which represented Law, was divided into two by a window. Raffaele has shown two groups: Justinian promulgating the Digest, and Gregory IX. promulgating the Decretals.

If Michel Angelo's work in Rome testifies to the terrific side of the character of Julius II., the work of Raffaele testifies to the greatness of his mind. The decoration of a room was a small matter; but Julius II. had his room converted into a mighty memorial of the dignity of man's achievements. He had displayed before his eyes all that was best and noblest in the past. In the largest spirit of human sympathy he took possession of the entire heritage of human knowledge.

We need not speak of the grace, the beauty, the dignity of Raffaele's work, or the consummate skill shown in the composition of these large frescoes. Julius II. was so delighted with the result, that he ordered Raffaele to proceed with the other three rooms as well. Raffaele had assigned him as the motive for his treatment of the next room, 'God protecting His Church'. His first picture was the expulsion of Heliodorus from the Temple of Jerusalem, as told in the Second Book of Maccabees. Here dramatic movement takes the place of stately repose; heavenly messengers sweep through the Temple, and the overthrown tyrant crouches before them; in the background the high

priest and his attendants are deep in prayer. We cannot doubt the influence of Julius II. on this picture, for in the corner is a portrait of the Pope borne in his litter, and gazing calmly on the prostrate king; the picture was an unmistakable allegory of his success in expelling the French from Italy. A second picture in the same room was nearly finished when Julius II. died; it represented the testimony of God against unbelief by the miracle of Bolsena, when a priest who doubted the Sacrament of the altar saw blood trickle from the consecrated host.

Besides his paintings in the Vatican, Raffaello found time to work for other patrons. For his friend Sigis-
 mondo de' Conti, one of the papal secretaries, he painted a Madonna as a votive offering to a church. This picture long rested at Sigismondo's native town Foligno, and bears the name of the 'Madonna of Foligno'. The portrait of the kneeling donor shows us the clear-cut features of the chief man of letters who served Julius II. Sigismondo came to Rome under Sixtus IV. in 1476, and had a long experience of papal service. Julius II. made him his private secretary, and employed him in many delicate negotiations. Sigismondo employed his leisure in writing a history of his own times, which is an excellent summary of the events; but his official reserve, and his striving after classical dignity of style, have prevented him from expressing his own judgments. The facts which he relates are known from other sources; we wish that one who saw so much close at hand had given us more personal details and more of his own opinions. Sigismondo strove to be a classical historian, but he has no conception of historical progress, and no criticism of the general tendency of his time. He misses the charm of a diarist or memoir writer: he does not attain to the rank of an historian.¹

¹ The history of Sigismondo de' Conti. *Le Storie de' suoi Tempi del 1475 al 1510* were published in Rome 1883, with an introductory sketch of the writer's life.

Julius II. was too much engaged in practical pursuits to pay much attention to literature. Occasionally he was pleased with a complimentary harangue, and recompensed the orator with a present, but he attracted no literary men to Rome. Once, indeed, he was led into the unwonted act of crowning a poet, more as an act of political complaisance than from any serious intention. It would seem that the Vatican librarian, Tommaso Inghirami, persuaded him to provide a literary entertainment for the Bishop of Gurk when he came as imperial ambassador in November, 1512. He consulted Paris de Grassis, who answered that there was no precedent for the coronation of a poet by the Pope; he added further that poets wrote about Jupiter and Pegasus, and such-like heathenish things, which it was indecorous for a Pope to recognise. Julius II. seemed convinced, but a few days afterwards, at a dinner in the Belvedere given to the Bishop of Gurk, a young Roman, Vincenzo Pimpinello, attired as Orpheus, recited some verses in honour of the Pope's victory over the French. He was followed by Francesco Grapaldi, secretary to the embassy of Parma, who similarly sang the glories of Italy freed from the barbarian yoke. Then Inghirami brought two laurel wreaths, which the Pope and the Bishop of Gurk held between them, while the Pope said, 'We, by our apostolic authority, and the Bishop of Gurk by the authority of the Emperor, make you poet, ordering you to write of the exploits of the Church'. Neither Pimpinello nor Grapaldi were of any merit as poets. Julius II. was not fortunate in his solitary attempt at literary patronage.¹

The most precious memorial of Julius II. is his portrait by Raffaele, which is a veritable revelation of his character. Seated in an arm-chair, with head bent downwards, the Pope is in deep thought. His furrowed brow and his deep-sunk eyes tell of energy and

Corona-
tion of
two poets.

Raffaele's
portrait of
Julius II.

¹ I print in the Appendix the curious passage in Paris de Grassis relating this occurrence. A sample of Grapaldi's eloquence and of his poetry is given in Roscoe's *Life of Leo X.*, Appendix, No. lxvi.

decision. The downdrawn corners of his mouth betoken constant dealings with the world. Raffaello has caught the momentary repose of a restless and passionate spirit, and has shown all the grace and beauty which are to be found in the sense of force repressed and power at rest. He sets before us Julius II. as a man resting from his labours, and brings out all the dignity of his rude, rugged features. The Pope is in repose; but repose to him was not idleness, it was deep meditation. A man who has done much and suffered much, he finds comfort in his retrospect and prepares for future conflicts.

CHAPTER XVIII.

BEGINNINGS OF LEO X.

1513—1515.

THE death of Julius II. plunged Rome into genuine grief, before which the voice of turbulence and faction was silent. Never in the memory of man had the city remained so quiet on the death of the Pope. There was nothing to disturb the action of the Cardinals or prevent them from carrying out the funeral rites of Julius II. and the preparations for the Conclave. They scarcely showed themselves deserving of this exceptional consideration; their behaviour was not dignified, for their first care was to lay hands on the treasure which Julius II. had left behind. In spite of his military expenditure Julius II. had practised strict economy; and the papal treasury contained upwards of 200,000 ducats, besides two tiaras with the triple crown, two simple tiaras, and jewels to the value of 50,000 ducats. The poor Cardinals thought sadly of the Bull which prohibited simony in the new election, and wished to use the opportunity which was in their power. They hunted out the constitution of Paul II. which provided that every Cardinal whose revenues were below 4000 ducats should receive from the Pope 200 ducats monthly till he reached that amount; and as Julius II. had not made this payment, they proposed to pay themselves the arrears which were due.¹ This plan was frustrated by

Conduct
of the Car-
dinals dur-
ing the
vacancy.
Feb. 20—
March
4, 1513.

¹ Letter of Marcello, in Brosch, *Julius II.*, 363: 'Li Cardinali poveri visto la bolla de simonia fece Julio si pensò un bel trato et trovò una antiqua constitutione di bonifacio octavo qual volea che ogni card. che

the firmness of the Captain of the Castle of S. Angelo, who refused to give up to the Cardinals the keys of the treasury. He showed them a brief of Julius II. forbidding him to deliver them save to the future Pope. The Cardinals declared him a rebel against the Sacred College; but the castellan was not to be moved, and they went away baffled.

When all was ready the twenty-five Cardinals who were in Rome entered the Conclave on the evening of March 4. They first attended mass in a chapel of S. Peter's, where each man as he gazed upon the vast columns that rose amid the heaps of stones was reminded of the great task which awaited the future Pope. The wind howled through the chapel, and the altar lights could scarcely be protected from its violence. The great Church of Rome was a dreary and piteous ruin.

The result of the election was very doubtful; and popular opinion pointed to Raffaello Riario, Flisco, and the Hungarian Cardinal Archbishop of Strigov as the most likely men. The Cardinals did not hasten to proceed to any decisive step. They drew up regulations for the future Pope, and signed them with great ceremony, till the guardians of the Conclave grew impatient, and on the evening of March 7 reduced the food of the Cardinals to one dish at each meal. On March 9 they took more stringent measures and allowed them nothing but a vegetable diet. The Cardinals in reality felt a difficulty how to proceed. There was no one specially marked out for the office, and the obvious course would have been to choose the most respectable of the senior members of the College. This is what the older Cardinals wished to do; and if this view had prevailed there would have been a basis for discussion. But the younger members of the College wished for a new departure in the Papacy. They were

non avesse duc. 4000 di intrada al anno el papa li desse duc. 200 al mexe per uno fin arivasse ala summa, e perche niuno havea avuto e tal card. erra stato do e tre anni avanti havessino intrada di duc. 4000, perho voleano refarsi di danari dil castello siche partivano duc. 120,000 tra loro'.

Conclave
of Leo X.
March 4-
11, 1513.

weariness of the excitement which the pontificates of Alexander VI. and Julius II. had so plentifully supplied. They wanted a kindly, genial, magnificent Pope, a man of high character and some repute, who would do credit to the office without the intolerable activity in political matters which had so long prevailed. They were not satisfied with any of the older Cardinals; some were too old, others too feeble, others not sufficiently respectable in life and character. In this divided state of opinion each party was bound to put forward some candidate; the seniors named Raffaele Riario, the juniors named Giovanni de' Medici. An attempt was made at a compromise; but there was no one on whom both parties could agree. It became a question of endurance, and nothing was to be gained by going through the form of holding a scrutiny.

In such a struggle the juniors had physical strength on their side, and showed greater resolution. The league of the seniors gradually began to waver. Cardinal Medici was especially helped by the support of Cardinal Soderini, who was clever enough to see which was the winning side. He thought it best to make terms, and his example of trusting to the generosity of his hereditary foe made a great impression on the others. Perhaps also the elder Cardinals were induced to give way because Cardinal Medici was known to suffer from an incurable ulcer, and needed a surgeon's care even in the Conclave; young though he was, he did not promise to be long-lived.

As last it was found necessary to take some definite step. On March 10 the Bull of Julius II. against simony was read and the first scrutiny was held. It declared nothing, as the votes were scattered: Cardinal Serra, whom no one seriously thought of, received most votes. After this Cardinals Riario and Medici had a private conference, the result of which was that the election of Cardinal Medici was practically decided. The Cardinals went to him and greeted him as Pope; many of them escorted him to his cell, and asked him what name he had chosen. Next day a formal scrutiny was held, and

Cardinal Medici was duly elected. The announcement caused universal surprise; no one had thought of him as a possible candidate, but every one was delighted as well as surprised. There was nothing known against the new Pope except his youth and his exceeding good nature.¹

Giovanni de' Medici had been made Cardinal when he was a boy and became Pope when he was still a young man. He was only in his thirty-eighth year, and had nothing to recommend him except the political importance which he had gained by the restoration of his family to Florence. He had shown great tact in the years that followed the exile of the Medici, and had done his utmost to be at peace with all men. Under the pontificate of Alexander VI. he had found it wise to absent himself for a few years, during which he travelled in Germany and France, till Alexander VI. ceased to suspect him and he returned to Rome. Julius II. had no especial love for him; but when the restoration of the Medici became part of his political plans he made Giovanni his legate in Bologna and so raised him to a political personage. Giovanni showed considerable cleverness in managing the Florentine revolution. Every one felt that he was the real head of the Medici, and rather than his elder brother Giuliano, directed the measures of their party. He guided the steps by which the Florentine government was put into the hands of trusty men, and he knew how to throw a cloak of moderation over violent measures. Still the Florentine Republic did not pass away without a struggle against its destroyers. A conspiracy against the Medici was set on foot; but it was revealed by the incredible carelessness of a hot-headed youth, Pietro Paolo Boscoli, who let fall from his pocket a compromising document in the midst of the

¹ There is an account of the Conclave of Leo X. in a letter of Alberto Pio, Count of Carpi, Maximilian's ambassador at Rome, in *Lettres de Louis XII.*, iv., 72. Another account, apparently extracted from Paris de Grassis, is in *Conclave de' Pontefici*, i., 170. I have added in the Appendix a few details from the MS. of Paris de Grassis.

crowd that kept the Carnival. In consequence of real or pretended evidence, many of the chief Florentines were exiled, among them Niccolò Machiavelli. Boscoli was executed, and the account of his mental struggles to die as a Christian is one of the most striking illustrations of the religious feelings of the men of the Renaissance. To them the example of classical antiquity was in the foreground, while the teaching of the Gospel was the abiding background of their moral being. In the time of action they turned to the memories of Rome for their examples; reflection brought before them the precepts of Christ. 'Drive Brutus from my head,' exclaimed Boscoli, 'that I may take the last step wholly as a Christian.' And the great question for the friends of the would-be penitent was the opinion of Thomas Aquinas on the sinfulness of tyrannicide. The good confessor who heard the account of his simple-hearted if mistaken patriotism could say afterwards, 'I wept eight days almost without ceasing; such feelings of affection did that night inspire. I believe that his soul is in peace, and has not undergone purgatory.'¹

Boscoli and another conspirator were executed as Cardinal Giovanni was on his way to Rome for the papal election. The conspiracy awakened no feeling of bitterness or thirst for revenge in the Cardinal's mind. Already he was a statesman of a practical order, who saw that he could not get his own way without creating some opposition, and resolved that he would try by geniality and kindness to make that opposition as little formidable as might be. He had some of the cultivated cynicism of his father. He wished to enjoy himself in his own way, and he wished

¹ The *Narrazione del Caso del Boscoli*, written by Luca della Robbia, in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, i., 283, is full of interest. Luca della Robbia (a relative of the famous artist) shows the abiding influence in Florence of the teaching of Savonarola. His desire for the salvation of his friend's soul, and his picture of one who was ready to believe in Christ, but found it hard to co-ordinate on a Christian basis the contradictory impulses under which his character had been formed, present a picture which is full of deep pathos.

every one else to share his enjoyment; it was their own fault if they were impracticable and refused to accept the offer; he pitied rather than hated those who were their own foes more than his. His only desire was that Florence should see what was her own advantage, and he judged it unreasonable of those who did not see that their advantage really agreed with his.

All men rejoiced at the accession of Giovanni de' Medici; and when he took the name of Leo X. they smiled and said that he was more like a gentle lamb than a fierce lion. The Cardinals could not restrain their satisfaction at escaping from the stern rule of Julius II.; they all behaved, says an observer, as if they had themselves become Popes.¹ The story was widely believed that one of the first sayings of the new Pope to his brother Giuliano was, 'Let us enjoy the Papacy, since God has given it to us'.² It seemed in men's eyes a worthy motto; and the Cardinals presented so many requests to the new Pope that he said with a smile, 'Take my crown, and grant what you wish, as if you were Popes yourselves'.

The festivities of Leo X.'s coronation showed that a reign of magnificence and peace was to begin. Men saw the Duke of Ferrara, who had been so long pursued by Julius II. with relentless animosity, welcomed in Rome and invested once more with his ducal dignity; he even acted as the squire of the Pope, and helped him to mount the steed on which he rode through the streets. The pomp and splendour of the procession was famous even in those days of pageants. The Pope's train was numerous, and the mixture of ecclesiastical, military, and civil dresses made a dazzling display of colours. Rome was unsparing of decorations. The streets were all ablaze with rich devices,

¹ Carpi, as above, 'Videntur ipsi domini Cardinales quotquot sunt fere toti esse Pontifices'.

² In *Relazione di Marino Giorgio*, in Alberi, series ii., vol. iii., 51: 'Godiamoci il papato, poichè Dio ci l' ha dato'; also in Prato, *Storia Milanese*, 405: 'Attendiamo a godere e facciamo bene alli nostri'.

triumphal arches, and allegorical figures of every sort, while the invention of the artist and the poet was alike strained to produce designs and mottoes. The rich banker, Agostino Chigi, showed his ingenuity by a brief summary of the past history of the Papacy and a forecast of its future; a mighty arch bore a living nymph attended by Moorish pages; on the frieze ran an inscription, 'Once Venus reigned, then Mars, now comes the reign of Pallas'.¹ A witty goldsmith, who lived near, showed greater knowledge of the times; he set up a statue of Venus, that bore the legend, 'Mars reigned, Pallus reigns, I, Venus, will always reign'.² Mythology and religion, history sacred and profane, were alike laid under contribution to supply motives for singing the praises of the new Pope. There was indeed no end to his greatness.³

However much Leo X. might be desirous of a life of peace, he soon had to face political questions of a disturbing kind. The treaty between Louis XII. and the Venetians was the prelude to a new invasion of Milan by the French. Louis XII. sent to Giuliano de' Medici that he might sound the intentions of the new Pope; but Leo X. knew that the possession of Parma and Piacenza would only be allowed by Massimiliano Sforza, and that a French restoration would mean their loss to the Papacy. So he rejected the overtures of Louis XII. and renewed the league which Julius II. had made with Maximilian.

Leo X.
renews
the alli-
ance with
Maxi-
milian.

A greater plan, however, of political action was soon brought before the Pope. Henry VIII. of England was so ill satisfied with his first ventures into foreign politics that he wished to compass some large design. He proposed to bring about a European confederacy against France, and divide her territories amongst

Scheme of
Henry
VIII.
against
France.
April, 1513.

¹ 'Olim habuit Cypris sua tempora, tempora Mavors
Olim habuit, sua nunc tempora Pallas habet.'

² 'Mars fuit, est Pallas, Cypria semper ero.'

³ These festivities are described at length in a letter of Giovanni Giacopo Penni, printed in Roscoe's *Leo X.*, Appendix lxx.

the confederates. France was to be attacked on all sides at once; Ferdinand would invade Bearn; Henry VIII. would enter Normandy; Maximilian would overrun the Burgundian provinces; it would be well if the Pope also undertook to pour his forces into Provence. The example of the League of Cambrai was to be followed on a large scale, and Europe was to be pacified by the destruction of the one power who was a constant menace to her neighbours.¹ So dreamed Henry VIII., inspired no doubt by the magnificent genius of Wolsey, who wished to set England in the foremost place in the politics of Europe. It seemed an easy matter to revive the old claims of the English kings to the throne of France, and to summon others to take their share of the booty. But Ferdinand of Spain shook his head over the plan, and did not give it a very favourable ear;² there was not much that he could hope to gain from the partition of France, which he saw would chiefly fall to the advantage of the house of Austria. So he listened to Henry VIII.'s plan, and meanwhile made a truce for a year with Louis XII.; soon afterwards he entered into Henry VIII.'s league as well. The crafty old man resolved to be on good terms with both parties, to do nothing himself, but be ready to take advantage if anything important happened. Maximilian was more bent on attacking the Venetians than on a war against France; he pleaded that he could not make an expedition without money, and Henry VIII. undertook to pay him 125,000 crowns. The combination against France was not very strong when on April 5 the league between Henry VIII., Maximilian, and Ferdinand was signed at Mechlin. It was still called the Holy League; but the recovery or defence of the States of the Church no longer appears amongst its objects. It was solely directed to the partition of the territory of France, and the Pope was requested to 'cause all the annoyance that he could against

¹ Henry VIII. to Cardinal Bainbridge. Brewer, *State Papers*, i., 3876.

² Letter to Henry VIII. of John Still, his envoy to Ferdinand. Brewer, *State Papers*, i., 3766, 3807.

the French king,¹ to make no truce with him so long as the war lasted, to give temporal aid, and to fulminate ecclesiastical censures against all who opposed the league.

This was a good deal to demand from the Pope, and Leo X. was not a man of far-reaching schemes. He was contented with things as they were, and only wished that the invasion of the Milanese, which the French king was projecting, might be repulsed. Louis XII. for his part trusted to his alliance with Venice and his truce with Ferdinand, and resolved to conquer Milan before the English army was ready to take the field. The restoration of the French power in Italy would be a sure means of breaking up the league which had been formed against him, and would leave Henry VIII. without allies in his invasion of France.

Accordingly, at the beginning of May, a large army under La Tremouille and Gian Giacomo Trivulzio crossed the Alps, and the Swiss troops of Massimiliano Sforza were not strong enough to oppose them. The people had no liking for their new duke, who had been brought up in a foreign land, whose feeble character they had learned, and whose extravagance burdened them with heavy taxes. The exiles returned; the towns surrendered to the French or the Venetians; Novara and Como alone remained faithful to their duke, whose only hope was in the Swiss. The Swiss, however, had solid reasons for keeping him in Milan. He paid them an annual tribute, and they were willing to fight so long as they were paid. Leo X. would not send any troops to the defence of Milan; but he sent 42,000 ducats. A body of 7000 Swiss infantry crossed the mountains and entered Novara, expecting reinforcements. The French, who were provided with artillery, besieged Novara, which could not long hold out; but news that more Swiss troops were on the way induced the French army to retire to a little distance. The garrison of Novara resolved

French
invasion
of Milan.
May, 1513.

Battle of
Novara.
June 6,
1513.

¹ Brewer, *Calendar of State Papers*, i., 3863.

to risk a battle, and on June 6 silently advanced against the French camp and fell on them unawares. They had no horse and no artillery, yet they attacked an army three times as numerous as themselves, and well provided with guns and cavalry. For a time the battle raged fiercely; but the Swiss kept their ranks and fought their way to the enemy's guns, which they seized and turned against them. The rout of the French was complete; they fled in panic, and scarcely stayed till they had crossed the Alps. All Italy was astounded at this exploit of the Swiss, which seemed to outdo the famous deeds of old.¹

The defeat of the French in Italy was rapidly followed by Henry VIII.'s invasion of France. On June 30 he landed at Calais, and on August 1 advanced to the siege of Terouenne. There he was joined by Maximilian, in whose interest, rather than in that of England, the expedition was conducted; for its object was to secure the Netherlands against France by the capture of the chief fortress on the frontier. The French resistance was feeble and half-hearted; their best troops had been scattered at Novara, and those who took the field were demoralised. The army which came to the relief of Terouenne fled, almost without striking a blow; and the French themselves made merry over their defeat by calling it the 'Battle of Spurs'. Terouenne surrendered and was given over to Maximilian, who razed its defences to the ground. The Scottish king vainly attempted to help his ally of France; he raised a gallant army and invaded England, only to fall in the fatal battle of Flodden Field. Henry VIII. pursued his campaign undisturbed by the threats of Scotland. The strong town of Tournay was taken on September 24, and Maximilian was anxious to pursue a campaign in which he gained all the profit; but the season was late, and Henry VIII. thought that enough had been done for the protection of the Low Countries,

Henry
VIII.
invades
France.
August-
October,
1513.

¹ Prato, *Storia Milanese*, 315.

while Scottish affairs needed his presence at home. He made arrangements to renew the war in the spring; Ferdinand of Spain bound himself by a treaty signed at Lille on October 17, to invade Guienne, while Henry VIII. entered Normandy.¹

Another invasion of the French territory had been at the same time undertaken by the Swiss, who advanced into Franche Comté, and besieged Dijon on September 7. Its commander, La Tremouille, saw that resistance was useless, and applied himself to bribe the Swiss generals. He made a treaty with them by which Louis XII. renounced all claims on Milan and undertook to pay a large ransom. The Swiss received a small instalment and withdrew; but Louis XII. refused to ratify the treaty, which is not surprising, and the Swiss felt themselves duped. They cherished an ill-will against France, which did France much harm in the future. For the present, however, the double dealing of La Tremouille saved France from imminent disaster. France had suffered severely at Novara, at Terouenne, and at Dijon; but no crushing blow had been struck. Practically Henry VIII. had failed; he had gained glory, but no substantial results. He had set England in a high place in European politics, but had not succeeded in overthrowing the position of France. The blow that he had meditated was one that must be struck swiftly and surely if it was to do its work.

The Swiss
attack
Dijon.
Sep-
tember,
1513.

Neither Ferdinand nor the Pope wished for the overthrow of France; both of them were content that things should stay as they were. The great object of Ferdinand was to prevent the growth of the power of the Austrian house. The only heirs to himself and Maximilian were their two grandsons; and Ferdinand wished to secure the division of the Austro-Spanish possessions between them, since he had grown jealous of his eldest grandson Charles, who might in a few years' time

Double
dealing of
Ferdinand
of Spain.

¹ Brewer, *Calendar*, i., 4511.

révive his father's claims to the Regency of Castile. Ferdinand was far-sighted, and was afraid of any accession of power to the Austrian house ; he wished to uphold France as the only safeguard, and so strove by intrigues and negotiations to sever the alliance between Henry VIII. and Maximilian without causing any open rupture. His promises to Henry VIII. were purely delusory.

Leo X. had been elected Pope in the interests of peace, and peace was congenial to his own temper. One of his earliest acts was to appoint as his secretaries two of the most distinguished Latinists of the day, Pietro Bembo and Jacopo Sadoletto, who employed their pens in writing eloquent eulogies of peace to all the sovereigns of Europe. But though Leo X. was unwilling to take any part in military efforts, he was none the less watchful of his own interests. First he secured Parma and Piacenza in return for a subsidy to the Duke of Milan ; and he rejoiced over the issue of the battle of Novara, though he lamented the shedding of Christian blood.¹ In like manner he sent an envoy to Venice that he might detach the Venetians from France and reconcile them with Maximilian. He congratulated Henry VIII. on his victories over France and Scotland, but expressed his hope that the English king would soon bring his wars to an end, and turn his victorious arms against the Turks.² The Pope in fact mildly approved of everything that was done, and at the same time gently urged counsels of peace.

Really Leo X. did not wish for France to be pushed to extremities. He had his own plans about Italian affairs ; and his plans could best be carried out by playing off France and Spain against one another. His immediate object was that France should be so far humbled as to turn for help to the Papacy. He naturally wished to see the schism brought to an end and

Pacific
attitude of
Leo X.

Sixth ses-
sion of the
Lateran
Council.
April 26,
1513.

¹ Bembo, *Epistolæ Leonis X. nomine scriptæ*, bk. i., 1, 2.

² *Ibid.*, bk. v., 19.

the unity of the Church re-established, and for this purpose carried on the ecclesiastical policy of Julius II. He confirmed the summons of another session of the Lateran Council, which he attended in great pomp. It was a pardonable mark of vanity that on April 26, the anniversary of the battle of Ravenna, Leo X. rode to the Lateran on the same horse which had borne him when he was made prisoner in the fight.¹ The position was now reversed. No longer captive in the hands of the French, Giovanni de' Medici rode as Head of the Christian Church to prepare the way for receiving the submission of France to his authority.

The sixth session of the Lateran Council produced the wonted flow of eloquence about the corruption of the times, the need of peace, and of the union of Europe for a crusade against the Turks, and a commission of prelates was appointed to report on the steps to be taken for these laudable objects. But when a demand was made that a citation be issued to absent prelates, meaning the schismatic Cardinals, Leo X. made no reply; nor did he assent to another proposal for continuing the proceedings for the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction. He told his Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, that he would not take any steps against the French king; ² he could say so with good reason, for he knew that Louis XII. was already desirous to make peace with the Papacy.

The Council of Lyons was quite useless as a political weapon, and its proceedings attracted no attention. The death of Julius II. removed the motives of personal hostility which had caused the attempted schism. The Cardinals at Lyons found that they had lost all consideration, and were only anxious to be reconciled to the new Pope. This was so notorious that Henry VIII. in April saw that the opening of negotiations between France and the papal court threatened the success

Submis-
sion of the
schismatic
Cardinals.
June, 1513.

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1513, § 19.

² *Ibid.*, No. 24.

of his league. He wrote to Cardinal Bainbridge bidding him oppose by all means the reconciliation of the schismatic Cardinals: such an act of ill-judged mercy would endanger the Papacy in the future, and would strengthen the French party in the Curia.¹ Leo X., however, was not so enamoured of the league as to sacrifice his own interests to its claims. He quietly pursued his negotiations with the schismatic Cardinals, who sent to the seventh session of the Council, June 17, a letter in which they made full submission. The learned Carvajal and the imperious Sanseverino were driven to humble themselves entirely; they confessed their error; they declared the Council of the Lateran to be legitimate; they accepted all its decrees, and prayed for its continuance. The fathers of the Council thanked God for such pious sentiments,² and left the matter to the Pope.

The restoration of Carvajal and Sanseverino was strongly opposed by the ambassadors of Spain and Germany, and by Cardinals Bainbridge and Schinner as representatives of England and the Swiss. But Leo X. urged many grounds for mercy; the Cardinals had been his friends in his youth; he burned with zeal to sweep away all memories of the schism. His real reason was, as Henry VIII. had foreseen, a desire to prepare the way for a reconciliation with Louis XII. So all remonstrances were unheeded, and Leo X. paid no heed to the taunt that he did not possess the constancy of his great predecessor; he preferred to show that at all events he had a quiet obstinacy of his own.

On June 26 Carvajal and Sanseverino were allowed to enter Rome secretly and occupy rooms in the Vatican. Next day they were admitted to a Consistory, but were ordered beforehand to lay aside their red hats and Cardinal's attire, and appear only in the dress of simple priests.

¹ Letter of April 12, 1513, in Brewer, *Calendar*, i., 3876.

² The letter itself is lost, but its substance is given by Paris de Grassis, Raynaldus, No. 42.

They knelt before the Pope and confessed that they had erred. The Pope pointed out the greatness of their wrongdoing, and went through the long list of their offences. Then he gave them a document which contained a full admission of their guilt and stringent promises of future obedience and submission. Carvajal looked through it and said that he would observe its provisions. 'Read it aloud,' said the Pope. Carvajal in vain strove to obey: the words choked him and he could only say, 'I cannot read aloud, for I am hoarse'. 'You cannot speak loud,' said the Pope sternly, 'because you have no good heart. You came here of your own free will, you are free to depart. If you think that the contents of that document are severe we will send you back to Florence. Take and read it, or begone.' Sanseverino came to his friend's aid and read the schedule in a clear voice. Then they signed it and swore to observe it, after which the Pope restored them to their offices and benefices. Their robes were brought in, and they were vested and went through the ceremony of admission as though they were newly created Cardinals. At last the Pope had pity on them and said to Carvajal, 'You are like the sheep in the Gospel that was lost and is found'.¹

Bembo announced to the princes of Europe that the schismatics, 'breathed on by the breath of a heavenly zephyr, had turned to penitence,'² and that the schism was at an end. The negotiations between the Pope and the French king went on briskly, ostensibly about ecclesiastical matters, till on October 26 Louis XII. signed an agreement that the Gallican Church should send representatives to the Lateran Council and there discuss the Pragmatic Sanction. On December 19 the Council held its eighth session to receive the submission of France. Two French ambassadors spoke in the king's name, saying that he had adhered to the Council of Pisa

Submis-
sion of
France.
Decem-
ber, 1513.

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, No. 44, etc.; Bainbridge to Henry VIII, in Brewer, *Calendar*, i., 4283.

² *Epistola Leonis X.*, bk. iii., 21, to Maximilian, June 27.

because he thought it a lawful Council; he saw that the mind of Julius II. was poisoned against him, and when certain of the Cardinals summoned a Council he recognised it; now that he had been informed by Leo X. that the Council was unlawful he submitted to his paternal admonitions, recognised the Council of the Lateran, and asked to be allowed to send proctors to attend its deliberations. His excuses were admitted and his request was granted. Leo X. was content to condone the schism as arising from a personal quarrel between the French king and his predecessor. He did not take his stand on the ground of the ecclesiastical irregularity, but frankly admitted that the affairs of the Church were determined by personal and political considerations. Perhaps it would have been difficult to have done otherwise. But the reconciliation with the schismatic Cardinals and with the French king showed the easy complaisance of practical statesmanship rather than the dignified severity of the head of a great institution. Henry VIII. judged more wisely than did Leo X. when he warned him that his lenity, founded on expediency, would give a bad example in the future, would show how little it cost to create a schism and how useful a weapon against the Papacy the threat of a schism afforded.¹ But Leo X. did not judge Henry VIII. to be a disinterested adviser. In the Pope's eyes the schism had been a miserable failure, and he thought that he could afford to treat it lightly. Yet his conduct was

¹ Henry VIII. to Leo X., April 12, 1513 (British Museum, Harleian MSS., 3462, § 28): 'Nos nuper intelleximus, ex his qui digni sunt et quibus fides adhibetur, scismaticos totis viribus laborare ut cum Smo D. N. reconcilientur et ad dignitates suas restituantur: quod si consequerentur Smus D. N. nostra sententia maximo dedecore afficeretur si tam repente in gratiam cum eo redirent et ad dignitates suas restituantur qui tam detestabile scisma concitarunt et continuarunt in toto orbe Christiano. Preterea si Stas ejus istis scismaticis ignosceret, magnam occasionem aliis seditiosis cardinalibus preberet ad idem contra personam suam facinus perpetrandum quando viderent tam impium et detestabile scelus impunitum relinqui. Tertio, si his ita veniam dabit confederatis suis plurimum detraheret, et omnibus bonis Christianis animum profigandi scismatis habentibus tolleret, quando videbunt scisma ab illo quem maxime tangit non puniri.'

a dangerous admission of the results of the papal policy—that the system of the Church no longer rested upon a purely ecclesiastical basis. The Pope could listen with an indulgent smile to excuses which rested on nothing save motives of political distrust; he saw nothing that demanded penitence in the recognition of the superiority of a Council over an intractable Pope; he regarded it as natural that a king, when hard pressed by a Pope, should use against him any weapon that came to hand. So he accepted the excuses of Louis XII. with all lightness of heart; it was not in the nature of a Medici to take his stand upon principles, and the maxims of Medicean statecraft soon wrought irreparable mischief to the system of the Church.

The theologians of the Lateran Council may have thought that offences against the government of the Church might well be overlooked in an age which threatened to undermine the foundations of the Christian faith. So widely spread was the interest in philosophic speculation that theology had been driven into the background. Bessarion was the last great scholar who was also a theologian; and the impulse which he gave to the study of Plato turned men's minds for a time into a direction where they were not conscious of any antagonism between philosophy and theology. The Florentine Platonists, Ficino and Pico, tried to establish the unity of thought and weave a vast if shadowy system which harmonised all truth. They ran the risk of explaining away the basis of theology, and their system disappeared before the teaching of Savonarola and the religious movement of which he was the leader. The influence of Plato gradually died away, and Aristotle became the oracle of the New Learning. His logical system attracted the Humanists as it had captivated the Schoolmen. But the Schoolmen applied Aristotle's logic to the construction of an organised theology by the process of deduction from Scripture; the Humanists applied it to the solution of their own problems by deduction from Aristotle's metaphysical system. They investigated the

Develop-
ment of
Italian
philos-
ophy.

nature of the mind and its activity ; they pressed into the region of psychology, and were not content to observe the limits which theology had set. The Italian mind had long been accustomed to the distinction between the practical and speculative reason, and the Italian found no difficulty in dividing his life into two portions. His conception of political liberty was an equilibrium between two conflicting claims ; by recognising now one, and now another, he could best secure the freedom of doing what he thought most convenient. The principles of Italian politics sank deep ; and in speculation also the Italian readily turned from the pursuit of truth as a harmonious whole to the definition of separate spheres for intellectual activity. He did not criticise the established system of theology, but pursued philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge. He was not deterred by conflicts, and did not shrink from contradictions ; as a professing Christian he bowed to the authority of the Church, as a philosopher he claimed to pursue his investigations undisturbed. He combined outward submission with inward revolt, though he was probably sincere in saying that revolt was far from his intention. The Italian had no trouble in leading a detached life. It pleased him to understand all systems, though he was not necessarily under bondage to any. He preferred to be a philosopher in an ordinary way, though he reserved his claim to be a Christian in an emergency.

The ecclesiastical authorities had not raised any decided protest against this temper of mind, and the evil was of long standing. The revival of Greek learning had done something towards procuring a better text of Aristotle and had made known his early commentators, chief of whom was Alexander of Aphrodisias. In earlier times Aristotle had been known chiefly through the commentaries of the Arabian Averroes, who taught that there was a universal intelligence of which all men partook equally, and from partaking in which man had a soul which was immortal. This doctrine of Averroes was combated by

Renewed
study of
Aristotle.

Thomas of Aquino, who refuted the opinion that the soul was one and the same in all the universe, and maintained the separate origin of every human soul. Alexander of Aphrodisias had extended the psychology of Aristotle and maintained that the soul was mortal like the body; and at the time of the Renaissance there was no second Thomas of Aquino to answer the newly discovered arguments; so that Alexander was the popular commentator whose views were put forward and whose arguments were readily adopted. Marsilio Ficino conceived that Platonism was the remedy for the heresies caused by the study of the Peripatetics. 'We have laboured,' he says, 'at translating Plato and Plotinus, that by the appearance of this new theology poets may cease to count the mysteries of religion amongst their fables, and the crowds of Peripatetics who form almost the whole body of philosophers may be admonished that religion must not be reckoned as old wives' stories. The world is occupied by the Peripatetics, and is divided between their sects, the Alexandrians and the Averroists. The Alexandrians opine that our intelligence is mortal; the Averroists that it is one only. Both equally destroy the foundation of all religion, chiefly because they seem to deny a divine providence over men. If any one thinks that such widespread impiety, defended by such keen intellects, can be uprooted merely by the preaching of the faith, he errs greatly, as facts may prove. We need some greater power, either widespread miracles or the discovery of a philosophic religion which may persuade philosophers to give ear to it.'¹

So wrote Ficino, and came forward with his offering of a misty effort to set forth the image of Plato as closely resembling the truth of Christ; but his philosophic miracle did not work conviction, his system did not reduce all gainsayers to silence. The question of the immortality of the soul continued to be openly disputed in the schools of Italy, and few were shocked by the discussion.

¹ *Proœmium in Plotinum.*

We cannot feel surprised that the theologians in the Council determined to make a protest against the reduction of Christian life to a subject of philosophic doubt. They framed a decree which condemned those who assert that the intelligent soul is mortal or one in all men. Scripture requires the belief in an individual soul in each man; otherwise the Incarnation was useless and the Resurrection was of no effect. Philosophers teaching in Universities were bidden, if in their lectures they had to expound the opinions of the ancients, to teach as well the orthodox faith and resolve the arguments of those who lived without the light of Christianity. Further, no one in holy orders was henceforth to devote a longer space than five years to the study of poetry or philosophy, without undertaking also the study of theology or of the canon law. This decree was ordered to be published every year by the ordinaries of university towns and rectors of Universities.¹ The protest of the Council was certainly couched in mild language. Theologians were content to assert the truth in the face of fashionable scepticism; they did not venture to engage in war in defence of the faith. The decree was hortatory rather than judicial; no means were prescribed for bringing to trial those who disobeyed. A barren protest was issued, nothing more. Theology was almost apologetic in the presence of the philosophic atheism which it denounced in half-hearted language. The decree is a significant testimony to the decay of dogmatic theology.

A second decree, providing for the pacification of Europe, was passed without debate. A third which published a papal constitution for the reformation of ecclesiastical officials was disappointing to the majority of the prelates. It was the first fruits of the labours of the commissioners who had been appointed in the previous session, and only enacted in general terms that all officials

Decree of the Lateran Council against those who denied the immortality of the soul. December, 1513.

The question of reform.

¹ Raynaldus, *Annales*, 1513, §§ 72-3.

should observe the rules of ecclesiastical discipline. When this was put to the vote, one bishop said that it was useless to pass decrees unless abuses were actually removed. Others, amongst whom was Paris de Grassis, said that reform should not be confined to the Curia, but was needed in the whole Church. When the votes were taken, a considerable minority negatived the decree on the ground that they wished for a thorough reform in head and members. Paris de Grassis told the Pope that the reformers themselves needed reforming; Leo X. smiled and said that he must have a little time to see how he could satisfy every one, and would return to the subject in the next session.¹ The Pope's smile was more significant than his promise. He knew too much of the world to have much interest in reform. His first creation of Cardinals showed only too clearly that his policy had more in common with that of Alexander VI. than with that of Julius II. Of the four Cardinals created on September 23, two were literary favourites of Leo X., Lorenzo Pucci, and Bernardino Dovizi; the other two were near relatives of the Pope, and both of them were men whose appointment was somewhat scandalous. Innocenzo Cibò was the Pope's nephew, son of his sister Maddalena, who had married Francesco Cibò, son of Pope Innocent VIII. In a letter to Ferdinand of Spain, Leo X. found it necessary to apologise for raising so young and untried a man to a lofty position. 'About Innocenzo,' he writes, 'we hope that he will realise our wishes; he has great natural gifts joined to excellent character, adorned by devotion to literature.'² Innocenzo was only twenty-one years old; but Leo X. reflected that he himself had gained the cardinalate at a still earlier age, and 'what I received from Innocent, I repay to Innocent,' he said with his usual smile.

Creation
of Cardi-
nals. Sep-
tember 23,
1513.

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1513, § 97. The nature of the reforms desired may be seen in Giovanni Francesco Pico's letter to Leo X. in *Fasciculus Rerum*, i., 417, etc.

² Raynaldus, *Annales*, 1513, § 83. See Paris de Grassis, in Appendix, for an account of the scandals created by the promotion of young men.

The creation of Giulio de' Medici was a still more serious matter. Giulio was the reputed son of the Pope's uncle Giuliano who had been assassinated in the conspiracy of the Pazzi in 1478. After Giuliano's death, his brother Lorenzo was told that he had left behind him an illegitimate son who was about a year old. Lorenzo undertook the care of the child, who in due time embraced an ecclesiastical career. Leo X. had already nominated him Archbishop of Florence, as he placed much confidence in his political sagacity. Before creating him Cardinal, he appointed a secret commission to investigate the circumstances of Giulio's birth. The commissioners duly reported that Giulio was the son of Giuliano and a Florentine woman by name Floreta, and that his parents had by mutual consent contracted lawful wedlock and were legally man and wife. On September 20 a papal decree pronounced Giulio legitimate, and removed all technical objections to his elevation to the cardinalate.¹ Leo X. was prepared to do for the Medici what Alexander VI. had done for the Borgia; but Leo X. knew Italy thoroughly, and instead of breaking with current prejudices meant to use them for his own ends while preserving the appearance of entire decorum.

The establishment of the Medicean family was steadily pursued. Leo X. proved that his father Lorenzo
 Florence committed to Lorenzo de' Medici. judged rightly when he said, 'I have three sons— one good, one wise, and one foolish'.² The folly of Piero had ruined the Medici for a time; the wisdom of Leo X. was to restore the fortunes of his house; meanwhile the goodness of Giuliano was an obstacle in the Pope's

¹ This document is given in full by Balan, *Monumenta Reformationis Lutheranae*, 470. Guicciardini, bk. xii., remarks that Leo X. went further than Alexander VI., for Alexander declared Cesare Borgia to be legitimate, because he was born of a married woman, whose children were presumably legitimate; Leo X. legitimated Giulio de' Medici solely on the ground that marriage had been promised.


² *Relazione di Marino Giorgi*, in Alberi, *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneziani*, serie ii., vol. iii., 52.

way. Giuliano was too simple and gentle to carry out the organised corruption of Florence which was the foundation of the Medicean rule.¹ He was summoned to Rome, and the oversight of affairs in Florence was entrusted to Lorenzo, the son of Piero, a youth of twenty-one, whose political career the Pope undertook to direct aright. A paper of instructions was prepared for the young man, ostensibly by Giuliano; but the hand which guided his pen was that of the Pope.² Lorenzo is initiated into the mysteries of Medicean statecraft—the control of the elections to the magistracies, the choice of fit instruments, the employment of spies, the means for exercising a constant supervision without seeming to be prominent, the way to flatter the people and establish a despotic power while retaining the forms of a free commonwealth.

Giuliano, on his retirement to Rome, had next to be provided for. First he was made a citizen and baron of Rome, and the festivities which celebrated this honour showed the introduction into Rome of the finer artistic spirit of Florence. The Piazza in front of the Capitol was filled with a wooden

Giuliano de' Medici made a Roman baron. September 13, 1513.

¹ I append a genealogical table of the Medici.



Alessandro, first Duke of Florence

² The document is printed in the *Archivio Storico Italiano*, Appendix No. viii. At the end are the words: 'Et solum ho facto questo per satisfare al comandamento de la Santità di N. S.'

theatre, which was covered outside with pictures telling of the old connexion of the Tuscan city with Rome.¹

In the morning of September 13, Giuliano was escorted to the Capitol; mass was said, and the freedom of the city was presented. Then the guests went to a banquet—a formidable entertainment which lasted for six hours.² When all were satisfied with food and drink, they listened to a pastoral eclogue which praised Leo X. and his brother at the expense of Julius II., but was none the less conceived in the spirit of light comedy and awakened peals of laughter.³ Then came a lady dressed in cloth of gold and attended by

¹ In the Harleian MSS. in the British Museum, No. 3462, is a 'Descriptione de la pompa et solennità fatta in Roma il dì che serenissimo Giuliano di Medici fratello di N. S. Papa Leone fu fatto cittadino et barone Romano,' written by Francesco Chièregato to the Marchioness of Mantua, on September 13, 1513. From it I have taken the description of the festivity. The account of the decoration of the theatre deserves quotation, as illustrating the condition of historical knowledge:—

'Imprimis hanno fatto un Theatro di tutta la piazza del Capitolio, et l'hanno circondato di tavole con quadri de dentro et picture che copriano tutto il tabulato:—

1. Eneas Hetruscorum armis fundamenta imperii Romani facit.
2. Romulus Cœlium montem Hetruscis dat habitandum.
3. Romulus centurias de nomine Hetrusci ducis vocat.
4. Romani litteris erudiendis in Hetruriam mittuntur.
5. Lutius Tarquinius Hetruscus Romæ regnat.
6. Augurum disciplina ex Hetruria Romam advehitur.
7. Haruspices Hetrusci semper a populo Romano consulti.
8. Porsenæ regis liberalitas erga populum Romanum. Florentia Colonia populi Romani a III viris deducta. (In questo quadro era una bandera che haveva suso queste parole: M. Antonius, M. Emilius Lepidus, C. Cæsar Octavianus III viri R. P. C.)
9. Fides icta populi Romani cum Hetruscis.
10. Hetrusci sacra populi Romani rite peracta custodiunt.
11. Junonis simulacrum ex Hetruria adlatum.
12. Hetrusci Scipionem armis commeatuque donant.
13. Insignia populi Romani ab Hetruscis sumpta.
14. Ludi scenici ab Hetruscis adepti.'

This theatre was so much admired that a poem was written in its honour—*Theatrum Capitolinum magnifico Giuliano institutum*, by Aurelius Serenus, Rome, 1514. The dedication to Leo X. is given by Roscoe, *Leo X.*, App. lxxxiv.

² 'Durò prefato convivio hore sei d' horologio.'

³ 'Una elegante egloga pastorale quale fu in non mediocre opprobrio di pp. Julio et in laude di nostra S. et del prelibato Magnico. Et fu tanto piacevole et ridicula et così ben representata tal egloga che ognuno crepava pel riso.'

two nymphs; she represented Rome, and sang some complimentary verses. She carried a basket of eggs, which at the end of her song she broke and threw among the company, who found them filled with rare perfumes. Next came a huge mountain of cardboard, from which issued a man of great stature who represented the Tarpeian Mount, and carried on his shoulders the lady who personified Rome. The man mountain thanked Giuliano for the honour he had done him, and made way for a car of gold drawn by two stalwart nymphs, who were yoked by golden chains and were driven by an old man. In the car sat Justice, Strength, and Fortitude, each of whom had much to say. Then came a second car drawn by lions; in it was seated Cibeles, with a globe on her lap; the globe was opened and let loose all manner of birds to the surprise of the beholders. Last came a car on which sat a lady plunged in woe. She was Florence weeping for her children, whom she vainly implored Cibeles to restore. Cibeles to console her proposed at last that Rome and Florence should confederate, nay should become one together and enjoy the same rule. Florence and Rome agreed to the proposal, and medals were scattered amongst the crowd to celebrate the happy union.¹

Even in pastimes the principles of the Medicean domination were expressed; Florence and Rome were to make one state, and by their union the power of the Medici was to be still further extended. Leo X. had great schemes for his relatives; he wished to secure for Giuliano the kingdom of Naples, for Lorenzo the duchy of Milan. Under colour of a desire for peace he negotiated with all the powers of Europe, watching eagerly for his own gain. He was every one's friend at once; but Ferdinand of Spain understood him well and suggested a comfortable settlement for Giuliano. He might marry a

Schemes
of Leo X.
for Medi-
cean do-
mination.

¹ 'Voleva che Roma e Fiorenza fusse una cosa medesima, et che se gubernassero con pari auspici; volse etiam Cibelle che allora la si confederasse con Roma.' Next day was represented the *Penulus* of Plautus, 'con tanta gratia che si crede che al tempo di Plauto non fosse ditta meglio'.

well-born Spanish lady, and might have in Naples the confiscated estates of the Duke of Urbino; the Emperor might be induced to give him Modena and Reggio, and the Pope could invest him with Ferrara.¹ Leo X. hoped for more than this, and continued his general amiability. He offered to reconcile the French king with the Swiss, the Emperor with Venice, and at the same time projected an Italian league, which would be opposed to both alike. It was one of the maxims of Leo X. that 'when you have made a league with any prince you ought not on that account to cease from treating with his adversary'.²

So Leo X. watched, but could not greatly influence the course of European affairs. The reconciliation of Louis XII. with the Papacy deprived the Holy League of its ostensible object, and Ferdinand of Spain made use of that pretext to withdraw still further from the league against France. He first made a truce with France for a year, and then induced the unstable Maximilian to break his promises to Henry VIII. and do the same. The accord of Ferdinand and Maximilian with France was signed at Orleans on March 13, 1514, and Maximilian even went so far as to pledge himself that Henry VIII. would ratify it. Henry VIII. was indignant at this breach of faith; he was weary of the craft of his father-in-law Ferdinand, and of the shiftiness of Maximilian; if peace were to be made with France he would make it in his own way. Leo X. sent an envoy to help in the reconciliation; he was always ready to take a friendly part in everything. But the peace between England and France was concluded without much consideration of the Pope. France and England entered into a close alliance, which was cemented by the marriage of Louis XII., who had become a widower in January, with Henry VIII.'s sister Mary, a girl of sixteen. Mary had been betrothed by Henry VII. to Charles, the

¹ Ferdinand to his ambassadors at Rome, dated September, 1513, Bergenroth, *Calendar of Spanish State Papers*, ii., No. 132.

² Antonio Soriano, in *Relazioni Venete*, serie ii., vol. iii., 290.

grandson of Maximilian and Ferdinand, but Maximilian had shown no particular zeal to carry out the marriage. England now separated from its alliance with the Austro-Spanish house; France was no longer isolated, and the political equilibrium of Europe was again restored.

Secure by his alliance with England, Louis XII. again talked of an expedition into Italy for the recovery of Milan. True to his general policy, Leo X. made one compact with Louis XII. and another with the Swiss; he further entered into a secret treaty with Ferdinand of Spain, and sent Bembo to Venice that he might try and detach the Republic from its league with France.¹ These negotiations were conducted with great secrecy. The treaty with France was merely a schedule signed by the Pope and Louis XII.; the treaty with Spain was a secret to be entrusted to not more than three advisers on each side. The vigorous policy of Julius II. was abandoned for one more in keeping with the temper of the age. Leo X. with a genial smile upon his face pursued his ends by an elaborate system of mine and countermine. If Louis XII. succeeded in his Italian plans, then Giuliano might secure the kingdom of Naples; if Louis XII. failed, Spain, the Empire, and the Swiss might agree to carve out a new principality from parts of the Milanese and the duchy of Ferrara. Leo X. had no prejudices about means; he was generally sympathetic to all parties, and was hopeful for himself.

While the Pope was engaged in this tortuous policy, it was scarcely to be expected that the Lateran Council should accomplish any useful results. The promised constitution for the reformation of the Prelates and Curia was long in appearing, and was the subject of much debate. The winter session of the Council was put off because the

Alliances
of Leo X.
1514.

Dissensions
between
Prelates
and Cardinals
in the Council.
January-
May, 1514.

¹ These negotiations are mostly narrated by Guicciardini, and in more detail by De Leva, *Storia Documentata di Carlo V.*, i., 184, etc. The treaty with Spain is given by Bergenroth, *Calendar of State Papers*, ii., No. 188. Papers relating to Bembo's dealing with Venice are in Roscoe, *Leo X.*, Appendix Nos. cxvii., cxix.

Prelates declared that they would vote against any measures which did not deal with the Cardinals as on an equal footing with themselves. The Pope interposed in the interests of peace, and was present at a meeting of Prelates when the privileges assumed by the Cardinals were loudly attacked. They claimed the right of presenting to benefices which became vacant by the death of any one in their service, and further assumed the power of reserving to themselves benefices. In the eyes of the Prelates one part of the reformation of the Church was a check upon the power of the Cardinals. It was enough that they paid tribute to the Pope; they no longer hoped to escape from that; they were, however, resolved to see that the privileges of the Pope were not extended to the Cardinals. Accordingly, when the Pope laid before them some of the provisions which were proposed for enactment the Prelates objected. The Pope, with his usual smile, turned to Paris de Grassis and said, 'The Prelates are wiser than I am, for I am bound by the Cardinals'. He agreed to prorogue the session till the Prelates and Cardinals could agree. A compromise was soon arrived at, that nothing should be said in the reforming constitution which did not apply to Prelates and Cardinals alike. The Council was manifestly divided into two parties. The Cardinals wished to lord it over the Prelates; the Prelates were resolved not to admit that the Cardinals formed a different order from themselves.¹

On May 6, 1514, the ninth session of the Council was at last held. It received the submission of the French Prelates and freed them from the penalties of schism. It renewed its exhortations to general peace, and it listened to the papal constitution for the reform of the Curia, a lukewarm document which laid down general rules of conduct for Cardinals and all members of the Curia, and condemned pluralities and other flagrant abuses in such a way as to leave sufficient

Ninth
session
of the
Lateran
Council.
May 6,
1514.

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1514, §§ 15, 16.

loopholes for their continuance. Then the Council was pro-rogued that the question of reform might be further considered. Leo X. was growing weary of the Council; it had served its purpose of ending the schism, and the Pope only awaited a decent pretext for dissolving it.

The Prelates pursued their protest against the Cardinals, and declared that they would vote against every measure brought forward until their grievances were redressed. The Pope had to act as mediator between the conflicting parties, and at length produced a compromise. Even so the Prelates were not satisfied, but raised further complaints of the way in which episcopal jurisdiction was set at nought by the privileges granted to the friars. They demanded that these privileges should be revoked entirely, and put forward a formidable list of monastic aggressions on the episcopal authority, arranged under eighty heads. The chief of their demands were, the payment by the monks of a fourth of what they held in possession, and the abolition of the liberty enjoyed by monks of hearing confessions, performing funerals, and preaching where they would without the licence of the bishop. They further wished to restrain the absolute power of jurisdiction over its members possessed by the monastic orders; unless justice were done within a month the cause was to pass into the bishop's court. Naturally the monastic orders resented this attack. The complaints were of long standing; the feud between seculars and regulars lasted through the whole Middle Ages. In former times monks and friars had been strong in popular support; now they had become standing objects of ridicule, for their ignorance no less than for their irregular lives, and there was no chance that the quarrel at Rome should agitate Europe. The bishops were stronger than the monks, for they could refuse their votes at the Council, and Leo X. did not wish to show to Europe discords within the Church. It was useless for the generals of the monastic orders to resist. The Pope advised them to give way and make terms while they had an

Com-
plaints
of the
bishops
against
the mon-
astic
orders.

opportunity ; it was possible for the Council to deprive them of all their privileges. This controversy suspended the sessions of the Council for an entire year ; at last the Pope besought the bishops to let the matter stand over and allow another session to be held for the purpose of despatching such business as was ready ; he promised that the matter should be settled in the following session.¹

The prelates gave way before this promise, and the Pope was able to hold the tenth session of the Council on Tenth session of the Lateran Council. May 4, 1515. May 4, 1515. The decrees passed in this session concern details which are scarcely worthy of a General Council. One question was curious. Amongst the charitable institutions of the Middle Ages were establishments for lending money on the security of articles which were put in pledge. These *montes pietatis*, as they were called, took no interest for the money lent, and the expenses of their management were at first defrayed by private charity. As the system spread it was found desirable to make a charge on each transaction for the purpose of covering the expenses of management. Since the religious sense of the Middle Ages was opposed to usury, 'the barren breed of money,' some men's consciences were stirred by a scruple if it were allowable to make any charge for lending money, which was in itself an act of Christian love. To assuage such scruples a decree of the Council declared that it was lawful for charitable institutions to receive payment for their management, and that such payment was not usurious in its character ; however, the decrees went on to say, it was better that such institutions should be sufficiently endowed by pious people to enable them to dispense with the need of making any charge on those who benefited by their charity.

A second decree was passed to please the bishops and correct disorders which had arisen from the multitude of exemptions from the jurisdiction of ordinaries which had been

¹ An account of this matter is given by Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1515, §§ 1, 2 ; also in a letter of Egidius of Viterbo, in Martene and Durand, *Veterum Scriptorum Amplissima Collectio*, iii.

granted by previous Popes. Those who had jurisdiction from the Pope over exempted persons were ordered to exercise it diligently; if they were remiss the ordinaries were empowered to interfere after giving due warning. The basis of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was asserted against lay interference; and the regular holding of provincial synods was enforced. All this shows an uneasy sense of the decay of ecclesiastical discipline and a desire to revive it. There was a feeling that the evils of the present time were due to ecclesiastical lenity; but there was no recognition of the fact that papal interference had broken down the ecclesiastical system, and that the system could only be restored by a readjustment of the relations between the Papacy and the Episcopate.

A third decree showed a consciousness of the influence of the New Learning in sapping the foundations of the Christian faith. Books of every sort were being multiplied by the printing press; scurrilous and libellous pamphlets abounded; and many philosophic works paid little heed to the doctrines of the Christian faith. A decree was passed, enacting that henceforth no book should be printed which had not received the approval of the bishop and the inquisitor of the city or diocese in which it was published. It was an enactment in keeping with the ideas of the time in which it was passed, and was not likely to be applied with undue severity; in fact it had little binding power, as it could only be enforced by spiritual penalties. The literature of that age stood in great need of supervision, and prelates themselves were amongst the writers who offended by their moral laxity. We do not find that the decree produced any immediate effect. The ecclesiastical and moral disorders of the time were too deeply seated to be removed by well-intentioned decrees. The Lateran Council was not sufficiently strong nor sufficiently earnest to set on foot any real measures of reform, and Pope Leo X. was more interested in the politics of the Medicean house than in the well-being of Christendom.

CHAPTER XIX.

FRANCIS I. IN ITALY.

1515—1516.

THE beginning of the year 1515 brought a political change of great importance. Louis XII. was fifty-two years old and infirm in health at the time of his marriage with Mary of England. He tried to suit his manner of life to the tastes of a vivacious girl of sixteen; the effort was too great for his strength, and he died on January 1, less than three months after his marriage. He left no male heir, and his successor, Francis Duke of Angoulême, his nephew, was a young man of twenty, who burned with a desire to win martial fame. France could only look with shame on the foreign policy of Louis XII., whose failure in Italy had been ignominious. He had shown himself unscrupulous and treacherous; he had sacrificed his allies; he had humiliated himself before the Pope; he had sent armies and had been responsible for brutal massacres; but the sum of his efforts, his treachery, and his humiliations, had been the loss of the French possessions in Italy and the disgrace of the French name. It is no wonder that Gaston de Foix had become the hero of the young nobles of France, and that Francis I. longed to emulate his glorious career. Italy might hear with equanimity that Louis XII. was preparing a new invasion; it was a more serious matter when the invasion was to be conducted by the young Francis I. in the first flush of his martial zeal.

Death of
Louis
XII.
January,
1515.

At the same time as the accession of Francis I. another prince began his career. The Archduke Charles of Austria was called by the Flemish Estates to enter upon the government of the Netherlands. Though he was only fifteen years old, his rule was more likely to secure peace for the Netherlands than was that of the Regent Margaret, the widowed daughter of Maximilian, who was devoted to the interests of the Austrian house. Cold, self-contained, industrious, but to all appearance dull, the young Charles undertook a difficult task. He had been brought up to regard France as his hereditary enemy; he had never forgotten that he was the heir of the Burgundian house, which France had robbed of its fairest possessions. But the ruler of the Netherlands was powerless against France, which could raise up enemies on its borders and attack it at will. Charles saw that he must bide his time, and Francis I. showed a condescending patronage. He wished to be at peace with his neighbours, that he might have his hands free for his Italian campaign, and proposed an alliance with Charles, which Charles was ready to accept. Francis I. had married Claude, daughter of Louis XII.; Charles was offered the hand of her younger sister Renée, a child of four years old. There were long negotiations about her dower, and the age when the marriage was to be celebrated. Neither party was in earnest in wishing for friendship, and it was agreed that Renée was to be handed over to her husband at the age of twelve; many things might happen in the interval of eight years.

For the same reason Francis I. was anxious to maintain the peace with England, and Henry VIII. had no reason for becoming his enemy. The treaty with Louis XII. was renewed, though Henry VIII. looked with a jealous eye on the prospect of French aggrandisement. At the same time Francis I. renewed the league between France and Venice. On the other side Ferdinand of Aragon was especially anxious to oppose the French designs in Italy. He proposed a league between

Charles
of Austria
Governor
of the
Nether-
lands.

Diplo-
macy of
Francis I.
January-
June, 1515.

Spain, the Empire, the Swiss, the Duke of Milan, and the Pope. Leo X. was the most difficult person to fix; he was engaged, as usual, in negotiating with both parties at once. He continued his dealings with France, where a matrimonial alliance had been proposed between Giuliano de' Medici and Filiberta of Savoy, sister of Louise, the mother of Francis I., who was all-powerful with her son. Leo X. conferred on his brother Parma and Piacenza, as well as Modena, which he had bought from the needy Maximilian for 40,000 ducats. Giuliano's marriage with Filiberta took place in February, 1515, and Leo X. was anxious to see what Francis I. proposed to do for his new relative. On this depended the Pope's action, and till he saw his definite advantage on one side or the other he cautiously listened to both. His envoy in France was Ludovico Canossa, Bishop of Tricarico, who vainly endeavoured to induce Francis I. to offer as a bribe for the Pope's friendship the conquest of the kingdom of Naples for Giuliano. The peace with Flanders and with England left Francis tolerably free and made him hesitate to incur so heavy an obligation in the Pope's behalf.¹ He expressed his wish to make the Pope the most powerful Pope that ever had been; but he said that the question of Naples was one of grave importance, which could not be decided at present.

Before Canossa had begun these negotiations the Pope was listening to proposals for a league with Maximilian, Ferdinand, the Duke of Milan, Florence, Genoa, and the Swiss. The league comprised also the family of the Medici, who were counted as having substantial interests of their own.² Its ostensible objects were war against the Turk and the defence of the Pope. Leo X. ratified it on February 22, and conferred on the Swiss the title of 'Protectors of Religious Liberty'; but he kept secret even from his trusty friends the part he took concern-

¹ Canossa's letters on this embassy are to be found in *Lettere de' Principi*, i., 7, etc., and in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, Appendix i., 306.

² Bergenroth, *Calendar of Spanish State Papers*, ii., Nos. 208, 209.

ing it. Cardinal Bibbiena wrote to Giuliano that the Pope was not willing to accept this league, but thought that he himself ought to take the lead in all things that concerned Christendom and ought not to follow others.¹ Really Leo X. did not expect that Francis I. would come to Italy that year, and wished to use the league as a means of obtaining his assent to the proposal about Naples.

Francis I. secretly pushed on his preparations, which England viewed with increasing jealousy. Leo X. was strengthened by the hostile attitude of England, and hoped that Henry VIII. also would join the league. Henry VIII. had no grounds for openly breaking off his alliance with France, but he nevertheless listened to the Pope's proposal. He had for some time been pressing the Pope to create his minister, Thomas Wolsey, a Cardinal, and though Leo X. was reluctant to grant his request, circumstances favoured the king. The English Cardinal Bainbridge, Archbishop of York, had died at Rome in July, 1514. There were signs of poisoning; the body was examined by the Pope's command, and the doctors' examination confirmed the belief that the Cardinal had been poisoned.² Suspicion fell upon one Rinaldo of Modena, a priest who was in the Cardinal's employment in some inferior office. Rinaldo had formerly been attached to the household of Silvestro de' Gigli, the English agent in the Roman court, who was rewarded for his services by the bishopric of Worcester. Bainbridge was a hot-tempered, arrogant, and overbearing man, and there was no love lost between him and Gigli. It was suspected that Gigli had employed Rinaldo to poison Bainbridge. The accused was imprisoned and tortured. He confessed a long career of crime, thefts, and

Death of
Cardinal
Bain-
bridge.
July, 1514.

¹ Letter of February 16, in *Lettere de' Principi*, i., 13.

² I do not know that autopsy was in those days very skillful: 'Et inventum est cor ejus vitiatum in dextra parte cordis,' says Paris de Grassis, but this was scarcely a sign of poisoning. The letters of Burbank and Pace, who were in the Cardinal's service, are given in Ellis, *Original Letters*, series i., i., 99, etc.; also Brewer, *Calendar of State Papers*, i., Nos. 5354, 5365, 5405, 5449, 5465, 5651.

many other misdoings ; he had put poison into the Cardinal's pottage at the desire of the Bishop of Worcester, who gave him fifteen ducats as a reward. This confession was made in the hopes of saving his life ; when he was told that he should have pardon for all his other offences save the death of the Cardinal, he committed suicide in prison with a knife which he had managed to conceal.¹ It is not unlikely, as Gigli urged, that Rinaldo was mad, and committed the murder to escape detection of his thefts. Anyhow neither Henry VIII. nor Wolsey believed in Gigli's guilt, and Wolsey wrote to him confidentially at the time when he was labouring under this serious charge. Leo X. after investigation solemnly acquitted him.

Wolsey's support in this emergency laid Gigli under a deep obligation to his patron, and he strove to show his gratitude by urging on the Pope Wolsey's nomination to the cardinalate. Henry VIII. wrote and expressed his strong sense of Wolsey's merits, and his ardent desire to see him advanced to a dignity which he well deserved.² But Leo X. hesitated ; English Cardinals were not very popular at Rome, and the overbearing conduct of Cardinal Bainbridge had not increased their popularity. Leo X. did not wish to admit into the College so powerful a man as Wolsey : he wished to fill it with creatures of his own, and was not sorry to keep suspended before the great minister of the English king a tempting bait which might be a guarantee of his devotion to the Pope's interests. But Wolsey was a stronger man than Leo X. and knew how to force the Pope's hand. When, in July, the French forces were actually on the march to Italy, Leo X. felt somewhat alarmed, and Wolsey gave him a significant hint. He wrote to the Bishop of Worcester that Henry VIII. marvelled at the long delay in sending the Cardinal's hat ; the sooner he sent it the better the king would be pleased ; if the king forsook the Pope at this time he would be in greater danger

Wolsey
created
Cardinal.
September
10, 1515.

¹ This is Burbank's account, and Burbank believed in Gigli's guilt.

² Martene, *Ampl. Coll.*, iii., 1296.

than was Pope Julius II. years ago.¹ This argument was weighty with the timorous Pope, and he agreed to make Wolsey Cardinal on condition that the King of England entered the league. Henry VIII. could not as yet declare himself openly against France, but he joined the league for the ostensible purpose of an expedition against the Turk, and Wolsey's cardinalate was secure.² The Cardinals still objected, but they were powerless against the Pope's will and the political necessities of the time. They murmured that the English were insolent, that Wolsey would not be content with the cardinalate, but would demand also the office of papal legate in England; in a spirit of prophecy they said, 'If this be granted to him, the Roman court is undone'.³ On September 10 Wolsey was created Cardinal, and was the one person who received that distinction.

It was, indeed, time for the Pope to strengthen himself by new alliances, for the example of his double dealings began to affect those whom he trusted in Italy. Genoa joins France. Ottaviano Fregoso had been set up as Doge of Genoa in opposition to the French, and the Pope had supported him. But he also negotiated with both parties at once; and his open defection to the side of France secured the French army a basis on the coast which was of great importance to their military operations. Ottaviano Fregoso wrote to the Pope to justify his change of policy, and ended his defence by saying, 'If I were writing to private persons or to a prince who measured state affairs by the same measure as private matters, I should find my justification more difficult. But writing to a prince who surpasses his contemporaries in wisdom, and who therefore knows that I have no other way to maintain my position, it is superfluous to excuse myself to one who is conversant with the lawful, or at least customary, action of princes, not only for the

¹ Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., No. 763.

² *Ibid.*, 780; Wolsey to the Bishop of Worcester, Aug. 1; the Bishop's answer, No. 887, dated Sept. 7.

³ See Paris de Grassis, in Appendix.

preservation but also for the increase of their states.¹ There could be no more crushing retort on the lessons of the political action of Leo X.

The French army assembled in Dauphiné in the course of July, and numbered nearly 60,000 footmen and 50,000 horsemen. Amongst its generals were Trivulzio, Lautrec, and La Palisse, who were well experienced in Italian warfare, besides the Spaniard Pietro Navarro, who had been taken prisoner in the battle of Ravenna, and whom the avaricious King of Spain refused to ransom. Against them were the troops of Spain under Cardona, the papal forces under Giuliano de' Medici, the Milanese army commanded by Prospero Colonna, and the Swiss commanded by Cardinal Schinner. The allies were all of them interested in protecting their own territories rather than in defending Milan. Cardona took up a position near Verona to prevent a junction of the Venetian army with the French; the papal forces advanced to the Po for the protection of Piacenza and Reggio; only the Swiss went to the front and took up positions guarding the passes of Mont Cenis and Monte Ginevra. Trivulzio, finding that the passes were closely watched, tried a new and difficult way across the Alps and descended the valley of the Stura. The Swiss, who were waiting at Susa, heard that the foe had passed by them and were safely posted at Cuneo. So unexpected was this rapid movement of the French, that Prospero Colonna, who was on his way to join the Swiss, was surprised and taken prisoner at Villafranca on August 15.

The Swiss were discouraged at the failure of their first designs. Francis I. on his part was desirous of making peace with such dangerous foes and opened negotiations for that purpose; but the arrival of new adventurers, eager for booty, and the exertions of

The
French
enter
Italy.
August,
1515.

Battle of
Marig-
nano.
Septem-
ber 14, 15,
1515.

¹ This letter is known only from Guicciardini, *Storia d' Italia*, bk. xii. It may be that Guicciardini is putting into Fregoso's mouth his own views; but such or such-like opinions of Leo X.'s policy must have been current in Italy.

Cardinal Schinner, broke off the negotiations. The Swiss, who numbered about 35,000 men, retired to Milan and waited for their allies; but neither Cardona nor Lorenzo de' Medici, who had succeeded his uncle Giuliano in command of the papal troops, would come to their aid. Leo X. had already begun to renew negotiations with Francis I., and his messenger, with all his despatches, had fallen into Cardona's hands. When Cardona saw that the Pope did not mean to commit himself he hesitated in turn, and the Spanish and papal generals each tried to persuade the other to cross the Po. Meanwhile the French army took up a position at Marignano, between Milan and Piacenza, while the Venetians under Alviano made use of Cardona's withdrawal from Verona to cross the Adige and advance along the left bank of the Po to Lodi. By this movement the communications between the Swiss and their allies were completely intercepted, while the Venetian forces were so placed as to support the French.

On the night of September 13 an alarm was raised in Milan that the French were advancing. The Swiss were at once under arms, and the few horse who had come to reconnoitre rapidly withdrew. The Swiss assembled in the Piazza to discuss their plans, for the sturdy republicans maintained even in war their habits of federal council. Long time they debated, for they were much divided; some were in favour of a peace with France; some wished to withdraw quietly from the matter; but the majority were eager to fight.¹ It was agreed that they should attack the French camp, and the Swiss army set out at once to fulfil their resolution. Some withdrew, but after they had gone a few miles some Milanese officers rode after them calling out

¹ Guicciardini (bk. xii.) represents Cardinal Schinner as the man who led the Swiss into this desperate enterprise, and puts a long speech into his mouth. The matter seems to have been settled without much rhetoric; and Prato, who was an eye-witness, makes no special mention of the activity of Schinner. He says (*Storia di Milano*, 341): 'Li senti fare un longo ragionamento: ma quello che dicessino, il loro parlare barbaro non me lo concedette sapere. Ma per quanto l'effecto mi mostrò, egli ragionno de andare al contrasto del re di Franza.'

that the French were already in flight; at this news they turned back, and when they reached the field of battle threw in their lot with their comrades.

It was late in the afternoon when the Swiss reached the French army, which was taken by surprise at this unexpected onslaught. The Swiss had no artillery and wore little armour for defence; they trusted to nothing save weight of their column, and their pikes for close quarters. The French cannon were posted on the right wing, guarded by 20,000 German lanzknechts; on the left wing were 12,000 Gascon bowmen. Artillery and crossbow alike played on the Swiss and wrought havoc on their unprotected line, but could not break their steady advance. They seized four pieces of artillery, and succeeded in coming to close quarters with their foes. A desperate fight went on in the gathering twilight, till both sides were wearied and overcome with thirst and hunger, and each man lay down to sleep where he fought, scarcely a stone's cast from his foe. As soon as morning began to break the combat was renewed. The Swiss fought with desperate courage; each man died where he had set his foot. The French were well-nigh overborne by fatigue when Alviano appeared with reinforcements in their rear. Those of the Swiss who had doubted about the battle began to withdraw, and the retreat became general; but even in their flight the Swiss showed their heroic spirit. 'It was a marvel,' says a Milanese, 'to see the routed Swiss return to Milan—one had lost an arm, another a leg, a third was maimed by the cannon. They carried one another tenderly; and seemed like the sinners whom Dante pictures in the ninth circle of the Inferno. As fast as they came they were directed to the hospital, which was filled in half an hour, and all the neighbouring porches were strewn with straw for the wounded, whom many Milanese, moved with compassion, tenderly succoured.'¹ In the records of the times we rarely

¹ Prato, *Storia di Milano*, 343. I have followed Prato's account of the battle in preference to the French accounts in the *Mémoires* of Fleuranges and Bayard, Morillac, *Vie de Bourbon*, and the letter of Francis I. to his mother.

find such heroism and such humanity. The Milanese had little cause to love the Swiss, who treated them brutally and exacted from them heavy taxes, and the mass of the Milanese were prepared to welcome the French as their deliverers; but in the hour of suffering and disaster they showed their respect for the valiant, and their charity to the suffering.

The battle of Marignano produced on all sides a profound impression. Trivulzio said that he had fought in eighteen battles, but they were mere child's play compared to this, which was a battle of giants.

Effects of
the battle
of Marig-
nano.

The Swiss left 10,000 dead upon the field; the French loss was about 7000, but it was severely felt, as there was scarcely a noble family in France which did not suffer. The battle of Marignano was a triumph of the old military organisation over the republican army which had so long been invincible in Italy. As the Hussite army had been the terror of the German nobles, so the Swiss footmen seemed invincible, and boasted themselves to be 'the tamers and correctors of princes'.¹ The battle of Marignano was a check to the spread of republican ideas, because it dispelled the charm of success which had hitherto accompanied the republican organisation in war. By this battle the way was cleared for the assertion in European affairs of the monarchical principle. The defeat of the Swiss at Marignano rendered possible the long warfare of Francis I. and Charles V.

The repulse of the Swiss seemed at first almost incredible, and military experts accounted for it by the lack of fortunate circumstances. Had daylight lasted a little longer on the first day of the battle they would have routed the French; had they not suffered from previous dissensions, when Alviano appeared on the second day they would still have won; had Cardona made any movement to support them, their victory would have been secure.² Leo

Terror of
Leo X.

¹ 'Domiteurs et correcteurs des princes,' said Bapaume, the French envoy to Henry VIII. Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 1113.

² Prato, *ut supra*.

X. does not seem to have thought a defeat of the Swiss to be possible. The first news that reached Rome announced their victory, and Cardinal Bibbiena illuminated his house and gave a banquet; when contradictory rumours were brought, they were not believed. At last the Venetian envoy received despatches from his government. He went in the early morning to the Vatican, while the Pope was still in bed; at his urgent request the Pope was roused and came in half-dressed. 'Holy Father,' said Giorgi, 'yesterday you gave me bad news and false: to-day I will give you good news and true; the Swiss are defeated.' The Pope took the letters and read them. 'What will become of us, and what of you?' he exclaimed. Giorgi tried to console him, though he felt little sympathy with his grief. 'We will put ourselves in the hands of the Most Christian King,' said the Pope, 'and will implore his mercy.'¹

Every one knew that 'it was the custom of Popes now-a-days to be always on the winning side'.² Leo X. had already opened negotiations with Francis I., who did not wish to have the Pope for his open foe. It is true that after the battle of Marignano the conquest of Milan was easy; and on October 4 Massimiliano Sforza surrendered the castle and agreed to live in France on a pension allowed him by the French king. But the Emperor Maximilian still held to the imperial claims to Milan; the Swiss still talked of sending reinforcements; Henry VIII. of England had complaints against France for its intervention in Scotland, and made naval preparations which betokened a descent on the French coast. Francis I. did not see his way clear to a march upon Naples; and if he was not prepared for that step, an alliance with the Pope was the best means of securing what he had already won.

¹ *Relazione di Marino Giorgi*, in Alberi, *Relazioni Venete*, serie 2da, vol. iii., 44.

² Prato, *l. c.*, 344: 'E costume de' papi moderni de tenere sempre da chi vince'.

Accordingly, the Bishop of Tricarico again set to work to negotiate, and Leo X. used his assumed terror of the French as a means of putting pressure upon his other allies. He told Ferdinand of Spain that he had thoughts of fleeing to Gaeta, and Ferdinand was moved to answer that the Church was always strongest when she seemed most feeble; for himself he would give a thousand lives and a thousand states, if he had them, to avert danger from such an excellent Pope as Leo X.¹ Hypocrisy could go no further on either side; but such-like empty talk enabled Leo X. to gain time in his dealings with France. He put a good face on the matter, bargained about the terms of the accord, and even recalled the Bishop of Tricarico to Rome for a personal conference. Finally the terms were signed on October 13. The Pope was bound to withdraw his troops from Parma and Piacenza, which he had gained at the expense of the duchy of Milan; on the other hand Francis I. undertook to defend the Pope and the Medici in Florence, and give Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici revenues in France and military commands. At the same time Francis I. expressed a desire for a conference with the Pope; he hoped to win him over to sanction his invasion of Naples. Leo X. also had many schemes about which he wished to sound the French king; he did not, however, think that the presence of Francis in Rome was desirable, as the passage of French troops through Florentine territory might be dangerous; he prepared to advance to Bologna and there meet the king. Yet no sooner had Leo X. made this agreement than [he proceeded to make apologies for it. He was driven to take this step to escape from ruin; when he could gain an opportunity he would do all he could to rid Italy of the French.² Leo X. was nothing if he was not deceitful.

In the beginning of November Leo X. set out from Viterbo

¹ Bergenroth, *Calendar of Spanish Papers*, ii., 215, 221.

² The Bishop of Worcester to Ammonius, November, 1515. Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 1105.

on his way to Bologna. He left as his legate in Rome Cardinal Soderini, not because he loved him, but because he wished to find a pretence for not allowing him to visit Florence, where the Pope arrived on November 30. The Florentines had worked hard to give him a splendid reception, and the magnificent decorations which were erected along the streets were long a subject of wonder throughout Italy. Florence employed her architects, her sculptors, and her painters to devise and adorn these structures of a day. The city gate was transformed into a splendid entrance to a palace; the whole of the Piazza di S. Trinità was occupied by a wooden castle; the unfinished façade of the cathedral was supplied by a wooden covering devised by Jacopo Sansovino and painted in chiaroscuro, with bas-reliefs and sculptured figures, by the hand of Andrea del Sarto. Boccio Bandinelli, Antonio di San Gallo, Granacci, and many others were employed in these works, and the Florentines prided themselves not so much on the lavish gilding bestowed on their decorations as on their grace and beauty of design, 'all wrought by the hands of good masters'.¹ The Florentines were put upon their mettle, and were resolved that no expense or labour should be spared. They had all the feelings of a mercantile community of the present day, and rejoiced in overcoming the difficulties which arose from the short notice of the papal visit. More than 2000 workmen were employed day and night; more than 70,000 florins were expended. Great space was required for workshops where such vast constructions could be put together, and they did not scruple to make use of their churches for this purpose. For more than a month before the Pope's visit, Divine service had to be performed in any remote corner that could be found.² It

¹ Luca Landucci, *Diario*, 352, etc.; Vasari, *Vita di Andrea del Sarto*. The account of Paris de Grassis has been published by Moreni, *De ingressu Leonis X. in Florentiam*, of which much is quoted by Roscoe, *Leo X.*, Appendix No. cxxix.; but Landucci's account is the best, and the interesting details about the carrying out of the work come from him.

² Landucci, *Diario*, 358: 'Erano in modo occupate queste dette chiese,

Leo X.
visits
Florence.
Novem-
ber, 1515.

was a strange way of showing honour to the head of the Christian Church.

Florence, which was under the yoke of the Medici, might show honour to a Medicean Pope; but Bologna was always rebellious to the papal rule and still resented the expulsion of the Bentivogli. The people showed no signs of joy at the Pope's entry; the magistrates sent only a paltry wooden cross for the Pope to kiss; and though they provided one baldachino of silk for the Pope himself, a second which was to be borne over the consecrated elements was only made of old cloth. When the Pope saw it he ordered the silken covering to be used for the Sacrament, while he himself had none. Paris de Grassis in his indignation begged the Pope to punish this ignorant and barbarous folk, but the Pope only smiled. Leo X. was not a man to be much moved by a petty slight.¹

On December 11 Francis I. entered Bologna and was met by all the Cardinals. In vain Paris de Grassis strove to inform him of his ceremonial duties and to organise his advance; the king horrified the Master of the Ceremonies by saying that he did not care about processions.² He made his way good-humouredly through the crowd to the palace where the Pope sat awaiting him in full Consistory. He was formally received and made profession of his obedience; and when the formal ceremony was over the Pope and the king retired to their own rooms. Then Leo X. went to pay a private visit to the king, not without a warning from Paris de Grassis

Leo X. in Bologna. December, 1515.

Conference of Leo X. and Francis I. December, 1515.

che bisognava dicesino l' ufficio per altre stanze. E di di festa e di feriali di notte e di di v' era maggiore rummore e fracasso, e tanto legname ch' occupava tutte le chiese.'

¹ Paris de Grassis, MS. Brit. Mus.: 'Intravit satis ruditer, quia nullus ordo aut apparentia lætitiæ fuerunt signa, quæ propter cives ostenderent se recepturos libenter Pontificem. . . . Baldachinus pro corpore Christi erat ex charta aut tela veteri attrita et maculosa, quod non solum ridiculum sed etiam sceleratissimum erat ante Papam offerre. . . . Ego secreto dixi Papæ ut puniret hunc populum ignorantem, sed non voluit suam ostendere iram.'

² 'De processionibus dixit se non curare.'

that he was to beware of the example of Alexander VI. and not remove his cap in the king's presence, 'for the Vicar of Christ should show no sign of reverence to king or emperor'.¹

During the public ceremonies of this interview a noticeable incident took place. Leo X. celebrated mass, and administered the Communion to some of the French nobles. That the Pope's labour might not be excessive the number was limited to forty. One of the French barons, who was not admitted to this privilege, cried out that at least he wished to confess to the Pope: he confessed that he had borne arms against Julius II. and had not heeded his censures. The king exclaimed that he had been guilty of the like offence, and all the French lords followed his example. Leo X. gave them absolution and his blessing. Then Francis I. continued, 'Holy Father, do not wonder that all these were the enemies of Pope Julius, because he was our chief enemy, and we have not known in our time a more terrible adversary in war than was Pope Julius; for he was in truth a most skilful captain and would have made a better general of an army than a Pope of Rome'.² Even in his religious acts a Pope was pursued by the secular policy of his predecessor, nay his religious acts themselves had become part of his own secular designs. Each Pope had plans of his own, and paid little heed to the reputation of those who had gone before him in his office. Excommunication and absolution were alike weapons of promoting worldly interests; the Pope felt no shame at being reminded of the fact, and laymen felt no scruple in avowing their knowledge of it.

One act of complaisance to Francis I. was performed by Leo X.; on December 14 Adrian de Boissy, brother of the

¹ The account of Paris de Grassis is mostly printed by Raynaldus, *Annales*, 1515, §§ 29, 30; also by Fabroni, *Vita Leonis X.*, 280. See, too, the letter of the Bishop of Worcester to Ammonius, Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 128r.

² Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, *Ann.*, 1515, § 33.

king's tutor and secretary, was created Cardinal. What were the real subjects of the secret conferences between Pope and king we do not know; the ostensible subject was the establishment of peace between France, Venice, and the emperor, with a view to an expedition against the Turks.¹ But matters more directly concerning the interests of both parties were discussed. Francis I. tried in vain to win the Pope's assent to an expedition against Naples; that question had to stand over for the present. Leo X. thought it hard that he should be required to abandon Parma and Piacenza; but Francis I. was resolved to maintain intact the integrity of the Milanese state, and he further demanded that Leo X. should resign Modena and Reggio to the Duke of Ferrara. Such a claim was reasonable, for Francis I. could not fairly desert his ally, and the peace of Italy would be endangered if a grievance were left needlessly open. Leo X. agreed to hand over these cities on condition that he received back the money which he had paid for them to Maximilian. In return for this sacrifice Francis I. was driven to consent to the Pope's plan of indemnifying himself by seizing the lands of the Duke of Urbino. Leo X. in fact wished to revert to the policy of Alexander VI., and was bent upon forming a principality for Lorenzo de' Medici. He could not get Naples; his attempt on Parma and Piacenza and Modena had failed; there remained Urbino as a possibility, and here Francis I. was driven to promise that he would allow the Pope a free hand. Besides these questions concerning Italian politics there stood over for discussion the ecclesiastical affairs of France. The Lateran Council had denounced the old grievance of the Pragmatic Sanction; the king and the Pope, aided by the French chancellor, Duprat, discussed a project by which each of them should make his profit at the expense of the Gallican Church.

On December 15 Francis I. left Bologna, and the Pope departed a few days later. Neither of them was much

¹ Leo X. to Henry VIII, in Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 1282.

satisfied with the interview; neither had persuaded the other that his interests lay in a cordial understanding between them. Francis I. already felt the difficulties of Italian politics. His success at Marignano had raised enemies against him on every side. He had not followed up his victory at once, and hesitation was fatal to future progress. Had he after the fight of Marignano marched against Cardona and Lorenzo de' Medici, he might have reduced the Pope to submission and advanced unhindered to Naples.¹ He was not prepared for so bold a stroke, and his army rapidly dispersed. Henry VIII. and Ferdinand drew closer together; the Swiss talked of another expedition; even Maximilian bestirred himself; the Pope recovered from his terror and again presented conditions to the conqueror. Francis I. was content to keep what he had won, and early in 1516 returned to France, leaving the Duke of Bourbon Governor of Milan.

Leo X. journeyed to Florence, where he again enjoyed the magnificence of his native city. But Florence was suffering from a bad harvest, and there was great scarcity of food, so that the Pope's followers could not afford to stay in the city. Leo X. took no measures for importing corn, and the people saw with growing discontent the unthinking luxury of the Pope and Cardinals in a time of general distress.² At last, on February 19, the Pope departed for Rome. He ordered Paris de Grassis, who was shocked by the command, to go a week earlier, escorting the Sacrament, which was generally carried before the Pope's person; he preferred to make his way back to Rome without any signs of his pontifical dignity. Soon after his return he received the news of the death of his brother Giuliano at Fiesole on March 17. Giuliano had

¹ So says Francesco Vettori, *Storia d' Italia*, in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, App. vi., 313.

² Landucci, *Diario*, 361: 'Aspettavano dal Papa facessi venire grano forastiero, non ne fece nulla. Si sbigottì ogniuno vedendo consumare là roba alla gente ch' era ditro alla Corte del Papa di forestieri.'

been ailing for some months, and his death was not unexpected. However much Leo X. may have grieved, he was warned by his Master of Ceremonies that it was unbecoming for a Pope, who was not a mere man, but a demi-god, to show any outward sign of mourning.¹

Death of
Giuliano
de' Medici.
March 17,
1516.

Giuliano's death was sincerely deplored in Florence. 'He was a good man,' writes a Florentine,² 'averse from bloodshed and from every vice. He may be called not only liberal, but prodigal, for he made gifts and incurred expenses without any consideration whence the money was to come. He surrounded himself with ingenious men and wished to make proof of every new thing. Painters, sculptors, architects, alchemists, mining engineers, were all hired by him at salaries which it was impossible to pay.' He was the worthiest of the Medici family, and was too simple and sincere to share in his brother's plans. His death removed an obstacle from the Pope's ways, for Giuliano was strongly opposed to the scheme for dispossessing the Duke of Urbino. When in exile he had taken refuge in the court of Urbino; he remembered with gratitude the kindness of Duke Guidubaldo, and would not have his daughter wronged. As he lay on his deathbed he besought the Pope not to do any ill to the Duke of Urbino, but remember the kindness which was shown to the house of Medici after they were driven from Florence. The Pope soothed him and said, 'You must do your best to get well again, and then we can talk about such things'; but he refused to make any promise to his dying brother.³

Before taking any definite steps in the matter of Urbino, Leo X. waited to see the turn that events would take in Milan. While he was making professions of friendship to

¹ Paris de Grassis: 'Papæ dixi quod nullum indicium extrinsecum faceret, quia ipse jam non ut homo sed ut semideus se non deberet in aliquo mœstum aut luctuosum ostendere'.

² Vettori, *Storia d' Italia*, 319.

³ *Relazione di Marino Giorgi*, in Alberi, *Relazioni Venete*, serie 3a, ii., 51.

Francis I. at Bologna, he was privy to a scheme for the re-conquest of Milan by his foes. Francis I. wished to secure what he had won by making peace with the Swiss, and his emissaries were busy amongst the Cantons. This awakened the jealousy of Henry VIII., who did not wish to see Francis I. with his hands free for further exploits; and an English envoy, Richard Pace, was sent with English gold to hire Swiss troops for the service of Maximilian. Henry VIII. would not openly break the peace between England and France, but he offered to supply Maximilian with Swiss troops for an attack upon Milan. It was useless to send money to Maximilian, who would have spent it on himself, and Pace had a difficult task in discharging his secret mission so as to devote his supplies to their real purpose. He was helped by Cardinal Schinner, and the condottiere Galeazzo Visconti; so skilful was he, that at the beginning of March the joint army of Maximilian and the Swiss assembled at Trent.¹ On March 24 they were within a few miles of Milan, and their success seemed sure, when suddenly Maximilian found that his resources were exhausted and refused to proceed; next day he withdrew his troops and abandoned his allies. Whether he was afraid of a determined resistance on the part of the French, who burnt the suburbs of Milan in preparation for a siege; whether he feared that his Swiss allies might refuse to fight against their comrades in the pay of France;² whether he was himself bought off by French gold, we cannot tell. Most probably he only began to count the cost of his enterprise when he saw it close at hand. He bargained for an immediate victory, and when he saw signs of resistance he shrank before the risk of a possible failure. He was not prepared for anything heroic. 'According to his wont,' says Vettori, 'he

¹ The difficulties of Pace are admirably told by Brewer, *Reign of Henry VIII.*, i., 113, etc.

² These are the explanations of the Italian historians, such as Guicciardini, Prato and Vettori.

executed a right-about-face.¹ The expedition was a total failure; yet English gold had not been spent in vain, as the Swiss were prevented from entirely joining the French, and Francis I. was reminded that his position in Italy was by no means secure.

Leo X. meanwhile, in the words of Pace, 'had played marvellously with both hands in this enterprise'.² He entered into a defensive alliance with Francis I., but sent no help to Milan; so that Francis I. said to the papal envoy, 'Agreements made with the Pope are to be observed only in time of peace, not in time of war'.³ But though the Pope would give no aid that cost him anything, he was willing to show his friendliness in dishonourable ways. He informed the French king of the intentions of Henry VIII. with a barefaced apology for his breach of faith: 'Although it does not seem a pastor's duty to make such reports, still the love which his Holiness bears to the Most Christian King and the business now in hand drive him to give information of the truth; but he would not have it quoted for the world'.⁴ At the same time he wrote to the Swiss that the King of France was his ally, and that all who warred against him were enemies of the Church; and after Maximilian's departure Lorenzo de' Medici furnished money to pay the Swiss who were in the French service.⁵

On the other hand he remonstrated with the Venetian envoy in Rome on the danger which Venice was running by advancing to the aid of the French,⁶ and he even allowed Marcantonio Colonna to join Maximilian with 200 men. Afterwards he took credit with Maximilian for sending him, and at the same time protested to Francis I. that he went

Duplicity
of Leo X.
towards
Maxi-
milian and
Francis I.
1516.

¹ P. 318: 'Secondo il suo costume dette volta indietro'.

² Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 1729: Pace to Wolsey, April 2.

³ *Relazione di Marino Giorgi*, 46.

⁴ Cardinal Medici to the Bishop of Tricarico, February 10, in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, serie 3^a, xx., 22.

⁵ De Leva, *Storia Documentata di Carlo V.*, i., 229.

⁶ *Relazione di Marino Giorgi*, 45.

against his will as a private person.¹ But the supreme exhibition of Leo X.'s diplomatic perfidy is to be found in the instructions given to Cardinal Dovizzi, who was sent as an envoy ostensibly to make peace between Maximilian and Francis I. Cardinal Medici wrote to him that the Pope, on the whole, would rather have the French in Milan than the Germans, because more pretexts could be found for opposing the French than the imperial claims; peace between France and Germany, though at first sight it might seem desirable, was not for the advantage of the Papacy, for it would establish in Italy the power of the Austro-Spanish house. Dovizzi was therefore ordered to act carefully in the face of the actual events; if the French were victorious, he was to plead a sudden indisposition, and not advance further; if the imperial army prospered, or seemed likely to prosper, he was to go on, but send a secret messenger to the Duke of Bourbon to assure him that he was going to act in the joint interests of France and the Papacy.² No wonder that the Pope explained his own policy by saying that 'it seemed good to him to proceed by temporising and dissembling like the rest';³ it was his modesty which prevented him from saying that he outstripped his competitors in those arts. He even had the effrontery afterwards to inform Francis I. that he had sent no legate to Maximilian; while he demanded Maximilian's gratitude for having hastened to send one at once.⁴ Truly Leo X. spared no pains to be on the winning side.

¹ Card. Medici to Bishop of Tricarico, Ap. 17: 'Tucto ha fatto senza licentia o commissione o participatione di N. S. Et benchè per diverse vie habbi potuto intendere lo animo del Papa, ha facto el contrario; si che vedete come el signore Marco Antonio serve lo Imperadore' (*Archivio Storico*, xx., 43). Card. Medici to Card. Dovizzi, May 17: 'Sua beatitudine non mancò mai di tenere a' servitii di Cesare el Signore Marco Antonio; et di poi andando a danni de' Franzesi, non lo ha mai revocato (di che loro mirabilmente si dolgano) nè etiam di quelle provisioni di danari che ha potuto adiuatarlo' (*ibid.*, 49).

² *Ibid.*, 36.

³ *Ibid.*, 35: 'Li è parso andare temporeggiando et dissimulando con questi altri'.

⁴ 'Nè vi ha mandato anchora gente nè legato nè danari;' 'subito che si intese la venuta sua in Italia per cosa certa la S. V. reverendissima fu

When the dread of disturbance in North Italy was over, Leo X. turned his attention to his schemes against the Duke of Urbino. He issued a monitory accusing him of his past misdeeds—his treachery towards Julius II. and his murder of Cardinal Alidosi; especially his refusal to bear arms under Lorenzo de' Medici when the Papal troops advanced against the French. It is true that Francesco della Rovere gave the Pope some ground for complaint. He resented his deposition from the office of Gonfaloniere of the Church, and though he was willing to serve under Giuliano de' Medici, as being an old friend, he had declined to serve under Lorenzo, and had made overtures to Francis I.¹ On these grounds Leo X. summoned him to appear in Rome and answer the charges preferred against him; and when he paid no heed he was excommunicated and deprived of his states. The papal troops to the number of 20,000 were directed against the duchy of Urbino, and Francesco finding himself without allies fled to Mantua. On May 30 Lorenzo de' Medici entered Urbino, and in a few months all the fortresses surrendered to him. On August 18 Leo X. solemnly created Lorenzo Duke of Urbino and Lord of Pesaro, with the assent of all the Cardinals, save the Venetian Grimani, Bishop of Urbino, who, however, so dreaded the Pope's resentment that he removed from Rome and did not return during the Pope's lifetime.²

Lorenzo de' Medici made Duke of Urbino. August 18, 1516.

So far Leo X. had been enabled to work his will because the scheme of Francis I. for the conquest of Naples had been made more possible by the death on January 23 of Ferdinand of Spain. The hand that had so long striven to maintain the balance of power in Europe was removed, and Francis I. could count upon dealing with a youth whose counsellors were incapable of any

Death of Ferdinand of Spain. January 23, 1516.

credita legato, et li portava tale commissione et tale ordine che sempre ne havea ad restare bene contento,' are the corresponding orders of Cardinal Medici to Canossa and Dovizzi in the letters quoted in note ¹, p. 254.

¹ Guicciardini, *Storia d' Italia*, xii.

² So he told the Pope (Letter of Cardinal de' Medici, February 10, *l. c.*, 21).

far-seeing objects. It was lucky for Charles V. that his grandfather died at a time when the power of France had again become alarming to Europe. Ferdinand's care in his late years had been directed to prevent the growth of the Austrian house, and he had designed to divide his heritage between his two grandsons, Charles and Ferdinand; but after the battle of Marignano he changed his will and bequeathed all to Charles, who at the age of seventeen found himself ruler of Spain, the Netherlands, Naples, and the colonies of the New World. Yet with all these possessions the new king was almost destitute of resources; he had not even money to enable him to make a journey to Spain for his coronation. Had not Henry VIII. stirred Maximilian to attack Milan, Francis I. would have seized a favourable opportunity for the invasion of Naples.

England was now the chief opponent of the ambitious schemes of France, and aimed at bringing about a league with Maximilian, Charles, the Pope, and the Swiss.¹ But Charles's ministers, chief of whom was Croy, Lord of Chievres, had a care above all for the interests of Flanders, and so were greatly under the influence of France. Charles was at peace with France; they were of opinion that by maintaining that peace the young king would more surely assure himself of the succession to Spain. France and England entered into a diplomatic warfare over the alliance with Charles.

First, England on April 19 recognised Charles as King of Spain, Navarre, and the Two Sicilies; then Wolsey strove to make peace between Venice and Maximilian as a first step towards detaching Venice from its French alliance. Maximilian tried to fire the imagination of Henry VIII. and draw money from him by making a fantastic proposal; he would make over to Henry VIII. his claims on the duchy of Milan, would help him to conquer it, would then escort him to Rome, resign in his favour the imperial crown, and spend

Struggle
for the
alliance of
Charles of
Spain.
April-
August,
1516.

¹ Letter of Henry VIII. to Poyninges; Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 1838.

the rest of his days as Henry's subordinate.¹ But English diplomacy was not attracted by such far-reaching schemes. 'Whilst we looked for the crown imperial,' wrote Pace, 'we might lose the crown of England, which is this day more esteemed than the emperor's crown and all his empire.' Pace regarded the proposal at its true value, 'an inventive for to pluck money from the king craftily'.²

Maximilian in fact had ceased to be a serious politician, and Charles and Chievres paid little heed to him. They considered that under present circumstances an alliance with France was more secure than a league against her; it would at all events give them time. So negotiations were secretly carried on, and on August 13 the treaty of Noyon was concluded between Francis I. and Charles. Charles was to marry Louise, the daughter of Francis I., an infant of one year old, and receive as her dower the French claims on Naples; Venice was to pay Maximilian 200,000 ducats for Brescia and Verona: in case he refused this offer and continued the war, Charles was at liberty to help his grandfather, and Francis I. to help the Venetians, without any breach of the peace now made between them.

Henry VIII. was chagrined at this result, and began to be suspicious of the constancy of Maximilian. He strove more ardently than before to make peace between Maximilian and Venice, and to win over the Swiss. The Pope's help was necessary, but the Pope set a high price upon it. He would do what England wished if thereby he could gain the restoration of Parma and Piacenza; indeed he longed for English help to set Lorenzo de' Medici in the duchy of Milan.³ As usual, he was cautious in undertaking any obligation, and steadily urged his own interests.

¹ Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 1878, 1902, 1923, 1931.

² Brewer, *Reign of Henry VIII.*, i., 136.

³ Bishop of Worcester to Wolsey, Oct. 4; Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 2420; Pace to Wolsey, Oct. 22; *ibid.*, 2473.

On October 29 an alliance was made between Henry VIII. and Maximilian for the defence of the Church; and it was so framed that Charles could enter it also without breaking the treaty of Noyon. The Cardinal of Sion was active in winning over many of the Swiss; but Leo X. professed to be afraid to commit himself.¹ He knew, sooner than did Henry VIII., that Maximilian was preparing to join the treaty of Noyon,² and consequently grew cooler in his relations to England, and more cordial towards France. On November 11 Cardinal Medici wrote that any misunderstanding or suspicion was 'alien to the Pope's nature and will, which wished to give itself without reserve and to meet with a like return'.³ Such a message was rather a severe trial even for the experienced diplomatist Ludovico Canossa, now Bishop of Bayeux, who was to deliver it to the French king.

In spite of the efforts of England, Francis I. was everywhere successful in settling his difficulties. On November 29 a perpetual peace was made at Friburg between France and the Swiss Cantons; on December 3 the treaty of Noyon was renewed, and Maximilian was included in its provisions. Peace was made between him and Venice by the provision that Maximilian was to hand over Verona to Charles, who in turn should give it up to the King of France, who delivered it to the Venetians; Maximilian in return received 100,000 ducats from Venice and as much from France. The compact was duly carried out: 'On February 8, 1517,' wrote the Cardinal of Sion, 'Verona belonged to the emperor; on the 9th to the King Catholic; on the 15th to the French; on the 17th to the Venetians'.⁴

Peace
between
the Em-
pire and
Venice.
January,
1517.

¹ Pace to Wolsey, Oct.; Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 2495. 'The Pope is naturally very fearful, and I think will be glad to have such letters ut possit [ostendere regi] Gallorum se ad hoc compulsos . . . ab imperatore.'

² Cardinal de' Medici to Gambero, October 13, in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, serie 3^a, xx., 238: 'Lo Imperadore tiene stretta pratica di accordarsi con Francia'.

³ Cardinal de' Medici to Bishop of Bayeux, *l.c.*, 242.

⁴ Brewer, *Calendar*, ii., 2896.

Such was the end of the wars that had arisen from the League of Cambrai. After a struggle of eight years the powers that had confederated to destroy Venice came together to restore her to her former place. Venice might well exult in this reward of her long constancy, her sacrifices, and her disasters. The war had drained her resources, but she had no thoughts of yielding, and emerged at last from the conflict safe and sound. Yet Venice was not what she had been before, and no longer threatened Italy, on which the stranger had made good his hold. The military power of Venice never recovered from the defeat of Vaila. It was not so much that Venice had grown smaller as that the problems of Italian politics had grown larger. It was not her political difficulties but the altered state of Europe which prevented her from recovering her old position. Venice was the last great Italian state, and her decay was gradual; but already new roads had been opened for commerce, and she no longer commanded the trade with the East. So far as her courage and resolution were concerned she could boast that she had withstood the combined powers of Europe, and after a struggle which had lasted for eight years had come forth, weakened it is true, but not shorn of any of her possessions.

Results
of the
League of
Cambrai.

CHAPTER XX.

CLOSE OF THE LATERAN COUNCIL.

1517.

Small interest felt in the Lateran Council. DURING this period of incessant political intrigue it was not natural that the Lateran Council should make much progress. The three objects which a Council was bound to profess, the peace of Christendom, war against the Turk, and the reformation of the Church, could not be pursued separately, for only a general agreement between European powers could supply the force necessary for a crusade or for ecclesiastical reform. The Lateran Council had owed its origin to the political necessities of the Papacy. It was not the Council but the Pope who had done away with an abortive attempt at schism; the Council simply registered the results of the papal diplomacy. Europe as a whole paid little heed to the Council or its proceedings; and amongst the mass of State papers preserved in every country, it is scarcely mentioned. Statesmen were not interested in ecclesiastical questions; the general tone of thought was national and practical. The New Learning employed the minds of thoughtful men; the spread of commerce attracted the trading classes; schemes of national aggrandisement filled the minds of statesmen. The Lateran Council would have come to an end had not the Pope still needed it to record a new triumph of papal diplomacy. While this was pending the Council was still kept alive.

Though the Council consisted only of Italian prelates, those prelates still remained constant to their plan of in-

creasing the importance of their own order. They had succeeded in asserting their ecclesiastical equality with the Cardinals, and had struck a blow at the abuse of monastic exemptions from episcopal authority. They went on to make another demand, which aimed at the permanent organisation of the episcopal order at the Roman court. They asked for permission to set up an episcopal college¹ or confraternity, which should hold a recognised position at Rome, and should have power to communicate immediately with the Pope and lay before him such questions as from time to time interested the bishops as a class. At first the Pope assented to this proposal, but the Cardinals raised the strongest opposition. They were the standing council of the Pope, and in that capacity took charge of all business which it was necessary to lay before him. They acted as protectors of national interests, and were recognised and paid accordingly by kings. The bishops might quote for their proposal the precedent of monastic or other organisations, but these were scarcely parallel cases. A confraternity of prelates, with an organisation of its own and the assured right of access to the Pope, would practically have superseded the College of Cardinals, and would have proved a serious limitation to the papal primacy; it would have wrought an entire revolution in the system of the Church.

The prelates who made this proposal were most probably ignorant of its real importance, and looked only to their present grievances. They resented the overgrown power of the Cardinals, they wished to reduce the monks to obedience, and to re-establish their own jurisdiction. They suffered from such constant encroachments that they saw no way of protecting themselves save that of setting up a chamber of their own with special delegates who

Proposal
for an
episcopal
College in
the Curia.
1516.

Leo X.
negatives
this pro-
posal.

¹ Paris de Grassis, MS.: 'Quum prælati multa petissent contra privilegia fratrum et quod liceret eisdem facere et habere confraternitatem episcoporum sicut habent laici multi et infiniti cujusque artis, Papa primo omnia se concessurum respondit te promisit'. This entire matter is obscure, and these movements of the prelates are only mentioned by Paris de Grassis, who tells us none of the motives, but only the results.

should permanently represent their interests in the Roman court. Had the bishops throughout Europe bound themselves together in favour of this scheme it might have been carried. But the movement was very partial, and was confined to a few Italian bishops who were present in Rome; in fact it was little more than a struggle of one party in the Curia against another. So unimportant did the matter seem at first, that the Pope was inclined to accept it. Consideration and counsel showed him its dangers, and he withdrew his approval.¹ The more he was pressed, the more stubborn he became. At last he told the unfortunate bishops that if they did not withdraw their request he would hold no further sessions of the Council, but would prorogue from year to year. Their demands for the reduction of the privileges of the monastic orders had not yet been embodied in a decree; if they persisted, they would lose what had been already promised. They made a last effort to obtain something in the direction of their wishes, and asked that the prelates present from time to time in the Curia should have the power of assembling separately, and discussing affairs concerning their order, that they should be allowed to appoint deputies, and present petitions to the Pope. They added that to make this scheme useful it was necessary that the prelates in Rome should not be solely Italians, but chosen from different nations, and that they should have leisure allowed them for this special service. Though this proposal would have made the new council of the Pope dependent mainly on his own selection, it still seemed dangerous, and was not allowed. The prelates were indignant that the Cardinals had prevailed against them, and were the more determined to urge their victory over the monastic orders. The Cardinals tried to modify their demands; but the prelates were firm, and the

¹ Paris de Grassis, MS.: 'Cardinales . . . qui forsan dubitarunt quod si prelati societatem ineant et in ea bene se confirmant super multis abusibus qui in ecclesiam intraverant, forsan redundaret ad reformationem cardinalium, sic operaverunt cum Papa quod Papa qui petitiones prelatorum primo benigne exaudiverat omnem exauditionem revocavit'. The rest is given in Raynaldus, *Annales*, 1516, § 1.

Pope, who wished to hold a session of the Council, was driven to let them have their way.

When all these difficulties had been overcome, the eleventh session of the Council was at last held on December 19, in the presence of sixteen Cardinals and some seventy prelates. The first decree bears traces of an uneasy consciousness that the Church was declining in general esteem, and that the teaching of its ordinary ministers was not in sympathy with the great currents of thought. The growth of the New Learning had not intellectually affected the bulk of the clergy; they did not understand it sufficiently either to appreciate its good points, or to warn men against its dangerous tendencies. They felt that many subjects of their teaching were openly or tacitly challenged, and instead of meeting the challenge they fell back upon general denunciations or the testimonies of miraculous stories. The Council rebuked these ignorant preachers, warned them against employing threats of impending judgments, against perversion of texts of Scripture, and against the use of fictitious miracles. For the future all preachers, secular and regular alike, were to be examined by their superiors, and receive from them a licence to preach. They were ordered to teach nothing save what was contained in the words of Scripture, and the interpretations of those doctors whom the Church had recognised; they were not to foretell the coming of Antichrist, or the time of the day of judgment; if any one believed that he had the spirit of prophecy he was to submit his prophecies to the judgment of the Pope, or if the need was urgent, to his ordinary. The Council's decree was wise and moderate; the misfortune was that ignorance could not be remedied by decrees.

The important work of the session was the registration of a triumph of the papal policy in the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction of France. However much in other points the Popes since Pius II. had differed from one another, they had been unanimous in their endeavours to sweep away the separate legislation

Decree
against
unlearned
preachers.
December 19,
1516.

Abolition
of the
Pragmatic
Sanction
of France.

wherewith the Gallican Church had withdrawn itself from the papal authority. Paul II., Sixtus IV., Innocent VIII., had alike striven to procure the formal abolition of these special privileges. They had all been able to win from the king some appearance of concession, but the Parlement refused to register any decree for the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction, which was consequently observed so far as suited the convenience of the Crown or the interests of his ecclesiastical favourites. But the quarrel of Julius II. and Louis XII. led to the full establishment of the Pragmatic Sanction, and the renewal of the Conciliar movement. The schismatic Council had failed; France had withdrawn its opposition to the Papacy. The abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction was the natural termination to the struggle and the pledge of friendship for the future. This was one of the questions discussed by Leo X. and Francis I. when they met at Bologna, and the French chancellor Duprat declared himself on the Pope's side. A little consideration showed the Pope and the king how they could best secure their mutual advantage, and the terms of an agreement were left for negotiation. The king agreed to abolish the Pragmatic Sanction and take in its stead a concordat with the Pope. By this compact both parties were gainers. The Pragmatic Sanction rested on the basis of the power of General Councils, of an inherent right of self-government in the universal Church, which was independent of and superior to the papal monarchy. It had been the aim of the restored Papacy to root out these ideas; the Pragmatic Sanction was the last remnant of the Conciliar movement, and no price was too great to pay for its destruction. Leo X. left it for diplomacy to settle what were the best terms which he could make with the French king; if the king would abolish the Pragmatic Sanction the Pope would grant him as a favour the most profitable of its privileges.

On the other side, Francis I. aimed at establishing the supremacy of the royal power in France, and it was worth his while to establish it definitely over the French Church.

So long as the Church stood on the Pragmatic Sanction it rested upon something independent of the royal power. The Pragmatic had received the royal assent, but was valid because it claimed to declare the ancient and inherent rights of the universal Church. Other nations might forego those rights, but the Gallican Church proudly maintained them. Francis I. felt as little sympathy with such a position as did Leo X. The Pope wished to root out all that was opposed to the papal supremacy; the king wished to be rid of everything that ran counter to the royal omnipotence. So the claims of the Gallican Church were contemptuously thrown aside, and the Pope and the king began to bargain over the fair division of the spoil.

Matters were finally settled, and the concordat was signed on August 18, 1516. Francis I. agreed to the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction, and obtained instead conventions which he asked the Gallican Church to accept as an equivalent. Leo X. granted to the French king powers over the Gallican Church which it was hard to express in terms of ecclesiastical propriety. The French king was allowed to nominate to all bishoprics and abbeys in his kingdom, though the papal approval was reserved; reservations were abolished; in presentations to benefices graduates of the universities were to be appointed to vacancies occurring in four months of the year; a check was put to papal provisions; appeals to Rome were restricted; excommunications and interdicts were to be formally made known before their observance was required. Amongst these regulations we are surprised by a disciplinary enactment, which the existing condition of the Church rendered necessary. Bishops were ordered to proceed against clergy living in open concubinage; they were to be punished by a suspension for three months, and if they did not then put away their concubine, by deprivation of their benefice. Bishops were enjoined in the most solemn words to accept no composition for conniving at this irregularity.¹

Concordat
with
France.
August
18, 1516.

¹ The text is given by Münch, *Sammlung aller Konkordaten*, 244, etc.

The celibacy of the clergy was in such danger of breaking down that it had to be asserted however incongruously, and at the same time the laity were also exhorted to greater chastity and order in their lives.

The Council unanimously passed this decree, and the Pope expressed his satisfaction by the emphasis of his vote: 'I not only assent, but assent greatly and entirely'.¹ The next business of the session was to approve the decree which had been the object of such prolonged struggles, the decree for diminishing monastic privileges. It was enacted that bishops should have full power of visiting parish churches which were served by monasteries, and should correct abuses in their curates; prelates and secular priests were to be allowed to celebrate the mass in monastic churches; monastic vicars were to be liable to examination by bishops as to their fitness for their office; friars were not to have the power of absolution from sentences passed by ecclesiastical authorities, and were not to administer the sacraments to those who had been refused them by their parish priests; they were not to give absolution to those who had not paid tithes and other ecclesiastical dues, and were in their preaching to urge this as a duty. Brothers and sisters of the third order, who lived in their own houses, and were only attached loosely to the friars, were to receive the sacraments, excepting that of penance, from their parish priest, and were not to be free from the penalties of an interdict by admission to the church of the friars. Generally the friars were admonished to pay due respect to the bishops as standing in the place of the Apostles.

This decree met with some opposition. Many were dissatisfied that it did not go far enough. But when the votes were taken it was declared to be carried. It was understood also that the reform of the mendicant orders was to be taken in hand in their chapters; but little result seems to have

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1516, § 27: 'Papa dixit: "Non solum placet sed multum placet, et perplacet"'.
Decree abolishing monastic exemptions. December 19, 1516.

followed. The subjection of the friars to the authority of the bishops in matters concerning ecclesiastical order was not thoroughly established; and the exemptions which had been abolished were in some points renewed. Women of the tertiary order living in a college were first exempted from the jurisdiction of ordinaries; then the exemption was extended to virgins living at home, and afterwards to widows.¹ The friars could not openly resist, but they soon recovered the ground that they had lost. The decrees of the Lateran Council do not seem to have produced much tangible result in the relation of the mendicant orders towards the bishops.

Now that the Pragmatic Sanction had been triumphantly abolished, the work of the Lateran Council was done, and it only remained for the Pope to get rid of it decorously. On March 16, 1517, its last session was held; and Paris de Grassis felt a malicious pleasure in selecting Cardinal Carvajal to say mass, so that the man who had called the Council into being by his attempt at schism should grace its triumphant close. The Pope, with eighteen Cardinals, eighty-six prelates, and a few ambassadors represented the greatest number that had ever been present at the sessions of this ecumenical assembly. Letters were read from Maximilian, Francis I., Charles of Spain, and Henry VIII. of England, declaring their zeal for the cause of a crusade; they were ornamental documents necessary to give colour to the imposition of a tax of a tithe on all clerical revenues for the next three years. One little point remained to be settled. A decree was passed forbidding in future the pillaging of the house and goods of the Cardinal who was elected, or was supposed to be elected Pope. The custom was obviously a relic of troublesome times, and might well be abolished; but it seems a ludicrous object for the concern of a General Council at so momentous a period in the history of the Church.

Then was read the decree for the dissolution of the Council.

¹ So Egidio of Viterbo boasts in his letter in Martene, *Amp. Coll.*, iii., 1264, etc.

Dissolution of the Lateran Council. March 16, 1517.

It rehearsed all that had been done for the peace of the Church and of Christendom. Schism had been destroyed; all necessary reforms had been accomplished; the faith had been declared and established; the Pope had good hopes that the peace of Christendom would soon be secured, and that all Europe would unite in war against the Turk. With these cheering thoughts the Pope bade the bishops return home to their flocks; but this happy confidence was by no means universal. The decree could scarcely be heard amid the expressions of discontent. Many exclaimed that it was not a time for dissolving the Council, but rather for beginning its real business; others said that it was useless to impose tithes for a crusade, of which there was no real hope. The opposition to the dissolution was strong, and the Pope's decree only secured a majority of two or three votes.¹

The Council of the Lateran is a convincing testimony of the helplessness of those who wished for reform in the Church. It was summoned in answer to an attempt to use a bygone movement as a political weapon against the secular policy of a Pope. No one believed in a Council; no one wanted a Council. There was no question stirring in the minds of churchmen; there was no special demand for reform; there were no men of mark who had any constructive schemes to propose; there was no real business to be done. The Kings of Europe did not trouble to send representatives to the Council; the national records of the time scarcely mention its existence. Leo X. might smile contentedly and congratulate himself that his lot had fallen in pleasant places. His predecessors had trembled at the name of a Council; he had found it tolerably easy to manage with a little tact and a little of the spirit of compromise. It had recorded and emphasised his signal victory over the Gallican Church; he in turn had gratified its self-importance by allowing it to pass a few insignificant decrees. It did its work submissively and passed away quietly.

Small
results
of the
Council.

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1517, § 16.

Yet the records of the Lateran Council show that there was a strong sense of the need of some reform, and that the reforming party sought a basis for future activity in the restoration of episcopal authority. If the Church was to be brought back to its former vigour a restoration of the episcopate was necessary above all things. But the protection of the episcopate from the aggressions of the Cardinals and from the exemptions of the monastic orders would not restore it to its primitive importance. The appointments of bishops were in the hands of kings or Pope; and Pope and kings alike sought for diplomatic agents rather than pastors of their flocks. There were earnest men in the Church, but it was hard to see how they were to be set in authority. It was useless to furbish up old machinery unless means were found that it should be worked by men of spiritual force. The objects of the Lateran Council were excellent, and its measures were wise as far as they went; but they were wholly inadequate to remove even the more crying evils which were universally condemned. The restoration of ecclesiastical discipline could not be effected by a few well-intentioned decrees. The reforming party was conscious of many evils, but it had no power behind it which was capable of working amendment. Its efforts awakened little interest, and it had no decided policy. The time was unfavourable for action; there was nothing to be done save to hope for the future.

It is the most astonishing instance of the irony of events that the Lateran Council should have been dissolved with promises of peace on the very verge of the greatest outbreak which had ever threatened the organisation of the Church. It may be pleasant to be free from demands of reform, but it is assuredly dangerous. The quiet of indifference wears the same aspect as the quiet of content; but it needs only a small impulse to convert indifference into antagonism. The man of foresight would have grieved that Europe paid no heed to the Lateran Council; it boded ill for the future that no one wished to hear the voice of the Church. The time is indeed out of joint which has no heart searchings, no

difficulties for solution, no proposals for amendment, no great ideal to pursue. Europe, in fact, was sorely destitute of great ideals. Its princes were engaged in personal rivalry; its peoples were separating into conscious antagonism. It was a time of material well-being and eager striving after riches. The increase of knowledge had brought self-complacency, and the pride of superior wisdom separated each man from his fellow. Old objects of common effort had passed away, and none had taken their place. A crusade was chimerical; the reform of the Church was not worth the trouble which it would cost. The wise man had his own opinions, which enabled him to lead his own life; as for the ignorant, it mattered little what they were taught. So men reasoned while each schemed for himself; and the Lateran Council was left to utter threadbare platitudes and raise wornout cries, while the world went on its way unheeding. Leo X. was quite satisfied that so it should be; for the scheming selfishness of the time was nowhere more clearly embodied than in the Pope who had been brought up in the statecraft of the Medicean house.

Amongst the most important of the Council's decrees was that of 1513, which was aimed against philosophic scepticism on the question of the immortality of the soul. Yet while the Council was still sitting, the chief of the philosophic teachers of Italy did not hesitate to publish a book which put forward all the arguments against this article of the Christian faith. While Francis I. and Leo X. were conferring in Bologna, Pietro Pomponazzi of Mantua was lecturing in the city and was busy on his treatise 'On the Immortality of the Soul'. He was an ardent Aristotelian, a fervent follower of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and was notorious for the freedom of his speculations. His book 'On the Immortality of the Soul' was published in Bologna on September 24, 1516. In the preface he represents himself as visiting a Dominican friar who was ill. The Dominican, who was a pupil of his, asked him, 'Master, the other day in your lectures you said that

Pietro Pomponazzi and the immortality of the soul.

the position of S. Thomas of Aquinas about the immortality of the soul, though you did not doubt of its truth, yet in no way agreed with the sayings of Aristotle. I should like to know, first, what is your opinion about this matter, setting miracles and revelations on one side; secondly, what you consider to be the opinion of Aristotle.' Pomponazzi, 'with God's help,' undertook to answer these questions. Following the Aristotelian method he discusses divers opinions and exposes the weakness of each. He concludes that the question of the immortality of the soul is a 'neutral problem like that of the eternity of the world; for no natural reasons can be brought forward which prove the soul to be immortal, still less which prove it to be mortal'. In practice it makes a good deal of difference which opinion is followed; for if the soul is immortal men ought to despise earthly things and seek after heavenly things; if it is mortal, then they must follow the contrary course. Its immortality depends on revelation from God; but each art ought to follow its own method, and immortality should be proved by the method of faith, which depends on Scripture. Other methods are not to the point. Philosophers may differ; Christians may agree because they possess an infallible method, but they must not proceed according to the wisdom of this world.

It was impossible to mistake the covert sneer which lurked beneath such words. Many were offended, and preachers raised their voices against Pomponazzi's teaching; but it is remarkable that Pomponazzi's treatise contains no reference to the Lateran decree, nor do we find that the decree was of much value to his opponents. Pomponazzi was not abashed by opposition, but continued the controversy with increased irony in a way which leaves no doubt of his meaning. He tells us that he was attacked by the 'cowled herd of the Dominicans, whose office it is to preach, and who preach that they themselves are omniscient'. Brother Ambrose, an Augustinian of Naples, was especially zealous in denouncing Pomponazzi in North Italy. Pomponazzi represents himself as a secluded invalid who rarely heard of

what was passing, and wondered with philosophic calm at the storm that was raised about nothing. When his friends told him of the preaching of Brother Ambrose, he exclaimed with an injured air, 'He will not find that in any part of my little treatise I have affirmed that the soul is mortal. I have only said that Aristotle thought so, and that immortality cannot be proved by natural reason, but is to be held by sincere faith.' He sent a humble message to the preachers who denounced him, begging that they would show him his error, 'for nothing can be a greater misfortune to a philosopher than ignorance, especially in such a matter'. Instead of doing him this favour Brother Ambrose continued to preach more violently than before, holding up his head and striking his broad chest and exclaiming, 'Look here and see if I need fear that pigmy'—for Pomponazzi was a dwarf. Hearing this the dejected philosopher again sent to implore Brother Ambrose to show him his fault. 'What!' said Ambrose, 'he has taken ten years to write the book, will he not give me four months to discover its errors?' Quick came Pomponazzi's retort: 'When he condemned my book in the pulpit he either knew my errors or he did not. If he did not, why did he condemn me? If he did, why does he need time to inform me of them? His excellent sermons have proved the immortality of the soul: why is he so anxious to overthrow its mortality? Both Aristotle and Averroes agree that the proof of the necessity of one of two opposites proves the impossibility of the other. Tell him that if he does not come within a month I will denounce him as a babbling preacher, a windy preacher, a man of no parts.' Presently Ambrose came to Bologna, but he came as a newly consecrated bishop; Pomponazzi went to see him and was received with kindness; he was told that Agostino Nifo of Naples had written a large treatise against him, which, when published, would show him his mistakes. 'If he has proved me to be in error,' said Pomponazzi, 'I give thanks first to God, then to Brother Agostino, for freeing me from my blindness. If, as I hope, I have proved him

to be in error, then I shall have the greater praise; so that, however the matter ends, I shall be the gainer.'

The insolence of philosophic superiority could not be carried further than in this account which Pomponazzi gives of his controversy with the preachers;¹ and he could not have written so if he had not known that he was safe. The Dominicans at Venice had taken strong measures against him. They reported on his book to the Patriarch, 'a simple and most holy man,' Pomponazzi tells us, 'but entirely ignorant of philosophy and theology'. The Patriarch laid the matter before the Doge, who forbade the sale of the book; and the Dominicans wrote to Rome to procure the Pope's condemnation. But Cardinal Bembo was a friend and patron of Pomponazzi. He read the accused book and gave his opinion that it contained nothing worthy of censure. The master of the palace, before whom the question formally came for decision, laughed and agreed with Bembo's opinion; he added that there were many men whose orthodoxy was undisputed, who held Pomponazzi's opinions.² Rome was more tolerant than Venice, and in the papal court Pomponazzi's book was read with a smile. Pomponazzi was told that if he went to Venice men would burn him or hand him over to the boys in the street to stone and pelt with dirt. He trembled at the thought of this menace, till he consoled himself by the thought of the saying of Socrates, 'I would rather be put to death unjustly than justly'. However, he stayed in the safety of the papal city of Bologna, where he lived unmolested, and on his death in 1525 was buried at the expense of Cardinal Gonzaga.

¹In his *Apologia*, published December 21, 1517, and dedicated to Cardinal Gonzaga.

²Pomponazzi, *Apologia*, bk., iii., chap. iii.: 'Ridet, laudat Bembi sententiam, refertque Bembo multos fuisse viros christianissimos qui hujus opinionis extiterant'. This passage has been unfairly taken to mean that many in the court of Leo X. doubted about the immortality of the soul. But Pomponazzi's position only was that the immortality of the soul could not be proved apart from revelation. It was one question whether his main position should be condemned; it was another question whether his mode of stating it was deserving of censure. The second question was dismissed with undue levity.

Those who find in the revolt against the Papacy the beginnings of an era of free thought and free inquiry, take no account of such cases as those of Pomponazzi. He was allowed to discuss with cynical frankness not merely outlying propositions, but the central ideas on which religious life was founded. He was held to be free from blame because he separated the region of philosophic speculation from the region of Christian belief, and was judged in the papal court with a judicial calmness and impartiality which the modern advocates of religious tolerance might well admire. He laid down a principle which was admitted at the papal court. 'I do not firmly adhere to anything which I have said in my book, save in so far as the Apostolic See determines. Whatever, therefore, I may have said, whether it be true or false, whether it be in accordance with the faith or contrary to it, I ought not in any way to be held heretical.' Provided that he recognised the right of the Church to decide upon the true contents of Christian doctrine, he was at liberty to speculate freely upon the philosophic questions which those doctrines contained.

The position was an abstract one, and was not compatible with much zeal or enthusiasm on either side, but it recognised the difficulty of adjusting individual liberty and general order. The philosopher claimed to arrive at rational conclusions by rational methods; the Church claimed to set forth the Divine truth concerning the life of man. Provided that the philosopher recognised the paramount authority of the Church, he was at liberty to show within his own limits what he could discover without the Church's help. The Church, on her side, secure in the possession of truth, could afford to allow that man should freely follow his own intellectual methods: if they led him to conclusions contrary to her teaching, it was only an additional testimony to the weakness of the intellect unaided by revelation.

Such a compromise might be attractive to students and men of culture; it was too abstract for ordinary life. It demanded an impossible amount of self-restraint and of

Papal
tolerance
towards
Pompo-
nazzi.

indifference to the practical issues of life. The scholar in his study might have his own searchings of heart, but when he stepped forward as a teacher he was bound to consider the issue of his teaching as a whole. Such lectures as those of Pomponazzi could not fail to have a disintegrating effect upon the basis of religious life. We are not uncharitable in supposing that Pomponazzi had this intention, and deliberately chose to attack Christian doctrine by the weapon of irony. However this may be, the Roman court treated him with leniency, and had no wish to enter into a war against philosophy. Pomponazzi was left to defend his position against attack on the side of orthodoxy, and the controversy was carried on by Agostino Nifo, and later by Contarini; but the Papacy refused to interfere. The Roman court was not in favour of repressive measures. It allowed free thought beyond the extremest limits of ecclesiastical prudence. The interest in dogmatic theology was slight; there was no recognition in Italy of the authority of the Church to restrain erroneous opinions, nor did the Church venture to claim it. No doubt Leo X. and his Cardinals flattered themselves that the Church was more in accordance with the spirit of the age than it had ever been before. They were soon to learn that the real spirit of every age speaks not so much in what can be heard and reckoned with as in the yearnings of yet inarticulate souls.

Pomponazzi wrote also 'On Incantations,' and 'On Fate'. In both these works he criticised current conceptions on theological points, and substituted the Aristotelian view of the uniformity of nature for a world full of miracles, while he asserted man's freedom as against any ideas of predestination, Divine providence, or even Divine grace. In all his writings Pomponazzi proceeds as a philosophic critic believing in religion as the root of virtue, but clearly distinguishing between what admitted of rational proof and what was the subject of faith. He is the first writer who gives complete expression to the modern spirit of criticism as opposed to the constructive theology of the Middle Ages. His attitude of

intellectual abstraction from current problems marks the difference between the Italian and the German spirit. The Italian was content to notice the oppositions to which the New Learning gave rise; for himself a life in accordance with virtue was its own reward, and he was contented to live to himself.¹ The German strove to reconstruct the crumbling structure of his intellectual conceptions, and gain a new system in which man might reconcile his difficulties by a quickened sense of his immediate relationship to God.

The Lateran Council had done all that it could do in the region of politics, and it was the region of politics that absorbed the attention of Leo X. The peace of Noyon had restored peace to Europe, but peace was by no means universally welcome. France was glad to have a breathing space; Charles congratulated himself that he was free from the tutelage of Maximilian and could leave Flanders in safety for the purpose of visiting his Spanish kingdoms, where his presence was sorely needed. On the other hand England saw herself outwitted in diplomacy, and was jealous of French aggrandisement; while Leo X., who had contrived by a judicious policy of wavering neutrality to promote his own interests in Italy, found himself in a strait. No doubt he ought to rejoice in peace, and work for an expedition against the Turk, whose advance was again a source of serious alarm to Europe; but Henry VIII. spoke truly when he said to the Venetian envoy, 'You are wise, and of your wisdom can understand that no general expedition against the Turk will ever be undertaken so long as such treachery prevails amongst the Christian powers that their sole thought is to destroy one another'.²

It is small blame to Leo X. if he felt this as keenly as any other statesman, and was anxious to minimise the results of the treaty of Noyon. The contracting powers, Francis

¹ For a detailed examination of Pomponazzi's writings see Fiorentino, *Pietro Pomponazzi*.

² Rawdon Brown, *Despatches of Giustinian*, ii., 36.

Sus-
picious in
European
politics.
1517.

I., Maximilian, and Charles, had agreed to meet at Cambrai to confer on a common policy. However much a crusade against the Turk was put forward as a pretext, both Leo X. and Henry VIII. were afraid of this conference and did their utmost to prevent it. 'Popes,' said the Venetian Giustinian, 'are always disquieted by meetings of great princes, because the first thing dealt with is the reformation of the Church, that is of Popes and Cardinals'; he might have added that the reformation of the Church meant in those days the furtherance of political schemes for the partition of Italy. The conference at Cambrai was carried on by ambassadors, and agreed to a division of Northern and Central Italy into two states dependent on the Empire. One division, including Venice, Florence, and Siena, was to be held by Charles or his brother Ferdinand; the other added Piedmont, Mantua, Verona, and Lucca to the French possession of Milan.¹ The scheme was a revival of the old League of Cambrai, and again aimed at the spoliation of Venice.

Conference of
Cambrai.
March,
1517.

This proposal came to nothing; perhaps it was not seriously intended. Charles was preparing for a journey to Spain; Maximilian was helpless, and only caught at anything which still kept open his claims against Venice; Francis I. was secretly listening to Wolsey, who saw in an alliance with France a means of restoring the position which England had lost by the peace of Noyon. Leo X. was left destitute of allies, and soon felt the dangers of his defenceless position. The cessation of war in Italy left a number of soldiers unemployed, and the dispossessed Duke of Urbino seized the opportunity to raise an army for the recovery of his possessions. With a body of Spanish, German, and Gascon mercenaries, he advanced in February into the territory of Urbino, where Lorenzo de' Medici could offer little resist-

War of
Urbino.
February-
Septem-
ber, 1517.

¹ *Monumenta Hapsburgica*, p. 37.

ance. In a few weeks Francesco della Rovere was restored to his old possessions.

Leo X. saw in this the hostility of France. He begged for help from Francis I., who treated him with cold civility, and ordered the governor of Milan to send the Pope reinforcements; but he did not wish to drive him into the arms of Charles, and therefore entered into a league for mutual defence.¹ Even when supported by French help the papal army was incapable of ousting Francesco della Rovere, who made the chivalrous proposal of deciding the dispute by a single combat between himself and Lorenzo de' Medici. This offer was naturally refused, and the war dragged on for eight months, to the discomfort of Rome and the draining of the papal treasury. Men laughed that a 'dukelet' should reduce the Church to such extremities, and Leo X. was almost beside himself through vexation.² The war went on till the resources of Francesco Maria were exhausted, and the Viceroy of Sicily interposed to prevent the extension of French influence. Leo X. undertook to pay the arrears due to Francesco Maria's mercenaries, on condition that he withdrew from Urbino; and he was allowed to carry away to Mantua his artillery and the famous library which his uncle Federigo had collected. He went away in September, comforting his people with the hope that he would come back in better days, for Francis I. had promised to restore him to Urbino when the Pope died or when he was at open enmity with the Pope.³ Francis I. did not scruple to mock at the Pope's helplessness, and remind him of his dependence on the good will of France.

The war of Urbino not only drained the papal treasury,

¹ Guasti, in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, serie 3^a, xxvi., 185.

² *Relazione di Marino Giorgi*, in Alberi, *Relazioni Venete*, serie 2^{da}, iii., 47: 'Gli pareva gran vergogna della Chiesa che ad un duchetto basti l'animo di fare queste novità; e il papa tremeva, ed era quasi fuor di sé'.

³ Marino Sanuto, quoted in De Leva, *Storia di Carlo V.*, i., 253: 'E prometer lo poi la morte dil papa tornarlo in caxa, over venendo s. m. a rotura col papa'.

but also gave an opening to the expression of the discontent which the grasping policy of the Medici had created on many sides. The secular aspect of the Papacy was reproduced in the College of Cardinals, which mirrored only too accurately the dynastic interests of Europe, and especially of Italy. Alexander VI. had found it necessary to reduce rebellious Cardinals by force; Julius II. had suffered from an open revolt. Leo X. hoped by an air of easy good-nature to spread general contentment; but it is hard to satisfy men whose interests are attacked; and Leo X., however cautious and plausible, could not escape making enemies. One of the Cardinals who had most keenly favoured the election of Leo X. was Alfonso, son of Pandolfo Petrucci, lord of Siena, who through his father's entreaties had been raised to the cardinalate by Julius II. at the age of twenty. Pandolfo hoped that by this means he had secured Siena for his eldest son Borghese. Siena, however, was in a chronic state of political disturbance. The Sienese wearied of Borghese's rule, and Leo X. secretly helped a party who proposed to substitute for Borghese another member of the Petrucci family, Raffaele, who was governor of the Castle of S. Angelo. Raffaele Petrucci was an old friend of Leo X., and would rule Siena in the interest of the Medici; so by papal help Borghese was expelled and Raffaele ruled in his stead.

Con-
spiracy of
Cardinal
Petrucci.
May, 1517.

Cardinal Petrucci was indignant at his brother's wrongs, and when he saw the Pope hard pressed by Francesco della Rovere, thought that the time was come for a restoration at Siena. He withdrew from Rome and entered into negotiations with Francesco della Rovere. Apparently his action was notorious, for on March 4 Leo X. wrote him a letter of kindly remonstrance, in which he warned him that he should regard any attempt on Siena as a conspiracy against his own person;¹ but the Cardinal was moved rather by ill success than by the Pope's admonition to withdraw from Siena

¹ Raynaldus, *Annales*, 1517, § 90.

and seek reconciliation with Leo X. The Pope agreed to receive him in Rome, and give him a safe-conduct which was guaranteed to the ambassador of Spain. Cardinal Petrucci returned to Rome on May 19 with a numerous escort of armed men, and went first to the Vatican to pay his reverence to the Pope; he was met by his friend, the Genoese Cardinal Sauli, who went with him into the chamber of audience. There the two Cardinals were arrested by the Captain of the Pope's guard, and were carried away to the Castle of S. Angelo, where they were kept in solitary confinement. The Pope summoned the remaining Cardinals and the foreign ambassadors who were in Rome, that he might explain his reasons for his action. He assured them that he was not moved by any political motives, but was striking at two heinous criminals; he had proof that the imprisoned Cardinals had conspired to kill him by poison; he did not propose to judge his own cause, but would commit the matter to the decision of three Cardinals, Remolino, Accolti, and Farnese.¹

This news naturally created great surprise in Rome, and men did not know how to judge it. The Spanish ambassador entered his protest against the violation of the safe-conduct, which was indeed indefensible. The Pope, however, conceived that the enormity of the offence justified any means for its punishment. He behaved as though he were in great terror; the gates of the Vatican were kept closed, and armed men were posted everywhere. The Cardinals, when they heard of the severity of the imprisonment of their colleagues, went in a body to the Pope, and asked that out of respect for their office the prisoners might be allowed one attendant each. The Pope granted this request, but no one else was permitted to visit them. Leo X., in short, behaved as though he were conscious of a serious crisis; but Paris de Grassis, who saw him close at hand, doubted about his seriousness. He tells us that he thought it his duty to cheer his master by bidding

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, *ut supra*.

him cast away his gnawing care and enjoy himself; Leo X. answered with a laugh, that he had no other object in view.¹

The nature of the evidence before the Pope was scarcely sufficient to justify his arbitrary proceeding. He told the Venetian envoy that a letter of Cardinal Sauli had been found in the hands of a servant of Cardinal Petrucci; it contained the sentence, 'I have not been able to accomplish what I promised'; when the servant was examined about the meaning of this suspicious remark, he confessed that there was a plot to poison the Pope.² As soon as the Cardinals were in prison, further evidence was sought. The secretary of Petrucci confessed, under torture,³ that a plot had been made to introduce to the Pope as his physician a certain Battista da Vercelli, who was to poison him by means of an ointment applied to the Pope as a cure for fistula.

The imprisoned Cardinals were also urged to confess, and the immediate result of their confessions was the arrest of another Cardinal. On May 22 the Pope was preparing to hold a Consistory when Cardinal Accolti, one of the commissioners for the examination of the accused, came to a long interview. The Pope summoned Cardinals Farnese and Raffaele Riario; and no sooner did Riario appear than the Pope, trembling with rage and excitement, rushed out of the room, leaving Riario in

Arrest of
Raffaele
Riario.
May 22,
1517.

¹ The following passage follows on that given by Raynaldus, 1517, § 93: 'Et hæc facta sunt, Papa demonstrante in publicis actibus se parum de talibus curare; quod cum ego dicerem ei ut depositis omnibus curis quæ mentem corrodunt vivere curaret, etc., respondit cum lætitia se de alia re non curare'.

² Marino Sanuto, *Diario*, MS., vol. xxiv., fol. 165, date May 20: 'Dicendo poiche za alcuni zorni fe retenir uno di quelli del detto Cardinal de Siena, al quale li trovò lettere dil Cardinal Sauli li scriveva non si ha potuto exeguir quanto era promesso, et judichando Soa Santita questa cossa de importanza, li fe retenir, il qual examinato, confessò la verità che detto Cardinal Sauli trattava tal ribalderia di attosechar Soa Santità, è che mai non aria pensato che detto Sauli li dovesse haver fatto questo'.

³ 'Avuto corda assai' are the words of the Venetian envoy (Marino Sanuto, fol. 184). He also tells us that Battista was a notorious ill-doer, 'ben noto a la Signoria nostra per i soi misfatti fatti a Venezia, bandito, et hora è a Fiorenze,' agreeing with Paulus Jovius.

charge of the guard.¹ Again the Pope summoned the foreign ambassadors and told them that Petrucci had confessed everything about the plot to poison him, and had inculpated Cardinal Riario as an accomplice. 'We were scarcely Pope four days,' exclaimed Leo X., 'before these men began to plot our death.'² Still, in spite of the Pope's declamation, men doubted about Riario's guilt. They remembered that a Medici had a grudge against the man who had been concerned in the Pazzi conspiracy, and they thought that Leo X. was using his opportunity to quit old scores; if Riario was conscious of guilt, they said, he was prudent enough to have fled when the first victims were seized.³

The Pope, however, did not treat Riario with severity; he was not committed to prison, but was detained in a room in the Vatican; and his nephew the Patriarch of Alexandria paid the Pope 200,000 ducats to obtain his uncle's release. Riario confessed that Cardinal Petrucci had told him of his plan, while he had tried to dissuade him. Petrucci on the other hand seems to have asserted that Riario answered, 'If you wish me to be with you, promise to elect me Pope'. Riario withdrew his confession and was committed to the Castle of S. Angelo; on his way he was in such an agony of terror that he could not walk and had to be carried.⁴ The luxurious Cardinals of Leo X.'s court were not fitted to endure solitude, imprisonment, and the threat of torture. It is hard to construct a credible narrative of their intentions from their confessions.

¹ 'Vix Cardinalis iste S. Georgii ingressus est cum ecce pontifex, qui alias laute ire solitus erat, medius semper inter duos cubicularios ductores, nunc præceps et vehemens exiit de sua camera et ipsemet ostium a foris clausit' (Paris de Grassis, MS.).

² Sanuto, MS., f. 185: '4 zorni poi fossemo fatti Papa tramono questi di darmi la morte'.

³ 'Multi tamen admirati sunt quod si iste Cardinalis tam prudens, tam magnus, tam cordatus fuisset conscius, quod non expectasset se capi sed potius aufugisset cum hoc potuisset multipliciter. Sed non plane creditur usque modo ex hac causa captum, sed potius ex eo quia cum pater Papæ Laurentius,' etc. (Paris de Grassis, MS.).

⁴ 'Il Papa mandò il detto Cardinale San Zorzi in castello, il quale nel andar cascò in angoscia, e fu bisogno fusse portato' (Sanuto, fol. 203).

More surprises, however, were in store for the Cardinals. On June 8 they assembled in Consistory, when the Pope burst out into complaints. He had evidence, he said, that two other Cardinals whom he had trusted had joined in the conspiracy against him; if they would but come forward and confess he would pardon them freely; if they refused to confess he would have them carried to prison and would treat them like the other three. The Cardinals gazed on one another in alarm, and no one moved. The Pope asked them to speak, and each in turn denied. Then the Pope summoned Paris de Grassis, and in his presence said, 'Before we carry out our intention, will you or will you not confess which of you are to blame?' There was still no answer, and Leo X.'s dramatic stroke was a failure; he could not succeed in his unworthy attempt to induce some unsuspected person to criminate himself. Paris de Grassis withdrew, and the Pope had to bring his game to a decorous end. Summoning the three Cardinals who were acting as commissioners in this case, he put into their hands the process as drawn up by the lawyers who had examined the prisoners and pointed out the names of the accused. The three commissioners returned to their seats and proposed that the Pope should interrogate each Cardinal on oath. When the turn came of Cardinal Soderini, he pleaded not guilty; whereupon the commissioners called out to him to change his pleading and throw himself at the Pope's feet. As no other course was open, Soderini fell in tears upon the ground and placed his life and goods at the Pope's mercy. Leo X. scarcely seemed to hear him, but exclaimed, 'There is another'. The commissioners turned to Cardinal Hadrian de Castello and called on him to confess. Hadrian instantly denied the charge, but before the threats of imprisonment admitted that he had heard Petrucci vow the Pope's death, but thought that he was a mere boy indulging in rash talk. The Pope submitted to the other Cardinals the punishment due to Soderini and Hadrian; and it was agreed that they should jointly pay a fine of 25,000 ducats, and

Consistory of
June 8,
1517.

should not leave Rome till it was paid; on these conditions they were free to go to their homes. Before dismissing the Cardinals the Pope bound them by the strictest charge to tell no one what had passed. 'None the less,' adds Paris de Grassis, 'in two hours' time it was all the talk of the town.'¹

This singular scene shows us Leo X. at his worst. He was engaged in trading with low cunning on the fears of the Cardinals, and his sole object was to make money out of their terrors. It would seem that the two prisoners were repeatedly questioned if they had spoken of their plot to any one. One of them at last mentioned Soderini, the other Hadrian, and the Pope acted on their combined information. The story current in Rome was that Hadrian's guilt was simply this. One day he passed Petrucci, who was talking to the surgeon Battista, whom he pointed out to Hadrian, saying, 'This fellow will get the College out of trouble'.² This sort of talk did not betoken a serious conspiracy; it was the brutal joke of a thoughtless youth which a man of experience could scarcely be expected to take seriously. However, the Pope had got Soderini and Hadrian into his clutches, and soon tightened his grasp. Instead of 25,000 ducats from them jointly, he demanded that sum from each of them. Overwhelmed by the demand, they fled from Rome. Hadrian made his way through Calabria by sea to Zara and thence to Venice. Soderini went to Palestrina, where the Pope gave him leave to remain; he did not return to Rome in Leo X.'s lifetime. Hadrian was degraded from the cardinalate, even from the priesthood, and was stripped of all his goods; he wandered in obscure places and died unknown.

It was now understood that the Pope wished to make money out of his prisoners. Cardinal Riario was rich, and had many relatives who could pay; so long negotiations

¹ I give the passage from Paris de Grassis in full in the Appendix.

² Marco Minio to the Doge of Venice, in Rawdon Brown's *Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII.*, ii., 108.

were begun on his behalf. Genoa and Francis I. interceded for Cardinal Sauli, but Petrucci had no friends. On Whit Sunday, before mass, the Pope told the Cardinals that he was full of compassion and forgiveness. He was so overcome by his feelings that he wept as he sat in church, and told Paris de Grassis that he suffered through pity for the criminals; but his tenderheartedness soon passed away, and he suddenly showed himself stern and inexorable. His relatives hungered for the preferments of the prisoners; and represented to the Pope his urgent need of money; so Leo X. turned to harshness, and ordered the judges to do their worst. On June 20 a sitting of the Consistory was held which lasted for nine hours; so loud were the exclamations at the Pope's proposals, that the sounds of the altercation were heard outside. At length the Pope pronounced sentence of deprivation of all goods, benefices, and the rank of Cardinal, and handed over the three prisoners to the secular courts.¹

Leo X. makes money out of the imprisoned Cardinals. June, 1517.

On June 25 the Pope summoned the foreign ambassadors to listen to evidence in the trial. He was sufficiently thoughtful to warn them to make a good breakfast, as it would take some time. The warning was necessary, for the wearied ambassadors sat for seven hours and a half, during which they heard nothing that they did not know before. According to the evidence, Cardinal Petrucci confessed his plot to murder the Pope by introducing Giovanni Battista da Vercelli as the Pope's surgeon: he had told his scheme to Sauli and Riario. The Venetian Marco Minio seems to have been convinced by the evidence, though he objected to the way in which the confessions of each of the accused were read to the others, so that the story was put into their mouths.² Riario denied all

Sentence of the criminals. June 25, 1517.

¹ Paris de Grassis, in Raynaldus, 1517, § 95.

² Marino Sanuto, *Diario*, fol. 237: 'La qual cossa esso Cardinal Siena communicoe con li do altri, sichè la cossa è certa. Ben è vero le persone e sta a fermar il processo non devesa far quello fece, perchè fenno lezer a li costituiti quello ha confessato li altri Cardinali, e altri, sichè come imbeccad' poi convenino confessar.'

knowledge of the matter till the confessions of the others were read to him; then he said: 'Since they have said so, it must be true'. He added that he had spoken about it to Soderini and Hadrian, who laughed and said they would make him Pope.

After this the inferior criminals, Giovanni Battista and Petrucci's secretary, were put to death with horrible barbarity. They were drawn through the streets and their flesh was dragged from their bones with red-hot pincers: then they were gibbeted on the bridge of S. Angelo. Petrucci was strangled in his prison; Riario and Sauli were allowed to buy their freedom. Riario agreed to pay the enormous sum of 150,000 ducats, Sauli 50,000. Leo X. used his opportunity to good effect.

This conspiracy against the life of the Pope and Leo X.'s behaviour in the matter give us an unfavourable picture of the morals of the Roman court. The conspiracy, however, was not a very serious one, and certainly was not managed with the dexterity of hardened criminals. Petrucci, young and hot-headed, seems to have been beside himself with rage at the political disaster of his house. He used incautious language and indulged in foolish threats. Perhaps the plan of poisoning the Pope was suggested to him by the villainous surgeon Battista, as a means of getting money from a dupe. Leo X. does not seem to have believed in the guilt of the other Cardinals, though he used his chance of paying off old grudges and gaining money which he sorely needed. He did not scruple to debase the whole College of Cardinals by treating them as suspected criminals; but this was the cunning of a man who wished to gain a further end. He was enabled to overbear their opposition to a new creation of Cardinals, and he used his chance unmercifully. On July 1 he created thirty-one Cardinals, 'wishing,' says Marco Minio, 'to outdo Urban VI., who only created twenty-nine'. The new Cardinals were chosen from political reasons or because they were the Pope's creatures. Leo X.

Creation
of thirty-
one Car-
dinals.
July 1,
1517.

wished to bind the Papacy, through the Cardinals, to the Medicean house.

That the Pope was rather pleased with the terror which he inspired we gather from a story of Paris de Grassis, who on July 24 brought Cardinal Riario into the Consistory that he might be formally restored to his dignity. On coming into the Pope's presence Riario began his speech: 'The Master of the Ceremonies is to blame for not informing me beforehand that I had to speak before your Holiness'. Paris, after the speech was ended, whispered to the Pope that he was afraid, when Cardinal Riario mentioned his name, that he was going to denounce him as privy to the plot. The Pope burst into laughter and said that he had thought the same. It was too good a joke to be lost, and when the ceremony was over the Pope told it aloud, and all the Cardinals went away laughing. They clearly appreciated the practical use of a conspiracy as giving an opportunity for indiscriminate accusations.¹

Restoration of Cardinal Riario. July 14, 1517.

The proceeds of the conspiracy and of the new creation of Cardinals enabled Leo X. to bear the expenses of the war of Urbino. When that was ended he had time to look round upon the affairs of Christendom.

Project of a crusade. 1517.

Europe was at peace save for the differences between Maximilian and Venice, and the desire of France to recover Tournai from the English. The progress of the Turkish arms was the great danger of the future, for a warlike Sultan sat on the Turkish throne. Selim overran Syria and Egypt, and was building a fleet which menaced the Mediterranean coast. The time was certainly ripe for a European under-

¹ MS.: 'Cum autem Cardinalis in gyrum osculabatur Cardinales ego qui stabam apud Papam dixi sibi me timuisse a principio sermonis quando dixit magistrum ceremoniarum in culpa fuisse, etc., quia timui ne me faceret participem et conscium hujus conjurationis de qua ipse punitus et inquisitus fuit. Et Papa elevato cachinno risit dicens primâ facie se etiam credidisse aliquid. . . . Et sic finito circuitu Cardinalium Papa surgens dixit cum risu adversus Cardinalem qualiter ego timuissem ne me accusare voluisset de conjurationis participatione; et sic cum risu res tota finita est.'

taking against the enemy of its civilisation, and Leo X. drew up a project for a crusade. A truce was to be proclaimed throughout Europe, and the Pope was to be arbiter of all disputes; the Emperor and the King of France were to lead the army; England, Spain, and Portugal were to furnish a fleet; the combined forces were to be directed against Constantinople.

The Pope sent this project to the princes of Europe. Francis I. was quite willing to accept it, for he had the Pope sufficiently under his control to reap all the advantages of submitting European affairs to papal arbitration. For the purpose of drawing the Pope more entirely to his side, he proposed a marriage for his nephew, Lorenzo de' Medici. He offered him Madeleine de la Tour, daughter of a sister of Francis of Bourbon, Count of Vendome, and so connected with the royal house. In return he demanded the proceeds of the tithe to be raised for the crusade during the next three years; he would borrow it till it was actually needed.¹ The Pope agreed, and the marriage of Lorenzo was solemnised in April, 1518. The Pope's presents to the bride were magnificent; amongst them was a bed made of tortoiseshell inlaid with pearl. Thirty-six horses were required to carry these presents to Paris, and their cost was estimated at 300,000 ducats. It was clear that the Pope's ardour for a crusade did not involve any self-denial to himself or his relatives. The marriage of Lorenzo produced no lasting results; Madeleine died in childbirth within a year, and Lorenzo followed her to the grave on April 29, 1519. Their infant daughter Catharine was destined to carry into French history the matured experience of Medicean statecraft.

Though Francis I. might favour the Pope's project for a crusade, Maximilian's inventiveness prompted him to draft a scheme of his own, by which the invasion of the Turkish territory was to be conducted on a graduated plan, extending over three years.

Failure of
the papal
diplomacy.
1518.

¹ Cherrière, *Négociations dans le Levant*, i., 41.

Perhaps no one heeded Maximilian, but England also showed little ardour for the Pope's plan. 'If the Pope is in earnest,' wrote Wolsey to his agent in Rome, 'let him curb the ambition of those who make the peace of Europe impossible. Let him exhort the French king to moderate his cupidity, or the crusade will never be achieved.'¹ So wrote Wolsey at the time that he was carrying on negotiations with France. He wished for the peace of Europe, but that peace was to be the work of England and was to rest on England's guarantee; he had no confidence in the results of papal arbitration.

The negotiations between England and France were carried on with profound secrecy, that they might not awaken the alarm of Charles of Spain, who did not wish the frontier town of Tournai to fall again into the hands of France. So Wolsey worked by himself, and when, in March, 1518, Leo X. appointed legates to visit the courts of Europe about the question of a crusade, England pleaded its rule against the admission of legates *à latere*. The legate chosen for England was one of the new Cardinals, Lorenzo Campeggio, a Bolognese who had done good service as a diplomatist in Germany. Campeggio was not allowed to visit England till Wolsey had been joined to him in the legateship, and when he came in July he was only useful to give greater splendour to Wolsey's triumph.

Wolsey had cautiously advanced with his negotiations, and the birth of a son to Francis I. in February gave him the means of proposing a closer friendship between England and France. On July 9 two articles were signed for the restoration of Tournai and the marriage of the Dauphin to Henry VIII.'s daughter Mary, an infant of two years old. In September a splendid embassy from France visited England, and the ceremonies of betrothal between the royal children were performed. The peace between England and France was, by Wolsey's

¹ February 27, 1518, in Martene and Durand, *Amp. Coll.*, iii., 1278.

cleverness, turned into a universal peace under the guarantees of England and France; the great powers, the Pope, the Emperor, France, Spain, and England, were to ratify it within four months; the smaller states within eight months. This treaty was signed at London on October 3 by France and England. It meant that Francis I., to gain the alliance of England, was obliged to sacrifice the advantages which he might gain from setting up the Pope as arbiter in Europe; it meant that Wolsey had developed his design of using the national advantages of England in such a way as to make her the mediator of European politics. It marked another advance in the national organisation of Europe, another step in the decay of the international position of the Papacy. Leo X. had laboured for a universal peace of which he was to be guardian; Wolsey had worked out a counter plan, by which peace rested on the mediation of England. Leo X. had no other course open to him than to ratify the treaty of London; he did so in a half-hearted way, reserving all his existing obligations and all the rights of the Holy See.¹

Now that peace was made there remained the crusade against the Turk; but this cry had long lost all reality, and was merely a decent cloak for diplomacy and a means of raising money. Statesmen knew only too well that a question would soon have to be decided which would determine the future relations of Europe. The Emperor Maximilian was in failing health, and the succession to the Empire, however decided, would be of momentous importance. The intentions of the German electors were the objects of keener interest than the successes of the Turk.

The efforts of the papal collectors to raise money for a crusade caused murmurings on every side. Men knew that Popes and kings liked to talk about crusades, because it suited them to impose new taxes on the people and arrange

Indul-
gences for
the cru-
sade.
1518.

¹ Rymer, vi., 174.

between themselves for a division of the spoil. Men murmured; but Popes and kings paid little heed to their murmurings. It chanced, however, that an Augustinian monk at Wittenberg raised a protest which grew into unexpected importance, and developed into a religious movement which shook the Papacy to its basis.

With the rise of the Lutheran movement the perspective of the history of the Papacy is entirely changed. Though Leo X. did not know it, his secular policy ceased from that time to be of any interest. Thenceforth the Pope was not to be judged by his capacity to maintain himself in his Italian territories, but he was called to account as the head of the Christian Church. The historical dignity, which is wanting to the Papacy in the period which we have traversed, is restored in the period which now begins. At the time when its security seemed greatest, when it had its roots most firmly in material interests, when it was most in accordance with the spirit of the age, it was suddenly called upon to justify its immemorial position.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

I. *Murder of the Duke of Biseglia and the 'Relazione' of Paolo Capello.*

It is most unpleasant work examining the records of crime which abound in connexion with the Borgia, and it is very easy for a writer who is free from intentional prejudice to assume that the numerous accusations have a cumulative force. It seems to me only fair to examine the evidence for each dispassionately, to separate subsequent rumour from what was said at the time, and to separate testimony about facts from testimony about opinions.

The account generally followed about the murder of the Duke of Biseglia is that given by Paolo Capello in his *Relazione* of September 28, 1500, in Alberi, *Relazioni Venete*, serie ii., vol. iii., 8, 9; also in Sanuto, *Diario*, iii., 845. This account is tragic and circumstantial; but it contains many details which Sanuto could have had no means of knowing, and it differs in many points from the account given by Burchard.

Instead of following blindly the *Relazione*, it seems to me fairer to follow Capello's despatches sent from Rome at the time as they are summarised in Sanuto's *Diario*. In them we have the facts and opinions as they presented themselves day by day; in the *Relazione* we have the story as it subsequently shaped itself in the mind of one who certainly was not free from prejudice. The following are the passages which bear on the question:—

July 16.—'Come eri, a hore tre di note, el ducha de Bexagne, zenero dil papa, a le schale di San Piero, volendo andar dal papa, fo ferito da 4 ferite, sul brazo, sul capo, su la spalla et sul costato, et che sta in pericolo.'—Sanuto, *Diario*, iii., 521.

July 19.—'Soa Santità dixè, per il caso dil ducha di Bexaie, qual lo vete medichar, non havia potuto esser in concistorio. . . . Item Madona Lugrecia, moglie dil prefato ducha, ha la febbre: e non si sa chi habbi ferito ditto ducha, ma si dice è stato chi amazò e butò nel Tevere el ducha di Candia. Et monsignor di Valenza à

fato edito, nium da Santo Anzolo fino a San Piero porti arme, sub poena.' etc.—Sanuto, *Diario*, iii., 532.

July 28.—' Il ducha di Bexaie, di la febre stava meio, ma di la ferita di la testa è in pericolo.'

August 6.—' El ducha di Bexaie sta meio, à passà il quarto decimo.'

August 18.—' El ducha di Bexaie, marito di madonna Lugretia, qual era marito et ozi è morto, perchè trateva di ocider il ducha, quando andava nel zardin, con una balestra; et il ducha l' ha fato far per alcuni azieri et àllo fato taiar a pezi fino in la sua camera. E il ducha dice, esso morto suo cognato, dice havia scritto a' colonesi venissero con zente col qual havia praticata in castello, e taieriano li Orsini a pezi.'—*Ibid.*, 671.

August 20.—' Questa note è stati presi alcuni servitori dil ducha di Bexaie, qual confesò a la tortura, uno servitor dil ducha Valentino era in praticata; e al palazzo è stà deputà la guardia de' sguizari di Valentino. Item, al ducha defunto fin qui non son fate le exequie, ma, subito, morto, fo posto in uno deposito in Sam Piero; e di tal morte tuta la corte ne parla, giudicassi la cossa non habbi a star qui.'—*Ibid.*, 671.

August 23.—' Come fo dal papa . . . li disse, el ducha di Bexaie tratava di amazar il ducha di Valenza; et suo cio che lo governava, fradello di madona Drusa sua madre, ha confessato questo.'

September 4.—' Colonesi hanno 200 homeni d' arme a li confini per dubito de Orssini, li qualli sacomana, e sono intrati in Viterbo.'

The account given by Burchard agrees with this, but is less full.

July 15.—' Circa primam horam noctis Dominus Alphonsus de Aragona . . . supra planum scalarum Basilicæ Sancti Petri per plures personas assaltatus fuit, et in capite ac brachio dextro ac crure graviter vulneratus. Invasores aufugerunt per scalas Sancti Petri, ubi circiter 40 equites eos expectaverunt, cum quibus equitarunt versus portam Pertusam.'

August 18.—' Dominus Alphonsus . . . cum nollet ex vulneribus sibi datis mori, in lecto fuit strangulatus circa primam horam noctis. . . . Capti fuerunt et ad Castrum Sancti Angeli ducti medici defuncti et quidam gibbosus, qui ejus curam habere consueverat, et contra eos inquisito facta. Liberati parum post, cum esset immunis qui mandantibus ceperat optime notum.'

Besides these accounts we have the letters of the Florentine Francesco Capello, in Thuasne's Burchard, iii., 436, etc. He agrees with the accounts of Paolo Capello and Burchard as to the attempt

on July 15, and says: 'Chi se lo habbia ferito non si dice'. On July 18 he writes: 'Il Papa di questo caso del Duca ha preso dispiacere assai et ne sta di malissima voglia. Fa poche faccende, et per anchora contende col fastidio del male.'

On Aug. 22 he tells that the duke is dead. Cesare Borgia sent men to his room to arrest his servants: 'Alcuni dicono che quando quelli satelliti intrarono in camera il Duca era in piè et cadde: alcuni che si volle levare dal letto et cadde et percosse il capo: et insuper che per rimescolamento et dolore morì subito subito. Di questa cosa si parla tanto variamente che meglio si può farne conjectura che intenderne apunto la verità.' In a postscript written in cipher he says: 'Parlasene con pocho honore del Papa et del Duca, et non manca chi dica ch' e' fu storozato'. We see that there was no real knowledge, but various rumours prevailed, and as usual the worst and most dramatic rumour is the one that has won its way to sober history.

The *Relazione* of Paolo Capello is circumstantial. According to it the Duke of Biseglia was in the first instance attacked and wounded by Cesare himself. This is contrary to Burchard's statement and to the ambassador's own letters written at the time. When wounded the duke made his way to the Pope and said, 'I have been wounded,' and told him by whom. Considering the nature of the wounds, which are minutely described by Burchard and the ambassador's letter, this seems very improbable, especially as the *Relazione* goes on to say that the wounded man lay in the house of the Cardinal of S. Maria in Portico. If he had made his way into the Vatican he would not have been removed to a Cardinal's house close by, where he was clearly taken as the nearest place. The *Relazione* goes on to say that the duke's wife Lucrezia, and his sister Sancia, stayed with him and cooked for him through fear of poison; the Pope also appointed a guard of sixteen men to protect him from Cesare. Once only Cesare visited him and said, 'What is not done at dinner will be done at supper'. Finally, one day he entered the chamber, drove out the terrified women, and called in an assassin who strangled Alfonso in his bed. The motives given in the letters are suppressed and the details of the crime are given in a different way. At the same time there are phrases which are fully intelligible only by reference to the account given in the despatches. 'Avendo l' oratore parlato col papa di questo, il papa li disse; il ducha dice non lo aver ferito; ma se l' avesse ferito lo meriteria,' etc. This refers to the first

attempt at assassination. After the death of Alfonso the *Relazione* says: 'Il duca ebbe a dire di averlo fatto ammazzare, perchè tramava di ammazzar lui, e di questo faria il processo, e lo volea mandare alla Signoria. Tuttavia mai non venne.'

The *Relazione* of Paolo Capello is discredited by Leonetti, *Alessandro VI.*, iii., 487, etc. Leonetti is not happy in his criticism of details. He impugns the authenticity of a document which makes three glaring mistakes:—

(1.) Capello calls Cardinal Mila 'zerman di questo papa'. It is not given to every one to have the knowledge of Leonetti respecting the exact relationships of the Borgia family, and a benighted Venetian may be pardoned for making a mistake—especially as he says that Cardinal Mila was in Spain, and had not been in Rome for thirty years.

(2.) He calls Cardinal Sanseverino vice-chancellor, whereas Ascanio Sforza notoriously held that office. This is fair criticism, but rests on the very imperfect edition of Alberi, who reads: 'Dei Milanesi nulla disse, cioè di Ascanio, del vice-cancelliere Sanseverino e dello Alessandrino'. The text in Sanuto's *Diario* runs: 'Di Milanesi nulla disse, ch' è Ascanio, vice-canzelier, Sanseverin et lo Alexandrino'.

(3.) He makes merry over a passage in which Capello, who left Rome on September 20, 1500, speaks of the Pope's joy over the capture of Rimini and Faenza, whereas Rimini did not belong to the Church till the end of October, 1500, and Faenza till April 25, 1501. But Capello says nothing about 'la lettera dell' annunzio Che Rimini e Faenza erano tornate in potestà della Chiesa,' which Leonetti invents. He only says 'zonta la *risposta di Rimano e Faenza*'; when the Venetian ambassadors took this *risposta* to the Pope, they asked him to keep it secret. We are tempted to ask how a sane man could imagine that the Pope was first informed about the capture of Rimini and Faenza by a secret message from Venice. We quote this as an instance of Leonetti's critical power. The *risposta di Rimano e Faenza* was an answer of the Venetian Senate to the Pope's repeated applications to know how far they would allow him to go in his plans for annexing the cities of the Romagna. If Leonetti had followed the despatches as given in Sanuto, he would have seen that a good deal of negotiation was going on on that subject—negotiations in which the Venetians had to give way to the Pope more than they wished (*Sanuto*, iii., 759-820).

But though these objections of Leonetti to the authenticity of Capello's *Relazione* are puerile, he raises a point worthy of consideration, when he points out the condition in which the *Relazione* exists. It occurs in Sanuto's *Diario*, in the form of a summary, and is not written in the first person. It is not the *Relazione* itself, but Sanuto's account of it. The question may be asked—was this account written at the time, or was it a later production? Leonetti calls attention to the fact that the habit of demanding formal *Relazioni* from the ambassadors of the Republic had fallen into disuse, and was revived by a law of 1533, from which date to the end of the Republic the *Relazioni* are preserved in full. He is of opinion that those given by Sanuto previous to the date of 1533 were compiled by him for the sake of completeness, and are not the work of the ambassadors themselves. I do not think that an apologist for Alexander VI. is wise in pressing this argument; for the *Relazione* of Hieronimo Donado, Capello's predecessor, contains the most valuable testimony in favour of Alexander VI. It is given in Sanuto, ii., 826 and 836, under date June, 1499, and contains the following passage: 'El papa ha 69 anni, a hordine in la vita sua, non fa quello si dice'. This is the sole contemporary notice which speaks of the stories against the Pope as due in some measure to slander.

But in the case of the *Relazione* of Donado, we have a good deal of information concerning Sanuto's authority for it. First (ii., 826) we have an account of a meeting of the *Collegio* on June 18. Amongst other matters 'Vene sier Hironimo Donado, venuto orator di Roma; e prima referi,' etc. What follows is Sanuto's account of a verbal communication made by the ambassador on his return. Afterwards (p. 835) Sanuto gives 'Relation di sier Hironimo Donado, fata nel Senato'. This begins: 'Secondo l'antiqua e laudabile consuetudine di questa ben instituta republicha, referirò,' etc. From what follows it seems that Sanuto copied the words of the *Relazione* at first, but grew weary and summarised towards the middle. Now in this case we see how methodically Sanuto chronicled. Indeed the mass of his work makes it clear that he must have written day by day methodically. He had no time to go back and work up documents. He had no animus of his own against Alexander VI. He does not compare Capello's account of him with Donado's. Those who are willing to take one must take the other on Sanuto's authority. On September 22, 1500, he records (iii., 842): 'Il principe vene in pregadi, et sier

Pollo Capello, el cavalier, referite la soa legation di Roma, di la qual fo dato sacramento, ch' è questa'. The *Relazione* is given in the third person; it is not the original document read by Capello, but Sanuto's summary. There is, however, no ground for supposing that it does not faithfully represent what Capello said.

There remains the fact that the *Relazione* does not agree with the despatches. This ceases to be surprising, if we consider that it was spoken to those who had read the despatches themselves, and its first words are: 'Come non diria quello di tempo in tempo à scritto'. The despatches contain what the envoy heard or saw from day to day; the *Relazione* supplements them, and gives the general impression left upon his mind.

What authority are we to give to each? I think the despatches contain all the envoy learned about the facts of the death of the Duke of Biseglia. The *Relazione* gives a dramatic setting, due to subsequent rumour and heightened in the telling for the purpose of conveying his strong belief in the resolute and unscrupulous character of Cesare Borgia. For this purpose he goes back to relate the death of Perotto, which occurred before he went to Rome, and of which he gives an account at variance with Donado and Burchard. What he tells in the despatches was the first sketch from nature; the *Relazione* gives the finished picture, touched up from rumour and imagination. It is meant to be interpreted by reference to the despatches. It alludes to the alleged motive for the murder as given in the despatches; but gives an account of its execution which is more circumstantial and dramatic than that first given.

I think there can be no doubt that Cesare was the murderer of the Duke of Biseglia; but I think that he probably had some provocation. Alexander VI. felt that and was perplexed. He tried to hush the matter up, and even Burchard was unable to understand much about it. To the ambassadors in Rome Alexander VI. gave some explanations. I think that the doctors and dwarf, of whose imprisonment and examination Burchard speaks, were examined, not about the duke's death, but in hopes of gaining evidence about the duke's supposed plot against Cesare. The matter will probably always remain obscure, but I think that the despatches of Capello give at all events a reasonable and probable clue which I have tried to follow as carefully as I can.

I am led to suppose that ill-will and suspicion grew up between

Cesare and Alfonso which ended in a murder resulting from personal feeling. Cesare Borgia would not commit a deliberate crime except for some good reason. The reasons alleged for this murder are insufficient. They are: (1) The desire for Sermoneta, which Capello seems to hint at; but Sermoneta belonged to Lucrezia, not to Alfonso, and devolved on her son Rodrigo. (2) The desire for the overthrow of the house of Aragon in Naples; but Alfonso was powerless to prevent this, and his death would not further that object. (3) The desire to marry Lucrezia to some one who would be more useful. This seems plausible at first sight, when the Ferrarese marriage is considered. But that marriage took place after an interval of sixteen months and can scarcely have been in view at the time of the murder. Moreover, the murder of her previous husband was not in itself a good recommendation of Lucrezia to another suitor. If Cesare were such an adept at poisoning as he is often represented, he might have used a means of getting rid of Alfonso which was less open and violent. It seems most probable that the deed was the result of sudden passion.

2. *The Poisonings attributed to the Borgia.*

The question of the credibility of the poisonings attributed to Alexander VI. and Cesare Borgia is one which can scarcely be considered by itself; it is only a special case of the belief in the use of poisons, which was largely prevalent at that time. The cases in which death was assigned to poison must be considered together, and the historian is bound either to believe them all or dismiss them all, or consider each upon its own evidence. Generally, however, the method adopted is to choose some cases as true because the rumour is repeated by several writers, and to dismiss others where it is only told by one or two authorities. A rumour, however, gains nothing in credibility by repetition; the question must always be, what is the evidence for it? The most objectionable habit in historical writers is that of saying that a man died 'not without strong suspicions of poison,' and then proceeding to discuss the advantages to be gained by the person suspected. It generally happens that the death of one who occupies a high position is to the advantage of some one or other; but this consideration is scarcely sufficient to establish even a suspicion that sudden, premature, or unexpected death is fairly attributable to poison.

We are ready enough at the present day to make merry over the superstitions and the ignorance of bygone times. We discard their beliefs in miracles, omens, portents, astrology, and the like, and we ridicule their knowledge of science. Yet we cling to their belief in poison, and are ready to suppose that they possessed a knowledge of poisons far in advance of that which exists in our time. I can see no reason to believe in poisoning more than in witchcraft. I can conceive no justification for picking out of the pages of a chronicler a record of poisoning as true, and passing by a series of portents as obviously false. The men of the fifteenth century believed in poisons; but they also believed in charms, amulets, and precious stones which would warn their wearer of the presence of poison. Had they any better ground for the belief in the one than in the other?

(1.) There is no doubt that some states were not indisposed to use poison as a political weapon. Lamansky, *Secrets d'Etat de Venise* (St. Petersburg, 1884), has collected a number of documents proving that the Venetian Council had proposals for poisoning their enemies brought before them from time to time, and accepted the proposals. Amongst the victims mentioned are Sigismund, when King of Hungary, Francesco Sforza, Mahomet II., and Charles VIII. of France. But these men died long after the dates when the assassination was projected, and none of them were suspected of having died of poison. Lamansky's documents prove that the Venetians were wicked, but show that their wickedness availed them little. It was one thing to undertake to poison a man, and another thing to perform the promise. Poison in the sixteenth century was not unlike dynamite in the present day; it created a great deal of alarm, but did little harm. Unlike dynamite, however, its operation might always be conjectured.

(2.) Lamansky, p. 534, etc., gives three receipts for poisons which were preserved amongst the papers of the Council of Ten. They date from 1540, and are remarkable for the simple belief which they show that the most effectual poison can be made from a long process of sublimating with elaborate care all the poisonous substances then known. The mixture was to be administered in wine; as its constituents were antimony, arsenic, aconite, orpiment, it would probably be fatal; but even its inventor did not answer for its certain success, and I apprehend that any one of the drugs used by itself would have been equally effective. If this was all that Venice could produce in 1540, the attempts of earlier poisoners

must have been still more clumsy. A document of 1432 (Lamansky, p. 6) says: 'Fuit facta proba in tribus animalibus porcinis de aliquibus venenis, repertis in cancellaria, missis perantea a Vincencia, que reperta sunt non esse bona'. The general impression left by the documents is that a number of impostors were ready to take advantage of the prevalent belief, that they made all sorts of promises, tried to extort money, and trusted to chance that some of the persons whom they undertook to poison might happen to die opportunely for their purpose. This is confirmed by the extravagant nature of the poisons proposed. Thus Lamansky, p. 9, tells of some little balls which when thrown on the fire filled the room with a pleasant odour, which whosoever smelled immediately died. The belief in poisons which killed by the touch or the smell, or from mere casual contact, was universal. The professional poisoner was as complete a charlatan as the astrologer.

(3.) The reason frequently given for poisoning was the appearance of the corpse after death. Thus Alexander VI. is said to have been black in the face, with the tongue protruding out of the mouth. In an exceptionally hot month of August in Rome, it is not remarkable that the corpse showed signs of putridity. I do not know that any known poison would have been likely to produce this appearance. The mere appearance of a dead body is no evidence which any one would now-a-days produce of poison.

(4.) Whatever we may think of the skill of poisoners in the fifteenth century, no one rates medical skill very highly. Yet many modern writers are content to assume that a man died of poison because the physicians said so. Whenever the results of their attempts at autopsy are recorded they are not very convincing. Thus Paris de Grassis writes of Cardinal Bainbridge: 'Cum dubitaretur in infirmitate venenatus, fuit de mandato Pape eventeratus, et inventum est cor ejus vitiatum in parte dextera'. It would seem that any appearance of any organic disease was put down to poison. Again in 1508 Paris writes of the death of Julius II.'s nephew, Cardinal of S. Peter ad Vincula: 'Vidi in facie et corpore tales maculas que, ut alii omnes presumebant, videbantur esse de veneno propinato'. The doctors on an autopsy found no signs of poison, but 'aliquas sanguineas maculas, propterea judicarent illum mortuum esse ex sanguinis superfluitate, et si phlebotomatus fuisset nihil mali habuisset'. I rather think that in the eyes of a modern physician his symptoms would have seemed more suspicious than those of Cardinal Bainbridge.

For these reasons I have been chary of accepting poisoning stories on mere rumour, and have done my best to appreciate the evidence in each case. The charges against the Borgia are not more credible because they are more numerous. It is not improbable that Alexander VI. used poison in the same way as his contemporaries; but I do not think that many of their attempts succeeded. Alexander VI. himself accused Caterina Sforza of sending an emissary to Rome to poison him by means of poisoned letters concealed in a cane (Burchard, ii., 579). The strongest case against himself is that of poisoning Cardinal Michiel. The death of Cardinal Ferrari is also suspicious. I do not think that there is any trustworthy evidence in the other cases.

3. *Julius II. and Leo X.*

The influence of the political movement which began with Charles VIII.'s invasion of Italy is nowhere seen more clearly than in the records of diplomacy. The number of state papers which exist increases rapidly from this period, and they supply detailed information by which we are enabled to judge of the accuracy and the information of contemporary historians. Foremost amongst the undertakings which mark this new epoch of diplomatic activity is the *Diario* of Marino Sanuto, begun in 1496 and continued till 1533. This careful record of the news which day by day reached Venice is now being published and has been my constant companion. In every country we have the same signs of political industry, and the political history of this period is mostly to be found in state papers, such as *Lettres de Louis XII.*; Le Glay's *Correspondance de Maximilien et Marguerite d'Autriche*; Desjardins, *Négociations de France avec la Toscane*; Brewer's *Calendar of State Papers during the reign of Henry VIII.*; Bergenroth, *Calendar of Spanish State Papers*; Rawdon Brown, *Calendar of Venetian State Papers*; Alberi, *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti*; Rawdon Brown, *Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII.*, being the despatches of the Venetian envoy Giustinian. Many other documents are quoted by Romanin, *Storia Documentata di Venezia*, and De Leva, *Storia Documentata di Carlo V.* By these papers we can test such well-known works as Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, and Zurita, *Historia del Rey Don Fernando el Catolico*, both of whom were well informed. Guicciardini's *Opere Inedite* contain much additional information, and so do the *Commissioni* of Machiavelli. It is needless to speak of the general importance of

Machiavelli as the great and characteristic genius of this period. His life and opinions have been amply illustrated by Nitti, *Machiavelli nella Vita e nella Dottrina*, 1876: more fully and with numerous additional documents by Villari, *Niccolò Machiavelli e i Suoi Tempi*, 1877-82; and with great thoroughness and care by Tommasini, *La Vita e gli Scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli*, 1883. Amongst secondary authorities may be mentioned Luigi da Porto, *Lettere storiche*, and the *Epistolæ* of Peter Martyr of Anghiera, which have been made the subject of a valuable study by Heidenheimer, *Petrus Martyr de Anghieris und sein Opus Epistolarum*, which fully discusses the value of their contents. Other sources are indicated in the references given in the notes. Of modern books I have found much valuable information in Brosch, *Papst Julius II.*, Roscoe's *Life of Leo X.*, and Cipolla, *Le Signorie Italiane*. My main difficulty has been to reduce within moderate compass the copious information which we possess, and I have reluctantly turned away from many subjects of great interest.

4. *Diary of Paris de Grassis.*

Paris de Grassis was a native of Bologna, who early devoted himself to the service of the Curia. In 1494 he was so far advanced in dignity as to be governor of Orvieto under the protection of Cardinal Cesare Borgia; he was afterwards Canon of the Church of S. Lorenzo in Damaso, and when he became Burchard's colleague in 1504 he says of himself that he had been for nearly thirty years engaged in the service of Cardinals or Popes. His brother, Achille de Grassis, was made Cardinal and Bishop of Bologna in 1511, and Paris became Bishop of Pesaro in 1516. He continued in office as Master of Ceremonies till the death of Leo X., when he retired to his bishopric and died there in 1528.

The diary of Paris de Grassis does not differ in kind from that of Burchard. He gives a full account of ceremonies, and relates such incidents concerning Julius II. and Leo X. as he was concerned with. Yet Paris de Grassis is ordinarily looked upon as an unimpeachable authority, dull but meritorious, while Burchard is regarded as a low and scandal-loving man, whose testimony has to be received with caution. This is due to the fact that Leibnitz and Eccard published extracts from Burchard which were used as testimonies against Alexander VI., while no one but Raynaldus and Bréguigny (*Notices et extraits des manuscrits du Roi*, iv.) has given many extracts from Paris de Grassis. Yet, after

reading the two writers through, I should call Burchard the less scandalous of the two. He is not so self-important or so easily offended as Paris, and he does not indulge in abuse of the kind which Paris levels against him. Moreover, I think that on the whole, after reading Burchard I have a higher opinion of Alexander VI. than I should have had if I had only followed the other authorities for his time. On the other hand, if I had not read Paris de Grassis, the other authorities for the lives of Julius II. and Leo X. would have given me a better opinion of their characters than I have after reading Paris. Paris is less respectful, more critical, more observant of details than is Burchard. He has more of the temper of a *valet de chambre* to whom his master cannot be a hero. His accounts of the marriage of Felice della Rovere, of Julius II.'s language about Alexander VI., of the effects of the *morbus gallicus* on Julius II.'s health, of the conduct of Cardinal Alidosi, and of Leo X.'s treatment of his Cardinals in 1517, are worse than anything in Burchard, and give information which is not found elsewhere, whereas Burchard tells us nothing which is not to be found in Marino Sanuto or Gius-tinian's despatches.

A compendium of a portion of Paris de Grassis' diary has been recently published by Armellini, *Il Diario di Leone X.*, Rome, 1884. This only deals with the pontificate of Leo X., and is not a reprint of the MS., but an abbreviation serving the purpose of an index, and dealing only with ecclesiastical ceremonies and laudatory remarks. Paris is largely quoted in Raynaldus, *Annales*, and there is an account of the contents of his diary by Bréguigny in *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, ii. I have thought it worth while to print a few extracts, dealing with points of historical importance, which Raynaldus has omitted.

5. *Extracts from Paris de Grassis' Diary. British Museum MSS., Additional, 8046-51.*

CARDINAL HADRIAN DE CASTELLO.

1507. Circa diem primum Septembris R^mus D. Card^{lis} Adrianus, tituli S. Chrisogoni, aufugit ab urbe; quo autem iverit et qua causa nescitum est. Tunc inde conjecturatum quod cum ipse et quidam Prelatus, Episcopus Vigorniensis, natione Lucanus, Regi Anglie dilectus, essent mutuo inimici, et Adrianus illum apud Papam calumniaret, in quo summopere Regi displicebat; item,

ut gratiam Regis iniret, multa mala de Papa et de toto Collegio ipsi Regi scripsisset; et tandem cum Prelatus ipse Vigorniensis qui ab Adriano accusatus fuerat, se in curia, procuratoribus patrocinantibus, adjuvisset et propterea absolutus juridice, ut dicitur, fuisset a Papa et iudicibus, quibus causa fuerat commissa, in tantum Regi placuit ut Adriano redditus, quos in Anglia habebat ex ecclesia, interdixisset et epistolas contra Papam et Collegium ad se prius missas Pape remisisset legendas inscio ipso Adriano. Itaque Adrianus, ignarus quid Rex fecisset, auxilium a Papa petiit apud Regem ut sibi redditus ecclesie liberaret. Papa, ut dicitur, terribiliter ipsum increpavit atque etiam aliqua verba exasperavit propter ea que de se injuste scripsit, et deinde se incusavit quod nihil jam pro ipso posset obtinere apud illum Regem quem sibi ex illius industria inimicum putabat, et sic illum a conspectu suo rejecit. Ex quo infelix Adrianus Card^{lis}, ut dicitur, timens incarcerationem quam Papa nuper Card^{li} S. Vitalis inflixerat aufugit nocte, simulato habitu, unici comitis societate confisus; quod simpliciter et leviter ac fatue factum omnes judicarunt. Et tertia et quarta die, cum in Spoletto esset, iteratis nunciis ad diversos Cardinales et ad ipsum Papam missis, suam penitentiam detexit et veniam et securitatem, quam salvum conductum dicunt, petiit. Quibus obtentis, rediit die 10 Septembris, ante consistorium, quod ingressus est, preter spem omnium existimantium eundem simplicissimum, fatuissimum, levissimumque, quod sic redierit, non cogitans peius fuisse reverti quam fugere.

Die Mercurii 6 Octobris R^{mus} D. Adrianus, Card^{lis} tituli S. Chrisogyni, qui diebus preteritis, ut supra scripsi, ab Urbe clam simulato habitu aufugit, iterum dicitur aufugisse hac preterita nocte, ab uno tantum comitatus, in habitu servili. Qua causa aufugisse dicatur tam repente absque ullis indiciis apparentibus Papæ contra ipsum nescitur ab omnibus. Creditur eum Venetias petiisse, post quem dicitur Papam caballarios misisse, ut retineretur ubicunque repertus fuerit in terris ecclesie. Inde autem ad plures dies intellectum fuit ipsum ad civitatem Tridentinam aufugisse atque ibi vitam agere securam et liberam cum suis paucis familiaribus ex Urbe accitis.

A YOUNG BISHOP.

1509. November 26 (on the occasion of the Festival of the Pope's accession in the papal chapel).

Insuper vidi quendam juvenem imberbem et pene puerum, annorum ut ipsa facies indicabat forte 16, cum episcopis sedentem in habitu episcopali; et intellexi eum esse nepotem Archiep. Tarentini, nuper Thesaurarii, quem Papa motu proprio promoverat; et tamen postea intellexi non sic esse, sed nepotem episcopi Assisitani . . . is autem puto Assisitanus sit quem Card^{lis} Vulturnanus promoverat in Concistorio. Itaque Papa post missam arguit me quod tolerassem illum sedere in Capella, cum vix mereatur servire pro clerico inter canonicos. Respondi omnia a sua Sanctitate procedere, quod illum in tale etate promoverit; et post multa Pontifex mihi imposuit ut illum non solum a Capella deinceps excluderem, sed et ex Urbe, ne in tam puerili etate ordinem et dignitatem episcopalem minueret. Itaque dixi eidem puero episcopunculo ut ad studium aliquod proficisceretur donec et faciem suam barba virili et ingenium virtute et literatura episcopali implevisset. Similiter et Card^{li} persuasi Pontificis jussu, ut idem eidem mandaret quod facerat.

THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLOGNA AND CARDINAL ALIDOSI.

Under date Oct. 20, 1510, comes an entry headed: 'De bello et pace et rerum Bononiensium statu'.

Ad meas sacras ceremonias nequaquam pertinere videtur bellorum hostilium paratus incursusque et civilium actionum opera describere. Verum affectus patrie et ipsa ob malam gubernatam rempublicam indignatio me cogit, ut aliquid de his tangam que maxime ad rem Pontificis faciunt. Itaque Pontifex qui ad Ferrariam capiendam bello et armis venerat Bononiam, sperans se provinciam quasi, dicunt, in momento adipisci posse, a spe sua hujusmodi multipliciter deceptus est, causante potissimum, ut publice dicitur, R^{mo} D. Francisco Alidosio Castellano, tunc Bononie legato, Cardinali Papiensi nuncupato; qui cum alumnus et creatura fuisset Pontificis, plurimaque beneficia etiam supra spem omnium ac ipsiusmet expectationem habuisset, nihilominus, ut publice dicitur, secret a Pontifici desciverat, et Gallorum partes, quorum Pontifex maxime infensus et inimicus erat, sequebatur; ob quod cum is mille modis a multis et pene ab omnibus inimicus noster cognosceretur, tum maxime a Duce Urbinatæ, ut dici solet, palpabatur. Ipse Dux Cardinalem prefatum tanquam exercitus Pontificalis proditorem ac Pape hostem ac totius populi Bononiensis inimicum capitalem noctu circumvenit et captum ad Pontificem transmisit, sperans quod eum Papa decollaret, aut saltem carceri-

bus manciparet. Sed Pontifex, ut vidit, sic eum benigne suscepit, blandeque allocutus in libertatem remisit. Et quoniam ea fama divulgabatur legatum scilicet captum et mox decapitandum esse, omnisque populus id avidissime desideraret ob multiplicia et pene incredibilia ipsius scelera et abominationes, ideo Cardinalis, callidissimus quantum existimari quisquam homo possit, Prælati propriis, nec non satellitibus illico ex Palatio, qua cum Pontifice erant, advocatis familiaribus, quasi letandus per civitatem vagatus est, ut conspiceretur publice se a Pontifice liberatum fuisse, quem nuper Dux Urbinas captivaverat; et propterea populus majorem in modum admirabatur, quasi Cardinalis imperaret Pontifici. Et, quod plus fuit, cum eo tempore vacasset ecclesia Bononiensis et populus eam maxime affectaret ut civi Bononiensi daretur, ipse Cardinalis sive fraude sive pecunia, ut dicitur, sive interventu malorum civium, etiam ecclesiam obtinuit quasi provisionem. Vix dici potest quantum populus egre tulerit, Pontificemque aspris verbis, quanquam absentem, lacessiverit quod potius inimico patrie et exercitus predicti et sui ipsius et nepotis sui, qui erat Dux Urbinas, inimico capitali malevolo quam civi Bononiensi etiam ecclesiam concesserit. Sed sic acta res est, volente sic Pontifice, et super ea multi opinati sunt Pontificem ipsum, ut fraudatorem fraude fraudaret, sic fecisse. Sed hoc demonstrabit eventus.

1511. *May 23.*—The account of the capture of Bologna is printed by Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, sub anno, § 59. Paris continues as follows:—

Hec cum Pontifex intellexit in nullo vere actu mutatus est a facie gravissimi Principis, sed placide et modeste, accitis ad se cardinalibus, captam esse Bononiam ab hostibus indicavit; non tamen legatum dixit in hoc peccasse, sed illos, quos dixi, cives factiosos accusavit et proditores. Petiit tamen ubi tunc legatus esset; et cum intellexisset ad Castellum de Rivo et non ad se aufugisse addidit, 'Forsan quia ibi securior erit quam hic'. Verum in Ducem Urbinatem ut negligentem, immo proditorem, verbis excaudit dicens, 'Si in manus meas veniet Dux nepos meus quadripartitum eum faciam ex merito suo'. Deinde, intelligens exercitum suum ex hac causa perterritum successisse versus Imolam, dixit se illico refecturum exercitum nisi penitus dissipatus esset. Et cum intellexisset partem ejus dissipatam non ab hostibus sed a villanis nostris, ex eo quod cum ipsi villani obtullissent sese confidere posse hostes fugare si modo ipse exercitus pateretur et non contra faceret

et ipse exercitus noster noluisset, hinc villani suspicantes exercitum hoc nolle forsā quia ipse speraret exercitum hostilem spoliare, propterea ipsi exercitum suum aggressi fugarunt, et spolia omnia, que fuit inestimabilis thesaurus, acceperunt. Quibus auditis, Pontifex magis in exercitum segnem et timidum et avarum indignatus est, nec non in villanos invectus est; et illico de exercitu reparatione cogitavit et Ducem Urbinatem ad se die sequente vocat; hic alium exercitus sui imperatorem seu capitaneum designat, videlicet Ducem Terminorum, qui erat tunc Neapoli Prefectus certorum militum a Rege Hispanie constitutus. Exploratores autem Papiensis, id est, Legati predicti, qui apud Pontificem debebant, ubi intellexerunt Pontificem ne in verbo solo legatum ipsum, sed tantum Ducem accusare, ac de alio legato sufficiendo designare, spem conceperunt posse legatum tutum ad Pontificem venire et providere quod sibi non sufficeretur legatus alius. Et sic Dux ex jussu Pontificis venit; Papiensis similiter metu perdende legationis inducitur ad veniendum Ravennę die Sabbati coram Pontifice.

Bone Deus quam justa sunt iudicia tua: unde Tibi omnes gratias agimus, quod de proditore perfido dignas proditiōis sue penas sumpsisti; et licet homo hoc fecerit supplicium, tamen a Te, sine quo non folium in arbore movetur, commissum aut saltem permissum credimus. Ideoque gratias Tibi rursus agimus.

Die Sabbati 24 Maii cum Legatus noster Papiensis ex castello de Rivo advenisset hora fere XIII. et ad edes Cardinalis Senogallensis divertisset, comitatus a balistrariis fere quinquaginta, jussit, ipsos quidem ibidem subsistere donec ipse refectus ex labore nocturni itineris confortatus esset. Sumpsit siquidem collationem parvam mox Pontificem aditurus, priusquam congregationem iniret; nam legatum novum Romandiole, ut predixi, decernere statuerat eodem die. Pontifex hujus occursum prescivit; et Dux, qui tunc apud Pontificem erat, eo relicto et assumptis paucis ex suo comitatu satellitibus, quos ad id factum promptiores sciebat, clam per viam eam ambulavit qua erat transiturus Legatus. Et, sic Deo benevolenti placuit, ecce, Legatus in habitu Hispano simulato in ipsis edium foribus mulam ascendit a suis stafferiis duobus adjutus. Appropinquanti autem Duci Legatus ipse proditor tanquam arridens caput detexit. Dux vero ex equo descendens furibundus habenas mule illius accepit, et eum similiter descensum extra mulam evaginato ense prius in capiti cedit, dicens 'Tandem proditor istud accipe; accipe inquam quod meritus es'. Conversusque eodem contextu ad balistrarios

astantes, qui clamare aut succurrere Legato velle videbantur, jussit omnes quietos esse de dicto facto. Legatus ipse sex aut octo vulneribus in capite partim et partim in ventre confossus cecidit humi. Tum duo ex satellitibus Ducis eum lapsum ictibus perforarunt et obruncarunt. Nullus autem qui astabat obstitit Duci; presertim Guido Baina, Imolensis, cognatus Legati et ipse balistrariorum prefectus; qui post factum et recessum Ducis, interrogatus cur non succurrerit, 'Quia,' inquit, 'timui ne Pontifici displicerem, cum existimassem hanc cedem ab eo jussam a quo Dux tunc recte abierat'. Hoc facto Dux a duobus tantum comitatus ab urbe abiit. Tanta letitia universali in populo sequuta est ut populus ipse una voce exclamare visus sit; 'Benedictus Dux, benedicta cedes illa, benedictum nomen Dei a quo bona cuncta procedunt'.

(The passage that follows is printed in Raynaldus, § 60.)

Altera die Cardinales omnes Pontificem adire consolantes, et quo magis dolorem lenirent suadebant non dolendum sed magis letandum esse de tanti inimici sui mortui casu; etiam addentes melius factum fuisse si ante Bononie perditionem ille casus evenisset; que res paulatim, ut fit, Pontificem placare visa est; etiam eadem die cepit perfidiam et omne genus sceleris hujus hominis denuntiare, que si enarrare vellem aut alius audire liberet, annus non sufficeret pro scriptura. Hoc satis sit, quod nemo doluit de hujus morte; omnes, toti et universi arriserunt et pre letitia exultarunt, gratias Deo agentes qui est benedictus. Amen.

(Under date August 22, after recording the death of the Cardinal of Reggio, who succeeded Alidosi as legate, Paris proceeds.)

Infelix patria mea que multum ab annis aliquibus circa Cardinales Legatos infelicitavit; primo Joannem Borgiam qui fuit admodum juvenis sed multe prudentie, ita ut totius Italie legatus esse meruerit, et demum iste mortuus est Urbini ex lapsu equi; deinde Baptistam Ursinum Cardinalem et legatum Bononie qui in Castro S^ti Angeli veneno potionatus interiit; deinde Ascanium Sfortiam Vice-cancellarium, quem cum generatione sua (fors) ad exterminium perduxit; tum Galeottum, Pontificis nepotem, S. Petri ad Vincula Cardinalem in primo sue etatis vigore florentem, Vice-cancellarium, divitem et omnibus animi et corporis virtutibus ornatum mors abstulit. Inde Antonium Fererium, tituli S. Vitalis Presbiterum Cardinalem omni robore et corporis forma virtutum-que multiplicium meritis dotatum in carceribus damnatum mors

consumpsit. Post hec Franciscum Alidosium, Papiensem, Pontificis pontificem, Regis Francie regem et gubernatorem in rebus et proditiionibus et maleficiis regiis administratorem merite cede trucidavit Ducis Urbinatis audacia; que si paulo prius pervenisset non quidem titubaret res et status Italie, quam hic Papiensis, nuper rusticus et ad rus unde venerat redire timens, dum per proditiiones regias statum sibi in Romandiola fundare querit, evertitur, sed merito, et jure interficitur.

ALFONSO OF FERRARA IN ROME.

Die 9 Julii per Urbem publicatum est Ill^m D. Alfonsum Esten. precedente nocte ex Urbe aufugisse ad oppidum Marini, quod est in terris Columnensium, et inde Cavos similiter cum D. Fabritio Columna; et licet Porte Urbis a Custodibus observarentur, tamen, sive vi aut astu, abierunt, ducente prefato D. Fabritio, qui cum illo etiam ut captivus e Francia venerat. Causa hujus fuge creditur fuisse talis: Cum Pontifex usque modo nunquam voluerit dare audientiam D. Alfonso, sed continuo audiverit nonnullos inimicos ejus, suspicatus est D. Alfonsus de animo Pontificis adversus se. Propterea aliquando per nuncios rogavit eum ut, si audiret, forsitan remaneret satisfactus ab eo; sed Pontifex arguens eum dicebat venisse verbo et facto multipliciter contra fidem datam, et per consequens salvum conductum evanuisse, et quod si eum incarceraret aut decapitaret, juste faceret. Excusabat se D. Alfonsus et petiit declarari in quibus contra fecerit. Tandem Pontifex, electis sex Cardinalibus, vid. Senogallensi, de Flisco, Agenensi, S. Vitalis et Aaragonensi, mandavit ut ipsum D. Alfonsum vocatum ad se ipsos redderent certiolem qualiter, cum ipse non servaverit imposita, vid. quod non liberaverit duos proprios fratres, quos captivos domi habebat, sicut sibi Papa dicebatur imposuisse ut liberarentur, propterea salvus conductus non salvaret eum quin Papa posset juste, si vellet, eum detinere in Urbe ac in carceribus; tamen Papa non volebat hoc facere dummodo ipse D. Alfonsus dimitteret omnem statum et ducatum Ferrarie quem habebat, pro quo Papa sibi alium daret in compensationem, videlicet Astensem, qui sibi fructificaret 20,000 ducatorum. Ad que ipse Dux Alfonsus respondit, primo, quod duo germani sui non erant capti occasione belli sed dudum ante initium belli, ex eo quod voluerunt eum interficere et ducatum occupare, et cum potuisset jure eos occidere non voluisse, sed pro pena in carceribus retinere; quinimo quod nec Pontifex nec alius

unquam verbum sibi fecisset de hujusmodi fratrum relaxatione; si tamen Pontifici sic placeret foret factum. Quod ad secundum, excusavit se non tantum deliquisse ut Ducatu et Statu Ferrariensi privari meruerit, maxime quia, si ipse in aliquo peccaverit, veniam petiit et absolutionem obtinuit publice, ut omnes in Consistorio publico viderunt. Et de hoc rogavit eosdem Cardinales ut suo nomine Pontificem supplicarent quod ipsum audire dignaretur et quicquid a se vellet preter Ferrariam haberet: quod ipsi Cardinales, ut audivi, in privato Consistorio retulerunt Pontifici. Sed ipse ita ferociter minatus est contra D. Alfonso ut timorem incusserit ei maximum quod salvus conductus receptus esset per illum, et quod vellet eum habere in manibus omnimodo, cum omnes portas per quas ille posset effugere clausisset. His intellectis D. Alfonso adversus D. Fabritium Columnam, qui eum in Urbem duxerat, conquestus est quod eum ad certam occisionem duxerit, quod non mereretur fides sua in illum ob vitam donatam, cum in bello ceperit et captivum habuerit et demum liberum fecerit additis multis muneribus; nec fides militaris hoc posebat ut alius confidens ab alio remunerato deciperetur. Itaque D. Fabritius, cum de his Pontificem interpellaverit, et Pontifex similiter in minis persisteret contra D. Alfonso, non dici unquam posse quod fuerit proditor alta voce dicens, et se velle Ferrariam reverti et in eisdem vinculis poni a quibus liberatus fuerit a D. Alfonso; quod cum Pontifex non multum curare videretur, ab Urbe noctu aufugit secum ducens primo ad Marinum prefatum D. Alfonso cum paucis ejus servitoribus. Supellectilem vero et bona ejus misit via recta adversus Ferrariam, sicut in salvo conductu continebatur: sed omnia fuerunt jussu pontificis primo quidem intercepta, deinde remissa ad edes ubi ipse D. Alfonso inhabitaverat.

* CORONATION OF TWO POETS BY JULIUS II.

1512. Die S. Martini, cum ivissem pro nonnullis particularibus negotiis ad Pontificem in hortis Belvedere spatiantem in serena die, inveni ibi parata omnia pro solemni et festivo prandio; ac intellexi quod ad ipsum prandium D. Gurgensis foret futurus simul cum omnibus oratoribus quos adduxerat, et quod recitarentur aliqua carmina festiva ad laudem Pontificis et Imperatoris quem ipse Gurgensis preferebat: et sic factum est. Nam in fine prandii nonnulli pueri in nymphali habitu, tanquam muse poetice recitarunt singuli pauca carmina; inde alius juvenis, nomine

Vincentius Pimpinellus, in habitu Orphei et trophæum manu gestans quasi illud esset ex hoste Gallo partum, recitavit plurima carmina in laudem prefatorum Pontificis et Imperatoris. Deinde quidam Franciscus Grapaldus, Secretarius Oratorum Parmensium, profatus est nescio quod oratione soluta, tum nonnulla carmina in laudem Italie liberate. Et hoc facto Dominus Phedra attulit ad Pontificem duas coronas laureas satis simplices, et in aurem Pontificis dedit instructionem quid de his agi oporteret. Pontifex, vocato ad se Gurcense ut manum ad laureas poneret (quod factum est) dixit hoc; Nos auctoritate apostolica, et hic D. Gurcensis auctoritate imperiali facimus te Poetam, mandantes ut res ad ecclesiam pertinentes et gestas scribas. Quo facto etiam vocavit illum juvenem quem predixi, cantorem carminum in habitu Orphei, similiterque ei lauream imposuit, dicens ut supra; que an bene vel secus facta fuerint censeant alii.

CONCLAVE OF LEO X.

1513. Die Martii 4to. Pro missa de Spiritu Sancto celebranda paravimus Capellam Sancte Andree, nam propter detestabilem lacrymosamque Basilice Principis Apostolorum ruinam non licuit apud crates ante confessionem Apostolorum, ubi antiquitus semper consuetum fuit celebrari; quia vix et egre in dicta Sancti Andree Capella celebratum fuit propter vastitatem totius Basilice ruinarum. Unde et stridor ventorum et vehementis tempestatis que tunc ingruerat vix patres et populum inibi manere permisit; preter quod sacra altaris luminaria custodiri vix poterant, licet quantum ex industria licuit aulæis circum quaque obductis reparatum est.

Et quoniam Card. de Medicis habuit nativum certum apostema in natibus, preterea fuit de consensu omnium Cardinalium intro-missus quidam chyrurgus cum omnibus instrumentis ad scindendum apostema; et iste qui intravit amplius non exivit, et fecimus eum jurare super altare in manibus Decani quod non intulisset aliquam ambasciatam.

Quoniam conclave undequaque clausum erat non comportabamus quod aliquid, quantumcunque exiguum, in aula illa aut alia projiceretur quod fetorem facere posset. Satis enim est illa tam multorum hominum desperatorum confusio; sic ut sola suspiria, sole desperationes, sole voluntates et vigilie Cardinalium et conclavistarum fetorem faciant. Omitto fumidos vapores luminariorum nocturnorum, et lacrymarum inclusarum intolerabiles vapores; sic ut odoramenta infinita per nos in initio portata non sufficiant quin stomachorum motus faciant.

Die 5^{to}. Cardinalis Medices infirmus in lecto cubabat.

Die 7^{mo}. Cum custodes videbant Cardinales de vanitatibus cogitare et non de Pontificis novi electione, tunc etiam quia tres dies effluerunt ex quo in conclavi fuissent, et non incepissent adhuc aliquid de electione novi Pontificis cogitare, non permiserunt nisi unum ferculum.

Die 11^{mo}. (After an account of the first scrutiny, which was very vague.) Deinde eodem die Jovis cum facta esset conclusio de novo Pontifici eligendo, qui esset Cardinalis de Medicis, Hetruscus, et patria Florentinus, Prior Diaconorum, ad illum, circa horam ultimam diei et primam noctis, in aula magna existentem accessere aliqui Cardinales, osculantes eum tanquam futurum Pontificem salutant, non tamen appellantes eum Beatissimum Patrem sed Reverendissimum Patrem, ut moris est; licet aliqui in contrarium fecerint, quos ego argui et multi censuere, cum quibus ipsemet Cardinalis futurus Pontifex. Et successive omnes Cardinales salutarunt, et ad cellam accedentem festivissime conduxerunt; nonnulli sciscitarunt ab eo quo nomine vellet in Apostolatu vocari; et dixit se nolle aliquid super eo concludere, sed in nocte studere.

1515. WOLSEY CREATED CARDINAL.

Die septimo Septembris cum essem in aula Consistorii, ubi Pontifex ad consistorium venturus expectabatur, intellexi ab oratore Anglico qualiter illo mane debebat creari novus Cardinalis unicus, videlicet D. Thomas, Archiep^s Eboracensis in Anglia. Et quia dicebatur quod Rex Franciæ, qui tunc cum validissimis exercitibus Mediolanum oppugnabat, eo expugnato intendebat etiam molestare Pontificem, non tantum in statu Florentiæ, cujus ipse ditionem obtinebat cum fratre et genere suo de Medicis, sed etiam volebat occupare quantas posset civitates ecclesiæ Romanæ, quia Romanus Pontifex favebat Duci Mediolanensi et resistebat dicto Regi Franciæ; unde Papa, sciens Regem Angliæ debere et posse favendo Pontifici obstare conatibus Regis Franciæ, propterea requisivit prædictum Regem Angliæ ut succurrat statui ecclesiæ Romanæ contra minas Gallorum; hinc quia Rex Angliæ promisit facere hæc novissima, instante Pontifice, et Pontifex, de hac promissione multum contentus, nonnullis postulationibus et capitulis Regis Angliæ consensit. Et hoc unum est, quod hic Archiepiscopus, qui etiam mediator extitit quod Rex Angliæ capiat arma contra Gallos, ex nunc fiat cardinalis; quod Papa promisit. Et ita proposita res est in consistorio coram Cardinalibus paucis,

circa duodecim, et absentium vota sunt perquisita, licet multa fuerint objecta. Et dicitur præsertim quod de facili non fiat Anglicus cardinalis, quia nimis se opprobriose habent in illa dignitate, quod visum est manifesto in Cardinali nuper defuncto Anglico; et etiam quod cum iste sit amicus Regis intimus non contentabitur de solo Cardinalatu, ut ipsorum mos maxime barbarorum, sed volet etiam habere legationem in toto regno Anglico; que si concedatur Curia Romana destruetur, si non concedatur ipse Cardinalis erit inimicus Papæ et omnium Cardinalium et per consequens inimicabitur ecclesiæ Romanæ et favebit Franciæ.

Item fuit objectum quod Rex propter istam dignitatem Cardinalatus non se movebit contra Regem Franciæ, maxime quia tam paucis mensibus ante, instante Pontifice, inter ipsos duos reges pax et confederatio facta fuerat; unde non verisimile quod propter hanc causam Rex Angliæ moveat se cum tanto dispendio. Sed omnibus non obstantibus Pontifex, ad quem res est remissa, die Lune septima Septembris ipsum in Cardinalem assumpsit.

CONSISTORY OF JUNE 8, 1517.

Die lune 8 Junii Papa in consistorio sedens jussit mihi ut omnibus oratoribus juberem ut inde discederent et expectarent extra consistorium, et mihi etiam. Itaque cum diu multumque morati fuisset Papa me introvocari jussit. Ego fui primo dubitans ne Papa vellet ex castello per me vocari facere Cardinales ibi carceratos, ut processui interessent, simul cum orationibus quas legere facere vellet. Et cum introgressus sum vidi omnes cardinales male contentos atque sufflantes ac inter se ipsos sollicitos et mestos; et illico dubitavi Papam voluisse carceratos tres privare et degradare. Et Papa conversus ad cardinales dixit eis, 'Antequam illud faciamus, vultis confiteri qui estis in peccato vel ne? Alioquin nos coacti ponemus vos in Castello ubi alii sunt.' Et Papa mihi mandavit ut exirem per modicum tempus. Itaque cum etiam diutius mansissem, tandem omnes exierunt, quamvis mesti et solliciti et pene desperati. Et cum nihil posset a quoquam ex eis intelligi de actis ibidem, presertim quia, ut dictum fuit postea, Papa terribile mandatum eis fecit ne aliquid de ibi factis aut dictis revelarent; sed, ut fieri solet semper, omnia inde ad breve tempus sunt patefacta. Et quidem sic Papa in consistorio conquestus est quod duo alii cardinales, ex eis qui tunc ibi coram se sedebant, essent conscii conjurationis facte per illos qui in Castello sunt, et valde miraretur et doleret de eis, cum

eis multa bona fecerit et cum eis de secretis animi sui participaverit, et tamen ipsi ut filii iniquitatis conspiraverint in vitam suam, et si ipsi vellent se ipsos accusare sponte quod eos acciperet in gratiam, et eis parceret, non nocendo eis in vita, persona, honore, rebus, facultatibus, prout detecto capite coram imagine Christi juravit et promisit, tangendo caput suum et jurejurando per sacramentum quod in capite habebat, etc. Si autem non se vellent accusare quod faceret eos trahi in castellum puniendos simul cum aliis, et hoc faceret coram oratoribus principum quos propterea per me admoneri fecerat ut ibi adessent; nam processum habebat in quo ipsi duo erant nominati, et negare non poterant, quia tres cardinales carcerati in hoc concorditer dixerunt. Et cum singuli negassent se non esse, Papa nonnulla indita declarabat: et illi magis negabant. Papa vocavit tres Cardinales ad se, et ostendit processum in quo illi specificabantur et mandavit eis ne nomina eis dicerent. Tandem hi tres Cardinales qui processum legerant dixerunt Papæ ut singulos interpellaret, medio juramento, an aliquis eorum aliquid sciret, et sic quoque de se ipse diceret quid vellet. Et cum ad Cardinalem Vulterrannum, qui ab eo multa bona acceperat, devenisset, et ipse constanter negaret, illi tres Cardinales redarguerunt ipsum hortantes eum ut se ad terram projiceret et misericordiam peteret de peccato commisso. Ille autem obediens eis projecit se, et cum lachrymis confessus est peccatum suum, omnia in arbitrio Pontificis remittens, vitam suam et bona commendans. Et Papa vix eum audire voluit, iterum et iterum dicens alium esse ibi qui peccatum celabat. Illi tres Cardinales ad Cardinalem Adrianum, tituli Sancti Crisogoni, natione Cornetanum, conversi suaserunt ut similiter genuflexus misericordiam postularet. Et quanquam ille constanter negare velle videretur, et Papa minaretur carceres, tandem confessus est se conscium et se pauca a Cardinale de Petrutiiis, qui erat caput conjurationis, audivisse, quod vellent Papam omnino interficere sive veneno, sive ferro, sed non advertisse, quia ille erat et est admodum juvenis et quasi puer, pueriliterque locutus; et similia se excusando dixit, confitens peccatum suum. Itaque Cardinales tres ibi concordarunt ut ipsi duo, videlicet Vulterrannus et Adrianus Cardinales predicti, donarent Papæ quisque $\frac{m}{12}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ Ducat. sic in totum $\frac{m}{6}$, et Papa nihil amplius ab illis quæreret sed omnino parceret. Sicque res conclusa est in pecunia solvenda, et sic illis pepercit, et eos ad domus remisit, habita fide quod ab urbe non recederent, sed infra

certum tempus pecunias solverent. Qua compositione facta, Papa ut factum hoc non divulgeretur mandavit strictissime Cardinalibus, sub pœnis horribilibus ne aliquid dicerent; sed nihilominus ad duas horas omnia in plateis facta sunt manifesta.

Sicut supra scripsi, cum Pontifex duos Cardinales predictos, videlicet Vulterannum alias de Soderinis, et Adrianum, suum intimum, in summa XXV. mill. ducat. condemnasset, vel, ut melius dictum est, absolvisset pro dicta summa tunc illicoque solvenda, et ipsimet sponte ad id libentissime querendum sese obtulerint prout obtulerunt, et re ipsa solvissent $\frac{m}{25}$ ducatos in simul; tandem quia susurronibus Papæ et malignis linguis aliter suadentibus, videlicet ut Papa ab unoquoque per se $\frac{m}{25}$ exigeret, et sic in totum $\frac{m}{50}$, res dura eis visa est; maxime propter bella in quibus male tractatur a Francisco Maria olim Duce Urbini, qui omnes terras ecclesiæ male tractat et ab omnibus tributa exigit, nolente Pontifice eis malis resistere propter pecuniæ defectum. Ideo creditur quod Papa propterea conditionem solvendæ per hos duos Cardinales pecuniæ germinaverat ut uterque $\frac{m}{25}$ solvat. Propterea alter Cardinalis, Adrianus, die Domenica 2nda mensis Junii summo mane fugam ex urbe arripuit versus Tibur et inde Fundos; et successive visus est et semicognitus. Papa in sero diei ejusdem misit multos qui eum sequerentur. Hec fuga licet sit damnata et vituperosa, tum propter ordinem tum propter personam, quæ sub Julio etiam bis in fuga fuerit, tamen excusata in populo fuit et quasi commendata propter asperitatem Papæ. Alter vero Cardinalis etiam ab urbe recessit versus Preneste: quid de eo sequetur adhuc non constat. Deinde habuit licentiam a Papa manendi extra urbem ubi ei placuit dummodo a malignationibus abstineret; et sic in Campania, ubi legationem habuerat, per multos menses mansit, et etiam Fundos accessit, ubi statum suum, quem cum Petro Suderino, olim Florentiæ domino, emerat, pacifice et quiete mansit.

Die Pentecostes, Papa, vocatis per me Cardinalibus, multa verba bona coram eis dixit de tribus Cardinalibus captis; et quod in veritate, quantumcunque pro merito eorum et peccatis in se Papam commissis deberent ac possent quidem inquiri et puniri et forsam privari; sed absit, quod tam crudele facinus Deus sinat in animum suum ascendere ut velit eos privare, cum ipse sit animi dulcissimi in omnes, præsertim in eos qui sunt fratres sui in Christo, et a quo in electione ad papatum habuit et sensit beneficium inenarrabile; et propterea in hac die Spiritus Sancti,

præsente eodem Spiritu Sancto, omnem injuriam eis remisit et libere pepercit. Quod verbum cum diceret caput suum detexit, quasi præsente Spiritu Sancto; et Cardinales omnes qui ibi erant versa vice non solum capita nudarunt sed etiam supplices facti gratias egerunt pro gratia concessa. Et Papa, pre cordis mollitie flevit, non solum ibi sed in basilica, dum misse presens erat; et in me respiciens dixit se ex pietate confratrum esse memorem, et propterea simul cum illis condolere de actu contra illo adhibito. Sed, proh bone Deus, quanta diversitas secuta est. Illico factus est ut serpens atrox, inexorabilis, impius, et crudelissimus, sicut creditor, a suis instigatus, ut sic puniendo ac privando illos lucrifaceret bona eorum ac suis condonaret tam in multitudine divitiarum quam in pluralitate beneficiorum quæ illi tres obtinebant. Itaque quotidie instigavit procuratores, et advocatos, et iudices maleficorum, ut venirent ad id: qui venerunt cum maxima omnium admiratione et stupore et pietate in pauperes Cardinales, quos tandem, etc.

The rest of the passage is in Raynaldus, 1517, § 95.

6. Egidius of Viterbo.

The judgments of Egidius of Viterbo are of some value as expressing the opinions of a man of old-fashioned piety on the course of affairs. Egidius was born in 1472 of poor parents and in early youth entered the Order of Augustinian Eremites. He was distinguished for his theological learning and for his eloquence. Julius II. made him Vicar-General of his Order and he was afterwards elected Prior-General by the Order itself. His speech in favour of a reform of the Church and the pacification of Christendom, in the first session of the Lateran Council, was famous throughout Italy. Leo X. made him a Cardinal in 1517, and he was occupied in many embassies both by Julius II. and Leo X.; he was confessor of Paul III. and died at Rome in 1532. Besides many theological works he wrote *Historia xx seculorum per totidem psalmos digesta archetypis: ad Leonem X. Pont. Max.* The facts which he has to tell are not new, but the interest attaching to the opinions of such a man as Cardinal Egidius is considerable. I owe the following extracts to the kindness of Professor Tommasini at Rome.

BIBLIOTECA ANGELICA C. 8. 19. COD. CHART. SECVLI XVI.

Extincto podagre morbo in diem quintum Sixto, Innocentius octavaus pontifex designatur, Joannes Baptista Cibo Genuensis;

qui puer olim minime diues, eleganti tamen forma, Alfonso Sicilie Neapolisque Regi astitit seruiuitque: Romam profectus longo post tempore, in cardinalis Bononiensis familia sese continens, Sauonensis prius, dein Melphitensis presul effectus est; qui cum omnium mortalium humanissimus ac comis maxime atque vrbanus esset, Sixto carus effectus, Datarius, ac tandem Cardinalis est factus. Creatus Pontifex, cum regni Neapolitani principibus, in Regem Ferdinandum conspirauit, Roberto Severinate duce copiarum accessito; fecitque quod et Absalon prius fecerat, qui regno vti potiri posset, multos aduersus Regem excitauit. Utrique tamen res parum successit: et quo plus Absalon fecit, plus et cepti penituit et penarum luit, non ipse modo, sed et secum Achitophel, habitus tunc mortalium consultissimus; factumque quod scripsit Hesiodus: Malum consilium consultori pessimum. Confecta deinde necessario pax est, pollicente Rege se proceribus daturum veniam, atque integrum Pontifici censum persoluturum. Utrumque in pace conficienda pollicitus; vtrumque confecta postea pernegauit, frustra querente, frustra clamitante, frustra per industrios nuntios pontifice repetente. Tria preterea de Absalon leguntur; pulcritudo elegantiaque corporis, qua Innocentius non parum comendabatur, tametsi animo fuit hebeti, ignaro et ad literas et bonas artes minus accomodato, vt qui Homericum Agamemnonem non modo non audiebat, non totam dormire noctem principem iubentem, sed ne interdium quidem vigilabat, quin inter sacra subinde dormitabat. Fuit Absaloni cum forma et humanitatis inditia et iustitie affectata predicatio; venientes enim non modo blande admittebat, sed apprehensos amplectabatur osculabaturque; idemque non meritis tantum viris, sed iis etiam faciebat quos ex ima plebe esse intelligebat. Eam rem memorie de Absalone proditam, in omni fere vita in Innocentio uidimus, nullo (quod ad eam rem pertinet) ordinis, etatis dignitatis discrimine; ita dum omnibus nitebatur esse gratus ab emuncti naris viris accusabatur. Absalon ius petentes aduocabat; de causa blande percontabatur, dicebatque, Bona vestra profecto causa est, si qui uos audiret haberetis; atque vtinam ego huius regni Iudex essem; nihil antiquius haberem, quam causas ut diligentissime audire: ita etiam iustissime iudicare totoque pectore studebat, vti hominum iustissimus esse crederetur. Non hec initio Innocentius, quem diximus pingui minerva hominem et, ut Plato et Aristoteles aiunt, οὔτε γράμματα οὔτε νείν εἰδότες, qui neque litteras neque nare nosset: sed vbi multa quottidie in vrbe geri sensit a sicariis,

crudelissima immanissimaque, ac in dies vulnera, cedes, et populi ea propter clamores audirentur: tandem veluti alto de somno experrectus, cum omnes quererentur de Justitia, statuit ut nemo preterea de ea queri posset. Nec tamen, Justitie tenacissimus effectus, assequi potuit id quod appetebat. Nam ad omnium preces ut surdus factus atque inexorabilis, dum expositam omnibus facilitatem quadam crudelitate commutasse videtur, qui prius Justitiam dicebant esse nullam postea vt nimiam accusabant, illudque Ciceronis iactabant: summum jus summa iniuria. Ipse nichilo secius, ut prius osculari vulgo consueuerat, sic vindicandorum criminum inuidiam annone uilitate leniebat. Qua sibi populi animos, nusquam enim ea vilior, nusquam Rome copia maior, supra quam possit credi conciliabat; cuius rei appetentissimum Absalon fuisse satis constat: quippe qui omnem Regni spem in aure popularis presidio collocauerat. Habitus tamen Innocentius Justus, ut vliscendo nimis, ita contra et exigendo minus: Sixtum enim imitatus in comparande pecunie ratione, ac questu faciendo, secretariorum collegium instituit, et numerum quem inuenit adauxit; vsque adeo haud penitet pecunie gratia sectari errores alienos. Cogitauit noua collegia Sixtus primus, breuiatores, sollicitatores, astipulatores introducens. Innocentius culpe predecessoris sectator quam emendator esse maluit, ac spem dedit, eoque hec sordium onera processura, vt migrandum quandoque ex obsessa his morbis urbe Roma sit.

Primus pontificum filios filiasque palam ostentauit, primus eorum apertas fecit nuptias, primus domesticos hymeneos celebravit.

Alexandro itaque Pontifice creato, quoniam, ut late disputauimus, humana imitentur diuinum exemplar necesse est, factaque in diuina luce fuga, fieri oportet et in hominibus fugam: principio illi ex Vrbe fugere Cardinales qui precipue creando pontifici fauerant: eosque qui non fugere statim incredibilis cepit penitentia. Ut enim que recte fiunt uoluptatem, ita que perperam merorem parere consueuerunt: in tanta imprimis re, cum deligitur vnus qui sit humanis diuinisque rebus proficiendus: qua quidem in re nemo vnquam errauit impune, nemo corruptione aut dolo malo vsus qui non vltorem senserit Deum, qui quo serius eo grauius insontes animaduertit. Penituit Cardinales qui creauerant, penituit et Proceres Romanos qui fouerant. Bellum primi sustinent Vrsini. Defendit vidua obsessum Brachianum, ut moneremur ita mitia

esse sacra arma ut ne in feminam quidem, uel irata, seuiant: sustinuit enim illa tamdiu donec Carolus Virginii filius nothus parua manu omnem prope exercitum cepit: cumque in eo duces essent, Guido Urbinas, ac Pontificis filius, cum Bernardino Lunate Legato, ille captus triginta aureorum se milibus redemit, hii fuga vix salutem consuluerunt: ut fuga et in hiis fieret qui pontifici erant chari, non in iis modo qui illum sibi infensum arbitrabantur. Conuertitur Pontifex ad nothos filios euehendos: minorem in Sicilie regno principem facit: maiorem in Hispania Ducem: Cesarem collegio ascribit: Lucretiam tandem Ferrariensi Duci in matrimonio locat. Maior in Tyberim projicitur, fraterno (ut fama est) scelere, ne suo Roma Romulo careret: Cesar factus familie princeps senatum deserit, sacerdotium deponit; in Galliam multo onustus auro contendit: prolis spe et imperii cupiditate vxorem Francisco Gallie Regi coniunctam ducit: Valentie oppidi et ius et cognomen accepit: atque regis affinitate fretus multa in Italia confecit. Aemilie namque preter Bononiam capte, Ethrurie Populinum, Piceni Camerinum Senogalliam, Vrbinum adiecit, armis potens, auctoritate duorum maximorum principum potentior, dolo ac proditione potentissimus. Excipitur apud Callium ut hospes a Guidone Duce: capit dato signo hospitii urbem: Urbinum inuadi iubet, quod Guidone uix per auia fugiente capit. Miserum fuit spectaculum cernere egrum hospitem et nihil suspicantem fugatum ab hospite: miserius spectare captos quis negatum est fugere: miserrimum inspicere imperio spoliatos et carnifici dare iugulum iussos. Iniecit deinde animum pontifex ut proceres Romanos deleret, ne, sicuti dictitabat, Urbem Romam mediam tanquam semper obsessam premerent cum vellent, et insultarent portis, et media vrbe cedes miscerent tumultus excitarent. Caietanum inuadit primos: dein Columnensium imperium capit Gallorum armis adiutus. Supererat Ursina factio, velut in cyclopiis antro ultima deuoranda: sed causam cum quereret, nec inuenire iustam posset pontifex, ipsi forte Ursini obtulere: ii enim et Cesaris potentiam et pontificis ingenium cum imperii cupiditate et sotorum exemplo suspectum habentes conspirant in Cesarem. Fuere hii Johannes Bentiuolus, Pandulfus Petrutius Senensis, Johannes Paulus Balio Perusinus, Baptista Cardinalis et Paulus Ursini, Vitellotius Tifernas, Liberoctus Firmanus. Recipiunt statim Urbinum et Camerinum, adoriunturque et superant cohortes Cesarianas. Sentit pontifex hebetem sacrorum armorum aciem, et uirium spedeiectus ad artes confugit; delenire primum Ursinos,

quibus cessuros alios peruidebat: accire illos, blande appellare, multa illis magna insignia polliceri. Et quoniam perfacile ac peculiare illi semper fuit rem pectore celare, vultum componere, apposite dicere, uehementer uel persuadere uel flectere, et non indignum putauit in ui victum pontificem supplicantis siue orantis munus subire: ita se uoti compotem futurum non incassum sperauit. Cessere uictores uicto: reddidere que abstulerant; Senogalliam suis illi uiribus acquiescere, imprudentes et miseri, qui nullam imperii cupidis fidem esse nec cogitarent, nec uiolari iura omnia imperii cupiditate cognoscerent, nec animaduenterent qui nos alias timuerint facturos omnia ne preterea sint formidaturi. Occurrunt armato Cesari inermes: veniam eorum que egerant petunt: excipit ille eos uultu hilari, animo longe hilariore. Erant illi cum deduxissent abituri, sunt tamen in colloquium accersiti: ingressi et capti sunt et trucidati: Vitellotius et Liberoctus strangulati eodem quo capti die: Paulus et Grauine dux non ita multo post necati sunt. Rome Pontifex eodem tempore cardinalem Ursinum rerum ignarum multa celeritate accersit: is parens in Hadriani molem includitur ac paulo post, spectante ac mirante populo Romano, elatus est (ueneno iactatum) ne lacrimis quidem pontifici deficientibus dum eius deflere mortem uideri uoluit. Recuperate itaque consilio vires. In res Ursinorum conuersus, Cere oppugnat uetustum gentis oppidum, et quanquam natura munitissimum expugnaturus ui fuerat, nisi Julius, Cardinalis frater, ita cessisset ut ipsi suis cum et rebus et familia incolumis abiret. Destitit ab aliis insectandis, cum Joannes Jordanus Gallorum regi hereret, cuius et ipse studiosus erat: que nisi eum tenuisset ratio actum de Romanis proceribus fuisset: urbem vicinorum metu perpetuo liberasset: duas illas nobilissimas familias factionum capita aut deleuisset, aut certe Italiam relinquere coegisset. Et si uictus non est prohibitus tamen uincere. Nouum collegium excogitauit breuiatorum, numero octoginta, ne iis quibus imperio successerat inferior ingenio uideretur, cum ad alia obeunda munia, tum ad comparandam pecuniam: cui facile rerum potite nihil non parebat, nihil non quibusuis in rebus obtemperabat; uenalia enim omnia. A quo consilio non alienum fuit, quod patrum collegio sex et triginta addidit: quorum duo de viginti Hispani fuere: ex Hispanis Italisque nonnulli exitere insigni eruditione, magno ingenio multaque uirtute prediti: ut qui vel nemini displicere potuissent. Inerat Alexandro acerrimum ingenium, inerat solertia, prudentia, diligentia, et multe efficacie

facundia naturalis. Nemo egit accuratius, persuasit uehementius, defendit pertinatius: tantusque rebus omnibus apparuit, ut cogitando, loquendo, agendo, sustinendo, quod ad maximum principem faceret, si uirtutes quibus ornatus erat libere fuissent, nec multa eas uitia obruissent, nihil plane deesse videretur: ut quisquis eum coram agentem obseruaret, ad agendum diceret et imperandum natum. Cibi fuit somnoque parcissimus, voluptatum tamen appetentissimus: tametsi illarum gratio nunquam publica munera obire, nunquam accedentes admittere, nunquam cuiquam pro offitio uel adesse uel respondere recusauit. Hec quanquam in eo erant, non tamen illuxit ea tempestate dies: nec diei ac humano uerbo eructare diuinus potuit dies: inuasere omnia tenebre: nox intempesta omnia occupauit. Ut domestica taceam Thyasteasque Tragedias, nunquam in ciuitatibus sacre ditionis seditio immanior, nunquam direptio crebrior, nunquam cedes cruentior, nunquam in uiis grassatorum vis liberior, nunquam peregrinorum iter periculosius, nunquam in vrbe plus malorum fuit, nunquam delatorum copia, sicariorum licentia, latronum uel numerus uel audatia maior, ut portis vrbis prodire fas non esset, vrbem ipsam incolere non liceret: pro eodem tunc habitum maiestatem ledere, hostem habere, auri aut formosi aliquid domi cohibere; non domi, non in curriculo, non in turri tuti: nihil ius; nihil fas: aurum, uis et Venus imperabat.

Obiit ergo tandem Alexander, annos fere vndecem cum ad firmandum Cesari filio imperium omnia fecisset: sed omnia simul eo obeunte interiire, ut ne horam quidem superesse potuerint. Tametsi Cesar duodecem armatorum milibus Vaticanum tenuit: patres ad Minerue phanum metu collectos milite circum cinxit: quem uellet patri successorem delegi tentauit: omnia tandem egit que vi armisque potuerat, vt quod sibi vtrinque imperium comparauerat perpetuo teneret. Fabio interea Vrsino, in patris inferias acies ducente et in Hispanum nomen fulminante, aderat tunc Rome Gallorum exercitus, qui forte erat in Campania ad lacessitum vndique regnum repetendum: tantumque vndique terroris in vrbe fuit, ut actum de ea esse diiudicaretur. Sed dum tempus erat quo vrbis scelera vlcisceretur deus (quod ni fallor nostris uideo ceruicibus imminere, domi rebus afflictis et principum nostrorum culpa prope perditis, foris crescente vsque adeo magno hoste, ut quicquid fere ambit mare nostrum vni illi pareat) dum male vndique agitur in vrbe, et nox noctem integrat, bonorum

votis lux uisa quedam illucescere est: alluxitque, Deo non deserente res humanas, diei dies. Excedit vrbis portas Gallorum exercitus in Campaniam: excedit Cesar multorum precibus victus, qui egrum lectica Nepetum se deferri iussit. Creant interea pontificem Pium Tertium, Franciscum Picolomineum, Senensem, sororis Pii secundi filium. Tricesimo ab Alexandro extincto die reuersum in vrbem Cesarem, ad gratulandum pontifici, agendasque Senatui gratias quod eum delegissent, quem maxime cupiebat, adorti Ursini, in Vaticano premunt. Defensitat is se primo: secedere iam parantem in Hadriani molem duci iubet pontifex. Qui cum pontificatum uix mensem tenuisset, incredibili omnium spe multa magnaue cogitasset, parasset, statuisset, antiquo cruris vlcere confectus interiit. Et quoniam hoc noctis et fugate lucis seculo, vnde Pius fugere posset, quemadmodum Alexander, non habebat, ne qua fieri posset ratione non fugere, anima illa ut lucis auida ac noctis impatiens, corpus terre ut noctem nocti reddidit ipsa luci ut dies diei se leta restituit quodam ueluti equinoctio seruato. Sancta enim Sedes, que mensẽm pontifice caruit, potuit tantum pontifice mensem frui.

Creat paulo post Senatus Julium secundum, spiritus acris uehementemque Pontificem. Is Julianus antea dictus, Sancti Petri ad vincula Cardinalis, animi semper habitus simplicis magni atque liberalis. Diximus Sextum ut Dauid ad principatum vocatum, ut qui ex eo prouenisset et Templum et Aram maximam exedificaret. Assuetus hic itaque magnis in omni vita rebus, maximo Sacerdotio potitus, animum adiecit ad maxima. Atqui ad temeritatem cohibendam arma vires ac aurum necessarium ratus, primis temporibus a bellis magnisque sumptibus temperat: pecuniam congerit, multum roboris parat vbi satis se munitum putat, ad iniuriam non modo propulsandam verum etiam prius illatam vlciscendam. Viterbii, Vrbis Veteris, Tuderti seditiones magna auctoritate et metu pacat: non obtruncat, non eijcit, non punit, sed exules restituit, suam quemque in patriam reducit: qui principis seueritatem veriti, non modo Julio uiuente sed ne moriente quidem, noui quicquam aut moliri aut cogitare ausi sunt. Intrat protinus acies ducens Perusiam. Johannem Paulum Ballionem secure educit, nec redire in patriam passus: multa pace ciuitatem componit. Pellit deinceps Bononia Bentiuolos Gallico milite, datque ciuitati ecclesieque libertatem. Gallo deinde Hispanoque iunctus, Venetos sacris interdicit cum prius

me Venetias misisset e Bononia: Fauentiam solam repetiisset: alia se permissurum recepiisset, vt sua per loca Romam redire et suspectam Florentinorum uoluntatem cauere posset; illi multa ultra citroque et dixissent et audiuisent: tandem idem se pro Fauentia facturos quod pro diui Marci turre respondent. Hec cum Julio renuntiassem, qui Gallicos dolos fugiens Romam aduolauerat, Si, inquit, rogati pauca negant faxo coacti reddant plane omnia: et qui te non audiere armis pareant. Visa ea res omnibus factu difficilis, immo quod nulla vnquam ui confici posset: in ore enim omnium erat Venetos que cepissent reliquisse nunquam: proinde eternum eorum esse imperium, consilio, mari, internaque iustitia munitum. Rettuli hec Julio: quis et Constantini Priuli Veneti patritii inditium aut potius vaticinium adieci. Dicere is solebat: Venetam urbem aquis, iustitia, et annone copia constare, olei, frumenti, silue, precium duplum raso excrescere: eam nunquam metam preuertere, caritatem non more aliorum principum suo lucro facere, sed sua impensa tollere consueuisse Venetos: dicebatque canus senex, Si perpetua hec futura sint, et Venetorum imperium perpetuum futurum. Cumque aliquandiu tacuisset, suspirans, addebat, iam tempus adesse, quod horum quod magis diuturnum sperabatur, id iam sponte deficiat; aque enim multos iam annos tanquam pelluntur, et tellus ante nostros oculos succrescit: quo ueluti ostento nature Venetam rem aut defuturam, aut certe per multa pessum ire ariolabatur. Nec secus atque is predixerat, euenit: intellexereque mortales sacra contempnenda non esse, rei publice prospiciendum usque ad aras, nihil diuino iuri detrahendum: elementorum celi marisque motus tametsi nature uim sequi, diuino tamen nutui parere, et permulta prudentibus premonstrare. Junctis itaque copiis cum Venetis pugnatum: Qui duce Bartholomeo Aluiano uicti nihil in humanis esse firmi docuerunt: occidere oportere orta omnia: celo et sideribus eternitatem seruari. Cepit Gallus et Cremonam et que Mediolanensis iuris prius fuerant: cepit Hispanus Apulie litus cuius illi potiora occupauerant: cepit Maximilianus Veronam, Brixiam, Forum Iulii atque alia ferme omnia: cepit Julius Fauentiam, Ariminum, Ceruiam, Rauennam; cepit Ferrariensis Dux sue ciuitatis Anthonitani sui maris ius: ille vicedomino erecto, illi Adriæ maris iugo excusso leti libertate potiti sunt. Venetos Julius domitos uolebat non euersos, quod parum Italie conducere uiderit. Aucte in ea re Regum externorum, debilitate sotorum uires, Quamobrem Venetos reclamante Gallo expiat

sacrisque restituit, et quoad eius fas est etiam fouet, ex hoste amicus factus, ex aduersario solius, ex oppugnatore defensor: Romani esse principis ratus, et parcere subiectis et debellare superbos, summique partes pontificis, pontificisque tum iusti tum clementis, et coercere contumaces et adesse supplicibus. De delendo Venetorum nomine cogitatum: id quod Julio pontifici nunquam visum, qui domitos illos non deletos uolebat: Italie libertati, cui aspirabat non paruo adiumento futuros quos magnum Italie tum ornamentum, tum munimentum arbitrabatur non tanta prius pressit cupiditate quanta postea pietate seruauit. Nec per Julium stetit quin in plures terras diuinus sonus exiret: misit enim me ad Ferdinandum Hispanie Regem, qui tunc forte a Philippo genero pulsus Neapolim confugerat: quocum iacta sunt magna Thraë et Asiæ recuperande fundamenta: que rata cum esse uellet tantam classem parauit, ut maris mediterranei littoribus superandis aut apta, aut etiam nimia esse videretur. Sed ecce dum vincendis hostibus sacrisque triumphis iniamus scisma oritur inter patres: quidam enim a pontifice desciscentes ad Gallum se recipiunt: Pisis concilium indicunt: Pontificem accersunt, monent, citant. Senatus reliquus cum pontifice Rome in Lateranensi ede concilium habent: Pisanum (quod conciliabulum dictitabant) detestantur, auctores senatu et dignitate submouent. Hic inter metus supplicationibus, illic ui et doctissimorum uirorum scriptis res agitur: hic dies diei eructat uerbum, illic ~~nox~~ nocti indicat scientiam. Jubet Julius me primum in concilio uerba facere, populo Senatuque flente, Deo et sanctis Apostolis preces fundere: nec id in cassum quidem: nam cum duo potentissimi Reges, Gallus Hispanusque, exercitus Bononie diu habuissent; ille ciuitatem defenderet, hic classe soluta quam in Turcas parauerat, pro pontifice et ecclesia defendenda, obsideret: pugnatum tandem Rauenne est: vtrinque misere: superior tamen in acie Gallus fuit. Summa tum consternatio in vrbe: cumque victorum manus insolens in horas expectaretur, iam iam menibus Petrus Marganus instaret, ecce exaudite pii Concilii preces, accepta bonorum uota, pacata diuina ira est: et cum nihil vnde salus oriri posset appareret, statim Eluetiorum aduentus nuntiatur: Gallorum exercitus qui tunc in exercitu legatum apostolice sedis ceperat redire iubetur, Eluetiorum motibus ire obuiam cogitur: qui hostium faciem aspicere non sustinuit sed Italia relecta trans Alpes fuga sibi et saluti consulere.

Fuerat Julius ad iram propensus, qui tamen iratus nemini obesse

niteretur: dubium pluresne ipse iratus iuuerit an blaudus Alexander euerterit. Fuerat in Julio firmum constansque ingenium: pro eloquentia illi animus: quod eruditione vsus rerum, utpote qui esset ad faciendum quam ad dicendum melior, edificandi studio non parum delectabatur; nam preter diuinam templi molem multa alia, tum in Vaticano, tum in cetera vrbe, erigere agressus est. Fuit huic pontifici animus inuictissimus et frangi fortune malis nescius; bis enim uiribus, animo nunquam uictus apparuit. Nam Bononie cum esset, Bentiuoli Gallis comitantibus portam tenebant: iam iam ciuitatem intrabant: in manu pontificem habebant: ipse, aliis fugientibus, nullum metuentis nullum indicium dubitantis ostendit: tametsi idem postea dixerit suis, eo die quo captam esse portam renuntiatum est, quoties cubiculi porta aperiretur, semper se expectasse nuntium qui adesse hostem diceret. Rome deinde audita clade Rauennate, cum ad fugam omnes conuersi nullam plane salutis spem haberent, solus immotus prestare, solus Gallo non cedere, solus non modo bene sperare sed etiam hosti et uictoria et Gallo interminari. Bellum aduersus Thurcas mouere ardentissime cupiebat, quam ob rem Perusia liberata me illuc accersit, populum uocat, habere me uerba se astante iubet nunciareque pro contione: hec non odio cuiusquam agere se, sed ut nostris pacatis rebus, ad Bizantium et Jerusalem recuperandam se conferret: proinde componenda domestica prius, dein externa aggredienda, ne dum aliena procuramus tecta ipsi, ut dicitur, domi compluamur. Hec eadem in medio astans populo Bononie audire uoluit, eadem Rome postea non semel ut ad id, quod diuino dignum pontifice dicebat, et excitarentur alii, et ipse ardenti oratione inflammaretur: facturusque id esse creditus est nisi ceci mortales tum diuinam rem ridere, tum ueram gloriam non suspicere olim ocepissent: cupiditatis quam laudis, priuatarum simultatum quam publice salutis, secordie, uoluptatum, auri quam industrie, uirtutis, eternitatis studiosiores. Animo is erecto elato atque alto fuit, ut qui iustissime pacem, militiam constantissime exercebat, ingentia extrueret edifitia, procerum petulantiam non ferret, principum tam minas contemneret quam uires animosque contuderet, ecclesie amplitudini, auctoritati, incremento prospiceret, incumberet, anhelaret. Quamoprem in eo rerum fastigio a Julio collocata res sacra est, vsque adeo aucta eo magnitudinis creuit, ut non augenda ulterius sed breui potius retro lapsura esse uideretur.

Cogita sanctissime Leo cogita: decem illa secula que ante

ortum diuini filii conscripsimus per patriarchas, per iudices, per Reges, rem sacram seruatam : lege post sacrum ortum totidem rursus secula per predecessores pontifices in te protractam, ex tenui suscitata, in tantum uel magnitudinis auctam uel splendoris ornatam, ut ulterius res procedere uix credi posthac posse uideatur. Inter ueteres vsque ad Salomonem res creuit : tuncque summo in statu sita incredibili lapsu imminuta est : vltimusque tantam imperii gloriam tenuit qui splendidissimum templum extruendum accepit. Numerauimus magnum maximarum uirtutum cumulum quo deus optimus maximus mentem impleuit tuam : quam rem non eo consilio fecimus vti laudatores essemus : id enim etsi fortasse prestare deberemus nos ingenio longe impares eloquentioris facundie uiris relinquendum duximus : tantum ea prestrinximus ut animum istum tuum, ut altam istam mentem commoueremus, ut quid vni tibi dederit deus agnoscens ad ecclesiam emendandam domi et foris ab armato hoste defendendam te tandem excitares, accenderes, inflammares.

7. *The Council of Pisa.*

So little is known about the steps which led to the Council of Pisa that I thought the following letters of the Cardinals to Henry VIII. worth printing. They are in the British Museum (Vitellius, B. ii.).

Serenissime et excellentissime Rex et domine colendissime humillime nos commendamus.

Pericula vitæ quæ nobis maxima in Curia nostra imminebant, et spes collapsæ libertatis nostri sacri senatus aliquando reparandæ et curandæ reformationis ecclesiæ, nos induxerunt ad aliquod inde exilium ; et subsistimus in hoc statu propter propinquitatem terrarum ecclesiæ et propter fraternitatem quam cum Majestate vestra et aliis Principibus Francorum Rex Christianissimus habet. Ad que omnia dirigenda, uno solo remedio, quo ecclesia semper usa est, et ex ejus ordinatione, que nunquam extitit revocata, singulis decennis in usu esse debuit, et votis nostris atque juramentis ad id adstricti sumus, provideri potest ; prout ex Jacobo Monterio exhibitore presentium, quem ea causa majestatem ad vestram destinamus, et cui supplicamus integram fidem adhibeat, accipere poterit. Rogamus majestatem vestram omni cordis affectu ut causam ecclesie et nostram commendatam suscipiat, sicut et predecessores vestri sepissime et constantissime susceperunt, ut in

eis gloriam utriusque seculi cumulatissime Majestas vestra serenissima consequatur: cui nos humillime commendamus et quam felicissime omnipotens Deus conservet.

Papie XXV. Novembris MDX.

Vestræ Serenissimæ Majestatis Humillimi Servitores:—

B. EPISCOPUS SABINENSIS CARDINALIS S. †.

S. EPISCOPUS PRENESTINUS CARDINALIS NARBONE.

F. CARD. CUSENTINUS.

R. CARDINALIS BAIOCENS.

F. CARDINALIS DE SANCTO SEVERINO.

Serenissime ac excellentissime Rex et domine nobis observantissime humiliter commendamus.

Jacobus de Monterio a Majestate vestra ad nos rediens attulit nobis ejusdem litteras in Richmond XI. Januarii scriptas, exposuitque quam a Majestate vestra in re sibus commissa responsionem poterat colligere. Habemus Majestati vestre ingentes gratias quod angustiis nostris et sancte Romane ecclesie perplexitatibus condoleat, hisque presentiam suam et auctoritatem pro dignitate ecclesie tuenda et securitate procuranda polliceatur, que nos discrimina hec patientius ferre et Maj^{ti} V. perpetuo gratias cogunt debere. Desideravissemus tempestivius et, si fieri potuisset, re integra M^{tem} Ves^m super publicis et privatis rebus nostris consulere, prout ipsa in literis suis exposcit; quia prudentissima consilia et summa autoritas M^{tis} V., presertim et S. D. N. et nos movere poterant; nec fuisset M. Vestra falsis nonnullorum suggestionibus tam prompta. Nos enim sola ecclesie causa et nostra moti sumus: et hoc M^{jtis} V., si per homines fidos inquirat, inveniet. Dolemus tamen satis literas nostras, quas misimus ad Maj. V. ut ecclesie et nobis prodesset, statim ad homines S. D. N. missas ut nobis nocerent. Rogamus ut iste litere non idem patiantur. Nos volumus pacem ecclesie, et presertim S^m D. N. illam bene ac quiete ordinari, nosque in ea facta pace et bona ordinatione includi. Non studemus partibus bellorum nec tumultuantium. Partes M^{tis} V. quas Deus ad tantum auxit fastigium, judicio nostro esse deberent pacem ecclesie fovere, et causam saniolem amplecti, ut sic desideratus finis functi Regis genitoris vestri, et Scr^{me} Maj. V. ac omnium nostrum de pace Xtianorum et bello infidelium et ad hoc ecclesia reformanda possit consequi et obtineri. Nec his M^{tas} V. consentiat qui nobis verum ecclesie splendorem procurantibus detrahunt, ut sibi impunitatem nanciscantur vel ut privata sua commoda adaugeant, sicut jam palpassè

manibus potuit V. M^{tas} cujus expectamus resoluta consilia postquam cum suis omnia consultaverit expediveritque ut bono et felici statui ecclesie conveniant. Et ut Maj^{ti} V. veritatem bona consilia parturiant Deum enixe rogamus.

Commendamus nos humillime V. Ser. Maj. quam Deus votive felicitet.

Mediolani die 2 Aprilis MDXI.

B. CARL. S. †.

S. CARDL. NARBONSIS.

F. CARDL. CUSENTINUS.

F. CARL. DE SANCTO SEVERINO.

Serenissime ac ex^{me} Rex et D^{ne} D^{ne} mihi observantissime, humiliter commendo.

Ad ea que Jacobus Monterius camerarius meus nobis attulit a M^{te} V. Ser^{ma} et ejus literas respondemus illi aliis communibus; iis que mea sunt illud tantum agam quam ingentes gratias M^{ti} V., que et diuturne observantie mee erga Regem genitorem suum suamque serenissimam domum memor est, et mihi ac rebus meis se nunquam defuturam pollicetur. Nos sumus in presentia in maxima expectatione quid adventus et conventus Cesarei oratoris et Catholici regis allaturus boni sit: quod maxime desideramus, si nostri laboris is finis esse non poterit, qui publicum bonum quietemque respicit, supplico Maj^{tem} V. quod ecclesie velit esse semper memor ac me et res meas minime deserat, qui semper felicem Regem genitorem ejusque filium M^{tem} V. et ser^{mam} Reginam semper observaverim quantum illam scio non latere.

Commendo me humillime V. R. Maj^{ti}, quam Deus felicitet. Mediolani II. Aprilis MDXI.—Humil. ser^{tor},

B. CARDLIS. S. †.

8. *Diary of Sebastiano de Branca de' Talini.*

The diary of Sebastiano Branca belongs to the same class as that of Infessura, and though it does not contain much that is new, it seemed to me interesting as showing how matters looked to a simple-minded contemporary. The extracts are taken from the MS. in the British Museum (Add. 8434).

1494. Conciosia cosa che essendo discordia tra Papa Alesandro VI. e lo Re di Napoli supra i censi et altre loro differenze, lo Papa et lo Collegio incitò lo Imperatore Massimiliano et anco lo Re di Francia, che dovessino venire a pigliare l'impreza contro lo detto

Re di Napoli con prometterli aiuto et favore quanto bisognava, et anco con dire che di ragione lo detto Reame spettava allo Duca dello Reno et non allo Re Ferdinando. Sopra de questo lo Imperatore et Re di Francia si condussero insieme a parlare et tandem concludere de venire.

Et doppoche fu lo Re Ferdinando morto lo figlio suo Duca di Calabria pigliò lo stato, et la Signoria dello Reame; et addomandato dello Papa d'essere coronato, lo Papa ed lui fece patti et parentezza, che se un figlio suo bastardo lo die per marito alla figlia dello detto Duca di Calabria; et lo Papa li promise di coronarlo di detto Reame. Assettate che furono trà loro le cose, lo Papa mandò a dire allo Re di Francia che non venisse, perche in Roma era gran peste et dubitava dello stato suo; item perche in Roma era gran fame et dubitava di maggiore carestia; et anco dubitava che se lui veniva che lo Re di Napoli non metesse lo Turcho in Italia, si che havesse a destruere ogni cosa. Et da lo Re li fu risposto che non timeva di peste, perche quando lui fosse morto hauerrebbe posto fine alle sue fatiche; et della fame disse che lui veniva sì fornito di grascia che (non temeva) carestia; et anco del Turcho disse che dal dì che nacque haveva havuto gran desiderio combattere con infedeli per la salute della fede Christiana, si che no lo voleva fugire. De che lo Papa fece concistorio et dichiarò che lo detto Reame aspettava allo detto Re Duca di Calabria; et così deputò lo Cardinale de Montereale, lo quale è figlio¹ dello detto Papa Alesandro, che andasse ad incoronare lo detto Re di Napoli. Et così si partì a 22 di April mccccxciii. Et subito veduto questo lo Ambasciatore dello Re di Francia si protestò in concistorio contro dello Papa et appellose della detta dichiarazione allo futuro Consiglio, lo quale disse doveva essere et fare presto.

Et in quello dì andò lo figlio dello Papa et lo signore Vergilio ad arrare la sposa in Napoli con molto trionfo et molta festa.

Et in eodem die saputo chebbe lo Cardinale di Santo Pietro ad Vincula, lo quale stava in Ostia, et era in disgratia dello Papa, subito segretamente si messe in un brigantino sconosciutamente et lasciò la fortezza d' Ostia molto bene armata et fortificata per tre anni; et andava con Dio perche dubitava di questa concordia chera fatta senza di lui tra il prefato Re et lo Papa; et incontimente la matina seguente lo Papa mandò fanti per pigliare Ostia, et non la potè havere.

¹This is a mistake. The Cardinal of Monreale was Alexander VI.'s nephew.

Alli xxvi. dello detto mese apparecchio le bombarde grosse et piccole con le altre artiglierie per andare a campo a Hostia.

Recordomi io Sebastiano di Branca de' Talini come alli 29¹ di Xbre 1494 vnne lo Re di Francia in Roma con trenta o vero quaranta mila persone, amico dello Duca di Milano et di Casa Colonna, a pigliare lo Reame di Napoli.

Venne lo Re di Francia in Roma contra voglia dello Papa et posose nello Palazzo di Santo Marco con tutta l'arteglieria sua attorno allo Palazzo. Era la piu bella gente non fu vista mai; le squadre della gente delle arme erano due mila cavalli et tre mila cavalli legieri; et li piu belli cavalli; cento, et doi cento, tre cento, ducati valevano l' uno. Et poi fece pace con lo Papa, et andonne a Palazzo a stare con lo Papa, et fece doi Cardinali franciosi. Et continuamente stette in Castello lo Papa per paura. Lo Re di Francia era lo piu scontrafatto homo che viddi alli di miei, piccolino, ciamaruto, lo piu brutto viso che havebbe mai homo. Lo Papa haveva tre figlioli, uno stava in Spagna, l'altro in Napoli, et l'altro Cardinale et chiamase Cardinale di Valentia. Lo Re di Francia volse lo Cardinale con lui, et volse lo fratello che era dello Turcho ancora, che lo teneva presone lo Papa: et menevaselli tutti doi alla guerra di Napoli. Stette in Roma lo Re di Francia 29 di, et poi si partisse alla volta dello Reame di Napoli. Lo primo di li posaro in Velletri; lo Cardinale di Valentia se ne fuggone con lo cavaliere dello Potestate et era Francesco dello Scavo. Lo Re de Francia fece pigliare lo Potestate et lo volse impiccare: lo Cardinale di S. Pietro ad Vincola lo campono: lo Re di Francia faceva quanto li comandava lo Cardinale di Valentia (? S. Pietro ad Vincola).

Re di Francia stette in Napoli per tutto lo mese di Maggio et venne la volta di Roma: lo Papa se ne fuggine con tutti li Cardinali. Fecero lega poi li Venetiani, lo Duca di Milano et lo Papa contro Re di Francia. Lo Re di Francia non stette se non una notte in Roma et allogione nello Palazzo dello Cardinale di S. Vitale; et da poi se ne venne alla volta di Lombardia.

Et poi del 1497 Papa Alesandro mandone lo campo a Casa Orsina; era capitano lo figlio dello Papa, chiamato Duca di Candia. Et poi veniva in Roma lo Duca di Orbino et lo Sigre Fabritio Colonna contra Casa Orsina, et piglione ogni cosa fuori

¹ It was on Dec. 31.

che Bracciano. Stavane dentro d'ella lo Sigre Bartolommeo d'Alviano; non la potero mai pigliare. Vitellozzo di Castello fece gente d' arme et fanteria assai et venne contro lo campo della Papa: et convenzaro a fare fatto d' arme insieme, et fu rotto lo Campo dello Papa et fu presone lo Duca di Urbino de casa Orsina. Et poi in capo d' un mese fece pace lo Papa con la casa Orsina; lo Duca d' Orbino pagone molte migliarie id scudi; questi denari furo dati allo Papa.

Ricordo in questo dì 15 di Jugnio 1497 come lo figlio dello Papa, che era Cardinale di Valentia, una sera amazzone lo fratello che era Duca di Candia, et poi lo buttò in fiume et fu trovato in capo di doi dì.

In questo medesimo anno lo Papa Alesandro Sesto fece parenteza con lo Re de Navarra; gli devo moglie una figliola allo figlio, che era Cardinale et buttone lo cappielo; et ordinò di andare in Francia, et fece rechiedere de molti joveni Romani. In prima vi andone Pietro Santa Croce, Marco Mariano di Stefano di Francesco, Menico Sanguignio, Julio Alberino, Joan. Batt. Manvino, Bartolommeo di Capranica; et chiascheduno de questi se spennero in dosso de valuta de mille ducati, et chi mille et cinquecento ducati alle spese loro; et tutti vestiti alla Franciosa. Et lo Duca Valentino portone con esso tanto tesoro che non potria stimare la pompa maggiore se fosse stato uno Re fornito in Francia a fare le nozze; et stettero in Francia un anno.

1501. Poi lo Duca Valentino venne in Roma quando fu pigliato tutto lo Reame, et fece gente d' arme, et remise campo in Pesaro, et piglione lo Signore di Pesaro, che haveva per mogliera la sorella; et stette con lei doi anni, et poi la lassane. Et poi Papa Alesandro gli ridette per marito lo figlio del Re Alfonso; era lo piu bello jovane che fosse mai visto a Roma; et la sorella la dette per moglie allo figlio dello Papa. Et stettero insieme ben doi anni, et poi lo Duca Valentino gli dette parecchie ferite. Non morse de quelle ferite; quando lo Duca Valentino vidde che ne campone lo amazzone nello letto mentre che guarisse. Et stette parecchi mesi così vedova. Lo Papa cercava di fare parenteza con lo Marchese di Ferrara; et così fo fatta la parenteza infra loro; et lo Papa gli dette per dote doi cento mila scudi in fra dote et acconcio.

Quando passaro la seconda volta li Franciosi lo Papa pigliane tutto lo stato di casa Savelli, et furo sbanditi di Roma tutti li

signori di casa Colonna, et de casa Savelli, et tutte le donne loro furono scacciate; et tolta tutta la robba de Paolo Margano, la donna sua fu mandata fora de Roma. Mai non fu usata tanta crudelta quanta fu usata a quel tempo.

1502. Adì 8 di Jugnio li partine lo Duca Valentino; se acconciaro questi altri Romani con lui. Ciascheduno di questi Romani havevano venticinque ducati lo mese; et così lo simile a questi altri Romani che gero in Francia con lui. Mandone lo Duca di campo sedici cannoni, venticinque colobrine. Tanto bene in ordine andava la gente d' arme e ben pagati li soldati che mai non fu capitano che pagasse così bene come pagava lo Duca Valentino. Era crudele sopra tutte le altre use; non gli poteva mai parlare nesciuno se non li signori ò vero Michelotto; de questi nostri Romani non gli parlavano mai.

In quel tempo che lo Duca Valentino hebbe pigliato lo stato d'Urbino et lo stato di Camerino, lo Re di Francia venne in Milano et give lo Cardinale di San Giorgio, lo Cardinale Sansevino, lo Cardinale de Roano, lo Cardinale Orsino. Tutti questi Cardinali stavano in compagnia dello Re de Francia. Adì primo di Agosto si partene lo Duca Valentino per staffetta, et give allo Re de Francia, et come giunse in Milano lo Re gli fece aparechiare una camera accanto la sua incontinente, et poi gli mandò le veste soi; questi Cardinali stavano tutti come le bestie, come giunse lo Duca. Et poi andone lo Re di Francia in Genova con tutti questi cinque Cardinali et lo Duca et lo Re di Napoli. Lo Duca era sempre apresso lo Re di Francia. Li Genovesi si disse che li havevano fatto tanto honore allo Re di Francia—tutte coperte le strade, et molte donne ornate, grandi balli, li giovani con tanti sfoggamenti che non ti porria stimare con tante gioie ornate; et poi lo Re di Francia se retornone a Milano. Dal ora ordinava Papa Alesandro di tollere lo stato a casa Orsina. Lo Cardinale de Roano mostrone le lettere allo Cardinale Orsino che haveva mandate lo Papa allo Re di Francia: allora lo Cardinale intravo in sospetto dello Duca.

Adì 8 di Novembre 1502 fecero pace li Orsini con lo Papa et collo figliolo, che si chiamava Duca Valentino, et alli 21 dello detto mese venne in Roma. Et sempre casa Borgia volse male a casa Orsina; fece morire lo fratello dello Papa Alesandro che si chiamava Borgia; per questa occasione sempre gli ha voluto male.

Nello presente mese di Jennaro 1503 fu strangolato lo Duca de Gravina, che era nepote dello Cardinale Orsino et dello Signore Paolo Orsino; questo offitio di strangolare lo faceva Micheletto che era un suo favorito. Questo Duca Valentino fu lo piu crudele homo che fusse mai; si chiamava per nome Cesare figliolo di Papa Alesandro Sesto spagnolo; lui fece morire tutti questi signori; inprimis, lo fratello che si chiamava lo Duca di Candia, lo fece gittare in fiume; fece amazzare lo cogniato che era figliolo dello Duca di Calabria; era lo piu bello giovane che si vidde in Roma; et ancora fece amazzare Vitellozzo della Citta de Castello, era lo piu valente homo che fosse in quel tempo, et ancora Liverotto da Fermo; erano capi de parti questi due; lo Duca di Gravina, lo Signore Paolo Orsini; lo Signore de Faenza, era lo piu bello figliolo, non haveva 15 anni, lo fece gittare in fiume; et ancora lo signore di Sermoneta, era anco così bello come lo signore di Faenza.

Adì 8 di Giugno venne presone M. Troccio in Roma, et fu pigliato in Corsica per mare, et lo mandaro in Bellovedere et là Michaletto lo strozzò et poi lo fece buttare in campo santo da doi facchini; voleva grande bene a Romani.

Papa Alesandro ha fatto in vita piu di quaranta Cardinali; tra l' altre cose hanno fatto dui Cardinali sono stati Governatori di Roma; mai homo si ricorda simile cosa in termine de doi anni: uno era Ciciliano, et l' altro Spagnolo. Papa Alesandro ancora haveva refatto tutto lo Castello S. Angelo, et tutto lo corridore che vanne da Castello fino al Palazzo.

Adì 18 d'Agosto morse Papa Alesandro Sesto, et stette nel Papato undici anni et giorni . . . ; et casa Orsina repigliane tutto lo stato incontinente.

Adì XI de Settembre 1503 si partine lo Duca Valentino da Roma et give a stare con lo Re di Francia, et give ad allogione a Nepi, et la si fermare tutta la gente d' arme seco et va a Segni.

Questo Duca Valentino, tutti li cardinali che fece Papa Alesandro, tutti li faceva lui. Era lo piu altiero homo non fu mai visto. Tra l' altre cose non dava udienza a nessuno, ne Cardinali, ne ambasciatori, ne Signori: non gli poteva parlare nessuno se non Micheletto che era boia suo.

Questo teneva la piu bella Corte che non teneva un Re: tutti vestiti alla franciosa, vestiti d' imbrocato d' oro et velluto fino alle calse, et le pianelle et le scarpe fur pur sprecato imbrocato et velluto e seta a tempo di Papa Alesandro, che non fu cento anni

arrietro; le piu stupende cose non furo viste mai; et furo fatte le sparse per tutta Roma quando morse Papa Alesandro.

Adì 3 di Ottobre 1503 venne lo Duca Valentino in Roma amalato; stette in Nepi perfino che fu fatto lo Papa lo Papa assicurane in Roma, et venne amalato con la madre che si chiamava madonna Vannoza.

Adì 15 di mese lo signore Bartolommeo d' Alviano et lo signore Fabbio Orsini, lo signore Renzo de Cere andorno tutti verso porta Torrione con molta gente et Romani molti per pigliare lo Duca Valentino; et fece lui armare tutta la gente d' arme et fanteria; et tutta questa fanteria la fece il signore Silvio Savello per girsene in Roma; questi signori fecero uno bello combattere assieme.

Et fece questo Duca Valentino pigliare la moglie dello Signore Bartolommeo Alviano; la tenne parecchi dì; et la moglie dello signore Fabbio Orsini, che era sorella consobrina dello Cardinale Borgia, la moglie di Gio. Batt. Caraffa, la moglie dello figliolo di Pietro Margano, et ancora la moglie che era figliola dello Re Alfonso. Si diceva che haveva praticato con la sorella et molte donne maritate o per bona voglia o per forza le voleva; mai non fu vista simile cosa. Pero questi signori si volevano vendicare de lui dello mancamento che haveva fatto lo Duca Valentino.

Adì 16 Ottobre andone lo signore Fabbio Orsino et lo Cavaliere Orsino in casa di Messer Pietro Matuzzo a pigliare la moglie sua, et la figliola era la figliola di Papa Alesandro Sesto: et menolla in Monte Jordano parecchi dì et poi la rimandaro: non gli fu fatto mancamento nessuno per farli quella vergogna alla figlia di Papa Alesandro.

Adì 21 Febraio 1513 morse Papa Julio II. a nove di notte: stette nel Papato nove anni et tre mesi et venticinque dì; fu Savonese; aquistone tutte quelle terre per la Chiesa; non lo fece mai Papa quello che haveva fatto Papa Julio; la prima terra fu Faenza, Forli, Cervia, Ravenna, Rimini, Parma Piacenza et Arezzo. Tutte l' ha aquistate lui per la Chiesa; non volse mai dare alli suoi. Pesaro lo dette allo Duca d' Urbino, suo nepote, non ad altro. Et morsero a tempo suo Cardinali 33. Et fece morire delle persone cento milia nelle guerre; et morse di quaresima.

1517. Lo Duca Francesco nepote de Papa Julio II. se partine dello mese de Jennaro con tutta quella fanteria che stava in Verona; erano quattro milia Spagnoli, tre milia Tedeschi et do

milia Italiani et 1500 cavalli, bene in ordine: et vennero alla volta de Urbino per pigliare lo stato suo. Lo Duca Lorenzo, nepote de Papa Leone, sapendo questa cosa cavalcone incontinente verso di loro; lo detto Francesco se ne givè a quello d' Urbino. Dentro nella cittade c' era Mr. Julio da Castello con tre milia fanti bene in ordine; come se approssimava lo Duca Francesco incontinente s' arrese la terra. Poi pigliano Mr. Julio da Castello presone, et tutta la fanteria spogliata in camiscia; era da Gennaro che fece piu gran freddo quel anno che non ha fatto da molti anni in qua. Papa Leone tuttavia faceva fanteria; era ce tutta casa Orsina. Ogni dì haveva delle rotte dallo Duca Francesco, et mai non volevano fare fatto d' arme; con loro haveva lo campo di Papa Leone piu di $\frac{m}{15}$ fanti.

Adì 29 Marzo venne la nova come se sono affrontati lo campo della Duca Lorenzo et lo Duca Francesco insieme. Se stimava se siano morte delle persone piu di tremila dello campo dello Duca; et certi pezzi d' artiglieria, et denari, et altre cose. Lo Duca Lorenzo fu ferito nella testa et la pallotta gli è remasta nella spalla. Et poi vennero 300 lancie francese in aiuto dello Papa, et girò a campo a quel castello dove fu ferito lo Duca Lorenzo; et fu pigliata tutta la gente furo salva, et tutti l' homini d' arme tagliati a pezzi; lo campo della Chiesa fu gran confusione. . . . Nello campo di Papa Leone X. erano delle persone $\frac{m}{30}$; erano dell' homini d' arme mille, et fanteria $\frac{m}{15}$ fanti: et mai non volsero affrontare con lo campo dello Duca Francesco. Non erano la meta; sempre li dette delle rotte. Tra le altre cose tutte le vignie et arbori furo tagliati; et l' homini delle terre, come erano Pesaro, Rimini et molte altre terre, abbandonaro tutte le loro possessioni per la crudeltà grande che si usava in quelle terre.

Nel fine de Aprile lo Signore Troilo Savelli venne in Roma a fare fanteria per gire in campo di Papa Leone. Lo Duca Francesco, sapendo che venisse questa fanteria, li cavalli leggieri con li villani se messero alli passi; tutta la fanteria fu presa et spogliata; et morse delle persone doi cento.

Adì 15 di Maggio come lo Duca Francesco d' Urbino et Carlo Baglione se partiro dalli confini di Pesaro et vennero alla volta di Peroscia, et sono stati a campo d' elli di dodici; le Perosciani se sono accordati col Duca Francesco de darli ducate $\frac{m}{10}$ cotanti, et $\frac{m}{2}$ de muni tione et quattro mercanti della detta terra, et darli vettovaglia allo detto campo. Tre o quattro castelli de Peroscia mettero a sacco; la piu parte della terra di Peroscia fu guasta; et poi andaro alla volta della Marca; tutti le fece pagare, chi tre mila ducati, chi $\frac{m}{10}$ ducati.

Adì 19 Maggio fu pigliato lo Cardinale de Saoli et lo Cardinale de Siena. Lo Cardinale de Saoli era Genovese de anni 30, lo Cardinale de Siena de anni 22. Papa Leone li mandane a chiamare lo Cardinale de Saoli; et lo Cardinale de Siena stava in Genazzano de Casa Colonna; li fece un brevè che debbia venire in Roma, et così venne. Sue Signorie come furono in Palazzo lo Papa commise allo Capitano della guardia che menasse in Castello. Il Cardinale Saoli tutto malcontento fu ditto che si stracciava il rochetto per ira. La casione fu questa: si diceva che volevano attossicare Papa Leone; havevano trama con un medico, che si chiamava Mr. Giov. Battista, che lo Papa haveva una fistola nello culo: ogni mese si apriva; che volevano attossicare lo Papa. Questo medico se partine da Roma et give in Fiorenza. A lo Papa li fu detto questa cosa: così fece restringere lo medico a Fiorenza et lo fece venire a Roma, et così li fu data la corda, et ha confessato lo peccato suo. Uno secretario dello Cardinale di Siena sapeva tutte queste cose, et un altro, che si chiamava Poco in Testa, relevaro de molte corde; in Castello confessaro questa cosa et da altri servitori dello Cardinale de Siena.

Adì 29 Maggio fu consistorio. Lo Cardinale de S. Giorgio gia a Palazzo et give nanti Camera da Papa Leone; li fu detto dal Cardinale di Ancona che restasse li, et fu menato nella Camera di Serapria Cameriero dello Papa et stette nella detta Camera sette dì, et li fu detto allo detto Cardinale di S. Giorgio che andasse in Castello; incontente se li fece l' ambastia et fu pigliato una sedia dello Papa et così fu menato in Castello S. Angelo. Lo Papa li mandone a dire che prestasse dodici mila ducati che lo voleva lassare. Come fu in Castello la mattina a buon ora vennero questi venerabili, come ho scritto de sopra, esaminandolo da otto ore sino alle 18. Se li fece l' ambastia a Mons^{re} Rev^{mo} San Giorgio, un mese innanzi che fusse pigliato, li prestano allo Papa dieci mila ducati sopra certe gioie; lo Card^{le} S. Giorgio mandone a dire che gli avendesse ogni cosa; allo detto lo fece esaminare sette volte se lo trovava in peccato. Altro non li trovano se non che lo Cardinale de Siena caccione lo fratello da Siena. Papa Leone li volse ricordare le cose vecchie a tempo di Papa Sisto; quando fu fatto Cardinale lo Cardinale di S. Giorgio haveva anni 17 et fu mandato a Fiorenza: fu fatto uno trattato a Fiorenza concasa de' Pazzi per amazzare casa de Medici quando si diceva la messa in Santa Liberata; così ce fu amazzato lo padre dello Cardinale de Medici; Lorenzo de Medici fu salvo, fu messo in Sacristia; lo Cardinale de S. Giorgio fu menato nello Palazzo et così fu salvo;

molti delli servitori suoi foro impiccati et lo vescovo de Pazzi et molte de casa Pazzi. Lo popolo diceva, Mora, mora lo Cardinale; li cittadini non volsero, così fu salvo. E stato in Cardinalato 42 anni, et in tre dignitati, Vescovo et Camerlengo, dicono 32; et dicono mai non fu visto in Corte de Roma che Cardinali havessero tre dignitati come lo Cardinale S. Giorgio.

Adì 22 Jugnio fu fatto concistorio contro lo Cardinale di San Giorgio et lo Cardinale de Saoli et lo Cardinale di Siena. Foro privati segretamente, et poi lo Papa mandone a pigliare segretamente tutto l' argento dello Cardinale San Giorgio, libre mille et doicento, et tutta la robba dello Cardinale di Siena. Quello medesimo di lo Cardinale de Volterra, Fiorentino, et lo Cardinale Adriano se ne fuggiro de Roma che erano in Frascati; et questi Cardinali che staro in prescione pagaro ducati $\frac{m}{35}$ perche sapevano quello che sapeva lo Cardinale San Giorgio.

Adì 27 Jugnio come foro messi in un carro lo medico Marco Antonio et lo segretario et foro menati per Roma et poi foro impiccati lo medico, Marco Antonio; quelli dello Cardinale di Sienna foro squartati et tenagliati.

Adì 28 fu impiccato Poco in Testa, homo de 50 anni: fu capitano de Siena 20 anni, homo di molta importanza.

Adì 24 Luglio fece concistorio Papa Leone per imbricare lo Card^{le} de S. Giorgio: lo concistorio durone un grosso pezzo, et lo Card^{le} de Medici, nepote di Papa Leone, andone in Castello per lo Card^{le} San Giorgio per menarlo in Concistorio denanti allo Papa. Come Cardinale così entrone in detto concistorio denanti allo Papa li dia bagiare il piede. Così lo Papa li perdonne in presentia de tutto lo collegio. Fatto lo detto Concistorio lo Papa lo chiamone in camera a parlamento con lui lo Card^{le} de San Giorgio: promise de pagare allo detto Papa per accordo suo $\frac{m}{150}$ ducati a Ogni Santi, et $\frac{m}{30}$ a pagare a Pasqua. Et promisero per lui molti Romani offitiali et altri forastieri di pagare de' denari per lui; et promisero di non andare fuori di Roma per $\frac{m}{150}$ ducati per securitate; et poi lo Papa volse che stenne in Palazzo.